

There is a certain difficulty regarding this seminar because the texts which we shall read are much more difficult to read than the ones we read previously, for example, Locke. There are even very great difficulties with Locke but I think every reader of normal intelligence who reads ten pages in Locke, which they may be, can give an account of what he read without too great a difficulty because immediately he begins to understand. In the case of Kant it is by no means so easy. Today I will give a general introduction. I hope I can finish it today. If not I may need the next meeting. The first text we have to read will be the introduction to the Prolegomena. This introduction is ten pages in the Modern Library edition. I make this suggestion: if you could find the time to read also the two prefaces to the Critique of Pure Reason it would be better. The item to which we turn then is Kant's Essay called Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent. It is also in the Modern Library edition. That would be our next meeting at the earliest. Who would be willing to do that? Sixteen pages text. Again I would say in this case if the student who does it would read German, he should read two other writings on the philosophy of history by Kant, also short, one on a Critique of (Inaudible) Philosophy of History and another on the (Inaudible) Critique of Kant's History which are not immediately available in English translations. The fourth subject we will treat is Theory and Practice - that is also in the Modern Library edition - to which one should add an article called The Principle of Progress which you will find in English translation in Kant's Eternal Peace, translated by Hastie, of which there is a copy in the library. That's number four. Number five is an essay called Public Law in this same edition of Eternal Peace by Hastie, pages 131-162. That is a section from Kant's Metaphysics of Morals. And then we come to Kant's Perpetual Peace of which you will find a complete translation in the Little Library of Liberal Arts and we discuss in one meeting the body of this text. And in the seventh meeting the supplements to Perpetual Peace, the things which are called by Kant Esays, or in the English translation, supplements. There are about twenty pages in the body and more than twenty pages in the supplements. Those are meetings six and seven. Now in the eighth meeting we have to discuss two points in the Critique of Pure Reason and I will do this in the form of a discussion with you of certain selected texts from the Critique of Pure Reason and we do not need a paper for that. And then in meetings nine through thirteen we plan to discuss the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals which is also available in complete translation in the Little Library of Liberal Arts. The last three meetings I thought we would read selected passages from the Critique of Practical Reason and The Critique of Judgment. Now this all presupposes that the difficulties are not such as to compel us to stop at certain points and to devote more than one meeting to a given subject, contrary to what I have previously assumed. We are not, after all, in a very great hurry. We want to understand something and if we understand better by sticking to forty pages of Kant then we may very well do so. But we do need some overall understanding of Kant's overall intention.

Now I turn to an introduction. The seminar is meant to deal primarily with Kant's philosophy of history. I will explain the problem and I will also explain why it is reasonable to begin our study of Kant with his philosophy of history. Now let us begin at the beginning.

When we read today a social science study, and are not completely drowned by certain conventions, we raise the following canon of criticism, I think, apart from the ordinary canons of criticism, is it clear, is it coherent, etc., etc.? Namely, whether the author does not . . . (inaudible) . . . Whenever we come across such a book, our interest decreases enormously. Now what does this mean? We mean this - that no one can be an intelligent and competent student of our society unless he is aware of the crisis of our time. If he is unaware of it, if he takes for granted that he has centuries and centuries in order to build up a perfect picture of the power structure of the state of Montana then there is something wrong with that man. Now such awareness

There is a certain difficulty regarding this seminar because the texts which we read are and are more difficult to read than the ones we read previously, for example, Locke. There are even very great difficulties with Locke but I think every reader of average intelligence who reads ten pages in Locke, which they may be, can give an account of what he read without too great a difficulty because immediately he begins to understand. In the case of Kant it is by no means so easy. Today I will give a general introduction. I hope I can finish it today. If not I may need the next meeting. The first text we have to read will be the introduction to the Prolegomena. This introduction is ten pages in the Modern Library edition. I make this suggestion: if you could find the time to read also the two prefaces to the Critique of Pure Reason it would be helpful. The text to which we turn then is Kant's Essay called Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent. It is also in the Modern Library edition. That is the first text which we read at the earliest. Who would be willing to do that? Sixteen pages. Then I would say in this case if the student who does it would read German, he should read two other writings on the philosophy of history by Kant, also short, one is a Critique of (indefinite) Philosophy of History and another on the (indefinite) History of the Human Race which are not immediately available in English translations. And I will say too we will treat is Reason and Practice - that is also in the Modern Library edition - to which one should add an article called The Principle of Progress which is also in English translation in Kant's Eternal Peace, translated by Hastie, to which there is a copy in the library. That's number four. Number five is Law called Public Law in this same edition of Eternal Peace by Hastie, pages 101-106. Then is a passage from Kant's Metaphysics of Morals. And then we come to Kant's Bar which is one of which you will find a complete translation in the Little Library of Modern Books and we discuss in one meeting the body of this text. And in the next meeting the supplements to Perpetual Peace, the things which are called by Kant supplements, or in the English translation, supplements. There are about twenty pages of text and more than twenty pages in the supplements. Those are meeting number six. Then in the eighth meeting we have to discuss two points in the Critique of Pure Reason. I will do this in the form of a discussion with you of certain parts of the text and the Critique of Pure Reason and we do not need a paper for that. And then in meetings nine through thirteen we will discuss the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals which is also available in complete translation in the Little Library of Modern Books. The last three meetings I thought we would read selected parts from the Metaphysics of Practical Reason and The Critique of Judgment. Now this is presupposes that the difficulties are not such as to compel us to stop at certain points and to devote more than one meeting to a given subject, contrary to what I have already said. We are not, after all, in a very great hurry. We want to understand Kant better by sticking to forty pages of Kant than to say "well, he is too hard" but we do need some overall understanding of Kant's overall intention.

I want to do an introduction. The seminar is meant to deal primarily with Kant's philosophy of history. I will explain the problem and I will also explain why it is so difficult to begin our study of Kant with his philosophy of history. Now let us begin at the beginning.

Let us first say a social science study, and are not completely drowned by certain conventions, we raise the following canon of criticism, I think, apart from the ordinary canons of criticism, is it clear, is it coherent, etc., etc.? Namely, whether the author does not . . . (indefinite) . . . Whenever we come across such a book, our interest decreases enormously. Now what does this mean? We mean this - that no one can be an intelligent and competent student of our society unless he is aware of the whole of our mind. If he is unaware of it, if he takes for granted that he has centuries and centuries in order to build up a perfect picture of the power structure of the state of Montana then there is something wrong with that man. Now such awareness

There is a certain difficulty regarding this seminar because the texts which we read are much more difficult to read than the ones we read previously, for example, Locke. There are even very great difficulties with Locke but I think every reader of normal intelligence who reads ten pages in Locke, which they may be, can give an account of what he read without too great a difficulty because immediately he begins to understand. In the case of Kant it is by no means so easy. Today I will give a general introduction. I hope I can finish it today. If not I may need the next meeting. The first text we have to read will be the introduction to the Prolegomena. This introduction is ten pages in the Modern Library edition. I make this suggestion: if you could find the time to read also the two prefaces to the Critique of Pure Reason it would be better. The item to which we turn then is Kant's Essay called Idea for A Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent. It is also in the Modern Library edition. That would be our next Monday at the earliest. Who would be willing to do that? Sixteen pages long. Again I would say in this case if the student who does it would read German, he should read two other writings on the philosophy of history by Kant, also short, one of a Critique of (inaudible) Philosophy of History and another on the (inaudible) Critique of (inaudible) History which are not immediately available in English translations. The fourth subject we will treat is Theory and Practice - that is also in the Modern Library edition - to which one should add an article called The Principle of Progress which you will find in English translation in Kant's Eternal Peace, translated by Hastie, of which there is a copy in the library. That's number four. Number five is an essay called Public Law in this same edition of Eternal Peace by Hastie, pages 131-144. That is a section from Kant's Metaphysics of Morals. And then we come to Kant's Perpetual Peace of which you will find a complete translation in the Little Library of Liberal Arts and we discuss in one meeting the body of this text. And in the seventh meeting the supplements to Perpetual Peace, the things which are called by Kant Esquisses, or in the English translation, supplements. There are about twenty pages in the body and more than twenty pages in the supplements. Those are meetings six and seven. Now in the eighth meeting we have to discuss two points in the Critique of Pure Reason and I will do this in the form of a discussion with you of certain selected texts from the Critique of Pure Reason and we do not need a paper for that. And then in meetings nine through thirteen we plan to discuss the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals which is also available in complete translation in the Little Library of Liberal Arts. The last three meetings I thought we would read selected passages from the Critique of Practical Reason and The Critique of Judgment. Now this all presupposes that the difficulties are not such as to compel us to stop at certain points and to devote more than one meeting to a given subject, contrary to what I have previously assumed. We are not, after all, in a very great hurry. We want to understand something and if we understand better by sticking to forty pages of Kant then we may very well do so. But we do need some overall understanding of Kant's overall intention.

Now I turn to an introduction. The seminar is meant to deal primarily with Kant's philosophy of history. I will explain the problem and I will also explain why it is reasonable to begin our study of Kant with his philosophy of history. Now let us begin at the beginning.

When we read today a social science study, and are not completely drowned by certain conventions, we raise the following canon of criticism, I think, apart from the ordinary canons of criticism, is it clear, is it coherent, etc., etc.? Namely, whether the author does not . . . (inaudible) . . . Whenever we come across such a book, our interest decreases enormously. Now what does this mean? We mean this - that no one can be an intelligent and competent student of our society unless he is aware of the crisis of our time. If he is unaware of it, if he takes for granted that he has centuries and centuries in order to build up a perfect picture of the power structure of the state of Montana then there is something wrong with that man. Now such awareness

...and that is what we mean by the modern condition and the modern condition is the condition of the modern condition. The modern condition is the condition of the modern condition - being aware of ourselves as being aware of a condition. This is the condition of self-consciousness, and it is the beginning of any possible history. Philosophizing, if we may use that word, seems to be a basically historical activity. This view has a great plausibility today and it is very hard to hit on some solid ground before one can raise any objection to it. Today one can say that those who claim that historical self-consciousness or are not animated by it do not fulfill the requirements necessary today of serious discussion. And I would assert this as simply true: if one comes across a present day writer who shows no awareness of that - I am speaking now rather in the social sciences not in mathematics - then we know that there is something wrong with that man. But there is still a difficulty here of which we must remind ourselves immediately, namely, in the past all philosophizing was non-historical. If not philosophy essentially non-historical, concerned exclusively with the eternal and the permanent rather than with the transitory and ephemeral? Now we have made a distinction, namely, the distinction between modern and pre-modern philosophy. Modern philosophy, at least from a certain moment on - and it is very hard to point out this moment too, not coincide with the very beginning of modern philosophy - modern philosophy was philosophically concerned with history, and more particularly with the historical situation in which the philosopher philosophizes. Fairly recently Hegel said, as Hegel, that every philosopher is the son of his time. That was of course always known; but that in his philosophizing he is essentially determined by his time. That is a phenomenon peculiar to modern philosophy. The external sign of this is a very simple fact; the term 'philosophy of history' is only about two hundred years old. As far as I have been able to find out it was coined by Voltaire in 1751. So that if we are strict or, if you please, pedantic we must say that 'philosophy of history' as such did not exist prior to 1750, which does not mean that some things which one may call 'philosophy of history' did not exist before but they were not philosophical philosophy of history'. Now the question which I have in mind is this: seems to us a crisis, the crisis of our time. Is this crisis not the crisis of the modern condition as such, namely, does the crisis not consist in the collapse of beliefs which were held by modernism for some centuries and by the ensuing lack of orientation?

Now let us start this general philosophical problem in a somewhat different way. What did 'philosophy of history' mean when Voltaire coined the word? A reasoned study of history, i.e., of records, or records of the past. Today 'philosophy of history' means very frequently, and it certainly means that in Hegel, the understanding, not of records, or records, but of a dimension of reality. When people speak of 'philosophy of history' they frequently mean by history something analogous to nature. 'Philosophy of nature' is not the philosophy of the study of nature. Similarly, 'philosophy of history' is not the philosophy of human concern with history but of something which is also called since Hegel the 'historical process'. That's a very strange thing.

Let us begin - what is the original meaning of history? It's a Greek word. It means something like inquiry, to make inquiries. From this point of view what a scientist does is of course also history. You know the term 'natural history' was still used in my childhood for the description of plants and animals. I don't know whether this use was common when you went to school. That was certainly a very common meaning, stemming from Aristotle, and very massive in Bacon, and so on. So history means originally inquiry, any inquiry, but it took on very early it seems a special meaning, namely, such inquiries as are inquiries with human beings. If you make an inquiry about an animal you do not necessarily ask people about that beast you want to study. You look at the beast, you dissect it, and so on. That's the true inquiry of that beast. But there are other things in which you cannot possibly find out the truth except by inquiring with people. For example, what happened when you were very young or when you were not yet born. You cannot possibly know except by inquiring with older people. And the step from inquiring with people who are older than you to people who lived

... before you is easy to take, because if you look up old files or old letters ... before you you do fundamentally the same as if you asked your grandfather about what happened in his village, or wherever it was, seventy years ago. At the same rate, the term 'history' took on this meaning of inquiring with other people and therefore the study of such things the truth regarding which can only be found by inquiring with other people. We may loosely say, or rather it is not so loose, the study of human actions and human speeches and human thoughts, loosely, the study of important events. Important events can be understood as important changes in human affairs, because if things do not change we ordinarily do not speak of events. The most famous Greek historian, Thucydides, describes the subject matter of his work as a change very emphatically, *κίνησις*. Changes in institutions, in laws, in thoughts, in beliefs, and so on. And therefore also history can come to mean the study of those laws, institutions, beliefs, etc. qua changed, i. e., qua having come into being.

Now, 'philosophy of history', as it is now understood, means that these changes form an ordered sequence. There is the accidental and the chance occurrence, but the accidental is subordinated to the lawful, or orderly, or meaningful. That is the necessary implication of 'philosophy of history'. This notion has emerged in the modern centuries - I will speak of this in somewhat greater detail later - and it became questioned generally by the precise historical research which began in the second half of the nineteenth century, and so some people made remarks to the effect that he would feel very badly if he were compelled to charge a fellow historian with having a 'philosophy of history'. In other words, no sober study of the past entitles one to speak of an ordered sequence in the sense in which a 'philosophy of history' asserted.

But something else emerged which is of more immediate importance to us today than the 'philosophy of history'. And this is the following point: an opinion, a view, which I will call, as it is frequently called, at least in continental Europe, historicism. Now historicism does not necessarily say that historical changes form an ordered sequence but what it necessarily says is this, that man, every man, is radically dependent in his most human on the place he finds himself, in that sequence, regardless of whether that sequence is orderly or not; the individual is the son of his time. But, whereas Hegel meant that the sequence of times is a meaningful whole and therefore there was no danger in being the son of your time because that made you a member of a rational whole, the whole rational, meaningful, orderly process; historicism as such takes away this comfort. We radically depend on something which is simply mysterious and cannot be conceived of in terms of human reason. In the simplest form one can state this view as follows: all human thoughts depend fundamentally on premises which appear to a given time or to a given type of man as evident but which are unevident to all other men. They are not truly evident, that is to say, absolutely evident. They are evident only by virtue of a peculiar dispensation of fate. The term fate is here absolutely necessary. The term fate implies that this thing on which we ultimately depend is not analyzable any more, because every analysis, say in social or economic conditions or what have you, is based on certain fundamental premises, which premises are not rational, are not evident. Is this point clear?

(What about the historicist's view that you can only understand an age in the past, you can only understand the age when you have gotten outside of it, such as Carl Becker?)

I think that Becker was a very, how shall I say it, an initial and groping form of historicism, halfway in every respect, because the question simply is: what does understanding of the past mean? All understanding prior to the study of your books, your historical documents, rests on certain points of view, doesn't it? That Becker knew, and said, if I remember well. So, the point of view from which he selects his themes has its roots in the present. Let us take this simple formula. Why is this

...of them is evident, the point of view from which he studies the past, the point from which he selects his themes and therefore his sources?

(But that is precisely what he denies in them.)

What?

(That the assumptions of the times are evident. You only perceive them.)

Yes. I see, I misunderstood you. But on the other hand what one could perhaps say is this - that is one way of putting it; in other words, your true premises are unevitable in such a way that you can't even know them. That is one of them. The other way is to say you can be aware of them but they are so evident to you that they cannot become a problem. Take a simple example - for all of us, to begin with, whether we know anything of that or not doesn't make any difference, science is the greatest authority today, the authority which everyone has to admit. Yes? No one can possibly say whether, say two hundred years from now, that this will still be true. It is impossible to say because you don't know what could happen - it is impossible. So we know that this can perhaps give a very good internal analysis of science - what its methods, its premises are, and what not, and yet its authoritative character which is so evident to us to begin with may have given way to something entirely different. No one can know that. But, I thank you. You made it clearer. So that is perfectly true - the basic premises may not even be knowable to a given time, but then they are, of course, unevitable in the highest possible degree.

The main point of historicism is that all thought, human thought, rests on premises different for different historical situations which are essentially unevitable, and which, even if they are known, cannot possibly be explained, say, in economic or social or racial terms because every explanation rests on fundamental premises, which fundamental premises are exactly those historical premises. It is by no means the theme of this course to discuss historicism. I only mention this problem here because it indicates a part of the reason why a study of the philosophy of history is necessary, because the historicistic position as we know it today and as it affects all academic men, with the exception of the pure positivists, to some degree, this is an outgrowth of the philosophy of history. In the moment the orderly character, the rational character of the historical process became questionable men had no choice, so to speak except to say that the dependence of man, the individual, on the spirit of the times is an unevitable fact, that far from saving the individual thought, it shows our terrible loneliness. We depend ultimately on principles, premises, which we cannot help admitting you they are not truly evident - that's one way of putting it; or perhaps we cannot even know them which would be another way to say the same thing. Now we would like to study this strange thing, this concern with history, this historical consciousness, to use a phrase of German origin.

Now let us really begin, and begin as reasonable people do, at the surface, and if there is a surface of the surface - which is not a very felicitous expression, but you will forgive me - let us by all means begin with the surface of the surface. What is that surface of the surface? In our case I do not hesitate to say Charles Beard's Introduction to Bury's The Idea of Progress, an inquiry into the origin and growth. One historical fact is of some interest. This introduction was written in the year 1932. Some people will say that this date fully excuses Beard, fully excuses because he could not possibly foresee 1933. But we are perhaps entitled to demand a bit more of foresight of a man who was to be a teacher, an academic teacher. But let us see, and let us read a few passages; "Philosophy of History (the very phrase is a long over debated ground) it means the investigation of the rational principles, which it is assumed are disclosed in the historical process due to the interaction and

of human mind under terrestrial conditions. If the philosophy of history is not illusory, history means the disclosure of spiritual reality in the fullest way in which it is cognizable to us in this posthuman condition, and, on the other hand the possibility of an interpretation of history as the movement of reason disclosing its nature in existent circumstances, this is the only hypothesis on which the postulate of history for its own sake can be justified at last". This is a simplistic restatement of Hegel. The only justification in the eyes of an intelligent man of the study of history, as a study conducted with full dedication, history for its own sake, is possible only if the history is the movement of reason. Who would be interested in the casual consequences of crime and follies. Now philosophy of history is essentially related then, to the notion of a progress of reason, or to use a more simple term, progress. History, as the history of progress doesn't make sense. Quoting a passage from Bury he says "A clue to the mystery of history can be found in the concept of development or progress. If so, then that is evidently a discovery as important as the human mind has ever made, with implications for mankind that almost transcend imagination". Progress of reason was here understood in these halcyon times as a part of a universal progress and this universal progress was called evolution. In other words, in the nineteenth century, some confluence of the idea of history, of progress, and of the idea of geological evolution had taken place and that seemed to be the clarifying discovery. There is however this difficulty, to which Bury refers, "Science tells us that apart from the incalculable chances of catastrophes man has millions and millions of years to live on this planet under physical conditions which need not hinder his development or impair his energies. That is a period of which his whole recorded history of six or seven thousands years is a small fraction". In other words there is a slight difficulty. We have the notion of infinite progress, (a straight line is now drawn on the blackboard) it is infinite, but we know that there is an end somewhere but that is so far away that a sensible man would not worry about that for one moment although there might be the incalculable chances of earlier catastrophes. And then there is another point, Bury refers to the dark imminence of this unknown future in front of us. Now if the progress is such a certainty, one could not possibly speak of the dark imminence, but one would say the future indeed is unknown but it can only be bright. Now Bury is dissatisfied with this remark. He thinks it much too harsh. And why? Bury has not done justice to one phenomenon when he spoke of the progress of reason, and that is technology. Of all the ideas pertinent to the concept of progress, to the interpretation of what has gone on during the past two hundred years and is going on in the world, none is more relevant than technology. And he speaks to the same effect later. "Technology by its intrinsic nature transcends all historical forms, the whole heritage of acquired institutions and habits. It serves with impartiality Japanese Samurai, American industrialists, and the Russian Soviet state. Universal in reach, it cannot be monopolized by any nation, class, period, government, or people. In catholicity it surpasses all religions. As an instrument of work engaging human energies in a manner far surpassing the lure of war as a social solvent and readjuster and as a philosophy of action, technology must be brought into the mainstream of history if the course of history is to be surveyed correctly and the dark imminence of the unknown future is to be in any way penetrated". Technology, in other words, is the capstone of the philosophy of history or of the idea of progress. Bury had a sober belief in progress but this fades into insignificance with Charles Beard's belief in progress. However there is one little speck and that speck was not the Soviet state - of course the Japanese Samurai were probably condemned to extinction. After all, that was a very bad time. This is it. In the idea of progress there is inevitably an ethical element. It implies that the stream of history flows in a desirable direction, on the whole, and that, once we are plunged in the middle of ethics, immediately a fixed point of reference, benchmark, must be set up from which to determine whether the movement of history is in a desirable direction and/or not. That leads to other difficulties. No, I can leave it at that.

Beard does not speak of it but you know from your own knowledge that this 1932

... and the time in which a certain notion came to this country from continental Europe. At the time when this building was built, more or less, and that was the notion that science is essentially value-free, that it is impossible to say anything rationally about what is good or bad. Now if that is impossible, of course it is absolutely impossible for a self-respecting scientist to speak of progress. In a very limited way he can say that of course there is a progress in the building of airplanes because the present airplanes are more comfortable, faster and more safe than other airplanes; sure, but given these premises which someone could very well say uncomfortable, unsafe and slow airplanes are much better and you couldn't argue against this man. So, in other words, is when the problem of values became a serious issue for social scientists. They couldn't speak of moral progress. And the truth I think is obvious. Who speaks of progress now? The term is change, social change. Progress, as the victory of value-free social science has lost its status. Beard didn't see the issue at all. This issue was so close to home in academic halls and not so far away in Europe or in the Soviet Union.

Now let us summarize the observations we might have made by looking at the surface of the surface. Philosophy of history means that history of mankind, generally speaking, consists in an ever-improved use of reason, but this progress of reason eventually makes itself reason itself, for what is the meaning of the belated recognition, since the last decade of the nineteenth century, that the highest form of reason, science, is incapable to distinguish between good and bad? So, the progress of reason culminates in - and I use the Kantian term - a critique of reason. Perhaps that is the first opportunity I have, and even a necessity, to refer to Kant. Are we then compelled to say that the highest achievement of reason is the critique of reason, and especially that post-Kantian form of the critique of reason, which says that reason is incapable to distinguish between good and bad? Yet, to which one can provisionally answer perhaps it is only a certain understanding of reason which first led to the idea of progress and thereafter to the self-destruction of reason. Perhaps that understanding of reason, underlying the whole development, is altogether questionable.

We should perhaps say a few words on this idea of progress. Bury's book is useful, is superficial, but it is not grossly misleading; he points out to you the books you have to study to find out precisely what the idea of progress is, and there are some remarks which are quite helpful. I will try to summarize Beard's thesis so far as it is relevant to us, in a few words. The idea of progress emerged among the Greeks, but among the Greeks only in a very rudimentary and half-hearted form. The real epoch of the idea of progress is the modern epoch, the sixteenth century and so on. Now, where were the points where the classical notion of progress was defective? I disregard whether every point is made by Bury or not. That is not important.

The Greeks knew the possibility of an infinite progress in the arts, or, at least, in certain arts. Take medicine. There is always a possibility of greater refinements, regarding treatment, regarding the treatment of diseases which hitherto had not responded to treatment, and so on, and so on. There was very clearly in existence, say, in the time of the Peloponnesian War, a certainty of progress achieved beyond the older times. When you read Thucydides, for example, you get these kinds of remarks which you will find later on in the 17th and 18th centuries: we are much superior in power as well as in understanding to our fathers and grandfathers. At least, the best men among us are the better men in relation to them. The question of course is this:

Progress achieved does not necessarily prove infinite or indefinite progress. Here is where the limitation of the Greek concept of progress comes in. In the first place, the suspicion, the conviction, that progress will be followed by decline. Take the analogy of the human body, to some extent, even of the human mind. Progress, growth, followed by decay. The fact, frequently observed, that in most societies precisely after a very glorious period a kind of lethargy, slackening, comes in. In Athens in

Plato to say he was quite sure that he had been born at a late time, by which he probably meant Athens soon no longer have a future, as we would put it today. Everyone who has been in France knows very well what this means, and even a precise analysis, a so-called scientific analysis, would bring out some facts which would confirm this. But, apart from that, and ultimately more important, is the fact that there would surely be catastrophes, natural catastrophes, cataclysms, which would put an end to all civilization, and then there might again be a new civilization beginning from these rude mountaineers who survived the cataclysm. We speak today of billions of years the earth lasted. The numbers which the classics mentioned regarding the duration of human life, undisturbed, human life on earth, were much shorter numbers. I remember now, I have looked it up - 75,000 years is a fairly high number, which alters, affects, the perspective of powerful men, not of men who do not think beyond their grandchildren. But the more important point I believe is this. For Greek thought on the highest level, as represented by such men as Plato and Aristotle, there was no connection whatever between intellectual progress and social progress. There was no essential connection. The classic passage on this subject is the second book of Aristotle's Politics, where he discusses Hypodamus. The point which he makes there is this. And I state it roughly as follows: to disturb settled opinion is of the essence of the intellect; to question, to ask questions, to raise doubts, but this which is so natural and so necessary to the intellect as intellect is a very grave danger to society. The intellect as intellect cannot have this concern with stability which society must necessarily have. Now, because you can read Bury's statement on that, I do not have to go into that. I will only mention a few points which are crucial.

There was a fantastic fellow in the 18th century, not a great thinker in any way and a systematic man. That was Abbe St. Pierre, who was respected by such a man as Rousseau, and therefore influenced in this way Kant. He was concerned with perpetual peace, but I am now only concerned with what Abbe St. Pierre teaches regarding progress, because I believe that is really the simplest and in a way the clearest statement. The first point. It was said already long before Abbe St. Pierre that intellectual progress necessarily leads to social progress, on the basis of this further consideration: if a man has discovered the truth, this discovery cannot help becoming public, sooner or later, with changing the public life, public opinion, and therefore making the public mind closer to the truth, in this sense more intelligent. The peculiar contribution of Abbe St. Pierre is this: he starts from the observation that a high-school boy can now, in the 18th century, or for that matter, even now in the 20th century, easily solve problems which could be solved in the past only by the greatest geniuses. Think of the enormous genius required for the discovery of Analytic Geometry, or Calculus - Newton, Leibniz - today an intelligent college-boy could master these things. So, this was the conclusion of Abbe St. Pierre: we are much more intelligent than the past was. How did it come about? Through the substitution, we can say, of method for intelligence proper. The magic of method consists precisely in this, that you can learn certain operations, and then by mastering these operations you can solve all kinds of problems which originally required a very great effort of the intelligence to solve. "Method levels the minds" - something of this kind was said by Bacon, and by another way by Descartes. So, the intellectual level of man has enormously been increased by the discovery of method. The second point which I would like to mention regarding the Abbe St. Pierre is this: he assumed that the world has a beginning in time, roughly the biblical chronology, say, six or seven thousand years. But, while being finite as far as the past is concerned the duration of the world is infinite regarding the future. Then, infinite progress is certainly assured. And this leads him to argue as follows: this was no longer the simple biblical; the beginnings were absolutely imperfect, savages roaming in the forest, and now he looks around in the 18th century and says look! how well-clothed, well-fed, and well-housed we are, and how intelligent in mathematics we are in seven thousand years. Now, make a proportion: one to seven thousand equal to seven thousand to infinite, and you can see that there

is absolutely no possible limit of human progress. I admire the Abbe St. Pierre for this reason, because he stated so simply the absolutely necessary cosmological premise of infinite progress, strictly understood. A beginning and no end, and the certainty of no end, as far as possible. In the moment this assumption becomes questionable it is hard to speak of infinite progress in precise language.

This other point must be mentioned which is crucial and which is really underlying this premise which I mentioned, the result of science becoming necessarily common property in the course of generations. This premise is prepared by a new understanding of the meaning of science. Science for the sake of power, as Bacon and Hobbes put it. Science serves the purpose of making man the master and owner of nature. Science no longer has a theoretical, a purely theoretical purpose, as it had in the pre-modern view, but it serves the needs of man and therefore of course it must be communicated. Therefore, because science for the sake of power there is necessary a harmony between philosophy, or science, and society. The progress of science or philosophy necessarily means an improvement of the lot of man, and therewith of society. I read to you one passage which is very revealing and somewhere where some of you would not expect it, and that is a passage from Pascal, the great religious writer and mathematician and physicist. He says,

"Man is brought forth, produced, only for infinity. He is in ignorance from the first days of his life, but he instructs himself unceasingly in his progress, for he has the advantage not only of his own experience but that of his predecessors, for he preserves always in his memory the knowledge which they have once acquired and of which the ancients have records in the books."

That is of course another crucial premise of the notion of the necessity of progress. An acquisition of the human mind, a truth discovered by the human mind, can never again be forgotten. That we ourselves, an individual who makes some observations, may forget it is I believe possible - at least I can judge from my own experience. But, that the discovery of someone else, of X, should always be remembered by other people is extremely fantastic. Even if the books are preserved, books must be understood. This is another grave premise, it seems to me, of the belief in progress.

And so this may be, the notion of progress culminated in this view, which I will illustrate to you by two quotations from Bury,

Later generations will always be superior to the earlier, for progress is a natural and necessary effect of the constitution of the human mind (stated by Pontinelle, late 18th century or early 18th century).

And,

Turgot had already conceived the total mass of the human race moving always slowly forward. There is no people in the world doomed by nature to perpetual inferiority or irrevocably disqualified by race from playing a useful part in the future of civilization. This doctrine of the possibility of indefinitely moulding the characters of men by laws and institutions laid a foundation on which the theory of the perfectability of humanity could be raised.

The clearest case, in other words, of the doctrine of progress is this: there

is a necessity in the nature of things of a progressive movement of the human intellect as well as of human society. This thought could be given in somewhat different terms. When you speak of the necessity of progress, especially of an infinite progress, or an indefinite progress, you say of course also the necessity of error. The same reasons which make it necessary that we now know this made it necessary that this was unknown in the past or that men erred in relation to that. The necessity of progress means also the necessity of error. And therefore the belief in progress in itself could very well lead to a vindication of the past. These people were not fools or, say, criminals; they could not have thought differently, they could not have acted differently than they did. More than that. We owe it to their errors and their crimes that we are where we are. In other words, we owe our best to human acquisition, as distinguished from nature. We owe our best to what our forebearers did. They acquired the wisdom which made possible our higher wisdom. The doctrine of progress, which led, generally speaking, in the 18th century, to contempt for the past could as well lead to gratitude to the past, and it could lead to the proposition, made in the 19th century, that everything good is heritage, heritage, and not nature. This possibility of the idea of was drawn only after the collapse of the French Revolution by the so-called conservatives. I mention this only in passing. To repeat this one point. The necessity of progress means fundamentally, primarily, in the older view, the necessity of intellectual progress and of the diffusion of knowledge. This, however, this intellectual progress and the diffusion of knowledge and the ensuing social progress is part of a comprehensive, deterministic, or necessitarian scheme. The necessity of progress has no other character, fundamentally, than the character of gravitation - it is absolutely, purely, necessary.

(change of tape)

... an end, as I have occasionally observed. If we ask for the most obvious reason why this has happened, or at least reasons which are visible immediately today, in our academic surroundings, the first is the fact I have referred to before, the certainty that all value judgments are merely, strictly speaking, non-rational, not to say irrational, and to speak of progress means to admit rational value-judgment. Otherwise, it is merely an expression of your subjective preference without any solid meaning.

(Isn't it possible that the idea of progress, though it is no longer an intellectual problem in the academic community has become nevertheless something implicitly accepted and not reflected upon. Even though, in other words, in word we may find a theory that social science teaches today which would be a rejection of the idea of progress but in deed and in activity it is nevertheless active?)

You are absolutely right. That is perfectly true. You know, I use a famous proverb about the Russians - scratch the Russians and you find it tough. So, scratch the social scientists - I always get into fights with ... (inaudible) ... but, still, you have to take seriously what people say. We don't make a psychoanalysis. We take seriously what they say, and, therefore, when they say that value judgments are absolutely, rationally, impossible, and cannot possibly have a rational basis that means of course we cannot rationally speak of progress, except under very limited terms where the whole question remains open. The progress of airplanes, or rockets, or whatever have you, yes, but whether that is really good remains wholly undetermined. In the same way in which you can speak of the progress of a disease, in that neutral way, can this be a progress? Que disease it has progressed, but if that is really a progress of the individual that can no longer be said.

(What about the general notion of social engineering, the question of manipulation?)

There is no doubt, yes, and I remember once I saw a book title by a social scientist, We chose Progress. So it is chosen sometimes by social scientists but I believe it is not in accordance with the strict rules of the profession.

The next point is exactly - his second reason is that historicism, of which I spoke before and to which we have to come back, which denies as such the possibility, in any serious sense, of progress, because of the fundamental equality of all, at least of all high, cultures. For example, take Spengler's book, Decline of the West. There is no possibility to say that modern Europe has progressed beyond China or Babylon, whereas Hegel had not the slightest doubt that you could show that modern Europe is superior to China. The recognition of the rights of man by the modern state was to Hegel was part of that simple proof that modern Europe is superior to ancient China, even if Confucius was as democratic as some people say, his was certainly no clear legal expression of the rights of man. But that is today taken for granted. Which self-respecting social scientist dares to say that perhaps the Athens of Pericles was objectively higher in rank than the bushman in Australia? We don't know that. But, let us drop this and simply reduce it to an uncontroverted thesis that the concept of progress, which played such an enormous role in the thought of the last few centuries, and even was still said by a very famous American historian, Charles A. Beard, in the year 1932, is today no longer not only not fashionable but really prohibited by the very principles of scientific method. This much about the general problem.

Why do we turn to Kant? Kant, we may tentatively say, was the first philosopher of the highest rank who discussed the philosophy of history under this name. The last chapter of his Critique of Pure Reason is entitled, "The History of Pure Reason". That is a very novel title. This chapter is very brief and in no way elaborated but still it is there. The history of pure reason should be written. But he didn't write. Kant didn't write a philosophy of history so he was aware of that idea yet he hesitated to elaborate it. There was a certain strange hesitation. You only have to contrast this between the philosophic generation after Kant. Take the example of Schilling, but he is somewhat earlier than Hegel but in this respect he was not very different from Hegel. Schilling's views roughly stated is this: there are two absolutes - extension and thought. This attribute of extension, space and what it means fully understood, is nature, therefore one part of philosophy is philosophy of nature. The other part, the absolute of thought, if this is fully understood it means history. So, the knowledge of the absolutes, metaphysics, may be said to be sub-divided into the philosophy of nature and philosophy of history. Hegel elaborated that but it is not in Kant. Why then did he hesitate and yet not reject it? Now it is impossible to answer this question or to prepare an answer to it without having some understanding of Kant's enterprise as a whole. We will try to prepare such a very provisional understanding by reflecting on the fact that according to Kant's explicit declaration he owed the decisive stimulus to his work to two men, to Rousseau and to Hume. Rousseau and Hume, neither of whom could be called a metaphysician, induced Kant to revolutionize metaphysics. Now let us discuss these two influences.

Let's first consider Rousseau, and let us do that from the point of view of the question from which we started - philosophy of history and thoughts. I limit myself now to two works of Rousseau which were crucial to Kant as we will see later on from some quotations. That is the Discourse on Arts and Sciences, the first famous publication of Rousseau's, and the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. The dates are in the early 1750's, 1751 and 1754 if I remember well. Now what is so striking in these two books is this. At first glance they present themselves as books denying the fact of progress. The moderns are inferior to the ancients, number one, but even the ancients are inferior because they are civilized men to the natural men, say to the savages. The whole progress was a mistake and a folly. That has to say, under all conditions Rousseau regarded progress as a problematic thing. Perhaps we shall say for the time being that Kant's hesitation to elaborate the philosophy of history or perhaps the peculiar character of Kant's ideas regarding the philosophy of history has to do with the fact that Kant was aware of a problem of progress and he had to become aware of that through Rousseau.

I would like to remind you of a few characteristic points of Rousseau's second discourse, The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. This book is explicitly a history of man, i.e., a history of the human species. A history read, as Rousseau puts it, not in human books but in nature, not in the books of men who lie but in the book of nature which never lies. It is a history of man's transition from the state of nature to civilized life. Should there be a connection between the state of nature and the philosophy of history, or the idea of progress? We must first answer this question and for this purpose we have to consider the state of nature notion all together not only in Rousseau's version but also in the version which we find in Locke and in Hobbes. In the first place, the state of nature idea takes the place of the biblical account of man's origin and thereafter. That is an undeniable fact. The state of nature means this - contrary to the Bible, the beginnings of man were most imperfect. The transition from the state of nature to the civil society is an unqualified progress whereas in the Bible the founding of the city is ascribed to Cain, and furthermore, this process from the beginning to the civil society is entirely natural, i.e., non-miraculous. The second: the state of nature became a theme within the context of reflection on the law of nature, the law of nature here in the sense of the moral law. The state of nature is a part of a novel version of the old doctrine of natural law. The traditional natural law doctrine, an idea of the middle ages, has no relation to the notion of the state of nature and to the transition from the state of nature to civil society. The traditional natural law doctrine is a strictly non-historical doctrine. There is the remarkable passage in the Summa Theologica, Part I, Question 46. Natural reason cannot know whether the world had a beginning or whether the world was always. Applied to our question that means the beginning of history may be the perfect Adam or may be the rude mountaineers who survived cataclysms - the Aristotelian view. Natural reason cannot settle this question. But however this may be one thing was certain on the basis of the older doctrine. There are always addressees of the law of nature, by which I mean that man in every stage, rude mountaineers, sophisticated dwellers of cities, are equally equipped to understand the principles of the natural law or the moral law. Man is as such an addressee of the law of nature. Rousseau and Locke deny this. Man is not always an addressee of the law of nature, since all knowledge and even reason itself is acquired and therefore man at the beginning was completely unable to understand any moral principles - that took a very long time. We will see later on that this is a very important difficulty for Kant. How was reason, and therefore how was the knowledge of moral principles, acquired? By a necessary process and a non-teleological process. A process not directed toward emergence and perfection of reason. But reason was somehow an unintended product of the process.

It is very difficult to find out the precise meaning of Rousseau's doctrine because so many things which he says in his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality are obviously taken from the Latin poet Lucretius who in the fifth book of the Nature of Things, gives what people now call a history of human civilization from primitive beginnings and so on and so on. And Rousseau obviously borrows very much from Lucretius. Therefore it is necessary to see the differences between Rousseau and Lucretius for a better understanding of the problem.

Now what is the difficulty? There is no state of nature in Lucretius for the very simple reason that there is no law of nature, no moral law, considered by this Epicurean poet. In Lucretius' language one would have to say the state of nature is the state of the philosopher when he is fully alive to the verities. That is the natural state of men. But this primitive, savage beginning cannot be a state of nature. What then is the root of this difference between Rousseau and Lucretius? We see here then that the state of nature, as understood by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, is meant to supply a standard for theories of society. Those rights and duties if there were duties, which belong to the state of nature, are the truly natural order with a view to which we have to order our lives. But the state of nature is extremely imperfect

and therefore the state of nature can only supply a negative standard. The state of nature is something to get away from. But since it is the only natural state it is the only phenomenon which gives us a rock-bottom orientation. Everything else, all merely laws, cannot be examined and cannot be justified except by reference to something natural. This natural with a view to which all existing institutions and laws have to be examined is the state of nature as a certain legal status, a status in which there are rights and to some extent even duties. The state of nature idea implies in other words that what is really good for man emerges through a break with this state of nature. The good emerges, we can say, through a rebellion against nature. This rebellion against nature, by which I mean the process of civilization, is however itself a natural process. By natural necessity a certain part of nature, call it man, emerges, which part is compelled by natural necessity to rebel against the rest of nature. The process of civilization is a natural process. But it is also not a natural process - that is the great, characteristic, difficulty of this position - because it is a rebellion against nature, for it requires wholly non-natural means, artifacts of a peculiar kind, to use the language of our contemporaries, verbal symbols, speech, and only that makes possible rebellion against nature. Verbal symbols are not natural in the way in which, for example, our bodies are natural. We can also say this position is cursed from its very beginning by the necessity in which it finds itself to say that there is an essential difference between man and non-man (and also there is not an essential difference between man and non-man). We find this up to the present day.

What, then, is the characteristic, the peculiarity, of the concept of the state of nature compared with Lucretius but also all pre-modern philosophy, materialistic or non-materialistic? What man can be the master of nature? To master nature means to understand nature. In the sense that man can learn to better produce things which nature produces imperfectly man can reproduce nature. To understand a thing means to understand its genesis. Everything must be understood as having come into being. For example, if you take classical utterances, atoms have a peculiar shape and size, but these must be understood from the modern point of view, ultimately, as modifications of something more primary. To take the most important example, reason was understood as having come into being. For Lucretius that was no problem; there are mind atoms as well as other kinds of atoms, and there could be no question of a genesis of atoms. Therefore the genesis of reason was no problem. Lucretius discussed at some length the genesis of speech, but very characteristically Rousseau transforms the discussion of the genesis of speech into a discussion of the genesis of reason. To understand meant to make, to construct a perfectly evident, as perfectly evident, i.e., as necessary, that is to say, a deterministic necessitarian or natural science which shows the necessity of man's production, of man's changing from bestial beginnings to civilization, or, in other words, man's progress. This is basic for Rousseau and accepted by him. But here we come to the difficulty, because at first glance, and not only at first glance, Rousseau denies the fact of progress and suggests, apparently, a return to the primitive, bestial state of nature. What then does he mean by this flagrant contradiction? Rousseau does not deny the fact of intellectual and technological progress. He merely denies that intellectual, technical progress is moral progress and progress in happiness. The pre-agricultural savages are better and happier than we and even than the ancients, although we are intellectually and technologically their superiors. Yet, Rousseau's argument proceeds, we cannot return to this state. And, above all, better does not mean for Rousseau more moral. Rousseau makes the distinction between goodness and morality or virtue. Goodness means instinctive goodness, say compassion. It has nothing to do with rational principles, with a sense of duty - that belongs to virtue. Now, as regards morality or virtue, as distinguished from goodness, morality stands and falls with civil society. The emergence of civil society coincides with the emergence of morality.

There are very great difficulties in Rousseau's doctrine which explain all kinds

of misinterpretations. In this book which I mentioned, R. V. Sampson, Progress in the Age of Reason, you find a statement on page 79 which to some extent is excused by the really very great difficulties of Rousseau's doctrine but of course how a reasonable man could write that page I still don't understand, for example, before the ink could have dried on the first sentences Rousseau had already thought of something entirely different. But I cannot go into that now. I would like to read you one passage of Rousseau which is still true, and that is in a defense he wrote in the letter to M. de Bormarte, the archbishop of Paris,

The development of intelligence and of vice always takes place in the same proportion, not in the individuals but in the peoples, a distinction which I have always carefully made and which none of those who have attacked me has ever been able to understand.

Rousseau is absolutely correct. No one who attacked him has understood it and I believe even today it is very rare that someone sees that. I cannot now suggest a solution of this great problem: of how these enormous contradictions which you find in Rousseau are solved according to Rousseau's own indications. I can only say that the analysis which I gave in my Natural Right and History I think is still correct. I still stick to that, but that would lead us now too far. Perhaps I mention only one point. Rousseau's contradictions go back to one fundamental contradiction, which, however, was not a contradiction but an antimony, of which he was fully aware and which he did not state clearly on every occasion, and, therefore, it is a formal contradiction, and that is that the perfection of the individual and social perfection are governed by entirely different rules. The perfect society, say Geneva, the city from which he came, Geneva, old fashioned, severe in its manners, demanding the full dedication to the common good, a life of duty in every form, and yet there is something in the individual which cannot be satisfied by such a life of dutiful citizenship but while for most people this life of dutiful citizenship is the highest they can reach there is an alternative and this is a mixture of the philosopher and the bohemian, let us say the artist. That, one can say, is what Rousseau has in mind. The solution of the social problem, the democratic republic as he saw it, is not only not identical with the solution of the problem of the individual it is even incompatible with it. There must be people living on the fringes of society who are, as it were, the salt of that society. The society as such cannot be dissolved. The nineteenth century was struggling all the time with this problem; in a way it is struggling up to the present day. If you take such a simple, everyday phenomenon that someone writes an indecent story instead of punishing him for doing something indecent, which would be Rousseau's idea, they say he is an artist and that is not pornography, but art. That is an indication of the problem. You see how the notion of art affects jurisdiction and therefore social life. That has something to do with Rousseau, but of course that is really only a statement of the problem on the lowest possible level. I must emphasize that.

Not to go further into the question of Rousseau but only to raise this question. What is the meaning of Rousseau's work as regards the problem of progress? In spite of Rousseau's doubt regarding the problem his whole work leads to the consequence that with a modification the tradition of the idea of progress is continued not only in spite of it but because of it. I read to you one passage to indicate why I had to make this remark. Kant wrote somewhere among his papers - that was not published in his life - and that is the key, not to Rousseau, although it is part of Rousseau, but to Kant,

I myself am a researcher - if that is the proper translation - inquirer out of indignation. I sense the whole thirst for knowledge and the greedy unrest to make progress as well as the contempt at every progress. There was a time when I believed that this all could make out the honor of mankind and I despised the vulgar who knows nothing. Rousseau had straightened me out. This illusory preference disappeared. I

learned to honor men, human beings, and would regard myself as much less useful than common-day laborers if I did not believe that this consideration could give a value to all others by establishing the rights of mankind.

That is what Kant - that is not the whole story, we will come to other passages - that is, however, the most emphatic remark Kant ever made on Rousseau. Rousseau had made clear to him that the theoretical ideal, the belief that the perfection of man consists in theoretical understanding, is a delusion, that man's true perfection, if we can use this term here, consists in morality, and morality consists essentially in recognizing the rights of man, in deed of course, and respecting the dignity of man. And Philosophy and all the theoretical pursuits ultimately can be justified only by these being in the service of this moral function. You see how Rousseau's attack on the idea of progress comes in at this point. Rousseau stated, in the first Discourse especially, 'intellectual progress is not moral progress, and moral progress is the only standard of progress', that was accepted - morality is the only standard ultimately valid - that was decisive for Kant. However, this in itself in no way explains that question which you have raised - why is 'philosophy of history'? What has morality and the understanding of moral principles to do with history, that is, philosophy of history? We will take this up next time, but I would like to see, in order to find out whether I have succeeded in bringing across this point - do you see a connection between the question of moral principles and history at the level of the discussion in Rousseau and Kant's time?

(The most manifest aspect of history were political history, and . . .)

Yes, but what has this to do with it? I mean, if we have moral principles we just have political institutions and political actions and these actions may be as criminal and as laudatory as they are but this does not our knowledge of the status of these principles.

Could you restate the question once more please?)

Kant learned or claimed he had learned from Rousseau the supremacy of morality, and that is so important to see that he can say Rousseau has straightened me out, if the proper translation of the German expression, Rousseau hat mich berecht gebracht, he brought me into order would be an equally proper translation. So that was the epoch making event in Kant's life, apart from Hume, which we will discuss next time. So Kant understood the status of morality. What does this have to do with the philosophy of history? Yes?

(If the status of morality is the result of this process, if morality does not emerge except as a product of this process, then Kant says all intellectual endeavors must be understood as being in the service of morality . . .)

That's a very good answer on the basis of what I said. I see, know what I have to emphasize. Kant of course does not accept this notion of a genesis of reason, and, therefore, your answer is not sufficient. But it has nevertheless to do with this question which I mentioned, only your answer must be generalized. The most important and the most fundamental phenomenon will prove to be, for Kant, the moral law, but Kant is confronted with a difficulty with which the earlier thinkers who spoke of the moral law were not confronted, namely, with the question, are there always addressees of the moral law? This question exists for Kant. Are there always addressees of the moral law? The most extreme savages, could they possibly know the moral law? Now, if not, that creates a very great problem, and the solution to that problem would be the philosophy of history. It would show why their ignorance is not only excusable

but redounds to the glory of God. I will read to you a passage next time. Can you see how it could redound to the glory of God? That the savages are completely ignorant of the moral law as moral law? If it is true that miracles and miraculous intervention redound less to the glory of God than natural causation, that God has constructed the machine of the world in such a way that it brings about everything without any miraculous intervention, then, and only then, is this a necessary conclusion. And it is for this reason that Kant compares Rousseau with Newton. For Kant Rousseau is the Newton of the moral world. Rousseau has discovered law, regularity, where previously people found only irregularity and no sense. We do not have to go into whether that is a perfect thought-out comparison, that is not the point now. But the crucial point is that Rousseau did - he means of course by the second Treatise - Rousseau by his second Treatise did something comparable to Newton's work. Just as Newton showed how this marvelous order of the visible universe is intelligible without any miracles entering, some simple laws, in the same way simple laws had been discovered by Rousseau. Yes?

- (Doesn't the fulfillment of the moral law for Kant depend upon political development and technological development as well, where you have a historical development coinciding with the fulfillment of the moral set-up?)

Well, that is an extremely difficult question which we are wholly unprepared to discuss at this stage and which can be stated as follows: can there be, from Kant's point of view, a moral progress proper? There can be a progress of the understanding of the moral law, I would assume, but can there be a progress that the next generation would be more moral than the preceding generation. Technologically and intellectually there can be an advance, that is the great question. In spite of this, Kant's belief in progress is primarily in the possibility of intellectual and institutional progress. You are quite right. In a very difficult way, hard to understand, this goes together in Kant nevertheless with an expectation of moral progress. The difficulty here is - you see, there is not a simple parallelism; that is due to a certain . . .

- (His whole concept of moral worth seemed to - it is difficult to conceive of moral progress in Kant from his own understanding of moral worth.)

Yes, that is a very great question, but you see that the difficulty which is here, that is exactly the point of the influence on Kant of Rousseau, whereas the general view was that intellectual progress was strictly parallel to moral progress. What does moral progress mean? An example, we are not cannibals. Why are we no longer cannibals? Because we are enlightened. We know that there is better food and that is a very unwise practice because the fear of being eaten up and being looked over would be impossible and so on. Now, Rousseau's point that intellectual progress is in itself something radically different from moral progress leads to Kant's point. And then of course if we develop fully in one direction it means there could be an intellectual and technological and political progress of the most important kind and yet there would be thousands of cannibals, living in a perfect, an organized society. Kant was aware of this question and he learned it from Rousseau. That is one of the important complications which exists in the consciousness of a modern man like Kant. Why is the philosophy of history for Kant a problem? Is there a possibility of moral progress? What does all other progress mean. I think we must stop now.

(end of lecture)

"I myself am a researcher from inclination. I feel the entire thirst for knowledge and the eager unrest to go further in it as well as the satisfaction with every acquisition. There was a time when I believed that this alone could compose the honor of mankind and I despised the rabble that knew of nothing. Rousseau brought me around. This blinding preference vanished, I learned to honor human beings and I would think myself less useful than the common laborer if I did not believe that this consideration of everything else could impart worth in establishing the rights of mankind." - Kant's "Bemerkungen"

Let us remind ourselves of some general points. I started with a very general and provisional sketch of the problem of historicism and I said that in order to understand that problem one must turn to the phenomenon of the philosophy of history. The philosophy of history we take here in a very limited sense; the notion that there is a historical process which is necessarily and essentially a progressive process, both intellectually and socially. This 'idea of progress' developed in the 17th and 18th centuries on the basis of a number of presuppositions which I will now merely enumerate. The real problem would be to see the connections between these premises.

1) Science for the sake of power. Science is essentially for the sake of power, and therefore there is an essential harmony between science and society. Science for the sake of production of goods and services.

2) Understanding is itself a kind of production. To understand means to construct, or to make.

3) To understand means to construct as evident, as necessary, as the product of a necessary process, and in principle everything can be understood in that way. From this there follows the possibility of a genesis of reason and changes of reason as a necessary process. This necessary process is a part of the whole cosmic process as a necessary process.

4) In classical atomism there was assumed qualitatively different atoms, atoms differing regarding shape and size. But these must be understood from the new basis as derivative from a homogeneous medium which we may call *mute matter*. An atom of a specific shape and size must be understood as having come into being. But what about *mute matter* itself? *Mute matter* at any rate has not come into being but is eternal or semi-eternal. Answer: no. *Mute matter* is itself the product of a process, indeed of a process of a very peculiar kind. *Mute matter* is an intellectual construct, and therefore something which has a genesis. The ultimate is then the constructing intellect of man. Yet, this constructing intellect of man must itself be construed as a product of *mute matter*. The classical representation of this view is really Hobbes.

5) The preceding sentence implies a polarity of matter and intellect or mind. Or, differently stated, a polarity of nature and mind, mind here being understood as the human in man, that which makes man human. This polarity means in more simple terms civilization or progress, is the fact of man's becoming the master of nature, of man's conquering nature. You conquer only an enemy. The relation of man and nature is a rebellion against nature. I leave it at these enumerations and the real task of my analysis is to understand the connection between these.

Now we turn to Rousseau. And at first glance, Rousseau's decisive influence on this problem is his awareness that the intellectual progress is moral and political regress, or, to state it more cautiously, intellectual progress is something fundamentally different from moral and political progress. This had a decisive influence on Kant.

Now I will first read to you a few passages of Kant's on this subject. These are all statements found among Kant's papers, not published by him. I have read to you one of these passages I think. There is first a general remark about Rousseau - the impression one gets when one reads the writings of Rousseau. There was an outstanding sagacity and soul full of feeling which perhaps no other writer of any age or of any people has had combined such a combination of sagacity and feeling. The second impression is the repulsion by the strange and absurd opinions which are opposed to everything which is generally accepted. We wish to exhibit his extraordinary talent and the charm of eloquence. This much about the general impressions. You see that Kant was not completely charmed by Rousseau. And then there comes this passage which I read to you last time and I think I should read it again.

I myself am a man . . . purpose of establishing a right of mankind.

So what he learns from Rousseau then is the denial of the supremacy of *Genius*,

of contemplation of theoretical understanding. That means at the same time the respect for the dignity of every man. Given the socially contemplative idea, the respect is strictly given only for the love of contemplation or to others to the extent to which they are potential contemplaters. But from this new point of view the respect is given to every man. The justification of philosophy is that it contributes to the establishment, or the recognition, of the rights of mankind. I mention three points by themselves.

1) The critique of contemplation, i.e., of pure theoretical reason in the name of morality, of which we have spoken in Rousseau's first discourse on the arts and sciences, and the supremacy of morality. This notion of the supremacy of morality has a long pre-history behind Rousseau; Socrates appeared at first glance as such a man. The one thing needful is moral virtue and philosophy is in some way the source of that. And therefore the name of Socrates plays a very great role in Rousseau.

2) In the turbulent 17th century people tried to find some basis for peace among the various groups and for some time it seemed that some general recognition of Christianity would be sufficient for peace. Men like Leibnitz hoped that there would be, if not a reunion, at least some arrangement between the catholics and the protestants on the basis of the recognition of their common Christianity. But then some people went beyond that and said the only basis on which men can agree is morality and therefore, the only criterion, the only demand which political society can make on the citizens can only be of a moral kind and not of a religious kind. So that played a great role in the 17th and 18th centuries and is also, of course, implied in what Rousseau and Kant are doing.

Now the second point which I mentioned on the basis of Kant's statement just quoted: Kant had a very particular notion of morality. Morality appears to mean recognition of the rights of mankind, of the rights of man. That is a specific interpretation of morality. For example, if you take the traditional notion of morality or virtue it could not properly be expressed in these terms. Although it might imply it. Later on when we turn to Kant's Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, there at the beginning Kant establishes that the only thing which can be truly valued is the good will and in this connection he speaks of all the various virtues, say temperance and courage, and tries to show that they are not in themselves valued, the good will makes them valued. And he mentions all the virtues, except one, because that he felt, instinctively, couldn't make sense, and that is justice. Courage, in the loose sense of the word, can be misused; temperance, in the loose sense can be misused; think of the miser who is temperant in order to be a good money maker, and wisdom can also be misused, think of clever cunning. But justice cannot be misused. So, in other words, there is in Kant a tendency to conceive of virtue primarily in terms of justice, i. e., the social virtue par excellence. And a further step, by no means identical with this one, would be to say justice consists fundamentally in the recognition of the rights of man. Those who have studied Hobbes or Locke a bit will see how this was prepared.

3) The third point is theoretical progress is different from moral progress. Morality is not necessarily furthered by intellectual progress. To some extent it is even hindered by it. This much about this.

I turn now to another passage which is in a published work of Kant in his Metaphysics of Morals, in the German edition which I use on page 141. I will state only the main points.

The consideration of happiness . . . against the state of nature.

What Kant here implies is that the consideration of morality is radically different from the consideration of happiness, which is a thesis written large all over Kant.

I am now interested only in noting the fact that this very new separation of morality and happiness has a root in Rousseau. Is it clear that up to Kant all philosophic morality did not distinguish, did not separate, happiness from morality. The happy life is the moral life. Or the virtuous life; maybe there are higher forms of virtue than moral virtue. That I do not go into. The happy life is the virtuous life. The vulgar concept of happiness that we see a gangster or another crook living in Palm Beach was not regarded as happiness. He had a lot of sensual pleasures maybe but he could never be happy because a despicable and worthless being cannot be happy. Because happiness means a state of contentment which is enviable, to give a somewhat popular conception of what happiness really meant . . .

(change of tape)

. . . in Kant a radical separation takes place. Considerations of happiness as happiness are wholly alien to morality - eudaimonism, that is to say, concern with happiness, is total to morality - I exaggerate the difference. This is prepared by Rousseau I think because Rousseau explicitly said, when he spoke of these men of the state of nature, savages, they are happy and they are good, but they are not virtuous, they are not moral, because they have no sense of duty. Out of simple kindness of the heart they are compassionate. The simple savage is compassionate, and, hence, happy, in his simplicity, but not virtuous. And that meant that civilized man, is, in the highest case, a virtuous man, but by definition he cannot be truly good and not be truly happy, because civilization prevents him from being truly good and truly happy. Why he cannot be good, kind, that is clear because from Rousseau's point of view civil society means property-owning, private property-owning, society and the property owner and everyone connected with private property cannot, for this reason, be simply compassionate. Property-owning means to be harsh somewhere to others. And that is by the way the point where there is an immediate way from Rousseau to Marx, but I cannot go into this now. But the point with which I am concerned now is only this that this divorce of morality and happiness is really implied in Rousseau and in certain other points which come up later.

What do all these things have to do with history, or the problem of progress with which we are concerned? Another quotation.

Rousseau proceeds synthetically and begins with natural man. I proceed analytically and begin with civilized man.

You see, by the way, how immediately relevant Rousseau is to Kant's own investigations and inquiries. He defines his own procedure in contrast to Rousseau's procedure. Rousseau begins from that, he begins with natural man and follows him on his way to civilized man. Kant begins with civilized man. From this it seems to follow that Rousseau needs history, he has to follow this history; and of course Rousseau didn't mean in particular because of the very sweeping character of his statements but the study had to be carried on with precision; he would have to, at one point or another, fall back on history. Kant, on the other hand, by proceeding analytically, from civilized man, by looking at us and himself, doesn't need history it would seem. Yet, there is implicit historicity in Kant's formulation of the problem. Kant does not begin with man but with civilized man. Kant's doctrine deals with man, qua civilized man, and that, in this formulation, is an indication of the presence of the problem of history; and not more than that. And now the last statement from Kant,

Newton was the first to see order and regularity combined with great simplicity, where prior to him one found disorder and multiplicity terribly connected. Since his time comets are running in geometrical curves. Rousseau was the first to

discover beneath the multiplicity of human appearances the deeply hidden nature of man and the hidden laws according to which Providence is justified by Rousseau's discovery. Prior to him the objections of Hume's theorem, i.e., whatever is is best, and Manes were still there. Afterwards, in Rousseau, God is vindicated and now is truth.

He doesn't quote that theorem but one can know that whatever is is best. So that is the last of the statements of Kant on Rousseau we have to consider. By the way, the name, Manes, he is the originator of the sect of the Manichaeans. Manes he is now called. And Manichaeism means that there is a good and an evil principle, the world as we know it is the world of a good principle fighting with an evil one. The world is not simply good, in other words. The refutation of Manes means that the world is simply good, it is the best of all possible worlds. That has been proven by Rousseau regarding human things, whereas regarding the cosmic phenomena it has been proven by Newton.

Now, what does this mean - that Rousseau is the Newton of the moral world, as a vindicator of Providence. Kant has here in mind the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. I have spoken of this before, in the last meeting, the difficulty implied in the distinction between natural man and civilized man. The natural law is not in fact known to all men, and the natural law is not duly promulgated to all men. These men, these cannibals for example, are excused because they don't know the wickedness of cannibalism. But still is this not a defect of a moral god, not to promulgate the moral law to all men duly? To which Rousseau replies, by implication, God could have done it only by a miracle and it is more becoming to an absolutely wise being not to use any miracles. The fact that the natural law was not promulgated to all men in the beginning and became known only in the course of history is a proof of the wisdom, and therefore, of the excellence of God. The fact that many savages do not know the moral is due not to negligence, or indifference, or powerlessness, on the part of God, but to necessity, to wisdom. It redounds to the glory of God that he was able to construct a world that does not need God's interference in order to be the best of all possible worlds. That is what Kant indicates.

The good life, Rousseau says, is the moral life. But one crucial qualification: what I am going to say about Rousseau applies only to that part of Rousseau which is interesting to Kant. Rousseau is infinitely more complex and one can say that at least half of Rousseau was of no interest to him. The good life is the moral life, as distinguished from the contemplative life. There is a tension between morality and intellectuality. Intellectual progress is not moral progress. The moral principles are given by the conscience. There is no need for theoretical knowledge in order to be moral. Yet, the conscience is threatened by false theories. Therefore we need a kind of wisdom to protect the conscience against these false theories. Let us call this pursuit Socratic wisdom. Socratic wisdom is needed in order to protect the conscience against false theories. This Socratic wisdom, however, must have a theoretical basis.

What is the theoretical basis of Socratic wisdom? Now, in this respect there is a great obscurity in Rousseau. There are two poles within which Rousseau moves; the one is a materialistic deterministic cosmology, sketched in the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, the other a certain deism and dualism, rather heretical, sketched, and developed even, in the professional faith of the Savoyard vicar in Rousseau's Emile. I don't know if there are any among you who have read Emile or who even know about it. The Emile is a work on education, a classic, and at a certain moment in the education of a young man called Emile, whose educator is none other than Rousseau himself, this young man had to be introduced into theology, into the teaching of God, because Rousseau prevented him hearing the very word God until he was about seventeen

or eighteen because he was sure that anything he would say to him about God at an earlier stage would be grossly misunderstood because he would have much too crude a notion to understand. Now, in this context Rousseau gives a theology, but he doesn't give it in his own name but in the name of a very heretical Catholic priest. There is a very great question. Rousseau doesn't identify himself with the Catholic priest, and that is very ambiguous, because this teaching includes the denial of miracles, and the denial of the createdness of matter, and some other very important remarks. So, either that Savogard vicar had said things which Rousseau would not have dared to say. Rousseau may have been on the right of it, meaning more conservative, but he may also have been on the left of it, more progressive.

To come back to the main point. The theoretical basis of Rousseau's Socratic wisdom is extremely dark, which does not mean that there are not many books in existence in which with the utmost confidence people say these and these are the theoretical bases. That is one of the characteristics of scholarship. There is something more: Rousseau makes an attempt to be neutral in the following way. Let us take such a simple use as materialism and spiritualism. To give an account which is indifferent to the conflict between materialism and spiritualism. He does it in the following way. He says that the characteristic difference of man, that which distinguishes man from the brutes, is not rationality, but freedom, and that is a powerful sentence of enormous social consequences. Not rationality but freedom. And we will find the traces of this statement in Kant. But then he goes on to say this freedom is not universally admitted he will say something which will be granted by everyone, by materialists as well as spiritualists, and that is that man is perfectible - not free. I am only concerned now with this aspect of the things, that Rousseau tries to make at least once an attempt to be neutral in the great metaphysical contest. Where he stood, that is very hard to say. Rousseau moves somehow between these two opposites, deterministic materialism and deism. Where, we do not know.

Now, Socratic wisdom, which is required for protecting the conscience, would seem to demand that this question, the metaphysical question, be settled. Kant settled it, by his Critique of Pure Reason. I would like to state the problem in the clear terms in which Kant states it. There are these alternatives: (at this point he writes on the blackboard) atheism or deism, determinism or recognition of freedom, materialism or immortality of the soul. According to Kant, this was the issue and Rousseau agreed to that. Atheism vs. Deism, Determinism vs. Recognition of Freedom, and Materialism vs. Immortality of the Soul. As I say, Rousseau does not explicitly and clearly settle the issue, so we do not know where he stands. Kant tries to settle it by his Critique of Pure Reason. Now, what enabled Kant, or rather, what stimulated him to settle this question in the peculiar way in which he settled it, was Hume's critique of causality. Critique of causality - that seems to offer an interesting possibility. To criticize causality, universal determinism, might be thought to mean to find room for freedom. Hume does exactly the opposite. His doubt of causality - it can be called doubt - implied the impossibility of freedom. The impossibility of freedom is in no way affected by any sceptical doubts Hume has had regarding causality. This we must see clearly, otherwise we will not see what Kant is about. I read to you a passage from Part III, Section 1, of the Treatise on Human Nature,

It is universally acknowledged that the operations of external bodies are necessary; and that, the communication of their motion, in their attraction, and mutual cohesion, there are not the least traces of indifference or liberty. Every object is determined by an absolute fate to a certain degree and direction of its motion, and can no more depart from that precise line in which it moves, than it can convert it itself into an angel, or spirit, or any superior substance. The actions, therefore, of matter, are to be regarded as instances of

necessary actions; and whatever is, in this respect, on the same footing with matter, must be acknowledged to be necessary. That we may know whether this be the case with the actions of the mind, we shall begin with examining matter, and considering on what the idea of a necessity in its operations are founded, and why we conclude one body or action to be the infallible cause of another . . .

The word 'infallible' is a very unusual expression.

. . . It has been observed already, that in no single instance the ultimate connection of any objects is discoverable either by our senses or reason, and that we can never penetrate so far into the essence and construction of bodies, as to perceive the principle on which their mutual influence depends . . .

That is the meaning of Rousseau's (sic) critique of causality.

. . . It is their constant union alone with which we are acquainted; and it is from the constant union the necessity arises. If objects had not an uniform and regular conjunction with each other, we should never arrive at any idea of cause and effect; and even after all, the necessity which enters into that idea, is nothing but a determination of the mind to pass from one object to its usual attendant, and infer the existence of one from that of the other. Here then are two particulars which we are to consider as essential to necessity, viz. the constant union and the inference of the mind; and wherever we discover these, we must acknowledge a necessity.

Then, he applies this to whether it is true of the actions of the mind, whether we do not find there also constant union and the inference of the mind, and we do, hence, the actions of the mind, and especially the actions of the will, are as necessary as the falling of a body or any other action of matter.

So, Kant did not turn to Hume in order to learn from Hume's critique of causality a loop-hole, as it were, for freedom. What, then did he learn from Hume? I would like to give, in other words, a provisional answer to this question of what Kant learned by thinking through Hume's critique of causality. I state it as follows: Kant found, or believed, that Hume starts from a premise, which was the premise of the whole tradition, as Kant saw it, and this premise can be stated as follows: all judgments are either analytical or else synthetic judgments a posteriori. There are no synthetic judgments a priori. Now, I would like to explain. It is hard to explain. I can only reproduce Kant. An analytical judgment is a judgment in which the predicate is implied in the subject. Kant did not mean tautological judgment, as is frequently understood, but in which the predicate is implied in the subject. Now, what would this mean? A simple example: a man is a mortal animal; when you think man you think mortal animal, you do not learn anything new. What is a synthetic judgment? A synthetic judgment, generally speaking, is one where the predicate is not implied in the subject. If you say Mr. X smokes, that is certainly a synthetic judgment, from every point of view, because it has never been seen before. We have to look at it, and from the experience of this very unusual case, we learn the unheard-of fact that Mr. X smokes. So, a synthetic judgment a priori is a judgment in which the predicate is connected with the subject on the basis of experience, say sensible experience. A synthetic judgment apriori would be a judgment in which the predicate, connected with the subject, is not implied in the subject, but is connected by evident necessity and yet not implied in

the subject. Therefore, a synthetic judgment a priori cannot of course be possibly derived from experience, because from experience there would never be an a priori judgment.

The most important example, at least on the first level, of a synthetic judgment a priori is the principle of causality. According to Kant, it is impossible to deduce from the concept of a thing, of, say, even an event, that it is necessarily preceded by a cause which brought it about, and, yet, on the other hand, it is absolutely impossible to derive a universal principle, like causality, from experience, because experience can tell you never more than up-to-now, and if you say up-to-now there has never been a case where an event has not been preceded by a cause, by necessary causes. In the first place that is not proven by experience, for so many events pass unobserved, but even if, they could change any second now. So, the principle of causality, without which science is altogether impossible according to Kant, cannot be an analytic judgment and cannot be a synthetic judgment a posteriori, but synthetic judgments a priori.

In order to understand the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori Kant has to develop a notion, which in this form is entirely original to him, of the spontaneity of the understanding. The understanding as understanding and, say, to want to reason as reason, by the spontaneous act, connect this fundamental synthesis, this spontaneity of the understanding. Synthetic judgments a priori are, taken as a whole, the necessary condition of experience. Experience doesn't mean sense data or sense impressions. Sense impressions are isolated, fragmentary, meaningless things. They become experience through interpretation, and this interpretation is fundamentally effected by the act of the pure understanding, the spontaneous act of the pure understanding. The understanding, the pure understanding, in no way empirical, constitutes any possible object of experience - that is a very misleading expression. The general character of any sensible object of experience is established by the spontaneous act of the understanding. This is of course what the pure understanding does, by circumscribing the general character of any object of understanding, is not yet an actual object of experience. It is a form. The form can only be filled by experience, and, ultimately, by sense data.

Now, if this is so, we understand from here how a true science is possible, a science based on universal validity and evident necessity, and yet while this same science can become actual only of sensible objects, so that a possible object of experience becomes an actual object of experience sense-perception is required. There cannot be any knowledge of non-sensible beings, supra-sensible beings, if they are. There cannot be any knowledge of God and the soul. In other words, the atheistic, deterministic, materialistic science is absolutely necessary and there is no possibility to interfere with this, on any grounds. It is impossible in the study of sensible phenomena to find something like a miracle, absolutely impossible, because in every case if you are confronted with an explanation of a phenomenon as miracle you always will be compelled, according to Kant, to raise further questions into the peculiar specific conditions of this phenomenon, which on the basis of previous knowledge would be a miracle; the scientist would say he may have to change a somewhat narrow notion of natural phenomena which we have given. There cannot be any knowledge, that is to say, theoretical knowledge, of supra-sensible things and their actions.

But, and now we come to the crucial term, this whole knowledge, pre-scientific or scientific is only knowledge of the phenomenal world. Only of the phenomenal world, precisely because this cooperation of human reason with sense-perception is not knowledge of the things as they are in themselves, or to use the strange Kantian expression, of the thing-in-itself. Yet, there is a kind of knowledge, of a purely rational kind, of a purely rational character, which is incompatible, by its very nature, with dependence on experience. Our theoretical knowledge, say, our understanding of causality,

is essentially dependent of experience in this sense, that it points us to experience for its fulfillment. The general principle of causality is in itself something revealed to you in things, if it is not applied in the course of analysis to sensible things. There is a kind of purely rational knowledge, knowledge of the moral law. This is knowledge, but knowledge of an absolutely supra-sensible kind, and, therefore, knowledge in the sense of the thing-in-itself, of true reality. Now, moral knowledge, knowledge of the moral law, stands and falls by freedom, and also by God and the immortality of the soul. Therefore, metaphysics, knowledge of freedom, God, and the immortality of the soul, is possible, but only in a practical respect. It is not possible as theoretical or speculative metaphysics. That is a very crude statement of the general character of Kant's reply to Hume. In other words, this atheistic, deterministic, materialistic view is inevitable and perfectly legitimate in every theoretical understanding, but it is also equally true that it is only an understanding of the phenomenal world, not of true reality. Of true reality we have an inkling only through the conscience, and the conscience enables us, and to a certain extent even compels us, to postulate the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. Now, let us see what the student has succeeded in extracting from the preface to the Prolegomena.

(student's paper is here read.)

Thank you very much for your paper. Now, I don't know whether I made clear a conclusion I had in mind when I gave my extremely sketchy summary of what Kant learned by thinking through Hume's critique of causality. I think the following thing must have appeared: that Kant, by his Critique of Pure Reason, solved Rousseau's problem - the status of that Socratic wisdom and the question of the dependence of that Socratic wisdom on theoretical science, that is all metaphysics, at least in the following way. Kant proved, or claimed to have proved, the supremacy of morality by having shown, that is, proven, the fundamental inadequacy of theory, of contemplation. Our theoretical faculty does not permit us to understand more than the merely phenomenal, and there is no possibility of a theoretical metaphysics at all. The highest knowledge, of which man is capable, is the knowledge of the moral law, and this knowledge is accessible to every human being as human being. There is no superiority in the decisive respect, possible. In a secondary way, there are such superiorities, namely, if the question arises how to defend the conscience against false theories that is not everybody's business, that requires a very great effort, as Kant pointed out in the philosophical work, Introduction of the Prolegomena. Now let us turn - I see already what will happen. I believe I shall not be able to do today what I wanted to do, but we will discuss now, somewhat more closely, the Introduction to the Prolegomena and next time we will study the second preface to the Critique of Pure Reason and also certain other passages in the Critique of Pure Reason, and for this purpose I urge you to get copies of the Critique of Pure Reason.

Now, what did you mean by the bottle-neck? That I found a very interesting observation, but I wasn't quite sure whether I understood?

(I found that the bottle-neck consisted in this: that, on the one hand, the deduction of these concepts, physics, was a very difficult thing, because it utilized previous physical achievements in solving or proving the basis of metaphysics. Whereas, on the other hand, he assumes, and, as a matter of fact, even explicitly says that in order to investigate pure reason he has only to use pure reason. Well, I think that is a contradiction. Why is pure reason sufficient to examine itself?)

May I make a pedagogic remark, as an old man? Don't say so quickly a contradiction. In our very informal discussions here, one should always use the strongest word. We don't have to be so cautious here. But I notice that some people, even in later life,

in writings, in published writings, speak so easily of contradictions without having considered whether there is really only a difference and apparent contradiction. But the difficulty to which you refer is a very serious one. Whether Kant solves it or not is a very long question. And it is this Kant says: "We can have knowledge properly only of scientific phenomena". Let me omit now the problem of mathematics which of course is a special case but let me take a simple version. We can have only knowledge of phenomena - let me begin with that. Is this a correct statement? I notice right away a very great difficulty. What about mathematics? What is the status of mathematical knowledge for Kant? Is mathematical knowledge not knowledge of sensible phenomena? When you study a circle you do not study this thing here (a circle on the blackboard); you use it only as a help for understanding a circle. What is the status of mathematical knowledge in Kant?

(It would have to be synthetic judgments a priori.)

Yes, but what about the subject matter of mathematics? Let us take the simple and clear case of geometry. Geometrical figures are spatial things, pure space, no matter. What about space? What is space, according to Kant?

(. . . (inaudible response). . .)

Yes, but more precisely, form of intuition. In other words, mathematics is based on our pure intuiting, whatever that may mean. Human knowledge in general is vague also but there are two forms of intuition: space and time. They are based also on acts of understanding people. Take the categories. What does Kant do? Kant, instead of using the categories for understanding say a cat, looks at the categories and the forms of intuition and their relation, and so on directly. Kant instead of using the categories makes the categories the theme. Kant's work is distinguished from that which we all do in everyday life and which we do as scientists by the fact that it is self-knowledge - self knowledge not indeed of him as this individual, Kant, but of him as a rational being. Reason knowing itself.

Now there is a question, a very great question indeed. What is the status of this reason knowing itself? Did Kant sufficiently classify the status of this knowledge? In other words. All knowledge has to do with phenomena but a knowledge concerned with the phenomenality, with that which makes possible phenomena, does this not have a radically different status? That is indeed a great question, and one can even say that this was the starting point of the development after Kant in German thought. In other words, is not this pure reason, which Kant claims to have discovered, in its true character, is this not the thing-in-itself? Is this not the actual? One can say that this is exactly the point of Hegel, that the Critique of Pure Reason understood, better understood than Kant understood it himself, means that the absolute, the thing-in-itself, is now for the first time perceived without Kant's being aware of it. Kant had this picture: the phenomenal world, and then there is somewhere the thing-in-itself, as such unknown, and Hegel says - well, I can't go into the argument, but Hegel's fundamental contention is that. That which is the ground of the phenomenal world, which makes possible the phenomenal world, the mind, that is no longer phenomenal, that is the thing-in-itself. That is a very crude statement and must be taken only as such. That is what you had in mind? Good.

Now, let us turn to the Prolegomena, to the introduction, and let us consider two passages. In the fourth paragraph, on page 41, he says,

If metaphysics be science, how does it happen that it cannot win for itself universal and lasting applause like other sciences?

If it is not a science how is it that other . . . footing any longer . . .

What does that follow? In other words, metaphysics always had a dubious status, but why can it not go on any longer? Let us see.

(In comparison with the achievements of physical science . . .)

Let us read the next sentence.

It seems almost ridiculous . . . gaining a single step.

Let us leave it at that. You see, that is only another indication of the crucial importance of the idea of progress. The mere fact that all the sciences progress whereas metaphysics obviously does not progress is an additional proof that metaphysics is not a science, at least not yet a science, and since we are now in this age where we have more clarity about the essentially progressive character of the sciences, we say "put up or shut up". There is no possibility of going on with a pursuit that is not essentially progressive. That is another consideration. Yes?

(. . . (inaudible question) . . .)

Yes, but since there is science - that will be taken up in the preface to the Critique of Pure Reason - from Kant's point of view science does not begin before Galileo. Mathematics of course is Greek but physics does not begin until Galileo. Reason can't know of a single science which was completed! Logic. Logic did not make a single progressive step since Aristotle. So, non-progressivity cannot be in itself a good argument. And another consideration: what about Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Kant's whole enterprise itself? Kant was sure that by himself, or perhaps by some young people trained by him, it would be finished. This height of all sciences, this self-knowledge of reason, the new metaphysics, or however you would call it, would be finished completely by Kant or, at the latest, in the generation after Kant, and then there could not be any further progress. Of course, this is a very popular and provisional statement, but it is still revealing. Now we turn to the third paragraph after this.

Nevertheless, I venture to predict . . . struggle against it for a while.

That is important. Kant does not say that metaphysics is bunk. The utmost he would say is the existence of the previous metaphysics is bunk. What he speaks is the true metaphysics, and this requires a complete reform, but in this man this expression is not strong enough for him, or rather a new birth, a new birth. What is the difference between these two expressions - a complete reform and a new birth?

(Something which has not previously existed is born.)

Yes, in other words, a complete reform would mean there are some elements which should be left - not even that is accepted.

Now let us see, let us go on and read the sequel.

Since the attempts of Locke and Leibnitz . . . (including its derivatives force and action, etc.,) . . .)

And therefore also cause and effect.

(. . . He challenges reason, . . . this idea from herself, . . .)

This idea is the concept of the connection of cause and effect.

(. . . to or hear him by what right she thinks anything to be so constituted, that if that thing be posited . . .)

Let us get this straight, that you understand this. How did he say it? "And he asks reason which pretends to have generated that concept - namely of the connection of cause and effect - of itself", the female gender is used. How did he translate it?

. . . by what right she thinks anything to be so constituted, that if that thing be posited something else also must necessarily be posited; for this is the meaning of the concept of cause . . . In plain language there is not, and cannot be any such thing as metaphysics at all.

Now what then does Kant say about Hume's great work? The connection of cause and effect, Hume is said to have proved, cannot be thought by reason out of concepts. What could that mean? Does anyone have an inkling of this? Of this discussion prior to Kant? I give you an example. Leibnitz has said that there are two - and that is very important for Kant's own doctrine - Leibnitz had said that there are two kinds of verities, verities of reason and verities of fact, and each of these kinds of verities has a principle of its own. The principle of the verities of reason is the principle of contradiction; so you see here is the recent origin of Kant's concept of analytical judgment. The principle of analytical judgment is the principle of contradiction, i.e., you can test the truth of an analytical judgment always without looking at anything, by merely seeing whether the analytical judgment is self contradictory or not. If you say a circle is square you don't have to look around you, you only have to remember what you think by circle. You see that the predicate contradicts the subject. But as for the verities of fact, Leibnitz says, this has the principle, not of contradiction but the principle of sufficient reason. That there is no fact or event which has not a sufficient reason for coming about. As far as I remember, Leibnitz left it at this juxtaposition and then there came a famous professor, Christian Wolff, and among the other things which Wolff did, he proved, or tried to prove, the principle of sufficient reason, which is another statement of the principle of causality. He tried to deduce the principle of causality from the principle of contradiction. In other words that the denial of the principle of causality is self contradictory. Now that had been done before, e.g., Hobbes in De Corpore. Do you remember anything Mr. ___ in Leibnitz?

. . . (inaudible response) . . .)

Kant says that they are irreducible according to Leibnitz himself. That I did not know. What Hume tried to show is that it is impossible to deduce the principle of causality from the principle of contradiction. It is not self contradictory to say that an event happens without having any cause. It is a very difficult question into which I cannot go here, the question as to how far Hume's doubt of causality extends. Recently the discussion does not go beyond this immediate question: the alternative is everything which comes to a beginning, comes into being necessarily out of something and through something. And the other alternative is everything which comes into being may come into being out of nothing, through an omnipotent God, which of course would not be a denial of causality but an assertion of it as unlikely. There are also some passages which go beyond that but what is a difficult question and which would deserve a very close study.

Let us accept Kant's interpretation of Hume at its face value: that Hume has proven the principle of causality, the denial of the principle of causality, is not self contradictory. Then the question arises, how do we know it? And Hume says . . .

(change of tape)

... we expect similar sequences as they have observed in the past. To take a simple example, we have observed in the past that when Spring comes people (. . . in audible few words . . .). This we see year after year but that is of course not a good example. Somehow we observe the sequence as that A followed by B all the time, and we have seen many such sequences. Now this creates an insurmountable inclination to expect B when we observe A. But we don't see any necessity of this. The necessity is only a necessity of our getting accustomed to it. There is no evidence. It is a mere 'psychological state'. There are great questions involved in this very thing and I use somewhat carelessly the term 'law of association'. What about Hume's whole enterprise? Is this not an attempt to explain science by science, the scientific method? I cannot go into that. At any rate, Kant restates here in his way the result of Hume: the principle of causality is not evidently necessary, it is not self contradictory to deny it. What is its status? Now, Kant speaks in the sequel of the fate of human observations, and people did not understand him, and it was not the question, he said, whether the concept of cause was correct, useful, and indispensable, regarding all natural science, for Hume had never questioned that. The question was whether it was thought by reason a priori and in this way had an inner proof, independent of all experience, and, hence, also had probably a more extended usefulness which was not limited to objects of experience. And here Kant indicates the implication of Hume's analysis of causality for metaphysics. Metaphysics is understood by Kant to mean a science a priori, a science in no way based on experience. That is a concept of metaphysics which is typically modern. One cannot say that Aristotle's metaphysics is altogether independent of experience. Think only of the demonstration of the existence of God from motion which Aristotle gives which at the first level is motion, as we say, empirically known. But, at any rate, Kant assumes that metaphysics is a strict a priori science, and metaphysics has to make use of the principle of causality. But if the principle of causality is not an a priori concept then metaphysics as such, as an a priori science, may be used but the principle of causality may not. At the end of the next paragraph, the paragraph beginning, "But to satisfy the conditions of the problem", read.

But to satisfy the conditions of the problem, the opponents of the great thinker . . . It is indeed a great gift of God, . . .

'A great gift of heaven' - why does he have to change that? Go on.

. . . to possess right, or(as they now call it) plain common sense . . . the most thorough thinker, and hold his own.

So, then he develops this whole theme: that an appeal to common sense is altogether impossible in speculative matters. We must keep this in mind and see what Kant's appeal to the moral consciousness, which is so crucial for his whole philosophy, means, later on. Now, let us see the continuation of the argument in the second paragraph following. First, let us read the first paragraph.

I openly confess, the suggestion of David Hume . . . give us no information.

Let us then read the beginning of the next paragraph.

I therefore first tried whether Hume's objection . . . in order to construct its system according to a reliable method.

Now, why did Hume limit himself to causality? Now I here must speak entirely from a very vague memory. Perhaps someone of you remember it better. Hume speaks of a number, three I believe, of principles of connection of ideas. Ideas are connected by constant use, that is one, cause and effect is the other, the third I forgot.

Now what Hume has in mind, the special status of the principle of causality, of cause and effect, is this, that whereas in the two other two cases we do not go beyond the present idea; there is such a going beyond that takes place in the case of cause and effect. The claim of the principle of cause and effect is much higher than that of the others. Hume concentrates on cause and effect. At any rate, from Kant's point of view, cause and effect, this particular way of connecting, is one of many, and Kant believes he has succeeded in discovering the picture of the possible connection, fundamental connection, and he arrived at that by a radical re-statement of the Aristotelian teaching regarding the categories, and linking that up with an analysis of judgment, into which I cannot now go. Let us read only the end of one passage which is important for our purposes. The third paragraph after the one we read.

We have been long accustomed to seeing antiquated knowledge . . . Yet even he did not suspect such a formal science.

Let us leave it at that. You see, Kant claims that it is an absolutely, entirely new science, a science never even thought of before, and of hitherto unknown dimensions, and of even unexpected dimension, has been discovered by Kant. The question is, and Kant does not say anything about this in our present context, what exactly is that new dimension? Now the answer to this question we will find, or at least a sufficient part for our purposes, we will find in the preface to the Critique of Pure Reason, to which we will turn next time.

But I would like to repeat only a point I made before. The whole problem is concentrated in what Kant calls synthetic judgments a priori. In other words, that there are necessary and evident connections which are not established by the principle of contradiction. It is not self-contradictory to question the principle of causality and yet it is very far from being arbitrary - there is a necessity which is no longer simply logical, a true necessity which compels us to assert the principle of causality, and, therefore, the principle of causality is a true principle, not a principle valid on the basis of previous experience and therefore valid only on these other notions. That is the crucial point: anything stemming from experience, from Kant's point of view, can never be of true necessity, and of true universal validity. It always must be supplied with the qualification of up-to-now, and it is not even possible to say that the principle of contradiction has up-to-now always been in fact observed because what men have observed can only be a very small part of the case. An infinite variety of processes are going on all the time which remain absolutely unobserved, maybe all kinds of little elves are behind that. With what right can we exclude that?

To come back to the main point, Kant's great enterprise does not consist in exploiting Hume's critique of causality for asserting freedom, in the way in which some people now use the principle of indeterminacy in nuclear physics. Kant admits, just as Hume before him, there is no escaping absolutely determinism in all our theoretical knowledge. There is full agreement between Hume, and Kant, and Leibnitz, and Hobbes, and Spinoza in this characteristic. But Kant questioned, not determinism but the whole sphere to which determinism congenitally belongs, the sphere of our experience, pre-scientific, scientific, and everything belonging to that. True reality, what Kant calls the thing-in-itself, and the only access to that which we have is the conscience. Next time we will then read the two prefaces.

(end of lecture.)

1

Kant Seminar (7 April 1958) Lecture III

... the points we made in the previous meeting as far as Kant is concerned. I remind you only for the sake of the record that the problem which I'm trying to understand concerns Kant's philosophy of history with a view to the broader problem of history as such, and not merely in the Kantian interpretation. We will come back to that.

We must now try to understand what Kant's overall intention was, and we started from the observation that Kant expressed his gratitude to two great contemporaries, to Rousseau and to Hume, and I will now try to summarize again what he learned from these two men, and the summary is really now mere enumeration without any attempt at interpretation.

What he learned from Rousseau. First, the supremacy of morality. Secondly, morality is primarily recognition of the rights of man. Third, moral progress is fundamentally different from intellectual progress; there is a tension between morality and the theoretical reason, to anticipate later developments, morality requires freedom, theoretical reason denies freedom. Fourth, divorce of morality from happiness. Rousseau says happiness belongs together with goodness, as distinguished from virtue. Happiness and virtue do not belong together. Incidentally, there is of course an older source, in a way famous source, for such a suggestion, but that is a very complicated thing, and that is Plato's Republic - do you remember - the guardians, happiness is of no consideration, justice is, and therefore, no consideration for their happiness; the happiness of the whole and not of the parts, which means also a separation of justice from happiness, as far as individuals are concerned, but that I mention only in passing. Five, it is necessary to show the working of God's wisdom and goodness in the history of man, or to vindicate God's providence by a proper understanding of history. The process from natural man to civilized man is a necessary process. Six, the point where Kant deviates from Rousseau right at the beginning, Rousseau proceeds synthetically, from natural man to civilized man. Kant proceeds analytically, he begins with civilized man. From this it seems to follow that, whereas Rousseau needs history in order to follow this process from natural man to civilized man, Kant, who begins with civilized man, with a phenomenon immediately accessible, does not need history at all. Yet, since Kant begins, not with man, but with civilized man, and civilized man is supposed to be a product of a process, the process of civilization, the historical element is implied in this statement of Kant's, that we begin with civilized man. So, if we put all these things together, with a view to the understanding of Kant's whole philosophy, the supremacy of morality requires the vindication of freedom, moral freedom. Yet, this vindication of freedom must be compatible with the recognition of necessity in its sphere. How could there be such a necessary process if there were not necessity? This much about Rousseau.

Now, what did Kant learn from Hume? Necessity - that means the unqualified validity of the principle of causality. Hume proves, according to Kant, that the principle of causality is not simply rational, it is not self-evident, its denial is not absurd, and it cannot be demonstrated like a mathematical theorem. On the other hand, the principle of causality is not a generalization from experience proper. To understand the principle of causality, there is needed a radical revision of the traditional concept of reason. This radical revision will imply the truth of the supremacy of practical reason over theoretical reason. A new understanding of reason which necessarily implies the supremacy of practical reason. That is the most general formula we can give of Kant's attempt at this stage.

Now, the highest use of reason was thought to be metaphysics, metaphysics have understood primarily as the doctrine of God, and the immortality of the soul, and freedom. The simplest formulation for our purposes would be to take the old medieval definition in Thomas Aquinas - metaphysics is the doctrine of incorporeal beings, God, angels, intelligences, and the soul. The radical revision of the traditional understand

the critique of metaphysics means a radical critique of reason. Now, metaphysics will be understood as that knowledge of supra-sensible things: God, the soul, and so on. As knowledge of supra-sensible things it must be knowledge not based on sense experience. It must be knowledge by pure reason, reason not supported by sense experience. Therefore, the critique of reason must be a critique of pure reason.

Now, let us turn to The Critique of Pure Reason and consider certain passages. The first impression we get after we have looked at the title (we do not now look at the table of contents, although that is always extremely helpful for a first orientation, more interesting, certainly, more informative, than the index) we see the motto, and that is already highly revealing; but I don't want to go into the motto now, but from where is the motto taken? From which writer is the motto taken? Does anyone have the Critique of Pure Reason here? The motto is from Bacon, from Bacon's Instauratio Magna; and that is very interesting, that when this radically revolutionary philosophy appeared, the first - let me say - the hero invoked at the beginning for the auspicious issue of the enterprise is Francis Bacon. We shall see later on whether this was not an accident.

Now, in the preface we shall read only one passage in the first preface, but we shall read more in the second preface. The external justification of Kant's enterprise, the Critique of Pure Reason, is this. Metaphysics has lost now (say 1780) its former position. Once she was regarded as the queen of the sciences and now she is in the state of Hecuba after the conquest of Troy. What prevails is indifference to metaphysics. Is this indifference to what was thought to be the queen of the sciences not a manifest sign of intellectual decay? This is the question Kant asks. And the answer is in this paragraph, the fifth paragraph.

But it is idle to feign indifference to such enquiries, the object of which can never be indifferent to our human nature.

Some of you may think of the remarks of certain contemporary thinkers that metaphysical questions are meaningless. Kant says they can never be indifferent to human nature. By which he doesn't mean they cannot be indifferent to human beings. There are all kinds of human beings. Think of completely lost specialists, but to man, to human nature, they can never be indifferent. Yes?

Indeed these pretended indifferentists, . . . they profess so greatly to despise.

That is also a very topical remark. I have found out in the last few days that there is now since thirteen or fourteen years, without my knowing it, an attempt under way to eradicate metaphysics as completely as it has never been eradicated before by so-called philosophical analysis. And the interesting thing is that the controversies among these people always turn around that their writings always detect some residue of metaphysics in the eyes of the other, and, of course the simon-pure, non-metaphysical positivists have apparently not yet appeared. That is what Kant has here in mind, although he does not think of this particular thing. He is thinking of a more interesting form of anti-metaphysical problems in the eighteenth century. Go on.

Nonetheless this indifference, . . . of the matured judgment of the age.

Now, wait a moment. We will go on in a moment. That is Kant's answer. The context for metaphysics cannot be traced to the intellectual decay of the eighteenth century, the seventeenth century. That is not a decayed age. Think of mathematics. Think of physics, and so on. That is a sign of a maturity of judgment. Now, we turn to the foot-note.

We often hear complaints of shallowness of thought in our age and of the consequent decline of sound sciences.

'of sound' is too weak. 'solid'.

But I do not see that the sciences which rest upon a secure foundation, . . . in the case of physics, even surpass it.

'surpass'? No, I think the present period of 1780 deserves a higher reputation for solidity than that, say of, of 1650. Yes?

The same spirit would have become active . . . directed to the determination of their principles.

Not 'determination', but to the 'correction' of their principles.

Till this is done, indifference, doubt . . . profound habit of thought.

Of the 'solid', that goes through. Our age is not an age of decay, like the Late Roman Empire, for example; but it is an age of solidness.

Our age is, in especial degree, . . . to sustain the test of free and open examination.

So, in other words, Kant first rejects the notion that the eighteenth century is an age of intellectual decay. On the contrary, it is an age of perhaps the greatest maturity of judgment which has ever existed; and part of the proof is the high status of mathematics and physics. But, more than that, the eighteenth century is the age of criticism par excellence, and that doesn't mean here literary criticism, although the concern with the principles of literary criticism was probably more pronounced than in any other age; but literary criticism is of the least importance. The criticism of religion, and government, for which the eighteenth century is so famous. The eighteenth century was characterized by the most radical effort to subject everything to rational criticism in public discussion. When Hegel said later on of the French Revolution it was meant the attempt to stand on its head, that was not merely critical. It meant also that this was the first attempt which men made to establish a rational society on rational principles, starting from scratch. And Kant certainly, while he disapproved of course of the bloody excesses of the French Revolution, he sympathized with the principles of the French Revolution. We must not forget that this was published in years prior to the outbreak of the French Revolution. So, our age is the age of reason, at least everything must now be submitted to the judgment of reason. That was in a way generally accepted. You only have to read D'Alembert, Diderot, Voltaire, to see that this was of course "the spirit of the age". But Kant goes one step further, a decisive step further. He criticizes the criticizer, he judges the judge, reason. Therefore, the title is most proper, critique, which up to now has been the application of reason, the application of reason to every possible standard however sacred. Now, this judge, the highest judge as Locke called it, "man's only star and compass", must now be criticized itself, because it proved to be in need of such criticism. The judge was not always a wise judge, and that has something to do with the problem of religion, as we shall see later where Kant thought that there was a certain criticism of religion which was unwise, unreasonable. To mention only the extreme example, atheism, an atheistic criticism, which of course existed, is, from Kant's point of view the criticism of reason which goes beyond its boundaries. A criticism of revealed religion, on the basis of natural theology, would, from Kant's point of view, be a different story. An atheistic criticism on the basis of reason is thrown out. That is for Kant not a prejudice but he has very definite reasons, as

We shall see. Reason itself must appear before the tribunal of reason - a strange situation. It becomes less strange when you read the sequel in the text where we left off.

It is obviously the effect not of levity . . . This tribunal is no other than the critique of pure reason.

So, in other words, that paradox, that reason should sit in judgment on reason, is no greater than the paradox of self-knowledge. Reason should know itself. That is the most difficult of all enterprises, but an enterprise which has already been tried in a way before, because he says it must undertake the business of self-knowledge again. So, self-knowledge existed to some extent, but now in a radically different way. Now, let us read the sequel, where Kant defines what he understands by the critique of pure reason.

I do not mean by this critique . . . all in accordance with principles

How did he translate that? 'all in accordance with principles'? Yes, but everything from principles would be a more correct translation. So, for us that is the most important passage in the first preface, of 1781. In the second there may be more.

Kant wrote a new preface for the second edition, 1787, which is much richer and much more important, and this preface of course is based on an experience, namely, the experience he had when the book was published, and was grossly misunderstood - even laughed at - in all kinds of ways, and Kant therefore felt it necessary now to state right at the beginning in more concrete terms, more precise terms, what the book was about.

So now we begin at a certain point which is the eighth paragraph, but I must first prepare that - where he speaks of Galileo and Torricelli, do you have that? Just one or two words about what was said before. He begins with a question as to whether metaphysics has reached the stage of science, and let it be clearly understood that metaphysics means here primarily the doctrine of God and of the soul. Ontology, which was traditionally reported as the most fundamental part of metaphysics, is not of much interest to Kant for reasons which we may see later. He is concerned with those questions which are of immediate concern to every human being. The ontological question proper, the question of being qua being, is not of interest to man's spirit. It is only a philosophic question, and only very indirectly, in its consequences, can the ontological question be of genuine importance. But the questions of God and the immortal soul affect every human being. And they are really the urgent and burning questions. So he begins then with the question of whether metaphysics has reached the stage of science. We know this already from the heading and the introduction of the Preface, which we discussed last time. This question, as to whether metaphysics has reached the stage of a science, becomes acute by virtue of the contrast of metaphysics with other purely rational sciences, logic, mathematics, and a part of physics. Logic and mathematics were sciences already in antiquity. Logic - Aristotle. Mathematics - Euclid is sufficient as a proof of that. But the case of physics is different. Physics has become a science only a short while ago. Here we understand the motto from Bacon. Physics became a science by virtue of a revolt in which Bacon plays a significant part. Perhaps Kant suggests we can learn something from physics as to what kind of radical change is required for raising metaphysics to the rank of science, and that means the same, on the basis of what I have shown before, as that we can learn something from physics as to the character of that revision of the notion of reason which is required.

Before we begin to read I would like you to look at the second note a few pages

later. There he speaks of the method which he uses and says, at the beginning of that note, "This method which imitates that of the natural scientist" - that of course does not mean that Kant makes a tremendous issue of such things but it is something more fundamental. The experience of modern physics is crucial for the possibility of the revision of reason which Kant undertakes. That does not mean, as Kant is typically taken to mean, that Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is a philosophy of science. It includes the philosophy of science, but the main function of the Critique of Pure Reason is the preparation of a new and defensible metaphysics. And Kant can not do that without elaborating on his way the philosophy of science. The philosophy of science as a theory of experience, as it was called, is only a means to that end. Now let us turn to this passage where he speaks of the revolution in physics.

When Galileo caused balls, the weights of which he had himself previously determined . . . They learned that reason has insight only into that which it produces after a plan of its own.

'after a project of its own' would be a more literal translation. This is absolutely crucial to Kant; a new light, that men understood it, that reason understands only what reason produces according to its project.

and that it must not be allowed to be kept . . . who compels the witnesses to answer questions which he has himself formulated.

'who compels the witnesses'. That reminds us of Hegel's expression of thinking. Torturing nature. Torturing is a very cruel, even abominable way of getting the truth. At least that is my opinion. But still in the case of a very - in the olden times, if someone was extremely recalcitrant, there was no question that he had murdered someone, but he refused to confess. Then you had to break this bad will by torture. Now let us assume that nature is, in some respects, comparable to such recalcitrant wicked fellows. We may torture him. At least Bacon has no objection to torturing as far as I remember. Did he have any objection to torture?

(Not that I know of.)

No. I think he was even present in one crucial case which is not very nice of him. At any rate, Kant does not say of course torture but, what I'm driving at is only this: the fundamental thought that science means torturing nature and not looking at it, is accepted by Kant in the very beginning. This only to show that the motto from Bacon is very far from being accidental. Yes?

Even physics, therefore, owes the beneficent revolution . . . it must adopt as its guide.

Yes, does this bring out clearly physics owes its revolution exclusively to the happy thought that nature must proceed according to what nature itself puts into nature? Does this come out clearly?

(No, I don't think so. You mean what reason itself puts into nature?)

Yes, reason. I'm sorry. Reason learns something from nature, but in accordance with what nature puts into nature. Is this correct?

(No, what reason puts into nature.)

I see. Now, this is the first remark we have to consider. This implies already the new notion of reason. Reason understands only what it produces according to reason's

our project. One can put this in a way more familiar to us, in a way in which it was stated very emphatically by Collingwood, the fundamental facts in science are the questions. We get the answers by the experiment or by any other observations; but the value of the answers depends entirely on the reasonableness of the questions. And this question, in its fundamental - the question here addressed to nature, in their fundamental structure, not in their details, are the projects of pure reason. A simple example: if I try to investigate into a certain causal connection, say, take this example of Kant's, the relation of oxygen. There is something here presupposed which has nothing to do with this or that particular phenomenon, and that is the principle of causality, that there are necessarily causes and the causes are necessary causes. This principle of causality is the general project of pure reason, which must be specified on the basis of empirical observation in order to become the specific question that we address to this phenomenon. The general character of the question does not stem in any way from observation.

Kant rejects the principle of empiricism, that every knowledge can be reduced to observation or to inferences from observation. On the other hand, he also opposes the classical view, the Platonic and Aristotelian view, that there is an intellectual perception of, say, of ideas, which is the most general formulation. Reason is projecting. Reason is not grasping. One could say, on the contrary, that for Kant projecting reason is very grasping. But, how should I say it? Prehending? Reason is not prehending but projecting. That is, according to Kant, the notion of reason underlying modern physics, even mathematics. The influence of mathematics was not so fundamental as that of physics, because as distinguished from the mere fact that mathematics co-existed for centuries with the old notion of reason, it was this work of Galileo and his successors by which physicists understood something for the first time. This co-operation of reason and experiment, with reason in the leading role, is dependent on the observations for the answers but with the leading role by reason. Now, let us skip the next two paragraphs.

The examples of mathematics and natural science . . . have become what they now are, . . .

By the way, did you notice the word 'revolution'? We had it before. That is quite interesting. I never thought of it. That was written two years prior to the French Revolution. This is not unimportant. There was something in the air.

. . . seem to me sufficiently remarkable to suggest . . . features in the changed point of view . . .

'point of view' is too weak a translation. The 'manner of thinking'.

. . . by which they have so greatly benefited. Their success . . . they bear to metaphysics may permit.

Yes. Experiment, on the other hand, could be the meaning in the context, the general pursuit. It may mean experiment but need not mean it. How shall I say it? A trial. An essay. When we speak of trial and error, let us try it, not experiment. Now, we come to the crucial passage.

Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge . . . the lines' of Copernicus' primary hypothesis.

The 'first thoughts'.

Failing of satisfactory progress in explaining . . . and the stars

to remain at rest.

Now, let us stop here. That is the famous remark which is usually referred to as the Copernican Revolution effected by Kant. In what does it consist? Kant's thoughts show the traditional notion, according to which truth is the agreement of what I think, let me say, with the subject-matter. For example, let the subject-matter be a cat, and if I think about a cat, and I think about the cat that it is green, then that is false because there is no agreement between my thought and the subject-matter, the thing, let me say, the cat. Now, I learn, or perhaps by some adjustment of my eyes, I see that the cat is black, and then I think the cat is black and in fact it is black. So we have here an agreement between my thought about the cat and the cat. That is the doctrine, stated in the simplest possible form, according to which truth is the adequation of the intellect to the thing. If that is truth, then metaphysics would be the adequation of the pure intellect, the intellect not supported by sense experience, to supra-sensory things. Now, what does the Copernican change mean? Why is this concept of truth in the first place, why must the traditional concept of truth, be questioned, according to Kant?

Let us first try to understand Kant. Truth consists fundamentally in the adequation of things to the intellect. That cannot be so simply true, because that would mean for example, if I imagine the cat to be green, the cat must become green, then I will paint it over in order to get the truth. That obviously must mean something more fundamental. The projecting activity of reason, of which we have heard before, which is shown by the actions of the physicists, the projecting activity of reason constitutes the possible object of experience, any possible object of experience. Now, this, however, implies, that in order to get at an actual object of experience I need impressions, as Kant would call it, sense-data, as the subject. So, in other words, what is the precise meaning of the comparison to Copernicus? Kant says it is very clear. The traditional view regards the spectator as resting, as inactive. Copernicus regards the spectator as moving, of course with the earth, as active. The traditional view regarded reason as perceptive, or prehensive. Kant is going to understand reason as acting, as projecting, as constitutive, and Kant's contention is that only under these conditions is it possible to understand mathematics and physics in particular . . .

(change of tape)

. . . yes, that is the assertion. In a way, any difficulty, even of the green cat, arises.

(I don't understand when you say that the notion crudely taken would be absurd, that it would mean we would have to paint the cat green.)

All right. I'll repeat that. The cat, an actual object of experience. Kant does not say that the actual object of experience depends on our projects, for then you would need experiments. The possible object of experience. That there are such things, a cat, a cat is a thing of some sort, that - those fellows say we don't see a cat, you know, we see patches, colored patches, and then that we call it a thing that is "a logical construct". That is what they say. I've read it many times. I could quote you several authors. That is, in a way, a corrupted version of what Kant says. That we are capable to perceive things as things, possible objects of experience, can never be due to sense-perception, which is admitted by those people. And one can have a very simple proof of that. There are other beings in the world that have sense-perception. Dogs, for example. We have no reason to assume that dogs perceive things as things. We don't know that. We have no way of really knowing. Yes? Well, one could even show that they could not because there is a certain connection between things and

classes understood as classes, dogs not cats, which presupposes words, verbal symbols, and therefore, that is a problem. At any rate, what Kant means is that such a thing, a thing causing another thing to behave in that way and being itself produced, caused, by preceding things or states of things, this whole framework of any possible experience, that is the project of reason. This project is, you can say, a frame of reference, but not in the arbitrary sense. It is a natural frame of reference, which we have by virtue of being rational beings, a natural frame of reference without which no perception would be possible, perception in the sense of the understanding of something as something, not mere - because even red goes much beyond any dog or monkey, that is universal. But I do not want to go into deep complexities. The actual object of experience can only be known by the cooperation of the projecting action of the reason and the receptive action, if we can say so, of the sense. So, a green cat, as green cat, can only be empirically known, but that we are capable to think such things as cat, tree, chair, that cannot be traced to sense-perception, and is due to this projecting reason.

The crucial case, from the point of view of Kant, would be the principle of causality where Hume had to leave it at saying that that we think in causal terms is due to an ineradicable habit going on in us by virtue of associations and what not, and which does not have any rationality in itself - you just can't help doing that. Kant tries to show that this is not a mere brute and unintelligible habit but that it is really rationally necessary if there is to be any ordered world as understood world. If there are mere sense-data, and that is the only thing clearly given - that was already said long before Kant - giving our senses colors, sounds, and so on, and so on, but this is not a world, it is not an ordered whole. Where does the order come from? Either the things are ordered in themselves, which was the Platonic-Aristotelian view, then man must have a faculty which allows him to perceive order, and that they meant by reason. Reason they understood as a perceiving, a prehension. But if that doesn't exist for some reason, - let us rule out for certain reasons which we may be able to partly find out, - but if this is ruled out, there is no other possibility but to say that the ordering is the work of the human mind, of reason. These things, in modified and crudified versions, are enormously powerful today. For example, the whole notion of the frame of reference, as it is typically used in the social sciences, presupposes of course that there is something which precedes all observations. Only the present day view of course is that the frame of reference is itself the result of previous experiences, and things of this sort, and so on, and so on.

(Did Kant deny that - I don't see how he could - if we never saw cat we would not have an idea of what cat is?)

Sure, he would not deny that, but the question is - he says in the beginning of the introduction that all our knowledge begins with experience, there is no doubt whatever about that, but, although all our knowledge begins with experience, from this it does not follow at all that all our knowledge arises out of experience for it might very well be that even our experiential knowledge is a composite from that which we receive by impressions and that which our own faculty of knowing, only stimulated by sense-impressions adds from its own.

(Isn't the classical view very similar to this; first, sense-impressions, then -?)

Yes, sure, but the only question is this, that for the classics, as distinguished from all so-called empiricism, Kant agrees with Plato and Aristotle, there must be an independent faculty of reason, which faculty is the higher one, to which alone understanding, as distinguished from mere sensing, is possible. There is full agreement. But the question is, is reason, - we don't make any distinction between reason and understanding now - is reason prehending, grasping something, to which reason adjusts itself, or equates itself, or is reason the origin of this order; human reason?

(How could Kant deny the arbitrary character of arbitrary classifications?)

That's not the point. Reason is not arbitrary. Being reason it is ruled by intrinsic laws. The mere fact that there is such a thing as the principle of contradiction proved to Kant that there are laws of reason of wholly non-arbitrary character, but, according to Kant, there are more such fundamental laws governing the use of reason. It is absolutely necessary to interpret patches and sounds and what have you as things. This necessity is not due to the fact that otherwise we would perish, which we of course would - you know, the organism - but it has a more fundamental reason. It is evidently necessary to interpret these sense-data as qualities of things. The argument of Kant, the whole Critique of Pure Reason is an attempt to show that, and especially to show it against Hume. Hume had said we sensible people say now this, now that, now this, heterogeneous impressions, the causes of these things are in no way perceived, and therefore has no basis in experience, and, as he also shows, it has no basis in reason. Kant tries to show that the very possibility of establishing the temporary perception to the temporary perceiver presupposes the use of causality. What we have as mere impressions, a, b, c, is the merely subjective line but the objective order - for example, I remember only that Kant has somehow this; you find a heavy object on a cushion, you find it. Why is the cushion impressed? In other words, what is the cause of this impression? Have you have simultaneous impressions. The simultaneous impressions cannot be understood properly without recourse to causality. In other words, the distinction between the subjective order of impressions and the objective order of event, without which no intelligent orientation is possible, presupposes causality as a means for establishing the objective temporary order. The details we cannot possibly go into - we would have to devote two quarters at least to the discussion of the central problems of the Critique of Pure Reason.

(Does Kant then mean that what you might call the proper objects of reason, pure reason, are products of the reason itself, imposed on the data received by the senses?)

You can put it this way. The possible object of experience is constituted by reason. The possible object is of course understood not as a simple object, it is understood as one object among many simultaneous perceivings and data. This whole Kant calls nature. Nature, we can say, is the totality of all possible objects, or, if you want to say, of all possible events. This nature is a whole, which is presupposed in any particular observation regarding any particular thing, is constituted by reason. For this reason Kant says Reason prescribes nature its laws. The most fundamental laws of nature are the positings, but the necessary and evidently necessary positings, of reason.

(Why did Kant think that this framework of all possible experience was the same in all men?)

Because they are all human beings. Because there is a human nature. It is human nature.

(So that the argument rests on psychology?)

Yes, that is a very complicated question. I think Kant took for granted that there is a human nature. But how does Kant really proceed? I take one way in which Kant has been interpreted, which is not baseless, which may not be sufficient, and that is this. Kant starts from the fact of genuine science, mathematics and physics, and raises the question how they are possible. And ascends to the condition of possibility of any objective knowledge. But one can enlarge that, because Kant certainly is not concerned merely with science - with our understanding. From Kant's point of view

scientific understanding is only a more radically carried-through form of our ordinary understanding. If a scientist discovers the cause of a certain event he does nothing fundamentally different from what we do if we find out who killed whom. Not radically different, because here too, as you know, the detective cannot simply look for observation; he must have an hypothesis guided by such general notions as motive and opportunity. You have read enough stories to know that as well as I do. So, here also it is the same. Now, Kant ascends from the fact of experience, in its pre-scientific as well as scientific sense, to the conditions of possibility of that experience. On the other hand, it is undeniable that begins the whole argument from the unquestioned premise that man is a rational animal. The great changes which took place after Kant, especially in the latter half of the nineteenth century, were based on this, that people admit, I mean outside of simply positivist circles, that there must be a framework of understanding in there is to be any human life, but they said that these frameworks of understanding differ from society to society. In other words, the system of categories, if we can use this term, is not, as Kant said, one and the same for all men, but there is a variety of such. Sociology of knowledge is such a form of that. So, these Kantian things, in modified forms, affects much of present-day thought, but of course not in the strict sense in which Kant meant them.

- (As to the classical view that there is an order in the external world, would Kant have to deny that or could he really admit this as a possibility, and, whether there is or not . . . ?)

Well, of course he would, in a way, naturally admit it, but he would say this: the necessity of such an order can never be understood from experience, because all experience is open to this objection: maybe up to now; with what right can I expect its conservation? There cannot be necessity and universal validity derived from experience. That it should be possible to grasp necessities, objective necessities - to use this word for the last time in this course, except only in senses in which Kant himself legitimated - that Kant denies. There is no possibility. The only form of pretension which man has is sense-prehension. There is no intellectual prehension. That is axiomatic for Kant.

- (He is not lead to a denial, an outright denial, of order in the external world?)

No, no. That is a very great problem, and in a way the Critique of Judgment has been written to clarify that. I give you the practical consequence, where it really comes out. Kant admits it as a matter of course, that a science of living beings must be teleological, that you cannot understand animal without speaking of function; a very simple thing, and to use this as a significant term, and not in a sterilized way, means teleological understanding. Function for, stomach for, and so on, and so on. But Kant says we cannot assert, we do not know, that the living beings are teleological. We must use teleology as an heuristic principle - we cannot begin to study the stomach without knowing what the stomach is for, or without raising this question - but we have no knowledge of teleology, whereas as far as the mechanical laws are concerned, that is knowledge. I can't say more now because it would become infinite and we must try to proceed in an orderly fashion.

- (In what is the necessary nature of human beings self-rooted for Kant, assuming that it isn't self-positing?)

I can give you only one answer, which is bound to be absolutely cryptic. In the ego cogito. In the "I think". We may take this up at a later stage.

- (What did you mean when you said that the classics took the capacity . . .)

Receptive. Aristotle uses this term. In Plato sometimes too. It is a kind of

being-affected, patient, being-affected. It is a very simple point. If you would sit down and read slowly the fourth chapter of Aristotle's On the Soul, the third book, then you would get the most coherent statement which we have, but it would be very difficult to understand. But take the simple things as they are presented in so many Platonic dialogues and that is fundamentally correct. We view, we grasp, we see, with our mind's eye, essential necessities. Did you never hear this - this is even in positivistic debates; to study facts, and to have all kinds of theories, and what not, and then the question is raised: What's the pattern? If you don't see a pattern it ceases to be an interesting study, but sometimes you see a pattern. That is a Platonic expression. You see, you don't impose it, you see a pattern. Have you ever had this experience, that out of a mere agglomeration of all kinds of data suddenly some order comes to sight, an order which is in there, but which you have not previously seen? Let us leave it at this simple and homely example, that every social scientist speaks of becoming aware of a pattern. That is a recollection of what Plato and Aristotle meant.

(Yes, but wasn't it for Kant also that he saw a certain order which exists because if he would create it . . .)

Not he, but reason incarnate, reason in you.

(Yes, but I remember reading about the moral law, that he was stressing that the moral law is binding on all reasonable beings, and not only on men . . .)

Oh no. That is simple. Practical reason has an entirely different status. In practical reason, moral law, reason is fully determinate without the help of sense-perception and therefore the specifically human doesn't come in, whereas in theoretical reason, reason is determining only with the help of sense-perception; i.e., a human peculiarity, and therefore the human comes in here. But we must now return. You raise all kinds of very necessary questions but we must stick to the surface of the argument. Otherwise we will not make any progress. Now, let us read the sequel, where we left off after the Copernican Revolution.

A similar experiment can be tried in metaphysics . . . know anything of the latter a priori

In other words, Kant denies implicitly that there can be a prehension of evident necessity. That is the crucial implication of this statement.

but if the object (as object of the senses) . . . are thought solely through reason, and indeed as necessary but

No, not "necessary", but "and indeed are necessarily thought". It is not arbitrary that we think it.

which can never - at least not in the manner in which reason . . . of things only what we ourselves put into them.

Yes, What is the main point he is trying to make? From the previous analysis, or report, of what he has done it follows that reason is unable to know anything of non-sensible things. Reason can only sketch the outlines, the essential outlines, of possible objects of experience, and possible objects of experience means possible objects of sensible experience. Reason has no possibility of knowing, in any way, supra-sensible objects, i.e., metaphysics in the traditional sense is impossible. Metaphysics, as the knowledge of spiritual substances, is impossible. But Kant makes here an important distinction between knowing and thinking. I can know, strictly speaking, only sensible things, because the mere possible object is not yet knowledge;

that is only the framework of knowledge. But I can think, and I must think, supra-sensible things, say God and the soul. But I cannot know them because in order to know them I would need sense-experience of them, or sense-experience necessarily leading up to them, and sense-experience is utterly unable to do so, as Kant claims to have shown in the second part of the Critique of Pure Reason, in the dialectics.

(In that case Reason thinks but it doesn't know?)

Yes.

(Well, you said that for Kant then the activity of reason consists in its projects, in the sense in which you spoke of before. The scholastic notion of abstraction Kant denies altogether.)

No, he would not deny that. For example, that our concept of cat is abstracted from particular cats, Kant would admit. That's no problem. But that is only empirical. It lacks true necessity.

(How does Kant know that reason can know nothing of non-sensible things, or how does Kant know that there is no such thing as intellectual perception?)

I do not remember any explicit discussion of that. Later on, in the nineties, a certain successor of Kant's began to speak of intellectual intuition, which played then a great role up to, but not including, Hegel. And Kant rejected that altogether. That would lead us very far, in that what Kant calls here thinking, as distinguished from knowing, very crudely stated, we must think, say an intelligent author of the world. This intelligent author of the world would not have any receptivity, receptivity as opposed to the existence of the things he makes - an originary intellect, as Kant calls it. Kant's premise can be stated as follows: intellectual intuition would be possible only for a creator proper. The Platonic-Aristotelian notion is no longer discussed and that has something to do with the pre-history of Kant with both Locke and Leibniz. That would lead us now too far.

(Which kind of intellect, thinking or knowing, is reflected in the argument of the Critique itself?)

Yes, that was the question raised last time. Is the Critique of Pure Reason not knowledge? Now, it is obviously not knowledge of a sensible kind. Nor is it like mathematics. That is a very great question, and we will later come across such. I only want to have the first argument now. Let us look towards the end of the next paragraph, where Kant draws the conclusion from his general sketch.

But when all progress in the field of the super-sensible . . . though only from a practical point of view

From a practical "intent" would be a more literal translation.

speculative reason has thus at least made room . . . by practical data of reason.

I will try to explain this in the most elementary, but by no means sufficient, way. This analysis of reason, in its use in experience, leads to the consequence that there is possible only, what we may call, relative knowledge, knowledge of the conditions of some events, or some types of events, which question immediately will lead, or sooner later, to the question of the condition of these conditions, and that goes on in infinitum.

We can never come beyond the stage of the knowledge of the conditions. But the very notion, the very awareness of the relative, presupposes an awareness of the absolute. It is impossible to think the relative without measuring the fact by something absolute. Kant uses the term "the unconditioned". So we must think the unconditioned, we must think it, but we can never know it. All our knowledge is relative in the sense that it is knowledge of conditions within certain limits essentially pointing to further inquiries of these conditions in infinitem. But this awareness presupposes an awareness of some unconditioned, or absolute. We can only think, we cannot know. But there is one way, Kant says, in which we have some access to that unconditioned, and that is the moral consciousness. Speculative reason has no prospect whatever in the field of the supra-sensible, but perhaps it finds, in its practical knowledge, data which permit it to determine the transcendent, rational concept of the unconditioned. I cannot say more than this now. Man has an awareness of the unconditioned, beyond the mere thinking of the unconditioned, in the moral law, and, therefore, the only possible metaphysics can be one based on the moral law. In very crude and provisional terms, Kant believes he can prove that we cannot consistently be decent people, act morally, if we do not believe in God. That is the only way in which we can "know" of God. But Kant doesn't call that knowledge but belief, but he says that this belief is a rational belief, because its sole basis is a rational law of action, the moral law. This is the general way in which Kant proceeds. Now, we must read a few more passages. We drop the next paragraph.

But, it will be asked, what sort of a treasure . . . supplant reason in its pure (practical) employment.

Now, what Kant has in mind is this: if we do not limit reason, theoretical reason, to its use in the field of sensible experience, as a limited field, then there is a danger that we absolutize these principles which we use, and must use, in understanding the world of experience. And that leads to the consequence, since absolute determinism is an essential implication of this experiential understanding, that there remains no place for freedom. So, by restricting the use of reason to a definite field, to the field of experiential knowledge, in the strict sense of the word, we leave room, we gain room, for asserting freedom. That is the positive use. And?

So far, therefore, as our Critique limits . . . that the police are of no positive benefit.

And so on. Kant here tries to defend himself against the very simple and obvious kind of criticism - well, critique - that is a purely negative thing. But in this connection he gives us certain points. The defense of morality is possible only by virtue of such a critique. You remember, when I spoke of Rousseau last time, I spoke of the necessity, admitted by Rousseau, of a Socratic wisdom, which defends the conscience? This conscience is threatened by false theories. There is, therefore, a need for the defense of the conscience, and that is Socratic wisdom, in Rousseau's sense of the term. This Socratic wisdom is, in a way, the most important function of Kant's critique. Theoretical metaphysics might seem to be morally necessary, namely, God and immortality. The fundamental premises of morality, according to Kant himself, are said to be established by theoretical metaphysics, but Kant says theoretical metaphysics has no higher status than the atheistic, deterministic, rude, science. What a materialist says, or an atheist, what a deterministic materialist says, has not a lower status than what the speculative theist and spiritualist says. So, by allowing any use of theoretical reason beyond that limited field of experience - I must also consider not only what happens to spiritualistic metaphysics, I must also speak of what is going to happen on the part of the materialistic, deterministic thinkers whose doctrine is incompatible with morality. Therefore, the critique of reason shows not merely that theoretical reason is limited to experience, but also, and above all, that practical reason is necessarily

independent of experience, or that practical reason is essentially supra-experiential, supra-sensory.

(What status does reason have if it in no way prepares the necessary, deterministic workings of the world of experiential knowledge?)

The answer of Kant is given in the immediate sequel, by the distinction between phenomena and things in themselves. The materialistic, deterministic, atheistic procedure is absolutely necessary in the field of phenomenal knowledge, according to Kant, absolutely necessary, but by realizing that the phenomenal world is not true reality you see at the same time the limited status of materialism and so on. From Kant's point of view, for the first time both materialists and spiritualists appear to be metaphysical because they transcend the legitimate sphere of theoretical knowledge. And all positivism, of course in this respect, is distinguished from Kant. A beautiful document is Lenin's Criticism of Mach. Mach was one of the founders of a more recent type of positivism and for him philosophy consisted in what he called analysis of sensations, no assertions that there are things. And that was as opposed to spiritualism as to materialism, and then Lenin, who, among his many vices had also a certain robust common sense, attacked him in a book, Empirical Criticism and Diabectical Materialism, or whatever the exact title is, which is quite interesting to read for a certain simple sense, for truth.

That is very long section now we must read that somehow but I believe we postpone it until next time and look rather at some other part. We have to read, indeed, quite a few of the following remarks. Perhaps, I take some shorter passages. This very long paragraph, at the end of it, Kant gives another characterization of what he is doing, what he says, "If one takes into consideration the inestimable advantage which the Critique of Pure Reason brings, to finish for all times with all objections against morality and religion in a Socratic manner, namely, through the clearest proof of the ignorance of the adversaries". Confronted with the atheists, for example, Kant will refute them in a Socratic manner - you don't know what you assert. You claim to know. The utmost you can claim is, in your capacity as dealing with thinkable experience, scientific or pre-scientific, you have to proceed on deterministic, materialistic premises, but that is for coming. What Kant tries is to show that, while his first attack, the first aim of his attack, seems to be the traditional, spiritualistic metaphysics, he emphasizes that he is as much opposed to the opposite view, to the atheistic, deterministic, materialistic view. It is interesting that the term, Socrates, occurs in this context. Kant's critique of reason is really Socratic wisdom in the way in which Rousseau understood the word - defense of the conscience, but of course a defense of the greatest possible sophistication.

Now, these other passages we disregard now. Now, because I think one should not end such a meeting with some detail, we come back to some details next time. I would like to now state the broader questions which emerge.

We have heard two since we have heard from Kant - whether we have understood them is an entirely different matter - first, the true basis of metaphysics is morality, not theoretical knowledge of any kind. For example, it is impossible, according to Kant, to prove the existence of God by ascending from the visible universe, say either by the Aristotelian way or by looking at the order, the teleological order - Kant tries to show that this argument has no power whatever. The true basis of metaphysics, i.e., of the rational statements, if I may say so, about God and the immortality of the soul, is morality. And the second point is the Copernican Revolution; reason is projective, constitutive, not receptive or passive. Two questions arise: first, only in and through morality does man become aware of the super-sensible. Only morality is not, and cannot be, in need of experience, but is purely rational. Why? Second, is there

a connection between the supremacy of practical reason, that practical reason alone opens up to us a vista into the thing in itself, is there a connection between the supremacy of practical reason and the new view of theoretical reason? Is there an essential connection, in other words, between the assertion that the true basis of metaphysics is morality and the Copernican Revolution - reason is projecting, constituting?

Now, we turn perhaps now to the first question and begin with this question. And for this purpose we turn to a much later passage, at the beginning of the dialectics, the section on the Ideas in General. One word must be said for our purposes now. Kant is compelled to make a distinction between the understanding and reason. This distinction is entirely different than the traditional distinction between understanding and reason. In the traditional view the understanding is the higher of the two. The understanding, let us say, is the faculty of mental perception, and reason is the faculty of connecting, distinguishing, and so on, the objects of mental perception. In Kant, understanding is the faculty by virtue of which we can order, organize, the sense-data. What we do in ordinary life as well as in science, is to use understanding for interpreting sensation. The use of the principle of causality is one of these. In other words, in all dealings with the conditions only the understanding comes into play. But we are compelled to think the unconditioned, or, if you please, the absolute - which does not primarily mean God, but absolute simply as the opposite of the conditioned. This is where reason comes in. Reason is, in a way, the higher faculty, but it is also the emptier faculty. So reason has for Kant, as he puts it, only a regulative, not a constitutive use. Understanding is constitutive, constitutes the possible objects of experience. But the horizon of infinite prospect in studying the conditions of conditions, and so on, this prospect of infinity, without which science is impossible, but of which it cannot make any concrete use, given this implication, that is reason.

We will get a somewhat clearer idea from what we shall read now, because Kant calls the concept of reason, as distinguished from the concept of the understanding, Ideas, an old term which he re-interprets. We begin here.

Plato made use of the expression "idea" . . . that is coincident with it.

So, in other words, Kant's simple point is this. Aristotle's categories - that corresponds to what Kant calls the concepts of the understanding. These concepts of the understanding, Kant says, are of such a nature that in experience there can be found nothing subsequent with it. Causality? We find specific causal relationships. Qualities, as constitutive? We find things with qualities. Or take the other Aristotelian categories. Quality, Cause, of course we find the other categories in sense-experience. Kant interprets the difference between Aristotle and Plato in these terms whereas Aristotle had in mind . . .

(change of tape)

. . . the idea is more lofty than the Aristotelian categories.

For Plato ideas are archetypes . . . the old ideas, now very much obscured

No, that is a terrible translation. "According to his opinion, they flow from the highest reason, and have become" - is there no other English translation? Why don't you read it, then.

from that source . . . in its original state

namely, the human reason.

but is constrained . . . very much obscured.

In other words, Kant gives here an extremely crude summary of the most strife, the traditional view of that. We don't have to go into that. But he's driving at something else.

I shall not engage here in any . . . in opposition to his own intention.

This is a very famous phrase, to understand an author better than he understands himself. Someone told me the phrase is older than Kant, a reliable man. I forgot who but it is not interesting. Now Kant means it of course here, in this expression, in a very sober and limited sense - it is possible to understand another human being, even a very great human being, under certain conditions, better than he understood himself and therefore what Kant is saying here is not meant to be an interpretation of Plato's teaching as Plato meant it, but Kant gives here the notion which Plato suggested to him, and these notions which Plato suggested to Kant are from Kant's point of view more defensible and truer than what Plato explicitly said.

Plato very well realized that . . . in order to be able to read them as experience.

You see spelling and reading are used here in a strict metaphor. The mere experiences must be spelled, must be reduced to something like letters in order to be able to be read as a theme. The spelling and reading goes beyond anything which mere sensation can possibly give. The understanding as distinguished from the mere being struck by something, by a sense-datum - that is the function of understanding.

He knew that our reason . . . may keep us far removed from its complete achievement.

Thank you very much. Let us stop here for a moment. I see here Kant gives the reason why moral knowledge cannot possibly be derived from experience. Experience shows us all this, Kant says, and Plato agrees with that, only imperfect human beings or imperfect institutions, let me say, but we cannot possibly recognize them as imperfect if we do not know the perfect. That's strict and good Platonism. At least Kant limits it to the practical field entirely, not entirely as we shall see later, but chiefly. The 'ought' can never be refuted by the fact that it is never fully realized. Without that, Kant says, we are bound to degrade morality. The distinction between 'is' and 'ought', which today is used as the greatest engine for bolstering up the most atrocious cynicism, was made by Kant in order to avoid and to destroy the basis of any cynicism. This is the fate of wrong ideas. That is as simple a statement that we can find, at least in the Critique of Pure Reason, why moral knowledge must be purely a priori, in no way based on experience. Therefore, whereas theoretical knowledge cannot but be based on experience, moral knowledge cannot possibly be based on experience. That is the outcome of the problem. And if it is true, as Kant assumes as a matter of course, that purely rational knowledge has necessarily a higher status than knowledge which is not purely rational, moral knowledge alone gives an access to the unconditioned.

He goes on now to say in a very remarkable passage - by the way, those of you who are familiar, more or less, with the history of Platonic interpretation in the nineteenth century, must recognize how tremendous the influence of these pages is on Platonic interpretation. For example, that the basic experience of Plato is the moral experience was said infinitely often but I read things of this sort. It is of course not without some confirmation from Plato, that is another matter, but this precision which Kant gives it is quite remarkable. Now, let us read, however, the immediate sequel.

The Republic of Plato has become proverbial . . . participates in the ideas.

Brucker was one of the first German historians of philosophy.

We should, however be better advised . . . philosopher leaves us without help,

He doesn't say the great philosopher, 'the excellent man', because that is more than philosophy in a technical sense.

where the excellent man leaves . . . I do not speak of the greatest happiness, for this will follow of itself

You see?

is at any rate a necessary idea, . . . ideas in the making of the laws.

Now let us stop for one moment. You see here Kant replaces the content of Plato's Republic by his notion of a rational social order, and it is of course strikingly different from the Platonic one but it concerns only what I said to begin with, the concern of the rights of man is a primary consideration of Kant. But Kant says, still, in spite of the fact that Plato's Republic is completely indifferent to freedom, as Kant understands it, yet, the formal character of the Republic, its being an idea, as Kant calls it, an idea, is the model of the true idea of the rational society. And one must imitate Plato, not in the content of the Republic, which is impossible from Kant's point of view, but in the intransigence in which Plato kept it clear from any objection based on experience. That this is not in any way correct because Plato's Republic is of course meant to be based on experience, I do not want to go into that now - we are trying to understand Kant. And that is a remarkable vindication of Plato against the extreme pedestrianism of the empiricism of the eighteenth century contrasted with Hobbes, Locke, and Hume, and therefore that had an enormous effect. Still, note the changed content. The perfect constitution in which the freedom of each can co-exist with that of everyone else under laws, that is the right order. And it is not concerned, as Kant emphasizes, with happiness. A good society is not as such directed to happiness, as it would be according to the Declaration of Independence, unless you emphasize the distinction between pursuit of happiness and happiness, and say the pursuit of happiness is the same as freedom, which one could say. And now the sequel and the end of the paragraph.

Nothing, indeed, can be more injurious . . . all good intentions.

I think that is intelligible to you, living on in very much of present-day thought, especially in the liberal version. For example, the reference to experience, say certain people, classes, races, or whatever it may be, should not have these rights, or privileges because it has been shown that they would misuse them. And Kant says yes, but we have to consider the fact that their inability to use them is due to a preceding injustice, namely, to the fact that they were brought into a condition where they could not possibly become citizens. In other words, it is really a revolutionary principle which Kant - I mean, not revolutionary as novel, but in the sense in which it leads to a revolution necessarily.

The more legislation and . . . whatsoever would be required

Plato, to the best of my knowledge, never says that.

this perfect state may never . . . may have to come to a stand

'have to come' must be emphasized, because there may be a limit.

and how great a gulf . . . beyond any and every specified limit.

In other words, that is another implication implied in Kant's reinterpretation of

the ideas, and to some extent is perhaps implied in the Platonic idea itself. The idea can never become realized. But there are very different degrees of realization, more or less. There is no assignable limit to the approximation. In other words, infinite progress towards the idea is essentially possible. This essential possibility of infinite progress cannot possibly be refuted, according to Kant, by an appeal to experience, because the ground of the idea is beyond experience. This notion of the possibility of infinite progress - take the example of infinite progress towards the rational society - does not of course mean that the historical process as such is in fact progressive; that is an entirely different proposition. The essential possibility of infinite progress is essential to the idea of the rational society.

Now, here at this moment we touch on our problem of history, of progress. Does not the possibility of infinite progress towards the rational society presuppose the infinite duration of human life on earth? If we are compelled to assert on the basis of theoretical knowledge that human life on earth is not of infinite duration, how can we bring two things together? Perhaps this is one reason why Kant did not elaborate a philosophy of history. Because an assertion regarding the historical process means to make an assertion regarding the world in which we live. An assertion of this kind is a composite of a practical, moral assertion, that the rational society ought to be our goal, and a theoretical assertion regarding the duration of human life on earth. There is a certain tension between these two assertions, and therefore when Kant speaks of what morality compels us to hope for or to believe he does not mention anything of this, but he mentions the immortality of the soul, because the assertion of a life after death can in no way conflict with theoretical knowledge. We cannot prove nor can we refute the assertion of life after death. One reason why Kant did not elaborate a philosophy of history, or spoke of a philosophy of history only in a kind of occasional reference whereas the great theme of his metaphysics, God and immortality, is this: that in the case of any assertion regarding the historical process theoretical knowledge, i.e., not knowledge necessarily following from the dictates of the conscience, but is necessarily evident. Whether that is sufficient we must see.

(Inaudible question)

But that is the point where one does something which Kant did not want to do, and that is a kind of dream. That is to say, making assertions regarding the visible universe which cannot be refuted - because you don't have the instruments, but which in their nature are subject to confirmation or refutation by sense-data, whereas assertions regarding the soul and God cannot possibly be affected by any possible process of science.

(It seems to me that the assumption of unlimited possibility must lead to . . .)

Yes, but Kant doesn't assert it for this reason. In other words, one can state it as follows: Kant's moral philosophy, which culminates in the social philosophy exemplified by Bacon about the rational society, is, in Kant's own opinion, incomplete without postulates of practical reason. We must hope or believe in order to act morally. Kant gives the example of Spinoza and says that Spinoza was a decent man and made some assertions about fundamental things . . . (a few inaudible words) . . . We cannot possibly act morally without having a moral horizon. There are two forms in which this could be stated: immortality of the soul and eternal life after death, or progress in science. Kant was of course familiar with both possibilities and he spoke of both of them, but it is striking that in the systematic presentation of the postulates only the immortality of the soul occurs, and not social progress in any way. And it is a difficult question. One must see what the reasons are. I believe one reason is that in the immortality of the soul no hypothesis of scientific character affecting subjects on which science is competent to speak enters. In the case of progress, infinite progress on earth, of

course Kant would say that. I believe that wholly apart from Kant's personal belief - you know there are all kinds of books that have been written on this, that he was from a lower middle-class pietist family, from which he got his religious simplicity, and from the lower middle-class in Prussia he got a certain submissiveness, and obsequiousness; and therefore he spoke all the time of duty - I mean this nonsense of course must be denied but when you think of the serious considerations here that Kant took . . . (a few inaudible words) . . . Given this fundamental distinction, given this broad outline of the problem, the immortality of the soul has a systematic preferability to the infinite progress on earth. And that must be considered. Whether it is sufficient is an entirely different question. It is interesting that precisely because the immortality of the soul was dropped by Kant's successors, who, therefore, became philosophers of history. Whether they took care of the problem created by the possible finite duration of life on earth, that is a question which is generally regarded today as unimportant, because who cares what will happen after seven billion centuries or whatever the most recent figures, but for a philosopher, the distinction between a thousand years of course and seven billions of years, and n billions of years, and true semitermity and eternity is crucial. Absolutely crucial. The attitude of the practical man, businessman, statesman is admirable in its sphere but it is limited. Of course it makes a enormous practical difference whether we know that earth will be destroyed during the lifetime of our children or whether it will be destroyed a thousand years from now. It makes an enormous difference for our passions, our affection but from a philosophical point of view the bigness of the numbers is of no importance. And in Kant, whatever we may believe about the immortality of the soul, there is implied a certain reservation regarding history, regarding human experience. I will explain this next time, that when so-called existentialism, especially in its original character, was a return to Kant, in this sense. But I see one thing with great clarity, that we still have to take up a number of things regarding these points I mentioned. Avec une clarté grande, as Descartes once said in a more important . . .

(end of lecture)

Now, I remind you only of the general points we made, on the basis of a consideration of Hume. The first point which Kant tries to establish is the supremacy of practical reason, morality, which means to dethrone speculative reason. There is no possibility of knowledge of supra-sensible things. On the other hand, that is to be traced primarily to Hume. Kant regarded it as indispensable to revise radically the traditional concept of reason. Knowledge of sensible things - this is Kant's answer - is based on a projection by reason of the possible objects of sensible experience. These are the two points which appear at the first acquaintance with Kant. No knowledge of supra-sensible things. No metaphysics in the traditional sense is possible. But knowledge of sensible things does not have the character which it generally assumes. Knowledge of sensible things is based on the projection by reason of possible objects of experience.

Now, we must see how these two assertions make possible the assertion of the supremacy of practical reason, of morality. It is the fourteenth paragraph from the beginning in the Second Preface. Kant had spoken of the fact his work being the Critique of Pure Reason might be thought to be of a merely negative kind, and then he goes on to show that it has a positive usefulness. To deny to this work of the Critique a positive usefulness is - but go ahead and read; this is already too far.

But, it will be asked, what sort of a treasure . . . limited to mere objects of experience.

Let us stop here for a moment. Is the thought of Kant clear, in a general way? Then we can perhaps go into special difficulties or intricacies to which he has referred. All possible theoretical or speculative knowledge is limited to mere objects of experience. That is the result of the Critique. We do not have to go into the question of how this is derived. But the result must be understood as such; otherwise we cannot go forward. Is this point clear - all possible speculative knowledge is limited to mere objects of experience, which means to mere objects of sensible experience? There is no possible speculative knowledge of non-sensible experience. Now let us continue to get the other part of Kant's thesis. Where we left off.

But our further contention . . . appearance without anything that appears . .

That there 'could' be an appearance without that which appears. Let us stop here and read the note where Kant explains what he means by that.

To know an object I must be able . . . it may lie in those that are practical.

So, the question arises: we know things, trees, so on. Kant says that the Critique of Pure Reason proves that these are only appearances, or phenomena. Kant contends that this is implied - that there are things-in-themselves, which, for the same reason, are inaccessible. We must take this to begin with as a merely dogmatical expression. There is a very great difficulty here which was noticed by one of the earliest critics of Kant, that without the things-in-themselves, as he put it, one cannot enter into Kant at all, and with it one cannot stay within it. But, whether there is not a necessity for Kant to assert that we must see later. But that is crucial - the contention that genuine knowledge of the phenomenal world implied for Kant necessarily, that the things-in-themselves are inaccessible to us. But he goes on to say we can think the things-in-themselves while we cannot know them. Now, what does this distinction between thinking and knowing mean? I can think everything, Kant says, which is not self-contradictory. Perhaps a golden mountain is not self-contradictory, or a chimera. Then it would be possible. But Kant adds logically impossible, meaning, it does not involve a contradiction. But a logical possibility is not yet a real possibility, as Kant puts it. It does not prove that the thing in question is truly possible. For example, in the case of the chimera, assuming that it is not self-contradictory, a beast which is

a raven in front, a goat in between, and a dragon at the end, we still don't know whether it is possible in the nature of things. We would have to know much more than we do about goats as well as about dragons to answer this question.

Now what about supra-sensible beings, God, the soul. We can think them. In that sense they are logically possible. The concept of God, or of the concept of the incorporeal and immaterial soul, is not self-contradictory, Kant says. But what about the objective, the real, possibility? That is not guaranteed by the logical possibility. Well, we need some data for that, and Kant says that these data do not have to be supplied by theoretical knowledge; they may be supplied by moral knowledge, by the conscience, you can say. The facts of the conscience, or given by the conscience, may show us that these notions of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are not merely logically possible but practically - for the sake of morality - necessary.

I'm now concerned only with helping you and myself towards a very provisional understanding of Kant's intention. There are many very difficult questions at every step. If there is a particularly obnoxious stumbling-block to any of you in these points which I have mentioned now don't hesitate to bring these questions up, and if some difficulties can be disposed of by a brief discussion that would be all to the good.

(Is it possible to know about things-in-themselves even that they are logically possible?)

You mean, for example, whether incorporeal beings is not a contradiction in itself. Kant obviously implied that the notion of an incorporeal being is not contradictory in itself. That he implied.

(. . . (inaudible question) . . .)

Kant would simply say, tell me what you understand. The soul as an incorporeal being, Kant contends, does not contain any contradiction. How would it be self-contradictory? In a way Kant does argue, in certain parts of the Critique of Pure Reason, that the denial of it is based on an obsolescence of 'matter'. Let us therefore enter into an analysis of matter, which Kant in a way does in the Critique of Pure Reason and we would show that matter necessarily disintegrates as you begin to analyze. In other words, the assertion that incorporeal beings is self-contradictory is based on a dogmatic and unanalyzed concept of matter or body. But surely great difficulties arise here as well as regarding the notion of God as a being possessing all perfections. Kant was aware of this difficulty but he said, he contends, there is no possibility of a logical contradiction here.

(Why can't you think a contradictory thought? I mean at least entertain a contradictory thought?)

Yes, sure, we do that unfortunately all the time. But what does that mean? That means with one hand we give something and with the other we take it away, so what remains is zero. That is, from both Kant's and Aristotle's point of view, extremely simple. To contradict oneself means to say nothing. You wipe out by the second action what you have posited by the first. For Kant that was no problem. A contradictory thought is an absurd thought. Strictly speaking that is impossible. When you think that the cat is green and the cat is not green that contains some reality, namely, that there are such things as cats and there are such things as colors. Surely, that is a non-contradictory thought. But the combination of the ascription of one color and the denial of that ascription to the same being makes you to say nothing.

(Can non-empirical concepts be more than purely negative? That is, Kant at some

points speaks of a concept of a mere X with no content in it whatsoever. Wouldn't all content belong to empirical concepts?)

There are these ideas of reason, of which Kant speaks in the dialectics. As follows: all empirical knowledge, in the sense of scientific knowledge, is knowledge of cause and effect, let me say very crudely, of conditions of conditioned things, and then of course of the conditions of these conditions, in infinite regress. But we cannot understand that thought of condition, according to Kant, without being aware of the unconditioned. We cannot be aware of relativity except to an opposing absolute. In a way this X of which Kant speaks has a certain definiteness by being decidedly non-conditioned, non-relative, and for Kant there is a necessity for man to think God, meaning one God, the unconditioned, cause of everything else. It is necessary, from Kant's point of view, for human reason, but to think God and to know that he is, are two entirely different things. The thought of God means not more than to think that God is possible. And it remains a mere logical possibility, and therefore empty, unless the data of the conscience compels us to assume that God is. No analysis of phenomena, Kant says, can ever compel us to assume that God is. There is no possibility of demonstrating the existence of God. But there is a practical necessity to assume the existence of God or to believe in the existence of God. So, in other words, what Kant calls the concepts of reason, or ideas, are not so completely empty, they are, especially, not arbitrary. A unity of the whole. We cannot help thinking and demanding a unity of the whole, and this unity is not complete, but on the other hand this unity can never be found in experience, and it can never be known to be but we must think of it. The concrete form of this unity is the idea of God. And to know that God exists is impossible. To think God is necessary. You can put it this way. The same would apply to the soul, the immortality of the soul, as well. We must think that but we cannot know it. That is implied in everything. The development of this part is given in Kant's doctrine of the ideas, in the first part of the dialectics.

(The problem that we must think these concepts of such attributes as unconditioned, unextended, non-temporal as purely negative. That is, do we get to the idea of a supra-sensible thing except by taking an empirical concept and one by one stripping it of its empirical attributes until we are left with something that is not empirical but purely negative?)

Yes, but the question is whether that is a merely arbitrary thing, this stripping, whether there is an evident necessity of our reasoning which does not compel us to do so, and, indeed, they lead in a way to empty abstractions. You can put it this way. Meaning, we cannot know if these beings are. We can never know that, but the question is whether we are not compelled by moral practical reason to assume this.

(How about specific attributes, such as God is just?)

Yes, we must assume that. That is part of it, that we must assume that God is holy, etc. That is developed by Kant in the Critique of Practical Reason. In other words, the God we must assume on the basis of the conscience must be a moral God. That follows.

(Is the theoretical possibility established by the Critique of Pure Reason that justice is not contradictory to one of the other attributes we do not know?)

That means simply that God is mysterious. Kant cannot claim to have perfect knowledge of the essence of God. That is absolutely impossible from his point of view. But the God which you must think and the extent to which you must think him is not self-contradictory.

(Because we are compelled to think a just God we must assume a just God is not

logically impossible?)

Because your theoretical knowledge does not tell you anything.

(It neither denies that it is possible nor impossible?)

No, what Kant says is this: if there were a theoretical knowledge of God then there could be a contradiction between the practical conception of God and the theoretical conception. But since there is no theoretical conception of God there can be no contradiction.

(But as long as we know we are ignorant of his attributes is it impossible for the conscience to think an attribute which might be in contradiction with one of the attributes . . .)

Yes, sure, that is part of the difficulty, but let us leave it at that for the time being. And now let us read the beginning of the sequel where we can answer one of our questions. The distinction between thing-in-itself and phenomenon is absolutely necessary. To speak of appearances means to imply something which appears. You can say that in a sense it is merely verbal. Why does he call it a thing in the first place? But we will see later that Kant does not make use of such silly quibbles. Now let us first get a somewhat greater clarity as to the status of the thing-in-itself from the next sentence.

Now let us suppose that the distinction . . . things as things in themselves.

Now let us stop here. So they are the 'same' things. It is not so that if we have here cats, and dogs, and trees, and chairs, and then there is something, an entirely different thing here. The same things, the same things, are known to us only as objects of experience. They are not known to us as they are as things-in-themselves. That is hard to understand. One can explain Kant's distinction first of all in a merely historical way, by referring to the tradition. Let us assume that all things have been created by God. God would know them in an entirely different way than we know them. The way in which God knows them is how they are as things-in-themselves. We know them only as created beings can know created beings. That is certainly a crucial premise of Kant's thought, the possibility of creation, and a divine knowledge of the created things. But one can perhaps understand Kant's thought also from a way which is more familiar to us today. What is the way in which average people of some so-called sophistication conceive of this matter? What is the status of our knowledge, say our scientific knowledge, according to what is assumed today? Vulgarly? Vaguely? Because we cannot help thinking about the same problem although not necessarily on the basis of the same premises as Kant does . . .

(change of tape)

. . . Our understanding is human understanding, on all levels, from sense up to everything. All our knowledge is relative to man. And some people today even say it is relative to specific men, say modern man, or Chinese - but we don't have to go into that complication. All knowledge is relative to man. But why should this knowledge or perception relative to man have a higher status than the perception relative to dogs or cats? Does this not create a problem, if all knowledge is relative to man? Does this not necessarily open the question of a kind of knowledge which would not imply of relativity? I will develop this a bit better. According to the view which prevails today, within the sciences as far as I know, man is a purely accidental being. There could be entirely different beings who also might be able to use verbal symbols but

would not be men as could be shown by the fact that they would not be able to read as human beings. Now what is that? I mean, what does knowledge mean under such conditions? Of course you can say knowledge is nothing but a tool that this particular beast called man produces in order to survive. Something of this kind is sometimes suggested. But there is something unsatisfactory in that. Because somehow we also think of knowledge as objective and not merely suffering from this kind of relativity. I do not know whether I make myself clear or not.

Well, let us look back at the Platonic-Aristotelian view to see another possibility. For Aristotle especially, but it is also true of Plato although less vivid, this problem doesn't arise because man is not accidental. Man is that being, only being, known to us which is open to everything. Man is the microcosm and therefore man has it in himself to be open to the macrocosm, to all strata, parts, or what have you, of the whole. So there is no relativity to man because relativity to man means the relativity to the measure. Plato does not reject, as some people say, the position that man is the measure of all things. He rejects a certain simple version of that such as that the individual is the measure of all things, but man as man is the measure of all things. If you look up the passage in the Laws, you can see a cautious formulation of that view and it is not simply rejected.

Now, that is abandoned. Man is just one species among any other species. What is the status of knowledge? Kant draws this conclusion. Man is not the microcosm. That is somehow implied. Therefore, relativity of knowledge to man implies another kind of knowledge which is truly open and that can, according to Kant, only be divine knowledge, not of dogs. Therefore, it seems that the Kantian assertion of the thing-in-itself is one, and a very respectable, alternative to the classical view of microcosm-macrocosm. That is, I think, the way to look at it. Today of course this question is pushed back by virtue of a certain attempt to get rid of anything which could be called false metaphysics, but an attempt which has never been successful except in . . . (inaudible few words) . . . but it was empty and formal and therefore not altogether to be recommended. There is another criticism possibly of Kant which was made after Kant--Fichte, Schelling and Hegel--of which I shall speak later.

(I'm having difficulty reconciling what you just said with the things we hear about in Aristotle, for instance, that the human things are not the highest things.)

No. The human things, surely, but that does not have to do with that. There is a passage in the sixth book of the Ethics where Aristotle makes the distinction between white, and say useful, useful. There Aristotle says if something is white it is simply so but if you say useful you imply a relativity. Useful for human beings, for fishes, for trees, or what have you. The human things, what Aristotle means by human things are things which are relative to man in so far as he is not a thinking being. For the time being that is the most difficult of all questions which you read. But I cannot go beyond that now. We may come to other aspects of it later.

I suggest now that we continue. You must not forget that our discussion is quite naturally very vague up to this point. We must come to that concrete and serious question which is the starting point of this whole distinction and Kant will speak of that in the immediate sequence so then let us read another passage. Read the same sentence again, please.

Now let us suppose that the distinction . . . by the mechanism of nature.

Is this clear so far? If there is no distinction made between things as phenomena and things as things-in-themselves then we must say that the principle of causality in

its strictest deterministic sense is unqualifiedly valid - unqualifiedly valid.

I could not, therefore, without palpable . . . could not have done otherwise.

Do you see that? It is necessary, Kant says, to say of one being, the human soul, that it is free, because if it were not free morality would be impossible. On the other hand, it is also necessary to say that the soul is not free but every human thought or wish is fully determined. That is necessary to say. Why is it necessary to say? Because such things as the Conservation of Energy could not be maintained of visible, physical phenomena, if this were not fully determined. The scientific understanding of the world, Kant maintains, requires strict necessity of every action, including of course mental action, occurring in one and the same world. And we would get all - all kinds of superstition would come in if that were not strictly maintained. On the other hand, it is impossible to deny the freedom of the will without denying morality. That is the problem at which Kant really stands - the necessity to maintain the universal mechanism of all events and at the same time to assert the freedom of the will. That is the starting point. And Kant says there is no way out. Either you must question causality, and to question it any point means of course to destroy the principle, and, on the other hand, morality. Now, let us read from where we left off.

But if our critique is not in error . . . also not knowable in any such fashion.

You see, in other words, I cannot say I know the soul as a being of a certain nature and therefore I know that the soul is free, a free agent. That is impossible. Therefore, the only way of knowing the freedom of man is to know it from a datum, from a fact, accessible to us, and that is the moral law, which implies that we are free. The moral law tells us: Thou shalt act in a certain way. That implies that we are free to act or not to act. That is the most superficial meaning of freedom. And therefore the fact of the moral law is impossible without freedom. Freedom cannot be deduced from a theoretical knowledge of a spiritual substance called the soul.

For I should then have to know . . . of the principles which flow from them.

Now, we must try to reach a point where we can translate for the purpose of our understanding what Kant says into notions which are familiar to you from your training. What would be an equivalent? Now, let us assume - well, how does the problem stand today? Things have changed, because the principle of causality is no longer the same as it was in science, but there is an equivalent. I don't know if this will work but I will try. According to the theory prevalent today scientific knowledge is possible only of facts, and correlations of facts. With that you are acquainted in general terms. It is impossible to know values, that is to say, we can know values as facts, meaning that A values alpha - that you can know, but of course we do not know it as a value. This is shown by the mere fact that conflicts between values cannot be rationally or scientifically decided. So we have a closed system of facts and correlations of facts and there is no possibility of knowing values. What shall we do? If we assume that this is not the last word about values, if we assume that there is some awareness of values - I apologize for the term 'values' - but if there is some awareness of values but which cannot possibly have a place within scientific inquiry must we not do something about that? Must we not limit the sphere of science and say, 'all right, in science we cannot talk about values in a way applicable to values, but there must be something else'. That is only the first step. The second step is that you cannot say, 'all right, here we have the sphere of facts and here we have the sphere of values'. That won't do, because the same phenomena - not in Kant's use of the word - the same things, are both facts and values. Take a simple case. A crook would not appear as a crook

in scientific language because it is a value-judgment, but on the other hand he means the same thing. When we look at things outside of the classroom, we say a crook, when we look at him inside the classroom we say a man with complexes or I don't know what. Now, what is that? How can we solve that problem? Except if we say we look at the same phenomenon from two different points of view. This would require in the first place, given the authority of science, that we show the essential limitations of science. The state of the problem was substantially very different in Kant's time but there is a certain similarity. Kant takes Newtonian science, understood in its strictly deterministic and atheistic sense, as the inescapable of phenomena. That is, you cannot theoretically understand any phenomenon except in deterministic and materialistic terms. That is the only way to understand it. Then what? There is something left out here of the utmost importance, and not only something in heaven, in an entirely different dimension where there would be no possible conflict, but concerned with the very same phenomena, especially man. You look at statistics of cars, a scientific investigation, and say that the incidence of this and this kind of thing is that and that, or you look at the incidence of rain, or hail, or whatever it is, and yet you know that that is not the only way of looking at things. When you are confronted with the criminal suppositions made to you by someone else or by yourself then you cannot look at it in statistical terms. So, how can we account for the duality of point of view, except by saying the same phenomenon belongs to two radically different contexts? Number one.

Number two: Kant assumed that the moral judgment is of a much higher dignity than the statistical judgment. You can probably understand that, although there are some people who doubt it, but you can understand how someone would make this contention, that if you are confronted with a simple example it is a more relevant question when you are confronted with criminal propositions to raise the question: Ought I to do it? than the question: What will become of next year's statistics? Yes? Because you can say that will take care of itself somehow. So that is a higher point of view, the moral point of view. Therefore, the extreme expression of that is the distinction between viewing things as they appear, as mere phenomena, and as they are in themselves.

The term 'thing-in-itself' is of course a very crude expression because we usually don't call man a thing, but Kant used the term probably for reasons of caution. He took the most general, the most vague, term, 'thing' and did not call it 'being-in-itself', or something of this sort. So, there is an analogon to that in our times, a question of the limitation of science, but it is merely an analogon which I introduced to help some of you perhaps to understand what Kant is talking about. It is by no means sufficient, for the simple reason that for Kant scientific knowledge is not fundamentally different from pre-scientific knowledge, as we somehow must assume today. Kant ante-dates non-Euclidean geometry and quite a few other things. I cannot go into that now. But we must reach a point that is absolutely necessary for our purposes where everyone of you can get a glimpse of the fact that what Kant is doing is not meaningless, as many people would say today it is. And I am very anxious to achieve that understanding.

(Perhaps, one of the difficulties of Kant is that he accepts, in the last analysis, moral data as higher than the physical data, or taking moral data so seriously, if not to push it back further to the instruments of science, he violates the methods of science. In other words, why do we have to accept moral conscience as an unanalyzable datum?)

No, Kant does not say it is unanalyzable, he says it is irreducible. That is not quite the same. Let us do that. Then we arrive at psychoanalysis, or something of this kind. Good. But the question is whether this works, whether this is really possible. Kant's analysis of morality may be questioned, but the question arises whether its

premise, that the moral phenomena are irreducible, is questioned. Because one could conceivably analyze morality in different terms. But the question is whether you can reduce morality to non-morality, or sub-morality. That is the question. The scientific thinker would of course say that you have to do it, just as it was said in Kant's time. You have to give a deterministic account of morality which means, in effect, - this is at least what Kant had in mind - that means the reduction of morality to non-morality.

(Insofar as Kant wouldn't ascribe this duality to the limits of human knowledge, but rather accepts it as the pre-requisite of human knowledge - if we could see that the duality of the noumenal and the phenomenal worlds is not inherent in the world as such but rather due to the inability of man to go beyond appearances, we would be saying that this duality is only transitional or temporary.)

Yes, but that means in principle it is already done. We do not have now a reduction of morality to non-morality but we will have it in fifty or two-hundred years. That, as far as the principle goes, is the same thing. That wouldn't help. But, let us take the scientific fellows and see whether that works and can work. They say that values - Kant of course wouldn't speak of 'values' - that distinction of good and bad, of just and unjust, which is what they mean by values, is merely emotive. That depends on the individual and the constitution of the individual, or what have you - that has no dignity, no cognitive dignity, whatever. You know that. Good. And then we give a merely factual account that class A is inclined to value alpha and Skid Row people are inclined to have Beta, and you know this kind of thing. That is the view. Can we leave it at that? Is it possible? The question arises, regarding science itself, is science good? This answer of course cannot be answered by science. That is clear. I mean what would science do in order to sell science, to get foundation money, is an entirely different story, but that they do as practical men or administrators but not as scientists. But the assertion that science is good, that enlightenment, or clarity, however you call it, are good things, cannot be maintained by the scientist as scientist in this modern view. That means not only special theories or hypotheses of science, but science as a whole. The whole scientific approach is optional. Yes? I mean it is not so that I, as a human, rational being, am obliged to respect science - not necessarily to become a scientist but to respect science - as the great actualization, the form in which reason is actualized, so that I must despise myself if I become an opponent. No. The values of the opponents are, from the point of view of science, as high as those of the scientist. That is a different personality type. Yes? That is all. You cannot say one is higher than the other. Science is optional. What then is the fundamental fact, given this state of affairs? Not science, nor any scientifically established fact or theory or hypothesis, has a fundamental option, the fundamental option, say, for simplicity's sake, science and non-science. Non-science can mean a possibilities, but that is of no interest to me now. All right. That is the fundamental point. I would like to understand that option, because while I may not be a scientific man, I try to reach some clarity. How do I proceed? If I try to understand this fundamental option, if I try to interpret that scientifically, I contradict myself. Because I make already an assumption which I know is optional. I have to go deeper than science. Furthermore I know, on the basis of this same fact, that the option cannot possibly be a rational choice, because no choice of any value can be rational. So, we are then confronted with this fact, that the fundamental human phenomenon is an option of a non-rational character which cannot be properly analyzed in scientific terms.

Now let me call this option freedom, because there is no compulsion, not either by external circumstances or else by reason. It is a radically free act. So we find then, deeper than science, more fundamental than science, a fundamental freedom, which can find one possible fulfillment in science, other possible fulfillments in other pursuits. That is an adaption of what Kant means to the present situation. Freedom is

the most fundamental fact. An understanding of what science does, an analysis of science, an epistemology, or however you call it, leads to something more fundamental than science, and that to which it leads is a radical, abysmal, freedom.

This is what people sometimes mean today by existentialism. Existentialism is a modified form of Kant. It has this in common: beyond the sphere of theoretical, speculative knowledge and more fundamental, more true, is freedom. This freedom does no longer have a law as it does in Kant, it is no longer rational, but that is another matter. But the formal structure of the thought is the same and of course existentialism emerged out of a modification of Kant so that what Kant meant is immediately intelligible to us on the basis of the present state of affairs. But, indeed, in Kant the specific formulation of the problem is entirely different because in Kant's time no one had said that science must be value-free.

David Hume, to whom they always refer as their father, or grandfather, while he denied that values can be rationally known, it was clear to him that the same values are accepted by all men, but people don't act on them. You could use the term natural law, in the sense of moral law, although in a complicated version. Hume was not a relativist.

So, this problem was in Kant entirely different and the problem was limited to this question: a closed deterministic system, excluding moral freedom, is incompatible with the phenomenon of morality. And the question which you raise is perfectly legitimate. Is Kant's analysis of the moral phenomenon correct? Surely, a very necessary question, but still one cannot dispose of it as a kind of old fogey. That I tried to make clear. Now, is there any other point? To repeat. Kant makes very specific assumptions that theoretical knowledge in its perfection as he sees it is not the science of our day, but the science of the eighteenth century, late eighteenth century, and somewhat modified. That is perfectly true. Therefore quite a few problems arise now which did not arise for Kant. One can state the problem as follows, disregarding the niceties about non-Euclidean geometry and the indeterminacy principle and so on: For Kant there was no question whatever that scientific understanding, Newtonian understanding, and the highest form of which is certain equations, is simply the most perfect form of our natural understanding. When I see x shooting y, x as the cause of the death of y, I do not proceed in a fundamentally different way from what the scientist does when he tries to find the cause of the phenomenon. It is only more perfect, because the scientist is not limited to this particular case but he tries to establish laws of cause and effect.

In the course of the nineteenth century, especially in the last decade of the nineteenth century, as far as I know, people became aware of one possibility which can be stated more simply as follows: the scientific understanding of the world, the understanding of the world which we find in modern science, is not simply the perfection of our natural understanding. It is a radical modification of it based on certain specific premises. From this moment on the analysis of our natural understanding of the world and the analysis of the scientific understanding of the world became two entirely different things and it was then understood that they had to be distinguished and the true problem for such a philosophy would have to be first to understand the natural understanding of the world and then to see by virtue of what modifications the scientific understanding of the world arises from the natural understanding of the world. And this change is connected, I believe, most of all with the name of Husserl, the founder of the school called Phenomenology, in Germany and Switzerland. That is of course one crucial difference, immediately the most important difference between the state of the modern day and that of Kant.

Now, I would like to read a few more passages in the Preface. I think we should

read the conclusion of this passage here because a very famous formula occurs of which we must take cognizance. Continue where we left off.

But as it is since I do not need for morality anything except that freedom is not self-contradictory and therefore can at least be thought and I do not need to understand it any more.

You see, that is the problem we had before, the difference between thinking and knowing. I can think freedom, because freedom is not contradictory; there is no contradiction between freedom and the mechanism, by virtue of the distinction between appearance and thing-in-itself. But I do not understand it. How does he say it in the translation?

Morality does not, indeed, require that freedom . . . may each, therefore, make good its position.

Yes. You see, that is the very simple and superficial formulation but not misleading. Kant tries to preserve physics but he also tries to preserve morality. He cannot do it except by making the distinction between appearance and thing-in-itself. Yes?

This, however, is only possible insofar . . . very dogmatic, which wars against morality.

Namely, the unbelief is dogmatic, not the morality. So, that is the famous formula. How does he say it?

(I must therefore abolish science.)

No, abolish is of course impossible.

(Deny.)

That is also not - aufheben, the German word which later on played a great role in Kant doesn't have of course in Kant that meaning, you know, where aufheben means both to destroy and to raise. But, on the other hand, abolish and deny are not - Pardon?

(Suspend?)

Yes, that would somehow be a bit better. I cannot now find a better translation. What then does Kant say? Without a critique of pure reason, without the critique which he has given, we necessarily assume that scientific knowledge of the world is adequate or full knowledge. In this scientifically understood world there is not only no knowledge of God, freedom, and the immortality of the soul but not even the possibility of it. Kant says that is fatal to morality. And the argument is more precisely this: the immediate demand of morality is freedom and Kant contends we cannot assume that freedom without assuming at the same time God and immortality. Into this question I do not think it is now necessary to enter. Science itself has its legitimate dogmatism but legitimate only within certain limits and these limits are established by Kant in this form: Science is the most adequate form of knowing the phenomenal world but the phenomenal world is necessarily distinguished from, and inferior in rank to, the thing-in-itself, the world in which morality is at home.

There are extremely important matters in the preface to the first and second editions which we must skip, but I would like to mention a few more points. In the

next paragraph, which is very important, because Kant makes here a distinction between the interest of the schools, of academicians, and the interest of man, and he tries to show that his denial of the possibility of theoretical metaphysics is a blow of course to the professors of metaphysics. Kant says there is a higher interest, and that is the interest of man, and this interest is not banished by the Critique of Pure Reason, but rather helped. Now, in this connection he uses a remarkable expression. The possession is the possession of these beliefs in God, freedom, and immortality.

This possession thus not only remains undisturbed but it yet rather gains thereby in respect because the schools now are taught not to assume to themselves any higher insight in the matter which regards man's general care than that which the great, the most estimable for us, man can equally attain.

That is a very important remark. The translation does not come out. "The great multitude" - mass is a term stemming from physics. I believe it has been applied to human masses only since the French Revolution - 'arising en masse'. People today speak of the masses and replace the expression 'the man' or 'the multitude' by 'the masses'. But Kant doesn't speak of 'the masses' - 'the great multitude which deserves our greatest human respect' - that is the otherside of the criticism of speculative metaphysics. If, in the most important respect, the most simple man is equal to the most sophisticated philosopher, in the most important respect both can claim belief, hence, there is no supremacy of knowledge concerning God, freedom, and the immortality of the soul, is not the status of the multitude of man is infinitely raised? This is that element of Rousseau of which I spoke before, and which we should never forget when we come to the more interesting questions. To my very great regret I must leave at these few remarks regarding the preface to the second edition because we cannot go into a really adequate study of Kant's criticism of metaphysics. I repeat therefore again the two points which Kant makes: the true basis of metaphysics is morality, and the - the Copernican Revolution of which we spoke of last time - reason is projecting, constituting and not receptive of fact. And this gives us two questions. First, only in and through morality does man become aware of the supra-sensible. Only morality is not and cannot be in need of experience but is purely rational. And we have read in the section on the ideas where Kant refers to Plato why that is so. Experience cannot possibly give us a clear notion of virtue, of goodness, because no man is likely to be simply good and even if he were we would not know that he is simply good if we did not have an independent standard of judgment. Experience is unable to supply us with moral and political standards. Therefore the moral and political teaching must be strictly a priori. The second question which arises on the basis of the two points which I mentioned is: is there a connection between the supremacy of practical reason and the new view of theoretical reason, the new view according to which reason is not receptive but projecting or constitutive? Now let us turn to one passage which is most important in this respect and that is in the section on the paralogisms of pure reason, in the Transcendental Dialectic.

Thought, taken by itself, is merely the logical function and therefore the pure spontaneity of the combination of the manifold of a merely . . .

Let us stop here for one moment. In all knowledge there is given a manifold, as it is called in the translation - a variety of sense-data, color and some other data. Now this manifold has to be united to become intelligible. This is the action of the spontaneity of the combination or connection of phenomena. That is the thing-in-itself. Now, beginning of the next paragraph.

The proposition 'I think' insofar as it amounts to the assertion 'I exist thinking' is no mere logical function but determines the subject which is then at the same time object with respect to existence.

Let us stop here. We don't need more than that. I'm sorry. We need the last sentence of the preceding paragraph.

If, on the other hand, I can be conscious of myself simply as thinking then since . . . although nothing in myself is thereby given to thought itself.

Now, I will try to explain what this is about. You remember perhaps the old story of Descartes, who believed he had discovered an absolute certainty in "I think, hence I am" and since I am as a thinking being and merely as a thinking being but since thinking can be the action only of an incorporeal being I know that I am as an incorporeal being, as an incorporeal substance, and from this it would seem to follow the immortality of myself as an incorporeal substance, although Descartes was shrewd enough never to try to prove the latter point. But others lacked Descartes' caution and therefore that was one of the famous proofs of the immortality of the soul. To which Kant says there is no question that the most fundamental phenomenon is the "I think". This however does not entitle me to say I know myself as a thinking, and therefore, incorporeal, or immaterial substance. That is the meaning of this old discussion. I am not now interested in this aspect of Kant's criticism of the proof of the immortality of the soul. Let us turn to the paragraph after the next.

Should it be granted that we may in due course . . . determinable independently of the condition of empirical intuition.

The only point which I ask you to keep in mind in the preceding sentences is this: thinking as such is characterized by spontaneity. Spontaneity as opposed to receptivity. The color-patches, we receive. The combining of the color-patch and the sound to the thing and its qualities, that is an act of the spontaneity of reason. And this spontaneity of the reason is the same fundamentally as the fact that our reason is projecting and constitutive and not receptive or passive. Now Kant here refers to another phenomenon, namely, to the moral conscience. This spontaneity of reason is the reason why the human understanding prescribes nature its laws. In other words, reason projects the possible objects of experience. The actual objects must also have the same status. The possibility of universally valid laws of nature depends on such a primary project of reason. This applies to theoretical reason. Now what is the case with practical reason? In practical reason we are also legislating. We are legislating, however, in regard to our own being only, not in regard to dogs and cats. But we are legislating entirely a priori. There is no possibility, no necessity, of supplementing the dictates of our practical reason by experience. You don't have to say: let me make a distinction between some individuals whom I might and others whom I might not kill. This does not enter at all. What I'm driving at is this: the Ego, the I, as legislating with a view to possible experience, cannot determine without experience. It can only give the general outline. The Ego, as legislating in regard to itself, cannot possibly be based on experience because it is fully determined in itself. This is the outline of the answer to the question which I raised before, whether there is a connection between the supremacy of practical reason and the novel view of theoretical reason.

We can now state this as follows: Kant asserts, in the first place against Hume, but in fact against the whole tradition, the spontaneity of reason. Now, spontaneity is a term with a long pre-history and the classic passage occurs in Aristotle's Ethics, Book III, where Aristotle makes a distinction between spontaneity, which all the animals have, and choice, which only man possesses. This distinction was somehow, I believe, in Kant's mind when he spoke of the spontaneity of reason. The spontaneity of reason is lower than choice or freedom. The spontaneity of the understanding gives rise to the phenomenal world as a determinate world. It is a kind of freedom. Our theoretical knowledge is based on a kind, or, if you want, on a shadow, of freedom.

The true freedom is the freedom of morality. But there is a connection between the assertion of the supremacy of practical reason, which implies the supremacy of freedom, and the new understanding of theoretical reason. Theoretical reason is itself an exercise of freedom in its spontaneity. . .

(change of tape)

. . . but there are certain very broad things which we must understand even if we have no interest beyond that in Kant or in philosophy at all. Let us assume that we have understood, on certain premises, it was necessary for Kant to distinguish between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and the simple basis for this was: the assumed necessity of a strict deterministic system and the impossibility of understanding morality on a deterministic plane. That must always be taken as the starting-point, as Kant says. If the world of modern physics or say the physics of Kant's time, is the world simply, there could not possibly be morality. Therefore, Kant is trying to show that the world as known theoretically is only the world as it appears as distinguished from the world as it is in itself. But there is a great difficulty here. The thing-in-itself is unknowable, Kant says. But given this how can it be said to be, if it is unknown? That is the simple difficulty which I referred to the first time. One can say that the development after Kant suffered from this difficulty as well as from others.

Now we come back to a question raised by Mr. _____ some weeks ago. What about the thing which Kant is doing in the Critique of Pure Reason? He discovers here a structure of reason itself. This innermost structure of reason is not mere phenomenal nor is it Kant's thing-in-itself. The basis of that is obscure. Would it not make sense to say this innermost structure of reason, or to use a stronger, more exact, expression, the transcendental subjectivity, the fundamental act by which reason constitutes the experiential unit, that this is the thing-in-itself? Let us drop God and immortality, to put it very bluntly, which Kant postulated, and let us see in this transcendental subjectivity the thing-in-itself, and therefore, in a way, God. Of course that requires other radical changes and as a result of this change we can say we have the Hegelian system. For Hegel the thing-in-itself is knowable, known, perfect. The adequate understanding of human reason is the absolute knowledge, is the highest metaphysics. It is a metaphysics which has nothing to do any more with incorporeal substances. It is based, according to his claim, at every point, on phenomena accessible to our experience. But it lays bare the inner connection of all elements of our experience, and that is the thing-in-itself.

I will try to state this a bit more precisely. In Kant there are two kinds of postulates of practical reason, immortality of soul - I disregard now the problem of God - but there was also, as we shall see next time, a kind of postulate of infinite progress towards the perfect political order, also a moral postulate. That has something to do with the question of Kant's philosophy of history. Why did Kant make these two kinds of postulates, the immortality of the soul and infinite progress towards the perfect political order? Because he made a distinction between moral progress and institutional progress. The progress towards the perfect political order is not in itself a moral progress. It is a morally desirable progress but not a moral progress. Man can live in a perfectly just society, according to Kant, and can have the morality of devils. So the perfect political order is morally desirable but not in itself moral. It would be moral if all its members were moral, but that of course depends entirely on the free act of the individuals. Therefore Kant is really compelled to make such a distinction which finds its expression in moral progress and immortality of the soul, but I still have the possibility of changing and that is not cut off brutally by that. But on the other hand this institutional progress is also morally demanded but that is not the same as the moral progress. In other words, institutional progress, as Kant

sees it, as morally desirable but not fulfilling the demands of morality, is, strictly speaking, lifeless; I mean, lacking moral life. Necessities of all kinds, of a prudential nature we can say, will bring about, may bring about, a perfectly just society. But there is no morality required for that. In itself it is a lifeless thing.

Now this we can say in a way was the starting point for Hegel. Hegel tried to prove that this progress towards the perfect social order is necessarily a moral progress too. Hence, he had no use any more for the immortality of the soul. That's dropped. But while this has many recommendations and advantages in the eyes of most modern thinkers it has one great disadvantage. Namely, there is a danger in assuming a fundamental harmony between institutional perfection and moral perfection. The simple word for this danger is philistinism, self-satisfaction that one lives in a particular society and acts according to its laws and decrees of its members, and that can go together with being . . . (inaudible few words) . . . At any rate, this difficulty, the Hegelian solution, and quite a few others, led to a revolt against Hegel after his time and led to a return to Kant. The most effective form of this return to Kant today is existentialism, and I would like to explain this briefly.

To return to Kant meant to re-assert in one way or another the distinction between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself but it was impossible to say that the thing-in-itself was unknowable because that is really not a tenable position. Therefore, existentialism asserts that the thing-in-itself is knowable in a sense. There is an awareness of it. But this awareness includes the realization that the thing-in-itself is essentially elusive and cannot possibly be fully understood or intellectually controlled. This thing-in-itself is what is called existence. That this is so is shown by the statement of the greatest man connected with existentialism, Heidegger. The simple formula of Hegel for this thought is: the substance is the subject. I cannot go into that now, but substance is Spinoza's term and subject is Kant's. The substance is not matter. The substance is the subject. For Heidegger the substance is existence. From this point of view it would be very interesting to have a look at Heidegger's interpretation of Kant but I believe that it would lead us too far and would go much beyond what we can do now here. We have to now find a link-up to the subject of our next meeting, namely, Kant's writings on the philosophy of history, and that would be more easily intelligible to all of us.

Kant admitted the possibility and the necessity of a philosophy of history but this philosophy of history does not form a part of his system. It is somehow marginal. The question is what prevented Kant from making a philosophy of history an essential part of his doctrine, and also what compelled him to admit its possibility. And the reason for addressing these questions to Kant is our desire to understand somewhat better what is meant by this mysterious thing called history, because the investigation of Kant may throw some light on it.

Now one point to which I referred in my very brief summary is this. There was one great competitor to the philosophy of history or to the recognition of history as a central problem of philosophy. That was the immortality of the soul. I think that is in one way easy to understand. If men are chiefly or predominantly concerned with salvation or perfection in the life after death the concern with perfection on earth is likely to be smaller. Perhaps that is only a promise but there seems to be some truth to it, that the concern with improvement of earthly institutions has become greater in proportion as the belief in immortality has lost its former power over large bodies of men. The interesting question is this. Whatever we may think about the immortality of the soul, does this belief not embody an awareness of difficulties regarding progress, difficulties which became less in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. That is one subject we have to consider but there will probably^{be} others. And it also has something to

do with the issue I mentioned before concerning Hegel. What about this essential cleavage between institutions and morality, or institutions and the spirit? Is it not an eternal problem which would even arise if all institutions were the best we could wish for? Was Kant not aware of this difficulty to a higher degree than Hegel? And Hegel's half pupil, Marx?

This much about the questions which we should keep in mind for next time. I promise those who have been shocked by the things we have read today that next time, and for quite some time, it will be easier going.

(end of lecture)

(Student's paper read)

One difficulty which you raised struck me particularly, namely, the problem created by the achieved perfection. Is this a real problem for Kant?

(I don't think it is a real problem because what is the status of this end? Is it liable to be achieved or is there a fixed terminal point for progress?)

Then what does Kant say about this?

(It appeared from several indications that there is not. For, although beings on other planets might expect to find their fulfillment in this life . . .)

That is irrelevant. Very simply, the goal is infinite in the sense that it will never be achieved. So, therefore, the trouble which could arise namely, the assumption of the achievement of the goal doesn't exist according to Kant. The conditions for it could never be completely fulfilled. So this problem does not arise in Kant. It does arise in Hegel.

Now, as to the second point which you raised you didn't follow it through, and that was the relation between what you called on one occasion morality versus enlightened self-interest, and what one could also call more generally morality versus civilization, say external civilization - you did not follow that through. I mean, what is your over-all impression of what Kant teaches regarding these two things?

(Well, my over-all impression in this regard is that morality is not liable to be the vehicle which would bring about the world-state. However, it seems rather unfortunate that it is not. If the enlightened self-interest of the rulers and of the ruled is the means for bringing it about then something is wrong with it because he says that every supposed good which is not motivated by good intentions is a glittering pretense. So, it remains somewhat the second best way of reaching . . .

Well, why not leave it at that and say more honestly that this is a very great problem throughout the epochs, whether the perfect social order, as you have called it, is essentially also the perfect moral order. You would agree with that. The last question I would like to ask is, what is the status of this teleology of nature which makes possible Kant's philosophy of history?

(The teleology of nature is, I believe, simply posited . . .)

You used a term which Kant himself uses. What is the status? An observation or what?

(It is a premise.)

Well, Kant has a special name for that. At the end you call it a hypothesis. No, that's not good.

(It is an apriori . . .)

A apriori, yes. But an hypothesis, as hypothesis, is not enough. It could very well develop out of a certain probability on the basis of what is previously known. What is the basis of that a priori assumption? I mean, if it is a priori that means of course it is in no way arbitrary. It is a necessary assumption, a rationally necessary assumption.

(The basis for the assumption is that with that assumption regularities can be observed which seem to indicate . . .)

But regularities are observed all the time without any assumption of a teleology. You must not forget this thing, the so-called phenomenal world. That is characterized by absolute determinism, which means mechanistic determinations - if mechanistic is the opposite to teleology - only efficient causes, in the old analogy, but no final causes. Final causes can not be used in scientific explanations. That is clear. That is understood by Kant. They have a certain function, but not an explanatory function, but an heuristic function. An explanation is an explanation in terms of material and efficient causes. Physical realities are of a deterministic, mechanistic kind. What is the character or the status of this a priori? The a priori underlying the scientific explanation is, you can say, roughly, the principle of causality, in the sense of non-teleological causality. But here we get another a priori. It must be a rational principle. Otherwise it would not be a priori. What kind of rational principle? There is only one alternative, at least in Kant. What kind of a priori is that? It can only be a practical or moral a priori. Cradely expressed, it is our moral duty to look at history. We shall go into the details later.

Now we have devoted four meetings, I believe, to Kant up to now and a variety of points of view emerged. Now, I was struck by the fact that you did not make use of any of them, I mean broad concerns. The first: why does Kant become interested in the philosophy of history? To use the example of Plato, Plato's best polity. That is a very improper comparison, because that would be given by Kant's doctrine of the just society and of the just society of nations, which he does in his philosophy of right. That has nothing to do with philosophy of history. Plato can prove or demonstrate what the just society is without saying a word about history. Why must Kant, as distinguished from Plato, have a philosophy of history in addition to his political philosophy proper? Number one.

(Because Kant seems to see a progress in enlightenment . . .)

Well, all right, but then your solution is to say that in Kant's time everybody believed in progress and Kant, being a son of his time, naturally also believed in progress. But the trouble is that Kant did not believe quite a few things which his other contemporaries believed. Proof: the Critique of Pure Reason. So there would have to be - we must try to see whether there was not a rational connection between Kant's innermost thought and the philosophy of history.

The second general question I raised at the beginning: whereas Kant is obviously concerned with the philosophy of history this philosophy of history plays a somewhat marginal role. We have these three essays, to which can be added two other essays which are not available in this English translation, The Criticism of Herder's Philosophy of History, in which we would find very little for our purposes, and the Presumptive Beginning of Human History, which is a re-writing of the first chapters of Genesis from point of view of Kant, in which there are quite a few interesting things but still that is not the very heart, one can say, of his system. So why does Kant not elaborate that? What prevents him from trying to do what Hegel did? After all, he could have developed such a philosophy of history. I notice Ranke writes a history of the Oriental World up to the eighteenth century but this is a sketch and has nothing to do with it.

Now, to come somewhat closer to the discussions we have had in the last few meetings, I will try to find an entry into Kant's thought by speaking of the two crucial influences on Kant, Rousseau and Hume. Now, Hume doesn't come in immediately here. That's clear. What about Rousseau? Does Kant mention Rousseau?

(On occasion. On two occasions, saying, "Rousseau was not so very wrong when he preferred the conditions of savages, for it is to be preferred providing one omits the last stage which our species will have to reach". That is towards the end of the seventh principle.)

By the way, Kant doesn't call them principles, he calls them propositions, which is perhaps somewhat better. In other words, Kant was not so generous in the use of the word principle as we are. In German, Grundsatz, principle. If you translate Grundsatz literally it means a fundamental principle, and Kant did not mean - in a way the most important part of the Critique of Pure Reason is called a Grundsatz, a fundamental principle. And so Kant was a bit more careful than we are today. So, that is the seventh where he speaks of Rousseau?

(Yes, that's right. He speaks of Rousseau twice in the seventh.)

So, let us read these two passages.

(The first, in the Modern Library edition, is on page 124.)

The first we can disregard. It is not very crucial.

(The other is the one I just read, which is about twenty lines from the end of the seventh proposition.)

Well, read it.

Before the last step, namely the joining of the states, is taken, in other words, the half-way mark of mankind's development is reached, human nature is enduring the worst hardships under the guise of external welfare, and Rousseau is not so very wrong when he preferred the conditions of savages, for it is to be preferred, providing one omits this last stage which our species will have to reach.

Yes, up to this point. In other words, that is one way of interpreting Rousseau and probably the most influential. That was accepted by German idealism generally and is, I believe, today also the favored way of interpreting Rousseau.

The first two Discourses criticize the world as it has been for a very, very long time, and measure it and measure it by the standard of the state of nature. An original happiness and goodness has been replaced by unhappiness and violence. And that is terrible and there is no hope except to return to the state of nature. No, said Kant. The Social Contract and Emile show us that there is a possibility of a good life and a good society, as a civil society and not the state of nature.

So, until this democratic society of The Social Contract has been established, mankind is in a worse state than the savages, but once this has been achieved man has reached the highest form. In other words, it is not so as a common notion of progress, say, that here are the savages and then there is constant progress. On the contrary, here (writing on blackboard) is the state of nature, and it is prior. This is the way in which Rousseau is frequently understood up to the present day. I read to you a passage from his Presumptive Beginnings of the Human Race of the History of Mankind:

"In his writings on Hobbes and on the inequality of man he shows quite correctly the inevitable antagonism of culture with the nature of the human race as a physical race, physical species, in which every individual reaches his destiny completely, but

in his Emile and in the Social Contract and in other writings he is trying again to solve the difficult problem of how culture would have to advance in order to develop properly the faculties of mankind as a moral species in such a way that this would not contradict the human race as a natural species."

What he means is this: There was harmony in the state of nature, harmony on the basis of non-development of morality. In history as a whole there was this harmony between man's nature and man's culture. One could use the Hegelian term in a somewhat slightly different meaning and say that the culture is characterized by the 'unhappy conscience'. They have a happy conscience. The solution is the harmony between nature and culture. Or, a happiness of a higher order than the savage has.

Perhaps, by starting from Rousseau - I do not know whether that will be sufficient from this remark about Rousseau which we just read. That would presuppose some knowledge about Rousseau's second Discourse especially, and also the Social Contract, a knowledge which you do not necessarily possess. However, the other point of view from which you could approach it is this: on the basis of some passages in the Prefaces to the Critique of Pure Reason and the Prolegomena I tried to give an overall picture of Kant's philosophy. You know, this conflict between the thing-in-itself and the phenomenal world corresponding to the distinction between freedom and determinism.

Now, let us turn to the reading. The essay is called: Idea to a Universal History in Cosmopolitan Intent. The cosmopolitan intent is the moral intent. If there is a duty, a moral duty, to be a citizen of the world, then this may also imply the duty to look at history, from a cosmopolitan view, or, rather, in a cosmopolitan intent, namely, not only to express your cosmopolitan views or intentions but also to contribute through your history to the establishment of a world community. Yes? That is what he means. This was written in 1784, that is to say it was published three years after his publication of the Critique of Pure Reason.

Kant made a note to the type of this essay or treatise which apparently is not translated: "A passage among the brief notes of the twelfth issue gelehrten Zeitung of this year, which was undoubtedly taken from my conversations with a scholar who passed through Koenigsberg, compels me to make this elucidation without which that note would not have any comprehensible meaning."

In other words, some fellow who visited Kant in Koenigsberg and had a conversation with him told this journal and this journal printed the interview and Kant was shocked at the stupidity which was attributed to him and that induced him to write it. I mention this exclusively because it shows that it depends on an accident that Kant wrote this note. That only confirms what I said before, that parenthetical or extraneous paradox of Kant's writings on the philosophy of history.

How, then, does Kant begin to present the problem? Now, history, in the ordinary sense of the term is the narrative of human action, and these actions, as human actions, are actualizations of the free will. But, since the free will is not a phenomenon proper, something observable, what we have are only the actions, phenomena, of the free will. How the free will becomes observable in act. Qua phenomena, these actions are determined according to general, natural, laws. There is no freedom there. So much so that Kant could say that a perfect natural science, a completed natural science, which is of course impossible, could predict the actions of individual X with a certainty with which astronomy now predicts an eclipse of the sun or the moon. So these phenomena are determined according to general, natural laws. Hence, one can detect a regular course of those phenomena.

5

(I don't understand that. How could there be a deterministic science of actions?)

Kant immediately explains that. Namely, when he says if you look at the plain of the freedom of the human will, wholesale, you detect a regular order. There is a question whether death is a voluntary action so let us leave it at the suicide statistics and the marriage statistics. Here we see why they all act freely. They could as well not have married and not have committed suicide. There is a strange regularity here. This shows that in spite of the freedom of the will itself there exists a possibility of a regularity of the phenomena. Or shall I say appearance from now on to avoid ambiguity? While the will is free and therefore actions of the will are unpredictable as such, because at every moment everyone is free to act virtuously or viciously, by its very nature it is unpredictable, but in spite of that the appearance, how these acts of the free will appear to observation, this shows a strange regularity.

Kant compares these appearances, marriage and suicide statistics and so on, and there is a certain - well, there is not the certainty like in astronomical phenomena - well, like in meteorology, for example, as Kant points out, for the weather is not a hundred per cent predictable and yet a broad range is predictable. For example, we don't expect it to be tomorrow ten degrees below with any reason. It could be 80 or so but beyond this range is extremely unlikely. And these statistics may be even a bit more precise than that.

Now, what happens if we look at suicide statistics? Because, as actions of individuals the actions are free, but qua actions of an aggregate of individuals the actions follow natural laws. Now, if we try to get from here a philosophy of history we would assume that history is an account of actions of aggregates and therefore follows laws. This observation is not entirely meaningless. You know that the so-called deterministic theories of history regard the individuals as secondary. Both Hegel and Marx and quite a few others. The real things are the changes of bodies of man, aggregates, so that when Marxists discuss the question of if Lenin had not been permitted to travel through Germany and had an apoplexy or what not would the October Revolution had taken place - they don't like that question and Trotsky says, for example, that the October Revolution would not have happened but an equivalent of that would have happened sooner or later. In other words, what individuals do is accidental. When the situation is ripe the individual will appear sooner or later, is bound to appear sooner or later.

Now, there is one point. The deterministic view, the deterministic view in general, does not imply necessarily a philosophy of history. Obviously. Think of Hobbes and Spinoza. History might very well be a fully determined - each act of recorded history might be fully determined, and therefore would be no historical determination. Do you see what I mean by that? Well, how would Hobbes or Spinoza develop that? He would say of course every action is determined, every human action, but that doesn't mean that each period of human action - say, here is one action, and that is the cause of another action, and so on - is in any way meaningful or regular. The regularity consists in certain, say, psychological laws, or whatever it may be. There is regularity. All human types are driven by the same passions and if the passions have a certain force and an opportunity sufficiently great one can predict what this fellow will do given the situation. But that there should be a pattern, a meaningful pattern, doesn't follow at all. In other words, determinism is perfectly compatible with the fact that history is a mess and that there are accounts of crime and follies with very few wise and decent actions in between is perfectly compatible with determinism as such. So, it must be a particular determinism.

But we see already an indication of what Kant is trying to do because Kant insists on the freedom by saying that the case of individuals and aggregates of individuals is

different. But that is not sufficient. The individuals are free; therefore, no predictability. And yet, in wholesale, there are such natural laws regarding free actions such as Kant has mentioned. There is, therefore, the possibility, somehow, that a natural purpose of which we are not sufficiently aware and for which men do not care works through these actions. There is no human plan. That is certain. There is no evidence of that in the series of actions of different individuals. But perhaps there could be a plan of nature. The argument is based on the premise, which Kant makes here, of a natural teleology as distinguished from natural laws, i.e., causal laws. Now I would like to discuss this question first, this question which I stated as follows. Let me first answer that question.

(I was wondering whether, according to Kant, what individual X will do is radically unpredictable, that is, if it occurs in the realm of phenomena doesn't it have to be mechanistic and deterministic the way all other phenomena are?)

If we have sufficient knowledge, yes. But we don't have it. What every social scientist in a more or less complicated form tells you today. I mean, for example, certain neighborhoods are conducive to juvenile delinquency but that doesn't mean that every boy coming from a broken home and living in a slum will become a delinquent or that every boy brought up in non-broken homes and living in a non-slum area will be a good boy. So you can only say that the prospects, the percentages are much higher in the first case than in the last case but which individual falls in which you cannot say.

(. . inaudible question about the predictability of troops obeying a sergeant based on fear . .)

Kant would say that was an absolutely impossible imputation. There may be one or more among them who do it because they want to become good soldiers and to be able to fight for their country. That is an absolutely silly - I don't think Weber ever said that. The SS men said that. SS here means Social Scientists. Weber never said that, because the same actions can be produced morally and immorally or non-morally, and morally would mean it is his duty to obey; non-morally would mean he only cedes to superior power. And even in that case there are people who - how do they call it today? A neurosis? You know, they just can't stand being bossed around and this is too much to take. They get crazy, you know. They spit in the sergeant's face. This is very rare but it is possible. I read another example in Trotsky, by the way, when he spoke about the tremendous famine in war-time Russia in 1917, and used as an explanation for the complete demoralization the unwillingness to fight, and he said that in the civil-war period there was still greater famine and large bodies of troops who were completely demoralized in 1917 fought well on the basis of a smaller amount of food in 1918. So, in other words, the lower limits - there is obviously a physical limit beyond which you cannot go in being able to fight or walk around, but that is very hard to determine where it lies but the usual problem is not the complete absence of food but the limits are extremely large.

(. . inaudible question . .)

Yes, but to repeat, Kant goes much beyond these people when he says that it is theoretically possible to predict every action. Now, whether modern theories of motivation are more useful to predict than these common-sensical hard and fast psychologies which people like Machiavelli used is to me an open question. Let us assume we have made progress in predicting actions beyond what was possible a few hundred years ago. It would still be imperfect, admittedly, always. And, as Kant put it, only a completed science could predict every action of every individual. Kant not only admitted but emphasized that. From Kant's point of view as men should go on and do their work and

that would simply mean that our actions, qua observable actions, are absolutely predictable. And Kant contends - and this is one of the greatest difficulties in Kant - that this does not do away with a fundamental freedom which as such can never appear. We cannot go into that question now. When we come to the Fundamental Principles Of Morals then we must take it up.

(. . inaudible remark . .)

Yes, you can say that this is statistically not important, but I have heard of people who wanted to do something improper or criminal and there was a wonderful opportunity and a very strong motive and a practical certainty of never being detected and thus complete determination and then they say: I can't do it. That happens. That this could happen of course is a strange thing. But that is Kant's beginning. Every man can do that. That has nothing to do with special gifts. That's what he means by freedom. And, if this is so how is it possible? How is it possible to make predictions in things of any moral concern. I mean I am not now speaking of what people are likely to eat. Even smoking, you could rightly say, is a vice. That is a perfectly defensible position and there are people I know, to my great sorrow, who can't simply say no. I too can, but in another way I cannot. Let us assume, given that this is the case, what is the implication of any prediction regarding cigarette consumption next year. There is a problem here. To show how this would make sense, let us assume that real proof were forthcoming that this is certain to lead to a most awful kind of cancer I think the day of cigarettes would be - unfortunately, the chances that this would happen on the basis of the moral, that it is a form of luxury - but we can't go into that question. We will take it up in another context. I don't believe Kant solved that problem, I would say right away. But we must keep to our immediate subject which is to understand Kant's thoughts regarding philosophy of history. We must first go on and get some more material. Now, in the second proposition there are a few remarks of some importance.

(There seems to be something wrong with the translation of the first proposition, in the second last sentence of the first paragraph of the introduction.)

Let me see. I will translate.

Individual human beings, and even whole nations, think little of it . . . that, while they proceed, each according to his bent . . . and while each pursues his own intention, according to his opinion, and frequently one against the other, they proceed unwittingly along the intention of nature which is unknown to them as a guiding thread, and they work at the achievement, or promotion, of that end, which promotion, even if it would become known to them, would be of little concern to them.

No, rarely is not good as a translation. Sir denken wenig daran. Barely would be better. We think barely on it. Now, let us go on to the second proposition.

Man is a being who cannot reach his perfection during his lifetime. If the human race is to reach its highest development of the faculties that can be done only in a sequence of generations. (As Kant puts it), in a perhaps unsurveyable sequence of generations . . .

(change of tape)

(student is reading)

. . . because otherwise the natural faculties would have to be considered largely pointless and in vain. This would vitiate all practical principles as it would suggest that nature, the wisdom of which serves as a principle in judging all other natural arrangements, would have to be suspected of childish play when it comes to man.

You see here the practical motivation. Practical always means moral. It is incompatible with a consistent morality not to assume that, not to assume that nature has an intention with man and that therefore, given the fact - and now comes the minor - man is not a being which can fulfill himself in his lifetime.

Let us turn immediately to the note to the sixth proposition which is of crucial importance.

The role of man is therefore very artificial. We do not know how things are arranged with the inhabitants of other planets and their natures, but if we execute this mandate of nature well we may properly flatter ourselves that we occupy a not inconsiderable position among our neighbors in the cosmos. Perhaps with these neighbors each individual can achieve his destiny in his life. With us it is different. Only the species can hope to do so.

You see. In other words, nature could very well have made us that each individual reaches his perfection in his lifetime. But, as a matter of fact, she did not. That is an empirical fact that our lifetime is so short. Therefore, this empirical fact is the minor of this syllogism. Nature has an intention, but in the case of man this intention cannot be fulfilled in the life of the individual. Hence, it was the intention in the case of man that perfection will be achieved through the sequence of the generation. That is an important point. You see, this whole proposition - the teleological principle is a priori but now here we have an empirical premise, which leads then to proposition one. Now, what is the importance of that?

Let us read the end of the fourth proposition first.

The natural impulses, the sources of sociability, the continuous resistance from which so many people strain, which at the same time drive man to a new exertion of his powers and thus to a development of his natural faculties suggests the arrangement of a wiser creator and not the hand of an evil spirit who might have ruined this excellent enterprise or spoiled it out of envy.

So, you see again the practical moral motivation. If there were no natural purpose then a theoretically possible creator would be a devil, but that there is a wise creator must be postulated on moral grounds. So, the whole teleology of nature rests on moral grounds. That we must never forget. Which discredits it today in the eyes of most people but perhaps it is not so simple, and let us wait.

I am now concerned with drawing only one conclusion. The whole philosophy of history rests on proposition two of course that there is a sequence of generations, because if each individual would achieve his perfection in his lifetime there would be no need for a historical process. But that this is so depends on the empirical premise that man's life is a short one and not that of martians who live perhaps five-hundred years. It is possible that there are such people in other galaxies. How do we know? Kant certainly could not know.

Now, what does this mean? It means that a philosophy of history resting on empirical presuppositions cannot be a truly rational doctrine, a priori doctrine. Hence, Kant did not elaborate a philosophy of history. I do not say that is the whole reason but

it is a reason important enough. Whereas the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are necessary postulates of practical moral reason, according to Kant, the reasonableness of history cannot have the same status because it implies this crucial empirical premise. That is the first point we have to know.

Now, let us turn to the third proposition. Man is destined by nature to owe his happiness or perfection to his reason, i.e., not to his instincts as brutes, and that is empirically proved by the fact that man doesn't have this marvelous instinctive system which brutes have regarding food and in other matters. Man was meant by nature to owe his happiness to himself. He was meant to be a free agent and therefore to be a rational agent. Kant corrects therefore his statement. Man should owe not so much his happiness; it depends on all kinds of accidents, but man can make himself worthy. On earth there can be only a very limited form of happiness, as he mentions here.

There is, however, one difference, which has frequently been repeated since against the idea of progress. The second sentence from the end of proposition three.

It remains perplexing that earlier generations seemed to do their laborious work for the sake of later generations in order to provide a foundation from which the latter can advance the building which nature has intended. Only later generations will have the good fortune to live in the building, but however mysterious this conclusion may be it is nevertheless necessary if one assumes that an animal species is to have reason and is to arrive at complete development of its faculties as a class of reasonable beings and die while their species is immortal.

What follows from that? Of course, that the species is immortal is a somewhat dubious assertion from Kant's point of view because it would presuppose the infinite duration of this universe in the future. Otherwise people could not properly be called immortal; only in an improper sense. So, in other words there remains a problem here. We have here a theme in the philosophy of history which condemns many many generations of men to unhappiness so that later generations may be happy. That remains perplexing. Is this fair? Is this just? How does Kant get out of this difficulty? Can it be solved? Kant says it is necessary given these conditions, that man was supposed to work his way up from a primitive state of nature to civilization and culture, and that had to be. But why not create man like Adam and Eve, that is to say, in a state of abundance and of the perfect development of their faculties and not compel man to work himself out of a kind of original slime. How does Kant get out of that? He doesn't solve it here; he only states it.

(The possibility that nature might be more concerned with man's self-respect?)

What about these poor fellows?

(They are doing this work for later generations.)

They did not even know that, they didn't have this comfort that they knew it. We today could say, well, although we suffer and have the atomic bomb we could still say that this is necessary so that the world state will finally arrive, so we have some comfort in the cold war. But what about these poor people earlier?

(I think one of the underlying dangers this perfection of man has to be created by man himself and you have to require an . . .)

But you repeat only the statement of the problem. You haven't found the solution.

(. . . inaudible answer . . .)

But, as Aristotle says, mankind cannot be happy or unhappy; only individuals.

(You don't have the same kind of determinism within the individuals as you do with mankind and . . .)

How does this help? I'm surprised at the lack of theological imagination, if I may call it that.

(The immortality of the soul?)

The immortality of the soul is of course - I'm trying again and again to see - and I think it is necessary to see - why Kant hesitated regarding philosophy of history. Kant has - that is my hypothesis - a sufficient or fundamental defect regarding the philosophy of history. That is a purely historical thing, but think of one simple thing, as we shall see very soon, perhaps today, we have, in these eighteen pages, the first outline of what about sixty or seventy years later became the communist manifesto. So, the problem is with us, the problem regarding expectations from history.

(Since man's life is too short for him to reach a perfection then society must reach perfection if there is going to be any at all . . .)

Yes, but what about the individual? You must not forget that the great criticism of Hegel by Kierkegaard and other men was always this: What about the individual? I mean, that the individual is used by the world spirit for extremely wise purposes is perhaps not a sufficient solution, especially for those individuals who are not so wise as to know it.

(Why should this idea of the immortality of the soul keep Kant from a philosophy of history?)

Not keep, I mean that would ^{be} a wholly improper historicist explanation. No, the immortality of the soul seemed to him a rational solution to the problem of the disproportion between morality and happiness. There is nothing original about this idea; Kant only restated it. Now, knowing this, that there is a perfect solution, which cannot be known but which must be believed he had of course lost freedom to see any possibility of happiness in a purely this-worldly sense. That is the problem of morality and happiness. He could admit to himself what others could not. That is not the only point but I think it is the most important.

(Does Kant make God not subject to the moral law, because in this case God would be using men as means, at least temporarily?)

Let us say, because it is not entirely wrong to say, that of course God is subject to the moral law. Kant's God is a moral God, a just God. But the

moral law does not forbid to use men as means. It only forbids to use them only as means. Because even those people who have no knowledge whatever of this progressive movement and if they had a good will and make a serious effort to live well, in accordance with that good will, can justly hope for immortality.

(Would you say that, according to Kant, these earlier generations which labor on behalf of the later ones deserve less than the later ones because they are not as human yet?)

That's a hard question. We will come to a passage where he at least indicates this problem of X becoming a man, and let us take this up in that connection, and don't forget.

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

I would simply say this, that from every Marxist's point of view, it is not orthodox Marxism. But they would say this: there is such a thing called the realm of freedom, which comes at the end. Now, the realm of freedom is that state in which every man can fully develop his faculties but he can do it only in and through living together or full cooperation as a wholly socialized being. Where is sacrifice in that? Sacrifice belongs only to the realm of necessity. What is possible are some very daring actions, say in a super-duper sputnik going to the next galaxy, which requires courage I suppose and that cannot be expected from everyone and that is just fine, but sacrifice in this sense, killing - there would be no killing, because such criminals cannot appear in a free society and if they do - well, the problem is simply to take care of them, as Lenin puts it. Maybe, by that time they will have become reconciled to psychoanalysis and will send them to psychoanalysts, but I don't know. But this notion of sacrifice has no place there. That's very Russian, that you must sacrifice your soul. Let us forget about that. We will come to Marx very soon but we must proceed in an orderly fashion.

Now, Kant goes on in the fourth proposition to this sentence. I read.

The means for bringing about the end, and the end is the full development of the faculties of man which can be achieved only at a very advanced stage and can never be fully achieved if there is to be . . . (inaudible several words). . . But the means for bringing about the development of man's faculties is the antagonism implied in man's unsocial sociality.

As Kant puts it: Man has a social tendency - man has not a social nature of course. That is impossible - man has a propensity to enter into society - notice that, line 6 or 7. The old Lockian formula: man is not a social animal - but on the other hand man has an inclination to - this is Marx' own term - to socialize himself. But on the other hand he also has a strong propensity to isolate himself, that is his anti-social or asocial inclination or propensity. And from this anti-social propensity there follows an antagonism; the war of everybody against everybody, if it is thought through. And that is an impossible condition, as we know from Hobbes and Locke.

To what does this point? To what does this universal antagonism point? To peace. But Kant says more precisely: to a lawful order of society. That is the only solution of such an antagonism. Now, this antagonism, this quarrel,

is crucial. The development can take place only by virtue of an antagonism.

Now, let us compare that very simply, very shortly, with a simple progressive scheme. What is the vehicle of progress, according to the simple progressive scheme? What does it bring about?

(It's just a simple line of causality, intellectual progress, ever higher.)

Enlightenment. Enlightenment. Ever increasing knowledge, and ever increasing diffusion. Kant says no. Antagonism. Something which has nothing to do with reason. Again let us look forward. How did the fellows at the end of the development call it?

(Class struggle.)

Class struggle, sure. The class struggle is developed from what Kant calls here antagonism. And here Kant says in a criticism of a certain sentimental Rousseauian notion, in this proposition, which we should read.

This resistance, which arouses all powers of man, compels him to overcome his propensity to laziness, and driven by ambition, desire to lord it over, or avarice, to make for himself a rank among his fellows, whom he can't stand very well, but on the other hand, from whom he can't get away very well either.

That is the social asociality. We are half-pathologically - and not in the sense of Freud but in the sense of Kant - by our passions bound to our fellow man. We need them for our passions and desires.

For example, take prestige. A man who is concerned with prestige is concerned with his fellows. He is in one way extremely social. He cannot get what he wants except in and through men. And, at the same time, he even calls everyone enemy because other men's prestige excludes his. That is the situation of man.

. . . for culture actually consists in a socially active man. All man's talents are gradually unfolded, tastes are developed. Through continuous enlightenment the basis is laid for a frame of mind which, in the course of time, transforms the raw natural faculty of moral discrimination into definite practical principles.

In other words, man is born as man with a raw natural faculty of moral discrimination, but that is not full morality. Full morality requires definite practical principles.

Thus, a pathologically enforced coordination of society . . .

Pathological means by the passions.

. . . finally transforms it into a moral whole . . .

Can transform it, can transform it. There is not a necessity that the moral whole will come about. There is a necessity for the social heaven coming about but not the moral.

Without these essentially unlovely qualities of asociality which spring through resistance which everyone must encounter in his pretensions all talents would have remained hidden germs. If man lived an Arcadian shepherd's existence with harmony, moderation, and mutuality, man, good-natured like the sheep he is herding, would not invest his existence with greater value than his animals have. . .

Domestic cattle.

Man would not fill the vacuum of creation as regards his end as a rational nature.

Yes, up to this point. So, you see, that is Kant's criticism, in a way a criticism, of Rousseau's idyllic notion of that primitive good nature of the man of the state of nature. But, Kant says, yes, but can there be any question that this is inferior to the development of man's faculties.

Kant never believed that the savages were kind. He had read so many stories . . . inaudible few words . . . but, however this may be, he accepts for the time being this notion: Good nature, and uncivilized, and unintelligent, and then at the end, consciously moral, autonomous, and all human faculties developed. That's the beginning and that's the end. How is man brought from the pre-moral beginning to the moral ends? Answer?

(By the asociality, which forces him to develop his faculties.)

Yes, sure, but I would like to have a clearer answer.

(War.)

Immorality. I would say that. Let us make the correction afterwards. At any rate, these people, the primitive people, are good-natured like sheep. These people in between are not good-natured like sheep. Their qualities are not lovable. Let us go to the end of this road and say that malice is required for bringing it about. There is a great problem here which is indicated by the fact that if I'm not mistaken the word passion never occurs. Kant speaks only of inclinations and propensities, which as such are morally neutral. The passions, especially the passions mentioned here, are simply morally bad. But he doubtless speaks of these passions but he seems to try to overcome the difficulty in an insufficient manner by avoiding the word passions. That is of course of the very greatest importance.

Again, let us look at Marx. That is a simple illustration and an important one because of the thought of today. How did it come about? The beginning, in-between, the end. Originally communism. Then you have private property, in various forms. And the historical process is the history of private property, you can say. And in the end we have communism on the basis of the full development of man's faculties. Private property, which is in Marx just as in Rousseau, inseparable from the unlovable quality, as Kant calls it, born from the passions, you can say, is the way for bringing about, from bringing man from original undeveloped simplicity to final developed perfection. But, to understand it you must also look backwards. Do you know of a similar scheme in pre-modern thought?

Plato's Republic?)

Very good. State it.

(The city of pigs, the feverish city, and the republic.)

Yes. That is absolutely so, and I think Plato's Republic is really the classic presentation of the problem. We have a city - well, such simple people who live like sheep, don't do any harm to anyone, not even to a brute, they are strict vegetarians, and no government and no laws appear; it is wonderfully happy. Socrates never calls it the city of pigs, someone else does, an interlocutor who doesn't like it. And why does he not like it?

(No luxuries.)

No luxuries. In other words, he has no moral objection. What does he speak of? Cookies, and special pastries are absent. But that of course is not Plato's argument but what Plato wants to indicate is this: if this fellow had lived among these he would have broken out at the first opportunity. So, in other words, it is an irrational dissatisfaction, but in this irrational dissatisfaction there lies a divination of the inadequacy of simple primitivity. To that extent the divorce is necessary. But what happens then? Then you get the city of luxury, and the feverish city. And what happens then?

(It is purified.)

A purification must take place. In other words - who does the purification? Well, say a certain wise man, because the purification is not effective in the republic, that is only in speech. But if we could put it into practical terms, men of superior wisdom and virtue would have to come in to establish the perfect society. The question we have to raise here is this: how does Kant need wise men of superior wisdom and virtue to establish the perfect society? What was your answer?

(To achieve the perfect society yes, because of the problems we haven't raised yet.)

Namely?

(That this must be a society of laws and the laws must be administered, and the person who is the master, as he calls it, is above the laws. He must be a perfectly just . . .)

All right, but - by the way that you have understood these questions properly I have very great doubts, and I think the emphasis in Kant lies not on the intervention of an autonomous reason which could deliver us to the passions but somehow the passions by their own way.

For the time being I would like only to read to you a passage from Kant's Anthropologie, which I don't know if it is translated into English. I will read it from the translation.

Of the many inclinations one may grant that Providence has willed but that they should become passions Providence has not willed, and

to present Providence from this point of view may be forgiven to a poet - namely, to Pope, who said reason is only a magnet. If reason is only a magnet the passions are the winds, meaning for a ship - but the philosopher must not permit this principle that Providence has willed the passions, that Providence has willed these passions so that the end may be achieved, not even to praise the passions as a provisional establishment of Providence in order to bring about good ends.

Now, he mentions among these passions, among others, with emphasis, ambition, the desire to lord it over other men, and avarice. You see, Kant had great difficulty to admit that the teleology of nature, or Providence, would deliberately use the passions, vices, towards achieving a good end.

Now let us look after Kant. What about Hegel? Because in Marx it is not different from Hegel. Passions are of course the thing which moves the history of the world. You see, that is another important consideration, why Kant was somewhat reluctant to go with full sails into a philosophy of history. Such a vindication of Providence would be saddled with a great problem that a moral principle, Providence, would justify immorality. Kant, the great moralist, had here some qualms which neither Hegel nor Marx ever felt. We will come back to this question later.

Perhaps I can find another passage which illustrates that. But I must confess that is by no means clear in Kant. Kant hesitates. I read to you from his Presumptive Beginnings of the History of Man, in a section called note.

Before Reason awoke there was not yet commands or prohibitions and hence no transgression, but when it began its business, and however feeble reason is, it came into conflict with bestiality and the whole force of bestiality. There had to emerge evils and, what is worse, given a more cultivated reason, there had to emerge vices.

So, in other words, the vices were necessary given the development of reason, but not yet a sufficient development of reason, and the non-rational, animal or bestial element in men. There are other passages. In other words, what I want to say is this: Kant is hesitant - one cannot say more - Kant is hesitant to say that the passions, these passions which he mentioned, ambition, avarice, and so on, are to be blessed for having brought man from a state of stupid simplicity towards a state of perfection. Hegel and Marx were, in this respect, more, as the Germans say, not pedantic.

(Wasn't Marx also very far from blessing private property?)

Yes, but read the Communist Manifesto and what it says about capitalist society and what it did. The monuments which it erected, what are the pyramids of Egypt compared to that. And what are the expeditions of capitalist society compared with the crusades. Of course capitalism destroyed all human relations and replaced them by the cash nexus but that too is necessary because without the tremendous development of the means of production and the simultaneous degradation of the proletariat there would never be the end of class society. Never. That is a famous story which some people regard as a basic contradiction in Marx that on the one hand he praises and on the other hand he curses capitalist

society. That is not a contradiction because the points of view are different.

(I don't understand why it is necessary to say that the passions play the role as chief means for effecting the transition.)

All right, that would be highly welcome. How would you do it?

(I don't know. I just don't understand why, for instance, if someone said that the beginning was a good-natured, unintelligent state and that the end was the conscious moral state, why did the in-between state have to be one in which evil, or passion, or however you want to call it, played a predominant role for effecting the change.)

Yes, you have a very great authority in your side, you know that. Aristotle. Aristotle's point is that most states have a very dubious foundation. Man is by nature a social animal, and it is possible, by virtue of this, that a rational principle could lead and would lead to the establishment of a good society. But the question is more subtle than that. But the question cannot be decided on this basis and say that Aristotle makes more sense. The question comes up in a more difficult way and is this: for example, for example, when you raise the question of the basis of moral principles in politics, you have . . . inaudible several sentences . . . Let us leave it at this for now, that Kant makes here a premise which had a great success after him and which resembles, but only resembles, a premise of Plato. It is not identical. At least it is controversial between Mr. ___ and me.

Let us go on and turn to the fifth proposition. Nature compels men to achieve a civil society, which universally (i.e., within it of course) administers right. The full development of man requires the greatest freedom. This freedom leads necessarily to an antagonism of its members - in somewhat older language, if everyone is the judge of the means for his self-preservation there is bound to be conflict, and if not everyone is not the judge of the means of self-preservation then he is not free. To be free means, on the lowest level, to be the judge of the means of your own self-preservation. And that means immediately conflict, because as many heads as many opinions. Yet, a limitation of that freedom, so that it can co-exist with the freedom of everyone else, that is the key proposition of Kant's legal or political philosophy. That is true freedom which can co-exist with the freedom of everyone else. For this purpose external laws, by which Kant means laws externally promulgated and externally enforced are required. Now, how does this look? Perhaps we read the fifth proposition.

The greatest problem for mankind, the solution of which nature forces him to seek, is the achievement of a civil society which administers law generally.

You see, civil society means in Kant still what it means in Locke, what we call now sometimes the state. It does not yet have the meaning which the term got in Hegel, where it meant the bourgeois society, the market society. I mention this in passing.

Nature can achieve its other intentions regarding mankind only through the solution and fulfillment of this task, where a simply just civic

constitution is the highest task nature has set mankind. This is because only under such a constitution can there be achieved the supreme objective of nature, namely, the development of all the faculties of man by his own efforts.

Don't forget this chain of ends. The end is the development of all faculties. For this end there is needed freedom of each.

It is also nature's intent that man should secure all these ends by himself only in society, not only possesses the greatest freedom, and hence a very gentle antagonism of its members . . .

No, I didn't see where - nature also wants that man should procure that.

. . secure all these ends by himself.

By himself. So, in other words, freedom becomes then, while primarily subordinate, becomes then equally high. The perfection of man must be achieved by each man himself. That's where freedom comes in as such, because one could very well say, from a paternalistic point of view, that some people might be able to achieve the perfection of which they are capable by paternalistic guidance. Not in here.

The society must also possess the most precise determination and enforcement within the limit of its sphere so that it can co-exist with the freedom of other societies.

Other societies? No, the point is this. When he says, on page 121, line 4 from bottom, "it is also nature's intent that man should secure all these ends by himself", then period. And now Kant draws - it is in German really a conditional sentence, and now the apodosis begins, "since this is all the case, society, in which freedom under external law is the highest possible degree combined with irresistible power to be found, i.e., a perfectly just civil constitution must be the highest task of nature for the human race". "Since - I am not responsible for Kant's complicated and awkward style - since nature can achieve its other intentions regarding our species only by means of the solution and completion of that one" - namely, the perfect civil society. Now go on.

What forces man, who so greatly inclines towards unrestricted freedom, to enter into this state of constraint? It takes the greatest want . .

No, did he say "that which compels man to enter into that state is want"?

It takes the greatest want of all to bring men to a point where they cannot live alongside each other in wild freedom but within such an enclosure as the civic association provides. These very same . . .

In other words, what is the greatest want, or need as Kant rather says? What is that? Not means in German more than that; it means only trouble, great trouble. Now, what is the greatest trouble in which men can be? The trouble which they inflict one upon the other.

These very same inclinations afterwards have a very good effect.

It is like the tree in the forest, which, since it seeks to take air and the sun away from the others, compel each other to seek both, and thus they achieve a beautiful straight growth. Whereas those that develop their branches as they please in freedom and apart from each other grow crooked and twisted. All culture and art which adorn mankind, the most beautiful social products, are the fruits of associability, which is self-compelled to discipline itself, and thus through a derived art to fulfill completely the germs of its nature.

Now, here everything depends on the realization of the inclinations, which inclinations make men miserable prior to the establishment of legal order, and which inclinations contribute so much to his perfection after the establishment of civil order, legal order. Which are these inclinations? That is hard to answer, but I see one clear consequence of these inclinations and they may help us to define the character of these inclinations. Competition. If the trees are isolated, then, he says, they won't grow properly, but if the trees have to compete for air and sun then they are compelled to grow properly. Competition is of crucial importance. Freedom for the sake of competition, for the sake of the development of man's faculties. How does this relate to Adam Smith, you suppose? Is the development of the faculties part of his schema?

(No, very little.)

Yes, that is then one point which - I know you are interested in the question of Adam Smith and Marx - that is one great change. The development of the faculties, the full development of the faculties, as the end, that he did not learn from Smith. That he learned from the German idealistic school. Well, you know that according to famous statements of Engels the German working class, as he called it, by which he meant the marxist part of the workers, were the true heirs to German idealistic philosophy, and there is much truth in that.

Now let us go on to the sixth proposition. That perfect civil society, this task of establishing the perfect civil society, is solved later than any other task. It is never fully solvable. Only an approximation of that perfect society is imposed upon us by nature. And in this same section he remarks, and that was the piece of resistance, the actualization of the perfect social order requires a good will, i.e., a coincidence of civic and moral goodness. Yes, but that is a very, very difficult question, whether such a coincidence is met. I mention here only one point. In the seventh proposition, at the end of the first paragraph, well, read it.

It is this which must compel states to the resolution to seek quiet and security through a lawful constitution, however hard it may be for them, and to do that which the wild man is so very reluctant to be forced to, namely, to give up his freedom.

No, I want here. Read this.

All wars therefore are so many attempts not in the intention of men but in the intention of nature to bring about new relations among the states and to form new bodies by the break-up of the old states to the point where they cannot again maintain themselves alongside of

each other and must therefore suffer revolutions until finally, partly through the best possible make of specific constitution internally and partly through the common agreement and legislation externally there is created a state which like the civic commonwealth can maintain itself automatically.

Like an automaton. Like an automaton. Now, if that is a mechanism, an automaton, that cannot be itself a moral society. It can only be - how shall I say - a framework for morality. That is a very great problem in Kant. I mentioned this before. We shall pursue this further next time, whether the progress, which we must assume, is necessarily a progress towards morality, or only towards an order of society which morality demands. Those are entirely different propositions. We have not solved it. We have barely stated it.

We stop here, and I would like to mention only one point which is of some importance, and which we will think over more carefully next time because we have not discussed at all today the connection of Kant's philosophy of history to his overall scheme. The crucial point is the distinction between phenomenal and the world as thing, thing-in-itself. Let us consider man, qua a phenomenal being, man is fully determined by antecedent causes, qua a noumenal being, qua a thing-in-itself, man is free. Now, we observe the progress toward the just society by observing the phenomena. In the phenomenal world we observe, we must assume - I leave this open for the time being - a necessary progress towards a just society. . .

(Change in tape)

. . . is somehow helped by man's freely willing it. There is a kind of necessity on the basis of the passions and interests which itself tends towards that. But somehow man's freely willing it, that men not driven by passions, say a man like President Wilson, out of a moral conviction, use these opportunities offered by the passions, that can come in. There is some tendency in the actual series of events towards the just society which is demanded by morality. There is then some agreement between necessity, the sphere of necessity, and freedom. In this agreement we may recognize the indication of a natural teleology. It would be too strange that the play of human passions and interests would point, and to some extent even lead, to a morally desirable direction. Furthermore that there is such an agreement, such a natural convergence, that there is such a convergence, is a defensible proposition. Nothing we know, Kant says, refutes it. We may therefore think it. But, in addition, we are obliged to believe in it, because such a belief is morally necessary. And of course the natural teleology is never more than a presupposition, never more.

Now, I had one more point that I wanted to mention, so that you keep it in mind, because you must reread that. You see, that is very, very, important. I had a clear statement somewhere which I can't find regarding the deeper connection. I'm sorry I can't find it now. I had a somewhat clearer statement of this point. Perhaps I can reconstruct it. What I wanted to say is this. The status of Kant's philosophy of history depends absolutely on the distinction of phenomenal world and the thing-in-itself, absolutely. Perhaps, there would be one way of approaching Kant's thinking entirely from the outside to say, look at what men are doing and what drives them. The crudest and most terrible things are the most effective ones. Say Nazi Germany, its past struggles, or

revolutions, or wars led to something which has been called a homogeneous and universal society, universal meaning embracing all men, homogeneous meaning there are no legal distinctions on any basis other than merit. It is a perfectly just society. So, let us assume that this is so, and if we make this statement that is very strange, how the amoral life of man should bring about a morally desirable result. What Kant contends is that you can't even diagnose without making this clear-cut distinction between determinism and freedom. Furthermore, you cannot understand if you do not make an assumption, never proved, which you are morally obliged to make, of a natural teleology. In the case of marxism it is an absolute riddle why the class struggle should lead to the perfect society. Well, the common form of the criticism of this is that Marx rests on an optimistic assumption. It makes sense under some teleological point of view but without it what is the basis?

I think we will leave it at that and next time we will devote to further discussion of these questions.

End of lecture.

So, let me see where we stand regarding the papers. No paper today. Then the next paper would be Mr. ___ paper on Theory and Practice. What do we do after that? We come to Perpetual Peace which is taken care of by Mr. ___ and Miss _____. And then we turn to the Fundamental Principles of Morals where we have three papers. And then, I fear, we will be through with the whole course by then, but if we have some time left I think we should have at least one meeting in which we take up a certain very difficult question of Kant's theoretical philosophy.

Now, before we turn to a coherent discussion we must finish our survey of Kant's Idea of a Universal History in Cosmopolitan Intent. We stopped at the last time at the fifth proposition. Is this correct? Yes. Can someone bring us up to date, not the interpretation but the mere assertions which Kant has made up to this point? I mean we could do that by reading aloud the italicised propositions. All right?

We approach history on the basis of an a priori assumption, namely, an assumption that there is an end of nature, an end which nature pursues with men. And then we see, then we are compelled to say that nature intends the development of all faculties of each being. Did you notice, by the way, that in the first proposition, for example, but also later on, Kant speaks of a creature? Did you notice that? That's quite interesting. Because in the moment you speak of an intention of nature as Kant means it you mean of course a divine intention. And, then, the beings are creatures. You see, you must disregard the vulgar use of the term creature, which is used now by many people who are not aware of the fact that they imply that the being in question has been created. You know, a 'queer creature'. You hear such expressions. Kant of course means it very seriously. So, all natural faculties of a creature are meant to develop fully and purposefully. Now, in the case of man this is impossible, as far as the individual is concerned, and therefore nature can achieve its ends in the case of man only in the series of generations, in a historical process. Now, nature wanted men to develop, not in the way in which a dog or a cat or a rat develops, but that he should owe his development fully to his own rational activity, and therefore she treated men so, seemingly, badly, that she didn't give him animal skins, you know, and all the other inconveniences which humans have, so we are compelled to make our clothes ourselves. Nature wanted men to owe his development to himself. But what is the means which nature uses? And the answer of Kant is: the antagonism, essentially belonging to man; man's social anti-sociality or antisocial sociality. The antagonism is the means which nature uses in order to compel men to develop his faculties. Here we have the origin of the class struggle in the Marxist doctrine and of similar things.

Now, but what does nature aim at? What is the end which nature tries to achieve by virtue of this antagonism which brings about both domestic and foreign war and all kinds of hardships? Answer: to bring about the establishment of a just society. And Kant defines here what a just society means in this very proposition. This is the point which I think we have reached. You see what Kant has done by these steps already is this: in a way which is problematic from Kant's own point of view, to vindicate God. This terrible mess of beastliness and stupidity, history, appears to be the arrangement of a wise providence. If men were not permitted to be so nasty to each other they could not possibly owe their betterment to their own achievement. Man would have stayed in a kind of banana situation, by which I mean lying under a tree, a banana tree, and wait until the bananas fall into your mouth, and no development of faculties would -

In other words, I don't think of a banana republic - that is another kind of phenomenon.

Now let us turn to the sixth proposition to finish our reading. Now, what does Kant say about this? Let us first read the proposition, the sixth proposition.

The problems the most difficult are, at the same time, the ones which mankind solves last . . .

And in what does the difficulty consist? Why is it the most difficult, and therefore also that which is solved only the latest? In other words, it is a much greater problem than to get proper clothing; that mankind solved at the very early days. Why is it so difficult? Let us see.

The difficulty which inheres in the idea of this task clearly reveals the following: man is an animal, who, if he lives among others of his kind, needs a master . . .

No. The translation animals is perhaps inevitable, given the present state of colloquial German and English, but I must point out one thing, that animal means, not in colloquial English but originally, a living being, and man is of course a rational animal, and there in this way it is still used. But I think in colloquial English animal today means only brutes. That's my impression. Now, the German word used by Kant, thier, means clearly brute, corresponding not to zoon in Greek but to therion. So, I would translate: man is a brute; because otherwise Kant would say Lebewesen, which is the German word roughly corresponding to animal. So the German is harsher than the English translation is. Yes.

For man certainly misuses his freedom with regard to others of his kind and even though as a rational being he desires a law which would provide the freedom of all his egoistic animal inclinations drive him to the exclusion of his self where he can. Man therefore needs a master who can break man's will, compel him to obey a general will, under which every man could be free. But where is he to get this master? Nowhere else but in mankind. But then this master is in turn an animal who needs a master. Therefore, one cannot see how man, try as he will, can secure a master, charged with maintaining justice, who would himself be just. This is true, whether one seeks to discover such a master in a single person or in a group of collective persons, for each of these would always abuse its freedom who has no one over him to wield his power according to the laws.

In other words, Kant says that by abolishing the monarch you will still have a sovereign legislative assembly. Yes? And who will keep them in check? Perhaps if they can commit ordinary crimes that is easy, but if they do things which are not so easily classified as ordinary crimes then a congressional investigation of members of congress is a difficult problem. Yes? The old question, Quis custodiat custodias, who will watch the watchers?

Yet, the highest master is supposed to be just in himself and yet a man. The task involved is therefore most difficult; indeed, a complete solution is impossible. One cannot fashion something absolutely

straight in wood which is as crooked as that of which man is made. Nature has imposed upon us the task of approximating this idea . .

Only by approximation. So, in other words, the perfectly just society cannot be achieved. The progress can only consist in an infinite approximation to it.

That this task should be the lastest that man achieves follows from yet another consideration. The right conceptions regarding the nature of possible constitutions, great experience in many activities, and a good will, which is prepared to accept such a constitution, are all required. Obviously, it would be very difficult, and if it happens it would be very late, and after many unsuccessful attempts, that three such things would come together.

Yes, you see, Kant here makes morality, a good will, the condition for the establishment of a tolerably just order, a statement which contradicts other statements of Kant's. I mention only one other remark on this subject, and that is the passage to which I referred last time in the seventh proposition, and near the middle. But before he speaks of the epicurean concourse of efficient causes, he speaks of a state, a condition, this just society which can preserve itself like an automaton. Now, that cannot be a moral society as moral society. That is a mechanism. Yes?

(Are we to understand that the egoistic, asocial, aspects of man are animal in the sense of biological, in the sense of continuous with the rest of nature, rather than specifically human?)

No. They are specifically human for Kant, surely. You know that the notion of evolution was of course already in the air in Kant's time. Now he would say if there is such a transition as long as the transition has not been completed that was not yet man. You could call them - how are they called? Homonoids? I don't know what the biologists use - but, at any rate, they would not be human beings. They would be man-like but not man. Their reason would be undeveloped at the beginning, unexercised.

(But why, when he speaks of this egoism or asociality he always associates it with animal instinct?)

Yes, that is nothing particular in itself, nothing new. That's what Aristotle also meant. Man is an animal which possesses reason. As an animal he has important elements in common with the animals in general. He must eat food, he must digest, and so on, and so on. Yes? Now, man is in this situation that whereas the animals can live properly because they are limited by instinct man is not limited by instinct. He has therefore a very large range and if he has not developed his reason properly he will make all kinds of foolish choices. Number one. But the high point of rationality, according to Kant, consists in his morality, which means, among other things, the morally right treatment of the merely animal in man. Take a simple example, regarding food, or smoking for that matter: we are free to control it, morally free, and if we don't use this freedom properly then we are bad to that extent; we may not be terribly bad but still bad. Yes? I don't know how far this answers your question.

(Quite a bit of the way but not entirely.)

But what is then the missing point?

(Well, I still have the feeling that he is going out of his way to associate, for instance, vainglory, ambition, and avarice, with the first primeval . .)

Yes, they are specifically human.

(They are specifically human?)

Yes, sure, in spite of the fact that sometimes we see a marvelous stallion, someone would say he is showing off but that is a metaphorical way of speaking. One would have to know much more of stallions than probably anyone knows today what is going on in the stallion who does these things.

(But these things are not specifically human in the sense that reason defines them as specifically human.)

No, they are based on a misuse of reason, but a misuse, and of reason. Good. Take avarice which has a reasonable beginning. We must store things for a rainy day, I mean even in the literal sense of rainy day. Yes? Now, but this can emancipate itself from its rational end and can become storing for storing's sake, and then it is avarice, and so on. But what a hamster does is not avarice. It is necessary for a hamster to live. You know the hamsters are such another story. Yes?

(I wonder if this civic commonwealth, as an automatic institution, contradicts the necessity for morality in a just society because a constitution or any institution is a phenomenon essentially, isn't it? And therefore wouldn't it be part of the determinate . . .)

Yes, this whole process which Kant describes here is a necessary process, a necessary process, but the problem consists in this - I will discuss this coherently later - that there is a strictly determined process which yet has a moral meaning, without being moral. Yes? Without being moral. That in a way is the gist of Kant's philosophy of history. But we will postpone it. We must come back to that surely.

Now let us turn to the seventh proposition. Read the seventh proposition.

The problem of the establishment of a perfect civic constitution depends on the problem of the lawful external relationships of the states and cannot be solved without the latter.

In other words, one cannot leave it as Plato or Aristotle did at the perfectly just society. We must also have a perfectly just global order, if I may say so. The relation between these different states must itself be in accordance with right. A league of nations. This sentence seems to say that without a league of nations you cannot even have a republic. You see, the problem of the proper order within a state cannot be resolved without the solution of this international problem. So, the demand for a just intra-state order is inseparable, according to Kant, from the demand for a just inter-state order. But still if you look a little bit later - this passage regarding the automaton which we read last time towards the end of the class, do you have it? In the seventh proposition,

where he says that all wars are so many attempts to bring about new relations of states and through destruction or at least cutting into pieces of all to produce new bodies which again cannot preserve themselves and which therefore must suffer new similar revolutions until finally - do you have that passage?

Until finally, partly through the best possible arrangement of the civic constitution internally, and partly through the common agreement in legislation externally, there is created a state which, like a civic commonwealth, can maintain itself automatically.

Yes, you see, here by this coordination Kant seems to say there is not necessary a relation of precedence of the just order within and the just order without. That is only for a somewhat proper understanding of Hegel.

There is another passage which I cannot now find. Oh, yes, before that passage which you just read, when he speaks of this antagonism; men are driven by the wars, and so on, and so on, to attempts, which to begin with are imperfect, but eventually after many devastations, failures, and even complete inner exhaustion of their forces, to that which reason could have told them without so much sad experience - do you have that? Now, what does this mean? There is a true a priori doctrine of morality which includes the true a priori doctrine regarding just societies and the just international order. Reason could have told men at all times. In principle the truly just order is knowable at all times, but men don't listen to that, and therefore since they don't listen to reason they must be forced into it the hard way. But there is of course a very great question here implied: was knowledge of the just order possible prior to a certain stage of the historical process? The importance of that question is seen immediately if you think of the Marxist doctrine where the true solution, the classless society based on public ownership of the means of production, could not have been seen, according to Marx, in any significant way, prior to roughly 1840. Kant's answer to this question is not as unambiguous as it appears from this passage. It is a problem for Kant and you see when he says also - well, man begins as these banana people, you know, after all, and for them no problem exists, and then they are driven out of this condition by overpopulation, which is Rousseau's reason, and they are of course absolutely dumb and stupid, having no experience, and it takes a very, very long time - in Rousseau's opinion, about his time - until the true principles of the just public order are discovered. This problem which is of course essential to the problem of history, for the following reasons: because if history, say political history, or similar sorts of things, and how the mass of men become gradually conditioned to reason, that's one thing, an important problem but a secondary problem. The much more important problem is of course the knowledge of the principles. Is the knowledge of the principles itself historically located or distinguished from the actualization of these principles in institutions? Now, in Kant we do not find an unambiguous answer to this question in general, whether these things - say, Kant's philosophy, would have been possible at any earlier date. We don't have a clear answer in Kant to that question. One thing only Kant says clearly and that of course is neutral to this question, that many trials and errors are needed until the truth is found. Well, Aristotle himself, in the beginning of the Metaphysics, shows you that, and when men first begin to think, without having any experience in thinking they are bound to take very gross solutions as sufficient, and it takes some time. I must leave it now at merely mentioning this question.

There is another point which I think we should mention. In this seventh

proposition, after the automaton passage, Kant raises the question of perhaps there will be a new relapse into complete barbarism, a complete relapse into barbarism, so that the progress we can observe within a narrow span is an interlude of no broad importance. Kant's answer to that is this: this amounts to the question whether it is reasonable that there should be teleology of nature in parts and yet chance in the whole. In other words, the assumption of a relapse into barbarism is unreasonable. I mention this now only as a fact. On the other hand, you see a little bit later - there is one thing of crucial importance. There cannot be a complete achievement of the perfectly just state nationally and internationally. When he speaks of the law of equilibrium - you must keep your finger there. Do you have the passage which I just read where he speaks of this situation? The use of all powers of the commonwealth for armament, the devastation which war achieves, but still more by the necessity to be constantly ready for war - do you have that?

And the want which every state even in the midst of peace must feel, all these are means by which nature instigates attempts which at first are inadequate but which after many devastating reversals and a very general exhaustion of the state's resources may accomplish what reason could have suggested to them. . .

No, no, much later. A little bit more than one page from the end. Did anyone find it while I read it?

By the employment of all the resources of the commonwealth for arms against one another, by the devastation which war is causing, but even more by the necessity of being constantly prepared for war, the full development of man's natural faculties is being inhibited by the evils which spring from these conditions which compel our species to discover a counter balance, the intrinsically healthy resistance of many states against each other, resulting from their freedom and the interests of a united power which would give support to this balance. In other words, these conditions compel our species to introduce a cosmo-political state of public security, which is not without all dangers for we must see to it . . .

There is a subjunctive in German, which shouldn't be without a leader. That's a bit too strong. But Kant means really of which it is good that it is not without danger, as appears from the immediate sequel, 'lest the powers of mankind become dormant.' You see, here is the teleological reason why the final goal should not be achieved but should only be the goal of aspiration, because if it were achieved - we had this problem last time. Mr. ____, you brought it up in your paper - what happens if the goal is achieved? Kant says dormancy and that wouldn't do. You see? Which makes sense, because the assumption of an end, Hegel's assumption, which has come, leads to a very great difficulty, an end of history if it has come. And therefore it is much wiser to say history is unfinishable, as Kant says. But it has certain inconveniences, especially if you look at the question of war, because an infinite progress towards perpetual peace means perpetual war. Therefore, that was Hegel's criticism of Kant, which I think is well-taken, and I think that people like Mr. ____ today, who refers himself to Kant, mean of course a peace now, a perpetual peace now, which is in this respect more sensible, but whether they are aware of the problem of dormancy and the other complications one would have to read their books to argue that question.

Well, here, in this context the question - there is a passage here - I can't find it now - in which Kant says the league of nations is inevitable - I'm sorry I didn't underline it, and so can't find it now - is inevitable. That of course would be - yes, this is another side of the difficulty. But, how can one solve the problem of Kant, by the way? The league of nations must not be an automaton, an end of all dangers, because then people become dormant. And that is really very easy to prove empirically. I remember after the first world war, where I was brought up in Germany, there was a terrific exhaustion at the end of the first war, and no one, except a few officers and non-commissioned officers, even wanted to hear of war, and then about 1925 they began to show war films, and there was a young generation, you know, and they were very popular; first they didn't show war films but showed films of military training, and very funny scenes, you know, where, how do you call this, the rough guy of a non-commissioned officer, you know, this kind of thing, very, very amusing, and you could say 'well, how nice really in the army', and so on, and then they gradually accustomed the people to become interested in real war, shooting, and showed films of the first world war and so on and so on. But that was, you must admit, a terribly short period, from 1918 to 1928. Imagine a period of a hundred years of complete security against war, against economic depression, against tyrannical government, and what have you, how people would constantly, by mere reading, because they have so much time, of the great books of the past, and they would see constant examples of heroes, which would show the absence of security. How is this bound to affect them? And the proposal of William James to find among such people of war a very good formula of the problem but not necessarily in itself the solution. There is really a difficulty.

(I think that the Soviets tend to substitute, by a constant war, the stage where the heroes are those who act, who go into competition. . .)

Yes, sure, that's Freud, but that's not fundamentally William James I think. And physicians, and bricklayers, and this kind of thing. Sure, you can also - but the strange thing is that all these peaceful forms of heroism lack an X which the heroism shown in war exhibits. I mean that would require a lot of analysis why that is so, but there is a problem of which I believe Mr. Riesman is well aware, if I have followed the point in his book, about broken - you know, now showing itself in juvenile delinquency and this kind of thing, where very great leisure, very great abundance, and in addition an extremely mild execution of the penal law, which of course would be a consequence of this form of security, naturally is there. But of course one could imagine perhaps this would be a refuge; the great days of Lincoln and therefore the great insecurity in every city plus the need for calm, that might be worth considering.

Now, let us continue - we can't possibly study everything - to the eighth proposition. Read the proposition.

The history of mankind could be viewed on the whole as the realization of the hidden plan of nature . . .

You see, could. One can, more literally translated. I emphasize the can. There is no necessity for that, either theoretical or moral but one can . . .

that the realization of the hidden plan of nature in order to bring about internally, for this purpose also externally, a perfect constitution, this is the only state in which nature can develop all

the faculties of mankind.

'Can develop all faculties of mankind completely'. Here you see he subordinates the league of nations to the internal just order. I mention this only in passing. The development of man's faculties requires then the antagonisms and, from a certain moment on, control by law of those antagonisms. What does the control by law of those antagonisms mean? Does this mean a complete extirpation of the antagonisms?

(. . . inaudible answer . . .)

Yes, but more simply, peaceful competition means antagonism, but a limited antagonism. That is, then, the solution to it. Now, Kant draws a conclusion in the sentence immediately following, 'one sees philosophy too can have its chiliasm (?)'. You know what chiliasm means? No? Mr. ____, that's your speciality.

(I didn't hear the word.)

Chiliasm, or however you pronounce it.

(Expectation of the thousand years.)

Yes, the millenium. Thank you. So, philosophy, too, can have its expectation of a perfect and glorious future. So Kant is, in other words, is aware of that, what has been said many times in-between, that the modern notion of progress is a 'secularized version' of biblical beliefs. Whether that is really true - if you think of the origins of these things and of such people like Condorcet and so on, you may doubt. But at any rate, from a certain moment on, Kant, and later on Hegel, believed in such things. But what does secularization mean? That is said by Kant in the immediate sequel. Will you read that?

We can see that philosophy has its expectation of the millenium. This millenium would be one in the realization of which philosophical ideas themselves . . . inaudible few words . . . Therefore, this expectation is hardly utopian. . .

No, well, that is really badly translated. The term that Kant uses is enthusiastic. Now, enthusiastic had a very special meaning. Today the word enthusiasm is frequently used in a sense of praise, but it had a very negative meaning in the eighteenth century. What did enthusiasm mean? That goes back to the Christian tradition, especially I remember Calvin's attacks on the enthusiasts, those who follow only the inner light and disregard all objective authority of the church, of the scripture, and so on. Then it was enlarged by the rationalists, such men like Locke among others, and meant simply a man who has all types of pipe-dreams, one could say of religiously adorned pipe-dreams. And something of this sort is meant by Kant here, namely, something absolutely transcending human reason and wholly irrational. But what is the specific difference between the philosophical chiliasm and the religious one? In the case of the philosophic expectation the philosophic idea can itself promote the actualization although only from afar. In the religious notion, Kant wants to say, the actualization is brought about by divine intervention, and not by man, but in the philosophic expectation the philosophic idea itself may have a very important contribution towards actualization, although by remote control, because philosophers don't have political power and so on and so on. The passage is also important

because it indicates that apart from greed and avarice and so on there is the possibility of an influence of reason on the process. This of course is not denied. What Kant means by this remark about philosophy which has a slight anti-biblical tinge - let us read the note to the ninth proposition.

Only a learned public, which is continued from the beginning uninterrupted to our own time, can be considered . . . inaudible few words . . . and the history of nations which live beyond that fringe can only be started with the time that they entered it. For the Jewish people that happened in the time of the Ptolemies, through the Greek translation of the Bible, without which one would give little credence to their isolated reports.

Isolated reports means of course not that the Bible contains only isolated reports but that they are isolated from certification by a learned public, and the learned public existed where, in Kant's opinion?

(In Greece.)

In Greece. In other words, if Thucydides had told the story of Moses and David then there would be no question, but since there was no Thucydides that's another matter. Yes? So, in other words, the credibility of the Bible begins only from the time of the Ptolemies, which is the first century B. C., and everything before that, if not supported by external evidence like diggings, as they do it now, is untrustworthy. That's an axiom of modern higher criticism of the Bible, not only of Kant. Unsupported statements of the Bible have no claim to credibility unless they are supported by external evidence. Well, of course today that is no longer put so bluntly but one cannot understand the history of higher criticism if one is not aware of that. Whether Josephus, who was after all certified to some extent, could be regarded as a somewhat respectable witness is a question, from this point of view. Yes?

But one can trace backwards from this event, once it is adequately ascertained, and thus with all peoples. The first pages of Thucydides, says Eusebius, is the real beginning of history.

'Is the only beginning of all true history', which is a somewhat different statement. Kant fully accepts Eusebius's word. So, you see, here you have the difference between the religious millenium based on Biblical promises and the philosophical millenium based on verdicts of human reason.

Now, in this eighth proposition Kant speaks of - up to now he has not gone into any empirical proof of the assertion. It is one thing to say a priori if there is a meaningful history it would have to come about by such antagonisms or so on, but whether these antagonisms and the changes and revolutions they effect are progressive is in no way proved. Yes? Kant has said up to now only a progressive movement could be brought about only by the human antagonisms, but the human antagonisms are not necessarily conducive to growth. Now here in this proposition Kant has some remarks about - what does it say, the next sentence? 'It only depends whether the experience can discover anything of such a way of the intention of nature'. Can you go on from here?

I would say some small part to this revolution seems to require so much time that in the small instance which man has so far transversed

one can judge only uncertainly the shape of the revolution's force.

Yes. Kant doesn't say revolution, or at least he does say revolution but in the old sense. He says kreislauf. What is that in English? Circular movement. Circular movement, just as in the example of the circular movements, or the quasi-circular movements of the heavenly bodies. Now, we don't have the evidence required for predicting the future of mankind as we can predict the movement of a planet or something.

Let us skip a few lines, where he turns to human nature.

Our human nature has this aspect that it cannot be indifferent to even the most remote epoch at which our species may arise. Only that epoch may be . . .

Yes, you see, while the theoretical certainty regarding progress is extremely small, such certainty is of a very great moral import. It cannot be indifferent to us. If the heavenly bodies would move with greater irregularity so that astronomical predictions would have the status of meteorological prediction that would not in itself be a serious thing for us, but the future of mankind is a matter to which no man can be indifferent, provided this development can be expected, can be expected with certainty. Yes? Next sentence.

Furthermore . . .

No, not 'furthermore'. 'especially'. Or something like this, vornaemlich.

Especially, it is less feasible in our particular case since it seems we do hasten by our own rational efforts to that time when this state might occur which would be so enjoyable for our descendants.

So, in other words, regarding the circular movements, the future movements of Saturnus or what not we can't do anything about it, but as regards the future of mankind we not only are much concerned with it morally but within limits we can do something about it. If we know there is a trend in a favorable direction we can put our weight behind it. Yes?

For that reason, even feeble traces that approach to this state become very important.

You see, feeble traces. That's the only empirical evidence which Kant has. Some feeble traces of a development in the direction of the just national and international order. Yes?

The states are now on such artificial terms towards each other that not one of them can relax its efforts at internal development without losing in comparison to the others . . .

In other words, even Soviet Russia must promote the study of mathematics and physics. Yes? I mean, they have not returned to primitive savagery because there may be some danger in mathematical and physical studies to their government. That's impossible. Whether this justifies - but Kant had apparently a broader notion, as we shall see from the sequel. Yes?

Thus, if not progress at least the maintenance of this end of nature, namely, culture . . .

Of nature.

. . . nature, namely, the culture that is safeguarded by the ambitions of those states to some extent. Furthermore, a civic freedom cannot now be interfered with without the state feeling the disadvantage of such interference in all trade, primarily foreign commerce. . .

Commerce, not foreign.

and, as a result, there is a decline of the power of the state in its foreign relations.

In other words, the most crooked and misanthropic Machiavellian must permit freedom of trade; otherwise he is going to lose the next war. Yes?

Therefore, this freedom is gradually being extended. . .

No, not therefore; but this freedom is gradually extended. But. Not 'therefore'. It is a new consideration. In other words, you cannot leave it by freedom of trade. Yes?

If one obstructs the citizen in seeking his welfare in any way he chooses, as long as his way can coexist with the freedom of others . . .

Can coexist, yes?

One also hampers the vitality of all business and the strength of the whole state. For this reason, the restrictions on personal activity are being increasingly lifted and thus general freedom granted and thus enlightenment . . .

General freedom of religion is granted. You see, Kant was absolutely aware of what was going on in Europe. The famous story of the victory, of the commercial victory of the Dutch by virtue of their religious tolerance is one of the major arguments in all these discussions in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. So, in other words, you want to have a strong state; every statesman and especially the Machiavellian statesman, wants one. All right, and then they have to grant freedom of commerce. But this freedom of commerce is impossible without a high degree of freedom of religion and even without a general freedom. That he must grant without ceasing a bit to be that nasty, misanthropic, Machiavellian. Yes? I emphasize this, this strictly Machiavellian character of the argument. Only some premises are changed. Machiavellian freedom of trade was not so important and freedom of religion still less. These were new premises. The new premises coming on top of Machiavelli were that the total power of the state is increased by commerce, by commerce. That settles the issue against Sparta in favor of Athens, the old controversy. But then we see furthermore that complete religious tolerance is the condition for freedom of trade. .

(change of tape)

. . these insects, you know. Pardon?

(Cicadas.)

Yes, spleen, you could say. Without delusion and spleen. With some delusions and spleens. In other words, you can very well have these things, especially in California; that doesn't do any harm, because the over-all thing is enlightenment, yes? That's a great good.

which must ever draw mankind away from the egoistic, expansive tendencies of its rulers and thus they understand it . . .

You see, only they have to be shrewd and must see that it doesn't pay to expand. Colonies may be a millstone around a state's neck, as someone put it, and therefore there is no love for the happiness and freedom of the natives, but it is simply too expensive and doesn't pay. So?

This enlightenment, and along with it the participation of the heart, are things which the enlightened man cannot fail to feel for the good which he fully understands must by and by reach the . . . insensible word . . . and have the influence upon the principles of government.

You see, here he comes - I mean, then we also have people who are not Machiavellians, who are decent men, and they see that the government abolishes a certain kind of harsh action, let us say, against religious minorities and this kind of thing. This enlightened man, we say that is good, although it comes from the Machiavellian motive, but is in itself beneficial. And now gradually this decency will spread and make, nay, Kant says, must, reach, sooner or later, even a king. And so then, you see, we will have this solution, that we have this just ruler of whom he had spoken before. Do you see the ambiguity of Kant? On the one hand it is impossible, there is no guarantee in the process towards the truly moral order, and, on the other hand, there is such a guarantee. This ambiguity goes through the whole book.

Now here we see we have a causal - that is a trend which Kant observed, that was 1784, five years prior to the French revolution, and about say eight years prior to the greatest series of wars which Europe had ever had, the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. Yes. But the emphasis has to be on the strictly non-moral character, the strictly Machiavellian character of the movement. A Machiavellian movement in a morally desirable direction, that is the clue to wisdom. A causal, deterministic trend, but that to which this trend points we know by our practical reason to be the just thing. Without morality the state demanded by morality is brought about. Now then we have here a convergence of determinism, of necessity, and of morality. That is a fact supported by experience. Now, what conclusion must a sensible man draw from that? It can't be an accident. There must then be a hidden harmony between - if we call that the is - the is and the ought, a hidden harmony. And the traditional name for that is Providence, but Kant does not usually call it Providence, he speaks of the purpose of nature. Behind the phenomenal nature which we observe, and which the exact sciences analyze, there is the noumenal background of nature which has a spiritual, moral character, but that can only be divined. We do not know that. What we know is this and this (pointing to the two converging members on the blackboard), but we know it. The convergence of the two, the relation, is a mystery. Kant does not go beyond that.

The difficulty however is this, a great difficulty which I mention already now, that Kant is very ambiguous as to whether this process has in itself a moral life and effect. That it brings about better and juster institutions

Kant asserts very definitely, but that can be accompanied by the full preservation of Machiavellianism in the hearts of all. I repeat the statement which we will discuss later on when we come to the Perpetual Peace: the just society does not require a nation of angels. The just society can be established in a nation of devils, provided these devils have sense. Sense means here only that they are shrewd. That is still here in the background. Now let us turn to the next paragraph, the ninth proposition. Read the proposition.

A philosophical attempt to write a general world history according to a plan of nature which aims at a perfect civic association of mankind must be considered possible and even helpful to this intention of nature.

Yes, in other words, this philosophy of history is itself a contribution to this end, just as Marx says: an analysis of bourgeois society is a contribution to its overturn. It is necessary. And, therefore - to come back to Kant - not only are we under moral obligation to hope for this end we are in a way enabled to work towards that end, without revolutions, by writing such an essay for example, if we can do that. But that is made clear again in this section that the teleology is presupposed, it is in no way proven. What is proven is merely a trend of society towards a juster society. That is the experiential fact. And then we know a priori what the just society is. But that there is something explaining this convergence that is a mere a priori assumption, which means in other words a morally demanded conviction regarding something which is in itself absolutely mysterious.

Now, in this passage you can see, a brief history - "if one begins with Greek history": do you have that?

If one starts with Greek history as the one through which all older and contemporary history has been preserved, or at least certified, we may trace the influence of Greek history on the formation on the body politic of the Roman people who devoured the Greek state. Again, if one traces down to our time the influence of Rome upon the barbarians who destroyed the empire, one then adds periodically the history of this state with other peoples as it has come to us through these enlightened nations, then . . .

Yes, but he says, "if one adds them episodically", and the word 'episodically' is underlined. In other words, when you come in the history of Venice at a certain point and Marco Polo, you mention that he went to China and there were some trade routes and this kind of thing. But that is only episodically, that is not the nerve of the history. Go on.

then one will discover a regular progression of improvements in constitutional governments in our part of the world . . .

Yes, in our continent would be more proper.

in our continent which would probably give laws to all other states eventually . . .

To all other states, yes. To all others, namely, to all other continents. You see Kant's amazingly European orientation. Yes. That is of course -

qualifies a bit the experiential development of the experiential thing. You see that is assumed that this were true that there was such a trend noticeable, say, from the Peace of Westphalia up to 1784. If that were true. What about the rest of mankind? That makes sense only if you have a reasonable certainty that Europe will eventually give the law to all other continents, because otherwise they will go on - nature will achieve its end only in Europe, not in China and other places. That of course we must not by no means underestimate.

I mention only a passage from the Anthropology, Kant's Anthropology, where Kant refers to the fact that this perfect state must be expected with moral certainty, a certainty which is sufficient to make it a duty to work towards that just society. That is the real reason for the philosophy of history. We cannot - I mean that this is a just society that we know a priori, by a priori knowledge. But that doesn't mean that we are under a moral obligation to work towards its preparation. This moral obligation arises only from the fact that there is a reasonable prospect of the establishment of the just society. That we get through these experiential considerations. But Kant makes here a very important condition. This will take place if natural revolutions - that means here natural catastrophes - do not cut off the process, suddenly. That is not excluded by Kant, and that has of course a very great consequence. Whether natural catastrophes will take place we cannot know, given the imperfection of our knowledge of the system of the solar and stellar spheres. Now, since we cannot know that therefore, and it is really possible that it could happen, therefore, the hope for the establishment of an ever-increasing approximation to the just society cannot have the status of the hope for immortality after life. Regarding immortality science (theoretical knowledge) cannot say anything now or ever. So we are free to believe. Regarding natural catastrophes natural science may be able to say something, that is not impossible. Therefore the moral obligation to believe in progress is smaller than the moral obligation to believe in the immortality of the soul. I will also come back to this later on.

Now let us read only one very important passage. In the first paragraph in the ninth proposition: "Such a vindication of nature, or rather of providence, is a motive not unimportant to choose a specific point of view for looking at the world." Do you have that?

For what good is it to create the majesty and wisdom of creation in the realm of nature, which is without reason, and to recommend contemplating that part of the great arena of supreme wisdom which above all contains that purpose, namely, the history of mankind, remains as a constant objection because the spectacle compels us to turn away our eyes in disgust and as we despair of ever encountering therein a complete rational end causes us to expect such perfection only in another world.

That is a crucially important passage. There is an alternative to the philosophy of history, and that because Kant makes this assumption which I trust all among you who are mentally healthy will immediately grant that it is immoral to despair. Now, if that is so, we must have grounds of hope. There are two grounds of hope which Kant regarded as most important. One is life after death. The other is ever-increasing perfection of human life on earth. The latter means philosophy of history. If philosophy of history fails the other still remains, but for some reason Kant wants both, but with this difference: that only the immortality of the soul is an integral part of Kant's moral

teaching, not the philosophy of history. And that is a clear statement, I believe, of the problem.

So this much about the text, or in connection with the text. Before we enter into a coherent discussion of the problem, I would like to find out whether you have any question which could be discussed now. Yes?

(Regarding the ancient parallel in the Republic, I wonder why . . . remainder of question inaudible . . .)

The answer to this could easily be given. Learn German, and read Kant's Presumptive Beginning of Human History. Kant gives there an interpretation of the history of mankind up to the flood, rewriting the Bible, and very radically. To mention only the most striking point, the fall was the greatest boon. Through the fall man asserted successfully his equality, his equality in the row with any rational being, God or angel, and other things of this kind. That goes much beyond Milton's famous end of Paradise Lost. How does he say it? The world was before them? I mean, Adam and Eve expelled from Paradise were not particularly . . . inaudible word . . . , but what Kant does goes far beyond that. I may have to refer to this writing later, but let us now turn to . . . yes?

(I'd like to ask a question about the relation between this process of historical development and freedom. If this historical development in some sense is a phenomenal process which is necessary then what about the requirement of nature or morality that man develop himself as a being?)

But he develops himself in that way . . .

(But he doesn't necessarily.)

In other words, you mean to say there is no perfectly free development here because development - he is constantly confronted with the choice: develop or perish, yes? Which you say is not a good choice. I mean there is not a state of perfect freedom.

(Well, it doesn't seem to be a state of freedom at all if you conceive of the process as necessary in some sense.)

There is not - I can only say - that is one of the questions we have to take up. For the time being I would only say this, this is a wholly determined process. That is wholly determined process, in which however - the difficulty which you have is this: it is the intention of nature that man develop his faculties. This he would not do if there were no incentives to such development. Yes? And therefore nature has arranged it that man gets these incentives. But, nature gives him the challenges, to which he responds, and that is his development. These responses are necessary, according to this scheme. But qua responses they have also a certain character of spontaneity. Yes? I mean, it is men who develop these things although he is compelled, you say. True freedom, moral freedom proper, is not to be found in this process as such.

Now let me try to answer the question: why does Kant embark on a philosophy of history? And for those of you who are very fanatically political scientists I make this remark as an apology. A political scientist who wants to understand

the present scene must have an understanding of Marxism. I believe every member of the American Political Science Association would subscribe to this proposition. Now, if this is granted, one must add immediately that the more thorough the understanding of Marxism is, the better. Otherwise we wouldn't be scientists. But this requires us to go beyond Marx, and not merely to the British economists, as most political scientists would immediately grant, but as matters stand, one has to go back to German idealism, to Kant, to Hegel, incidentally also to Fichte, of whom I do not want to speak now. That is really necessary. And therefore we are doing our duty by studying Kant, especially that aspect of Kant which is immediately related to Marx, namely, his philosophy of history. You have no objections?

Then, I would like to - here is my question: why does Kant embark on a philosophy of history? And I would like you to help me and find out whether my argument doesn't have flaws, because I have to learn something also from you. Now, only one provisional question. Why did the turn to history take place prior to Kant, prior to Kant? And there I would bring myself to this remark. The principle: we understand only what we make, we understand only what we make. Therefore to understand a thing means to understand its genesis. To understand reason means to understand the genesis of reason, and therefore all kinds of changes also which reason underwent, the history of reason. That Kant entitled the last section of his Critique of Pure Reason - History of Reason, History of Pure Reason, is an indirect proof of this state of affairs, although I believe Kant did not have this thought in mind. Man as we know him is civilized man. He has become what he is through a necessary process. The point where Kant fully agrees with Rousseau. So, in this fundamental principle of modern thought which was stated most simply by Hobbes we have I think the primary and essential condition of this turn to history prior to Kant, this specifically modern turning to history prior to Kant. But we must in a way forget about that although it works only in Kant because when Kant says the understanding prescribes it laws to nature as a solution to the problem of physical science he states in a much more sophisticated way what Hobbes in his crude way had said to understand means to make, prescribing. And the remark about the Copernican turn, you know. In the second preface to the Critique of Pure Reason.

Now let us then turn to Kant and see how the argument is strictly within Kant. The point from which we must start is the difference between phenomena and things-in-themselves. That may be a wholly untenable and absurd premise but it is the premise of Kant. Now this premise is not identical but equivalent to the distinction between necessity and freedom. The phenomenal world is ruled by strict mechanical necessity and things-in-themselves would be free.

Now, here a difficulty arises which I state to you in Kant's terms. The passage is taken from the preface, the introduction to the Critique of Judgment.

Although there is an unsurveyable gulf between the sphere of the conquest of nature, as the sensible, and the sphere of the conquest of freedom, as the supra-sensible, so there is no transition from nature to freedom. And so these world, as it were, are different worlds, the phenomenal and the noumenal worlds, of which the phenomenal world cannot have any influence on the second, the world of freedom. Yet, the world of the thing-in-itself, the noumenal world, ought to have an influence on the phenomenal world.

The ought is underlined by Kant. That is the moral ought. Our duty consists in acting morally in the phenomenal world on phenomena.

The concept of freedom ought to make real within the sensible world that purpose which is imposed by the moral law; hence it must be possible to conceive of nature also in such a way that the legality of its form . . .

Meaning, say, the regularity that belongs to nature.

must at least agree with the possibility of the moral aims to be effected within.

Now, I will try to restate that last sentence a bit more clearly. Freedom ought to have effect within nature. That is not a wish; that is identical with an understanding of morality. We ought to make morally, and to act morally of course means to make changes within the phenomenal world. Take a simple case, an everyday case: we are under a moral obligation to execute a criminal, to effect a change within the phenomenal world. You can also take more common examples from your experience; that doesn't alter it at all. It must therefore be possible to conceive of nature in such a way that it agrees with the possibility of realizing moral goals within nature. If nature would make this absolutely impossible morality would be impossible. There must be a ground of unity of the supra-sensible which underlies nature with morality, although this unity is not knowable either theoretically or practically. There can be not more than intimations of this mysterious or secret harmony between nature and freedom. This harmony is the subject of Kant's Critique of Judgment, and Kant finds two types of phenomena which show that there is some hidden connection between say the mechanism of nature and morality. The first is the beautiful and the sublime, what they call now our esthetic experience. That is, as Kant tries to show, something which is not possible - which is a link between scientific knowledge and morality. And the second phenomenon is the teleology of organisms. The well-known fact that you cannot possibly understand or analyze an animal if you do not know the function of this or that part in which you are interested. Function implies purpose. And Kant understands that of course - Kant says that a teleological explanation is impossible, is theoretically unsatisfactory. The explanation must be via physical or chemical terms, as we would say. But we cannot solve the problem except in teleological terms. In other words, that this particular acid having this and this chemical composition is required for digestion, you use this acid and you see how it affects chewed food, and then you see how it does chew food and then you see it has a beneficent effect on the body. The real explanation is the physical and chemical explanation. But, when we are confronted with organisms we cannot help thinking teleology here and that means, in Kant's language, we cannot dispense in studying organisms with reference to a supreme wisdom which has arranged things that way. Well you know the famous facts - is it the butterfly - I forgot what it is - which depends absolutely on the seed of one particular flower - no, it is not the butterfly - which produces only for one moment in the whole year, and this particular insect - that these insects live exactly so that at this single hour when this flower - I forgot the exact details but you must have heard it. It is really absolutely fantastic. If someone speaks of supreme wisdom he cannot be said to make a meaningless assertion. It may not be a demonstrable assertion.

Now Kant goes beyond this. It is very important where he goes beyond. Not in the body of the Critique of Judgment, not in the Appendix to the Critique of Judgment. He raises there the question concerning another kind of teleology, not intrinsic teleology, the usefulness, say, of such and such a stomach, or such and such an animal, but the question what are plants for, what are brutes for, and others. You can also take individual brutes. In other words, not an end within the species, an end of the species. Kant calls that the teleology in the extrinsic relations of organisms. This is identical to the question of a final end of nature in producing organisms. And Kant says the only final end there can possibly be is a being which is an end in itself, because otherwise you always become circular. You say the goats are for us but we are also for the lice and you don't get a clear picture if there is not somewhere an end in itself and this end can only be man as a moral being.

Now this is confirmed by a passage we read in the ninth proposition where he says "What is the use of admiring the beauty and the wisdom in the sub-human nature if there is no wisdom to be found in the history of the human race". Kant does not use the word 'history' there, in the Critique of Judgment, but it is not far-fetched to say that the teleology of history is the necessary culmination of the teleology of nature. But I must emphasize that this is not stated by Kant with this emphasis with which I state it now, except in this particular passage, but not in the Critique of Judgment, and it is done in this Appendix. It is not an integral part of his whole teaching.

Now what follows from this regarding the status of philosophy of history? Philosophy of history being the teleological contemplation of history from a moral point of view. The status of philosophy of history cannot be different from that of natural teleology proper. It would be, in Kant's language, a regulative idea in the service of theoretical mechanical explanation. In the case of animals, we look at it as a being who instincts towards a purpose in order to instruct the problem which then the biochemist or biophysicist will solve. Kant says the assertion of a teleology is theoretically impossible. The teleology cannot be more than a regulative idea, and yet Kant regards it as very important that we have to think teleologically when we are confronted with organisms. So the same would seem to apply to the philosophy of history, but we see that this is the wrong approach. The theoretical study of history is not in need of such a regulative idea. You can explain a war perfectly in terms of the conscious motives of the actors and of the phenomenal circumstances. There is no need to assume, for understanding this war, to assume an underlying purpose of which the actors were wholly unaware. And if you say, say the Civil War, these conscious motives of Lincoln on the one hand and of Calhoun on the other, and something came out which neither Calhoun nor Lincoln dreamt of, you can very rightly say that these were necessary accidental consequences which do not in themselves have to be meaningful. Kant also never says that.

Now in this passage in the ninth proposition of the Idea, Kant refers to the other world. The postulate of the immortality of the soul is the protection against the despair stemming from a non-teleological study of history. In other words, we study the history as practically all historians study it without an assumption of a teleology and then if we are sensible people we get despondent about the follies and crimes of the human race, but we have some comfort, we have some power to which we can withdraw and that is that. Yet, I draw from this the following conclusion: if the philosophy of history is to have a rationale that rationale cannot be the need of a philosophy of history for the

explanation of history, but this rationale must be also a postulate of practical reason, a postulate of morality. That I think is absolutely necessary as the first step towards an understanding of Kant.

If there is anything not clear please don't hesitate to ask me because I really would like to make that clear. Mr. ___ you have some difficulty?

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

If the philosophy of history is a culmination of the teleology of nature, the teleology of nature has, in Kant's doctrine, the status of a regulative principle, a principle guiding our instructing of providence, but has no explanatory function whatever. In the study of organisms we need to think teleologically in order to explain, eventually explain in physical or chemical terms. If we try to explain historical phenomena we do not need such a regulative idea. The motives of the actors, the circumstances, yes? All the circumstances, are a sufficient explanation. Therefore, the philosophy of history cannot have the same rationale as the biological teleology. If the philosophy of history is to have any rationale it can only be a postulate of practical or moral reason. Is this clear? Good.

How can this be understood? We are obliged to act morally. That means in effect, to mention the main point, to recognize in deed the rights of man, in every man. But if this is so we must have a moral concern with the establishment of a political order which is characterized by the recognition of the rights of man to the extent to which such recognition is legally possible. Is this clear? We must work towards such a just order; otherwise we are crooks, from Kant's point of view. But, on the other hand, and I will prove this premise when we come to another writing of Kant's, we must not engage in revolutionary activity. Because revolutionary activity means conspiracy and conspiracy is not possible without lying and lying is absolutely forbidden. So we are reduced to this situation: - you laugh about it, but it is not so easy to say - I mean the wise laughs come easily to many of us but there is a problem there. We are morally obliged to hope for the establishment of the just political order. There is no contradiction here. In other words, only a vicious man would not hope for that. Yes? Just as in ordinary life - what is a malicious man? A man who wishes evil for other people, who enjoys it if they suffer. A good man is happy if other people are.

Now then we must see whether this hope for the establishment of a just political order is fantastic or whether it has some basis in fact. Because if it is fantastic we are not allowed to hope as sensible people. So we must try to look at history philosophically. We must approach history with an a priori premise of a possible teleology of nature, that nature is perhaps directed towards the establishment of the just social order. This is I think the crucial rationale of Kant's philosophy of history.

Now at this point I make a stop. Sometimes comparisons are very helpful. It gives us a kind of indirect test whether it is sound. Now is this not a sensible statement, I mean worthy of a serious thinker, as Kant was? Look at yourself. Can you respect a man who is malevolent towards the human race? You can explain it. You can say this poor man should be behind iron bars or he should be taken care of in another way, but you might pity him and all these

sorts of things, but you cannot really - your heart doesn't open when you see such a man. You can say he has such great merits as a symbolic logician that I forget about this nonsense he says about human beings. Sure, that is generous of you, but still it is something which needs an excuse, which is not in itself good. From this point of view, where is there a flaw in Kant's argument? You see Kant is very sensible. Kant does not say we are morally obliged to hope for that, for the establishment of the just political order, if we do not have any experiential basis for that. I mean, we are not morally obliged to hope for something absolutely fantastic and Kant tries his best - well, it is not so very long and perhaps not so very good - to show this trend. That is already a criticism of Kant but I am now trying to understand what leads him to make these remarks and we may then see whether his remarks are sound. And to repeat: if this would break down, nothing fundamental would change for Kant because the hope which he needs as a morally acting man he has, the immortality of the soul, and therefore he has a refuge from which he cannot be driven.

I would like to put the question in this form: why did this other great and serious man - philosopher, Plato, not say that? Plato also would say, I believe, that we are obliged to act morally and this has necessarily political implications but the political implications cannot be of such a nature that we are morally obliged or even entitled to tear down an imperfect edifice in order to establish a perfect edifice, but that we can hope - the term used by Plato, and by Aristotle, for the best regime is something for which man would wish or pray. One could almost say that they are equivalent to hope. So, in other words, that a decent man would hope for the possibility of a good life of man is the same in Plato. Where does the difference come in?

- (Wouldn't Plato feel that theoretically you could achieve some knowledge of what the just society would be like even though it would be extremely difficult and perhaps not perfect might agree with . . .)

The content would be entirely different in Plato than in Kant.

- (But I mean he would think that there is a theoretical foundation whereas for Kant there is absolutely no theoretical basis. It is based completely on the moral law, the need for such a thing.)

I see your point.

- (He postulates the necessity for believing that it must be . . .)

That is a crucial difference. Plato's perfect society is construed out of a reflection on the soul of man, on the nature of man. According to Kant that is impossible. That is a crucial difference.

I just wondered whether we have to go so high in order to understand the difference. I mean this. I wonder quite literally, I do not know. Perhaps we can find a more immediate reason where the difference would come in. I would state this - I think I really state only in different terms the same thing. The link is the following consideration: for Plato speculative metaphysics is possible, for Kant it is impossible. Hence, for Plato the speculative life can be the highest pursuit. Yes? For Kant it cannot be. The moral concern becomes the concern of man, not the speculative concern. Therefore, a much

greater weight is given to the question of the establishment of the just order than this question has in Plato. One could also perhaps start from the angle that in Plato, as well as in Aristotle, the actualization of the best order necessarily depends on chance, and there is no place in the Kantian deterministic order for such a thing as chance. In other words, I only want to raise this question.

Now Mr. ____.

(I was wondering why you couldn't have the same sort of rationale for the teleology of history that you have for the immortality of the soul? Does Kant have any basis in fact for the immortality of the soul?)

Yes, but nothing can possibly contradict that. It is absolutely impossible, according to Kant, for theoretical knowledge to say anything about the soul as soul.

So, now, let me continue that. All facts, including the facts which show a progress towards the just order, are parts of the realm of necessity. A trend - I cannot avoid using this word 'trend' when speaking of what Kant says, although Kant never uses it - a trend towards the just society would have the character of a natural necessity, yes? Natural necessity. Yet, at the same time, it would be a moral trend. A bit more precisely, a trend towards the morally required. There would be a convergence of necessity and freedom. Kant says that. Yet, the mechanical system must in no point be interrupted. What would happen to the principle of the conservation of energy, and so on, if it could? The convergence towards the moral goal must not be the work of morality. That would mean outside interference, interruption of the system. Hence, it must be the work of amoral or immoral actions. The passions of greed, ambition, and the desire to lord it over other men, or nations, they are the nerve of history. Here is a difficulty which we may perhaps discuss but which I mention here now, as Kant emphasizes in a passage to which I drew your attention, near the beginning of the eighth proposition: the progress is helped by men who freely will it. The moral man who sees that without any illegality he can give a push in the right direction - think of perhaps a simple servant, a morally alert man, a footman of this Machiavellian king, finds himself on some hunting expedition or what not, alone with that simple man, and the king, bored, has a chat with him, and then this simple man, out of the simplicity and moral depth of his heart, tells him something which the king accepts on Machiavellian grounds, but here the action stems from moral grounds. So the moral thing does enter the picture. That creates a difficulty.

But what I would insist on now is only this: that I believe there is a connection between Kant's radical distinction between the phenomenal and the world of freedom why the historical process is, in Kant's doctrine, not essentially an intellectual process but a process due to the passions. In other words, Kant is much more alert to the moral ambiguity of intellectual progress. Intellectual progress is morally ambiguous, you can easily see if someone makes a discovery in order to produce things which are harmful to human beings is an intellectual progress, and so on. Take any other example. Intellectual progress is, from Kant's point of view, essentially morally ambiguous. By the greater clarity achieved by Kant in this respect he is able to state this more clearly than his predecessors that the historical process in itself is moved by amorality,

or immorality, and yet in a morally desirable direction.

The study of history shows that the morally desirable trend of history exists. That is empirical fact. Hence, our hope is not irrational. It is reasonable to believe in Providence guiding men, without their knowing it, towards a just order of society. We can say, it is reasonable to believe in an invisible hand. That brings me to the question: what is the difference between Kant and Adam Smith - where also an invisible hand brings it about where men not guided by moral motives produce a social order which is morally desirable? These men motivated by a- or immoral motives do something conducive to the common good, the common good admittedly a morally demanded end. I know that Mr. Cropsey alone in this room is able to answer that question but I will go out on a limb and try my answer on the basis of my great ignorance of Smith. I would say from what I learned from Mr. Cropsey's analysis, that Adam Smith's invisible hand does not bring about the state of society demanded by morality. Kant wants a convergence of the plane of passions not with institutions demanded by a low grade morality but with institutions demanded by unadulterated, pure, morality. Is this a fair statement?

(Yes.)

You see now the great achievement of German idealism. I use achievement here in the 'value-free' sense, meaning that it is a feat. Whether it is a feat for good or evil requires a further analysis. What happened prior to German idealism, you know in the development from Machiavelli to Rousseau roughly, and Adam Smith, who was a typically modern thinker, was a deliberate lowering of the moral standard. Virtue was no longer meant to be real virtue but slave of the passions. An easy-going - I don't know that they ever heard of these men - they really wanted to have men, but they thought they could have men best by telling them, 'take it easy', and 'lower your goals'. Enlightened self-interest in a rather crude common-sense - that will do much better than any moral heroism which will create only troubles for yourself and everyone else. At any rate, a lowering of the standard, a deliberate lowering of the standard. This was opposed by German idealism, beginning from Kant and culminating in Hegel. So, it is no longer - the German idealists believed - and I proved it to you in a way by reading through the passage on Plato's Republic in the Critique of Pure Reason - they really try to restore the high moral standards of Plato and Aristotle. There is no question of that. But they did this by combining these new standards with the alleged insights gained in this development between Machiavelli and Adam Smith. They are all incorporated in some way. You can also say they already interpret morality itself, however lofty, in a peculiarly modern sense. That is much too general of course.

But to come back to the more precise point. Whereas Adam Smith says for certain very important purposes, but not the morality highest purposes of man, such a society where everyone thinks only of himself and only the whole, as it were, which is unthinking, a thing you know - private vice, public benefit was a harsh formula coined by Mandeville but it is something of this sort. There is something very uninspiring and dismal in this thing, but if you look at the schemes of the German idealists that is lofty. The play of the passions, avarice, and the desire for dominion and what have you, they are nasty things but they bring it about that a goal which the perfectly unadulterated highest morality demands will be realized. In other words, they take the scheme which was developed on the way from Machiavelli to Adam Smith and believe it can be

integrated into a . . .

(change of tape)

. . . which goes together with an undeniable moral dedication. I read occasionally in some Englishman's book about the bolsheviks where he spoke of their very high integrity. He meant that. It was not in any way self-seeking or petty or so. It was really a high dedication compatible with these peculiar means.

Now I have of course almost lost the serious part of my discussion in something approaching the trivial. Let us recover as soon as we can the proper level of the discussion.

(I have a problem with the morality of human agents for Kant. If human agents in all their externals are part of the phenomenal world how can they in any of their actions be moral? Or free? Since every aspect of the phenomenal world is determined and unfree, the opposite of it?)

Man belongs to the two worlds. There is something - Kant I believe has never solved this problem. You know there is a great obscurity there. But one way of putting it, which is not the Kantian way, but which has become very, very fashionable afterwards, is this: Man qua - for example, that is the way in which this thing is stated by Collingwood in his Idea of History in the paragraph on Kant, but it is very complicated - when you look at man from the outside, and any man, and to some extent you can do it with yourself, if you approach a human being as a mere spectator or observer then you must proceed in the case of man in exactly the same way as in the case of a mineral or a plant. Full determination. Yes? Morality - but if you are acting you cannot look at yourself as a spectator. As an acting man you know you have to do your duty or else to despise yourself. Yes? That is one way - in other words, two points of view take the place, as it were, of the two worlds. That was one way in which people tried to do that. One must consider for an understanding of that, and we will read some pertinent texts in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, is this: from Kant's point of view morality, your own ought, is not observable. A man can be thoroughly virtuous in the external sense. Yes? How can you be sure he is not motivated by the desire for prestige, mere self-interest. Yes? And even if you say these are extreme cases, yes, but, try to make the man concerned also with consistency and not losing face. You know this problem. So, in other words, it is impossible to know whether there ever was a human being who was really moral, in the strict sense, because legality, as Kant calls it, compliance with the moral law in actions, that can be frequently observed, but that can be very deceptive as to the soul of that action. This fashionable interpretation of Kant has this basis in Kant, that morality as such cannot be observed. We can never see, we can never know, just as in the other case you know sometimes a man who is in the greatest abomination from the point of view of legality can be a more honest man ultimately than a perfect gentleman. Well, the old Biblical criticism of - that is part of this story. Yes?

(When you spoke before of the duty to hope for a perfect moral state, I'm not sure what that implies. For instance, in the case of a tyranny you have to hope for it publicly or do your intentions just have to remain pure?)

Now, let us start from the beginning. I mean a moral man or a just man can be just, it seems, in any society however unjust, because he would simply

disobey unjust commands of the government. Yes? And that could very well mean death, torture, and so on, and so on, but that has happened and will happen. But there is a certain not-necessary disproportion. It would be better if he would live in a just society. I mean, while he may transgress and disobey manifestly unjust commands of the tyrant, by merely being a member of their society and doing peacefully his private job he somehow also contributes to the preservation of the tyranny. You know the objection which was raised to some Germans who could have left Hitler and were absolutely anti-Hitler, still involuntarily were staying in Germany, were used an argument was not so bad. That makes sense. Yes? But, at any rate, the thing which a reasonable man wants would be a just society where the laws which he has to obey are such that he can obey them. I mean that makes no difference. Where does the problem come in? Is it a question of - you spoke of the case of a man who lives in an unjust society.

(He has a duty, for instance, to hope for the overthrow of Hitler. Does he have to go about stating this hope or acting on it in any way or is a mere hope enough for him?)

Yes, that is a very moot question. I believe Kant would probably say he cannot criticise it openly. If he is commanded to do something immoral resist passively. He cannot do more than that. Otherwise that would already be an incitement to some others. Kant was in this respect extremely old-fashioned. Mr. ____.

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

Well, is it not - I mean, I have never engaged in conspiracies and I personally don't know a single conspirator in my experience of the men I met, but my . . . inaudible several words. . . a conspiracy is not possible without lying. These conspirators meet somewhere, say at eight o'clock in the evening at a certain house on 55th street. Then someone invites him, 'I must see you very urgently'. 'I can't break my engagement'. 'But it can't be as urgent as you say it is'. He cannot possibly tell. In one way or the other he will lie. The mere fact - well, what about the servants, if there are such servants present. They cannot possibly be told about what was going on and they must be kept out of the house. The man will not say, 'You see tonight we have a meeting of conspirators and therefore you must be out', but he will say, 'Why don't you go to the movies and there is a particularly fine movie there', which is an indirect way of lying. And of what I heard of conspiracies and what I read I have the impression they wouldn't have the slightest difficulty regarding all kinds of disingenuousness. By the way, or take the simpler case, tyrannicide. You don't lie. Just take a gun - well the fact that you keep it covered until you use it is not strictly speaking a lie, yes? That is also a convenience. Then you take it out and shoot. From Kant's point of view that means that you, without any authority, kill a man, murder. That the community would be happy that you did it does not dispose of the fact that you did not have a formal authorization from your community. Well, Father Buckley knows these discussions from the theological discussions. Kant here simply takes up here a very severe line taken by theologians of former times. Not by all but by some theologians. It is a part of the argument of Kant because once you do away that - I see your point - you are thinking of Marxists for example. The hoping business is replaced by doing something, by agitation, conspiracy, and so on. Yes? But even the Marxists need of course also - I mean I cannot now develop that point, how one

would have to restate this argument in order to arrive at the Marxist formula. These parts, I grant you, have to be dropped, about the moral impossibility of conspiracy and merely hope. That has to be dropped completely. But we are speaking now of Kant, as a preparation for Marx.

Now, I would like to mention one point because the time is already advanced. Why does Kant refrain from elaborating a philosophy of history? Because these casual little articles all lead to this. The passage in his so-called systematic works which touches on the subject is paragraph 83 in the Critique of Judgment. But the word 'history' doesn't occur there a single time, characteristically, and in addition all this section to which paragraph 83 belongs is the Appendix to the Critique of Judgment. So it is fair to say that the philosophy of history is in Kant marginal. Why is it only marginal? The reason is this: the radical difference between nature and freedom, to which there corresponds on the moral plane the difference between legality and morality. Legality can be brought about by amoral motives, by all kinds of compulsions. Morality can never be brought about by compulsion. Now, Kant's thesis can be therefore simply stated as follows: the historical process as such can lead only to legality, to the establishment of a just order without moral livening, automaton. This does not detract from the morally preferable character of the just society. Think of such a simple thing as the abolition of torture. God knows what wicked and stupid and nasty motives some people have had who objected to the torture, but it cannot be denied, from the point of view of practical reason, or moral reason, that there is an absurdity in the institution of the torture. That you are in the temptation to condemn innocent men merely because they are particularly responsive to severe physical pain. I mean, you don't want to find out who can stand pain. You want to find out who committed the crime, and the torture is not only not a necessary but not even an appropriate means for finding that out. So that the same way, the just society as Kant defines it, including the league of nations, are morally required but not themselves moral. The historical process can only lead to legality, to an automaton, to a soul-less mechanism, driven by enlightened self-interest. The men living in it may very well be morally inferior to some men living in unjust societies. Institutional progress gives us the greatest moral relevance, from Kant's point of view, and its moral relevance is the ground for his philosophy of history, as distinguished from the other - worldly solution, via the immortality of the soul. You are morally obliged to have an interest in the future generations on this earth, an obligation which is not covered by the belief in the immortality of the soul. But the radical difference between institutional progress and moral progress is a reason for the problematic status of the philosophy of history. Kant's full heart cannot be there, because, as I say, it may lead to a pleasant Orwellian nightmare. By pleasant I mean there will be no - you know, these awful things which Orwell, I've been told, has described in his book, Big Brother, and this kind of thing. But there can be - so it can be in a pleasant way, but it can be as soul-less as that. And what Hegel did, apparently - we can smell this from here - was that he tried to show, to prove, that this separation of moral progress from institutional progress is not possible in the way in which Kant did it. And my general guess is this: conscientious men exist in all societies. It is conscientiously possible, in a given state of affairs - that is Hegel's implication - to commit acts of cannibalism. These fellows in Mexico, the Aztecs, the priests and the others, we have no right to doubt that there were people among them who simply thought they are doing their duty in what they did. Well, they had a wrong notion of their duty. But their conscientiousness cannot - that you have no right to deny. That may happen everywhere that a very conscientious -

Kant's awareness of the radical difference between institutional progress and moral progress, and that later on became the objection to Hegel on the part of such people as Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in different ways that the assumption of the coincidence of institutional and moral progress means something which one could call phillistinism. There is something which remains outside of all institutional progress and on which the value of man alone ultimately depends. And these people, to that extent, these people continue what Kant had in mind, to that extent.

Now, we must stop.

(end of lecture.)

... and thus concerning the question of why Kant turns to philosophy of history. To make it more specific, what is the difference between Kant and the discussion in this respect? Now, in the first place, the supremacy of morality. In the second place, morality as such cannot give man satisfaction, and therefore the postulate of the immortality of the soul. But the third consideration, that morality is primarily the recognition of the rights of man in deed. Such recognition requires obedience to law. But in imperfect societies there is a tension between the duty to obey the laws and the content of the laws, for example, in a way all human society.

From this there arises the moral demand for the disappearance of this tension between the duty to obey the laws and the non-moral or immoral content of the laws. This disappearance cannot be brought about by the conscious action of man. According to Kant's argument, because it would require a revolution, conspiracies, lying. There is no moral way to bring about the disappearance of this tension. Yet this disappearance must be believed to come about naturally, i.e., not miraculously. Hence, this can be done only in a continuous process, because nature doesn't make jumps. One could raise this question: why can't the disappearance of the tension between the duty to obey the laws and the content of the laws be brought about by the conscious of man? Does not precisely Kant teach: thou canst for thou oughtst? Is this intelligible? You can, you have the power, because you are under a moral obligation. And if we are under a moral obligation to work for the establishment of a just society we must face the possibility of that.

Kant obviates that by asserting the moral duty to obey the established government or never to lie. Therefore, since our duty to work towards the establishment of the perfectly just society conflicts with the primary moral duty not to lie it must be questioned. One could of course achieve the same result by asserting the powerlessness of reason over against the passions. In the classical philosophy, Plato and Aristotle, the problem was solved by reference to chance. The realization of the perfect order depends on chance. Now, chance is replaced in modern thought, 17th century and so on, by regularity or lawfulness. And in this particular case regularity or lawfulness of the progressive process. The progressive process is the quasi-moral parallel to scientific determinism. Chance is disposed of in the first place by scientific determinism. But then something remains of course and these are what we call the historical accidents, and these irregularities and chance occurrences are integrated into the progressive process. I thought I should add these points to the points I made last time, and now we may perhaps come back to these things in our discussion. And now I ask Mr. ___ to read his paper.

(Student now reads paper.)

You left the question of judgment - you saw rightly that this is a crucial question--you left it somewhat vague. But it is difficult to settle that on the basis of these readings but I will take it up very soon. I would like to mention only one point. You mentioned what amounted to the right to the pursuit of happiness. I don't believe you used that expression but you meant that, didn't you?

(I think I mentioned that the sort of order that would result would in effect make this possible. I didn't say that it is a right. I'm not

sure of that point, but I think that it would create an environment in which this sort of thing would be possible and encouraged.)

Yes, but one can't help thinking, nevertheless, in reading this, of the right to the pursuit of happiness as being in Kant's mind. And one thinks immediately of the Declaration of Independence. And Kant was naturally aware of these things. But it is perhaps not unimportant to mention this very strange fact that the notion of the right to the pursuit of happiness as the basic right of man is of German origin. That is not generally known I believe, so I would like to mention that. I have read a book by a Frenchman called Ginard(?) on the Declaration of Independence I believe it was and in which he makes this extremely profound and sagacious remark, comparing the French declaration of the rights of man with the Declaration of Independence, the French did not mention the right to the pursuit of happiness. And that was obvious, because the French are an old people, you know, who are too experienced to believe in happiness, whereas the Americans, as young people, naturally believe in happiness. In other words, the frontier versus Versailles, or something of this kind.

As a matter of fact one can lastly show that this goes back to a German natural law teacher who was quite well-known to Germans, Christian Wolff. He was of the enlightenment in the schools in Germany. In Wolff's Natural Law, which must have appeared in the 1740's, there is an explicit statement to that effect that all natural rights can be reduced to the right to the pursuit of happiness and this can be made the basis of the whole doctrine. And to illustrate this a bit I give two examples that occur to me, of this natural right doctrine of Wolff's. There is a natural right to adorn one's body by artificial means. In other words, a natural right to cosmetics. On the other hand, there is a natural right prohibition against avenging the glory of God against blasphemers. That is the spirit of European . . . inaudible word . . . in a nutshell. And that is - you know there is a kind of super-Americanism which tries to discover the roots of the Declaration of Independence in very specific frontier experiences in this Appalachians or wherever it was, but one has to know a bit about the European pre-history. I thought it would be proper to mention it in this connection.

Now I will turn to our subject, and see if we can make a transition. We are, in this seminar, primarily concerned with Kant's philosophy of history. Now Kant's philosophy of history, as we have seen, presupposes a clear notion of the perfectly just civil society. The progress is a progress towards the perfectly just civil society. It also presupposes a clear notion of the law of nations, or perpetual peace. Now these doctrines are developed thematically in Kant's Metaphysics of Morals, of which we will discuss a part next time. But Kant develops these notions also in his essay, On the Common Saying: 'This may be true in theory but it is useless or worse than useless for practice'. I have to translate this so complicatedly because the German, . . . inaudible word . . . namely, either it is useless or it is worse than useless, good-for-nothing, . . . inaudible word . . . If that saying were sound Kant's own theory, namely, the theory of the perfectly just society, might be useless or worse than useless. Therefore, he has to show that this saying is wrong. Now, Kant here first states the problem in the following terms. I have to repeat chiefly what Mr. __ (student who has just read paper) said but perhaps I can add one of the other points. Now by theory Kant understands here first a system of practical

rules, if those rules are thought as principles, and hence in a certain generality, and if they abstract from a variety of conditions. For example, a general mechanics as abstracting from friction. Practice is not every manipulation but that effecting of a purpose which is thought as compliance with some general rule. In other words, if you are bitten by a mosquito and kill it that is not practice proper. That is an action. But if you would do this in compliance with some general rule, that is to say, after he had given some thought to the problem of the killing of mosquitos and developed a theory, and with a view to that, then it would be practice proper. Even a perfect theory would require a mediation in order to become practicable, and this is the act of judgment. In what does the act of judgment consist? In subsuming this case here under a general rule. For example, let us assume we have a theory of mosquito killing, to recognize this thing which happens to you now, being bitten by a mosquito, and to subsume it under a rule, would be an act of judgment. A man lacking in judgment could have a perfect theory of mosquito killing but would, in given cases, be incapable to say whether he was bitten by a mosquito or by a flea for example, which might require a different theory. No better example than this occurs to me at the moment but I hope you get the idea. A judgment is not supplied and cannot be supplied by the theory.

But - now we come to the crucial point - there cannot be rules for judgment. For, let us assume - qua rules they would be general and we would need a new act of judgment for subsuming the case under the rule of judgment, and this would go on ad infinitum. It would be a vicious infinite regress. From this it follows there can be theoreticians who can never come to action because they lack judgment. Judgment is therefore a natural gift not subject to any rules. So, in the very best case we need judgment. But it also happens that the theory itself is not perfect, that it is incomplete, and therefore useless for practice. That of course is clear; a wrong theory or a very imperfect theory is a very poor guide for practice. I think one could find some examples in present day political science, some of these models.

Now, if we look at a practitioner, an intelligent practitioner, he supplies the defect of the theory and therewith tacitly completes the theory. That is to say, his good practice, as distinguished from the imperfect theory, is based on an implicit awareness, and being a mere practitioner he may not be able to spell out that theory, and his awareness on the whole may be superior to that of the man who has only an imperfect theory. This of course Kant also admits. No one can pretend to be the practitioner of an art and yet despise theory, without admitting in the act that he is an ignoramus in his own art.

Now, these ignoramuses are a nuisance, but there are other people who are worse than them, and they are the pseudo-sophisticates who despise schools and their theories in the name of the world. It is very interesting that this species does no longer play such a role in our modern world, so great has the prestige of science, including social science, arisen. Well, one time, when I was confronted by certain excesses of social science, I thought that sooner or later the business man who gives the money, must rebel, but in the meantime I have been told that it is an absolutely hopeless hope, because the need of the business man, and God knows how right that it is, in social science, is so deeply ingrained they will hope against hope. But, in former times, and I suppose you all know from experience such people also, who despise the theories of the schools in the name of knowledge of the world, they say the teaching

of the schools consists of empty ideas and philosophic dreams. One must admit that the schools also have changed. They don't give you any more any empty ideas but knowledge.

But Kant does not deny that there may be empty ideas, which are indeed thinkable but which cannot be given. They are thinkable because they are not self-contradictory, but which cannot be given because there is no corresponding experience to them, and therefore such things are useless in practice. An example of what Kant means here - he is not speaking here of morals - for example, non-Euclidean geometry, prior to its application in physics and theory of relativity and so on, one could say that this is a mere speculation of mathematicians which has no bearing on practice whatever, but today of course the view has prevailed that there is no speculation of mathematicians, and I think this is universally recognized, even among the business men, which cannot issue in practice and therefore basic research in mathematics must be encouraged. But, you see, we are here in an older period and we have to make an effort to understand that.

But, the point which Kant makes, a theory - yes, this is all right regarding what we may call theoretical theories, theories in the theoretical fields, but a theory which is based on the concept of duty, a moral theory, cannot possibly be useless or misleading for practice. So, in other words, if someone figures something out in mechanics or something like that that may very well be an empty dream - well, the problem of the perpetuum mobile would be such an example; that is, if someone would figure out that something of this kind might be possible under conditions which could never be given however, that would be an empty speculation. But, as regards moral theories the problem does not exist at all. For a given course of action will never be our duty if that course of action were not possible in experience. If we know that something is our duty we know by this very fact that it is feasible. Well, Kant makes this qualification that if this course of action is necessarily possible in experience, either completely or in indefinitely close approximation. For example, the perfectly just society is possible in experience, not now, but it is possible in an infinitely close approximation. No theory based on moral principles can be confirmed or refuted by experiences. Experience would always mean experience up-to-now, and it is vulgar and narrow, Kant asserts, to judge of future possibilities from experience up-to-now. I think that is again a point where the adversaries Kant attacks have ceased to exist. Today, every proposal, every possible social or technological future is regarded as possible. People would say that we do not know how we will finally come to Mars and perhaps establish big empires on Mars, sixty years from now, or a hundred years from now, or whatever it is, and regarding any social experiment. This has now disappeared, and this is very interesting. The significance of experience up-to-now, which was a bulwark for Hume and a pillar for human orientation and judgment, has ceased to have the importance which it has had in past times.

But to come back to the main point, a moral theory - Kant doesn't mean by a moral theory a theory excogitated by a professor of moral science. He means the true moral theory that can never be confirmed or refuted by experience. This implies of course that we have a purely a priori knowledge of the moral law with all its political implications. Its rational character guarantees its feasibility. There is no need for judgment in the way in which it exists in theoretical matters. Let us take a very simple example. Let us assume that the proposition: thou shalt not steal, is a moral law. Now we are confronted

with that in a given case. What do you have to do? Stealing is wrong. It is substantially so extremely simple that you cannot think of judging. Well, stealing is immoral. I'm about to steal. Well, a child can do that. If you still call this judgment it is nothing which requires any natural gift, any particular natural gift. Yes?

(Would Kant consider that judgment might come in in a case like this in the difficulty of identifying a particular act of stealing? Certain business practices might very well be undecided whether or not it is stealing . . .)

Kant tends to deny that, because he would say the fellow who moves so close to stealing that he would require a very great expert to assure you that he is not stealing, is already a dishonest man. Yes? Now, let us see - I will give later on an example which Kant gives in one of these texts.

Now I would like to make an historical observation. The date of publication, as Mr. ___ (student who read paper) mentioned, is 1793. You know what 1793 meant, the enormous excesses of the Jacobins were over. Does anyone of you know the exact date of Robespierre? I think early in 1793 but I couldn't say for sure. At any rate, the French Revolution, the great effort to establish the rights of man in all their purity, had led to, what Kant regarded as a terrible disappointment, and prior to that, long before that, when Kant was still in a state of complete enthusiasm for the French Revolution, someone wrote a book called, Reflections on the Revolution in France, 1790. Now we find here a remark on this subject of theory and practice. I believe, without giving a shred of evidence, and therefore I shouldn't really call it belief, I regard it as possible that this was the epoch-making action against the French Revolution, and which had an enormous influence all over Europe, especially in Germany, that the real opponent whom Kant had in mind was Burke, whom he never mentions. I cannot prove that. One could perhaps, if there were an indexed edition of Kant's letters, which I do not know. One might be able to see whether he had read that.

(Towards the end of the essay on constitutional law he seems to be stating Burke's position almost exactly as something that is undesirable.)

Yes, but of course you must not forget - on a lower level, say on the level of a clever bureaucrat, this argument could also be made, you know.

Now I read to you a few lines from Burke's Revolution in France.

These metaphysic rights, (the rights of man), entering into common life like rays of light which pierce through a dense medium are by the laws of nature refracted from their straight line.

In other words, whenever you try to establish the rights of man you must somehow dilute them.

The nature of man is intricate, the objects of society of the greatest possible complexity, and therefore no simple disposition or direction of power can be suitable either to man's nature or to the quality of his fiat. When I hear the simplicity of contrivance aimed at and boasted of in any new political constitutions I am at no loss to decide that the artificers are totally ignorant of their trade

or totally negligent of their duty. The pretended rights of these theories are all extremes, and in proportion as they are metaphysically true they are morally and politically false.

That's an extremely strong statement. Here, theory is said to be not only useless but worse than useless. "In proportion as they are metaphysically true they are morally and politically false". And I think because Burke had stressed these views in such an extreme way, much more than any ordinary administrator or bureaucrat would, I think the natural enemy is Burke, without being able to say whether he was in fact the enemy Kant had in mind.

Of course one could give a milder interpretation of Burke but, to bring it a bit closer to Kant's point, one could say that Burke meant that the theory of right in question is not a true theory, but he meant also that the fundamental error underlying that particular theory was the belief in the possibility of a priori theory regarding political things. And these theories developed by men like Condorcet and Rousseau were of course not technically a priori in Kant's sense, because they were all based on an empirical principle, such as happiness or self-preservation, but on a looser sense of the word they could well be described as a priori theories because they were not based on any political experience but only on some fundamental facts of human nature known by experience, say, self-preservation. Burke rejects all these kinds of theories - politics is an empirical science. Which means, in more practical terms, all sorts of political arrangements, for example, a hereditary nobility, may be legitimate under certain conditions. Whereas the theories, like those of the French Revolution, and of Kant, make such statements that the hereditary nobility is illegitimate under all conditions, without looking at the conditions.

I take another passage, from Montesquieu, Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and their Decadence. It's just an accident that I think of that; there are many others one could take.

When the government has a form established a long time and things have settled down somehow it is always good to leave things in that state because the often-complicated and unknown reason which make that such a condition has lasted make that this condition will maintain itself still; but when one changes the whole system one can remedy only those inconveniences which present themselves in theory and one leaves other inconveniences which practice alone will make one discover.

Now, what does he say then? Again, the complexity of political matters. What one can know theoretically, i.e., in advance, of the working of those reforms is something different from what you can only find out by experience of those reforms, and therefore it is ignorant or criminal to act on the basis of a theory in political matters alone.

So, this is the position which Kant attacks on the assumption that there is a natural public law, a public law established by pure reason, which has the same moral status in principle as the moral law.

Now, I will say a few words about the first essay which is in some ways interesting. It is a very brief statement, but also a very difficult statement, of Kant's moral philosophy proper. I will mention only a few points. It deals

with the relation of theory to practice in morals. The point which Kant makes is, against the contemporary German professor, that one cannot explain morality in psychological terms. For morality is based on freedom, and psychological explanations presuppose the mechanism of natural necessity. A psychological explanation is impossible. Now, the totality of psychological motivations can be reduced to the formula: the desire for happiness. Morality is radically distinguished from the desire for happiness.

Morality, or duty, means the limitation of the will to the condition of universal legislation to be made possible by an assumed maxim regardless of the object or purpose.

Now, I will explain this. It is not as difficult to understand as it seems. What does Kant say? When you act morally, when you act exclusively out of a sense of duty, and not because you expect some worldly benefits, or some benefit, any benefit; but how do we recognize our duty? Answer: whenever we want to do something and we do not know whether it is right we make clear to ourselves - we can do this without any sophistication. We can simply say, 'now if someone else would do it'. Now what would you say if someone else would do it? That we can state in more precise terms. In all our actions we can find that they are based on a maxim, on a major premise of a moral syllogism. For example, if I am in financial straits and plan to rob a bank, or a cafeteria, then my maxim is this: if I am in need then I may try to get money by hook and by crook. That's the maxim on which I act. And then I make a simple test. I give this maxim the form of a universal law, which would run as follows: whenever a man thinks he is in need he is under a moral obligation to get money by hook or by crook. And then Kant says, I see the impossibility. We will discuss this argument when we come to the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, but I state now the principle of it. The universalization of the maxim is the test of the morality or immorality of the maxim. A maxim which is not universalizable is necessarily immoral.

Now Kant develops this, and had developed this before in some other writings, and this German critic, Garver(?), says this theory is much too complicated to be of any use for practice. What he meant was this: let us start from considerations of happiness, which everyone understands, and then I see in a given case, by simple considerations, it is not conducive for my long-range happiness that I steal, and that is a reflection of which most men are easily capable, and that is that. Kant denies that. Kant says precisely his moral doctrine shows the simplicity, the infinitely greater simplicity, of moral decisions than of prudential decisions. And I think I should translate to you this passage.

Here's the following case. Someone has a deposit in hand, the owner is dead and the heirs know nothing of it, nor can they possibly ever hear of it, say they live now in New Zealand. Now, explain this case to a child of eight or nine years, and at the same time ask that the man who now has the deposit has come without his fault just now into a complete decay of his fortune. He sees around himself a sad family of depressed poverty of wife and children and he could get out of this misery immediately if he were to appropriate that deposit. At the same time this is philanthropic and benevolent whereas those heirs are rich, selfish, and at the same time luxurious and extravagant, so it would be as well as if this addition to that fortune would be thrown into the sea. And now one shall ask this child whether, under these conditions, it could be regarded as permitted to use this deposit for his own benefit. Without

any question the child will answer: no! And instead of any reasons he can only say this, it is wrong; that is to say, it conflicts with duty. Nothing is clearer than that . . .

(change of tape)

. . . and my reputation as an honest man wouldn't be very useful for this, but these considerations are very unpleasant, but other difficulties would enter. If you would embezzle the deposit to get out of trouble you would become suspect if you would make a display out of it because people would wonder how you got the money. And if you proceed slowly your misery may increase so much that you wouldn't get any benefit at the end of it. In other words, considerations of happiness are absolutely ambiguous because of the uncertainty of the future and the inability to know all possible developments. The moral case is of utmost simplicity. That is the basis for Kant's assertion. Now of course the application of this to politics is a matter we will come to later, but let us first consider it - yes, business man does not necessarily simply mean what we understand today, a man, you know, who has some dealings with other human beings. This fellow who has the deposit and who has some dealings with the owner of the deposit.

Now what would you say? Is it so absurd that every eight year or nine year old child would immediately see that and at the same time the infinite difficulties - let us assume that there is a famine, the mother is ill, and needs an operation immediately and there is only a selfish physician who refuses to take his knife out of his case if he does not make a certain amount of money - and such people do exist - so he is confronted with a difficult question. "Shall I kill, be responsible, for all practical purposes, for the death of the mother of the children" and that may come into terrible moral problems - let us assume that they are girls, and they may very well become prostitutes - and, on the other hand, we have a good conscience by having returned the full sum, and so on. In other words, I believe judgment is here in this immediate interest due; that is all one could say. There are cases of utmost simplicity without any question but they are of no great interest. But there are cases where surely only experience and prudence, as it was formerly called, is required. Without discernment the moral law does not speak in simple cases. And that is the first consideration we have of course.

As I said, we will turn to the second essay which deals with the relation of theory and practice, and public law, which is, as it were, the macroscopic - is the macroscopic example for the microscopic sob story which we have just heard. Or, would you like to bring up anything to this point? There may be people who have these notions that it is really extremely simple to settle all moral questions. Mind you, an eight or nine year old child, don't forget that. Kant might in a pinch retract that and perhaps - and we must give him that freedom; but that he could say it is very revealing. I mean, for example, how is a normal eight or nine year old child able to distinguish very clearly between what he wants to do out of compassion and what he does out of duty. After all, from Kant's point of view, what you are guided to out of mere compassion has nothing to do with duty. Think of that poor child who should know that compassion is an utterly irrelevant consideration; only duty. That's some remark. Yes?

(. . . inaudible question. . .)

9

I am inclined to think in the same way. Yes, I believe that even in Rousseau, who prepared Kant in various ways, you cannot find such a statement. Now, is there anyone of us - because that question is of great importance. It is in a way a test case for the whole theory, but it is not the whole theory. Yes?

(. . . inaudible . . . because in our actions considerations of what other people can do enter. We consider the possibility in our moral act of what the other men shall do, while Kant didn't consider that . . .)

I don't know what you mean. Do you mean primarily an other-directed morality?

(No. Suppose I'm minded to give the money back, but now I know that this money shall not be used well, so I think it might be better to let it go at some . . .)

Yes, that is another matter, but in this case you wouldn't keep it for yourself. Well, take a somewhat more extreme case. If the deposit is a gun, and this fellow has become insane in the meantime, then, according to a very competent opinion, you are forbidden to return the deposit to the owner. Yes? You know? That's clear. Now the case of this extravagant fellow, your case, is not quite as extreme, because one could rightly say it is not your duty to be responsible for the transactions of an adult person, if you are not his tutor. But still if you give it to the uncle there is no question. I mean, then you wouldn't certainly embezzle it. But here we are concerned with the question where a man may touch a deposit for his family's needs, maybe even for his own needs, and where the case is of such a complexity that we would not - if it depended on us, in the case of someone else, where there is no interest of our own in the case, we could not honestly say that is a crook. The implication of course is that if he did not return the deposit under these conditions he would be a crook; which is, I think, a very harsh statement. Yes?

(One of your earlier statements, that if we know we ought to do something then we know that it is possible, that somehow feasibility is guaranteed by rationality. . .)

Or morality. But all right.

(I mean it sounds always that those are in the wrong order, that if we know we ought to do it then we know it is possible. One would think first whether it is possible.)

No, that is what Kant tries to avoid. And you can say that he has taken care of that problem really a priori, because all questions of feasibility deal with the phenomenal world. That's theoretical knowledge. Yes? But the moral law transcends the phenomenal world.

(But the moral action takes place in the phenomenal world.)

Yes, but what does this mean? Well, you must not misunderstand - for example, you see someone drowning and you feel that it is your duty to save that person. But it is very stormy, very far away, and you know it is a hopeless case, then of course you are under no obligation to do it, but that is another

matter. You know, that has something to do with - the old formula for that was: a serious intention to do it in case of physical impossibility. That's another matter. But of course here also the question comes in, especially in political questions where what is the use of good intentions, you know, of the constant obligation to have good intentions if there is no practical possibility. To that extent the questions are related as you indicated.

(But I can't see how the rationality guarantees feasibility, simply because you would not have a duty.)

Because the duty does not contradict itself in such matters. There are spheres in which reason leads to contradictions and where theoretical reason oversteps its boundaries but not that. Yes?

(How can any a priori knowledge be couched in such terms as state, or citizen, or sovereign; that is to say, how can we know a priori that anarchy is impossible since the only thing that prevents anarchy from being possible is that our notions of happiness conflict with anarchy?)

I would state it as follows. Must not one presuppose that man is a social being? And isn't it primarily an empirical fact, at any rate, it is not in itself - or even if it is not empirical simply it is a theoretical insight preceding moral knowledge proper.

(But no knowledge concerns state or . . .)

But I can show you how Kant can do that. The moral law itself says that morality consists in the fact that your maxim can be universalized, can take on the form of a universal law, i.e., of a law valid for any rational being. You do not have to know that there are rational things, strictly speaking.

(. . . insudible response. . .)

No, then Kant would simply say that this is an empirical fact, Oh, no, anarchy is impossible. I thought mere solitariness. Let us assume that the moral law dictates to you to become a member of the society, and you try, you look around, and you live on an island surrounded by an ocean and there are no other human beings, then of course you can't fulfill it. Just as you cannot fulfill the duty of beneficence with money if you don't have any money.

(No, the question is not whether it is possible or not, but whether knowledge of anything to do with the state is possible a priori.)

It is morally impossible, from Kant's point of view, even if it were physically possible. Morally impossible. Kant doesn't decide - I think he would regard it as - he speaks of some people in the South Sea Islands and for all he knew, and for all I know for that matter, they could very well have lived anarchically, and that meant also immorally, or at least premorally. Take up the question later on. We will come to it. Yes?

(Isn't it possible to say that probably Kant is right in his basic principles. That is, it is easier to make judgments about right and wrong than it is to make judgments about complicated empirical consequences, but that complications would arise in moral judgments where they conflict, and that

the case of the deposit is a case possibly of the conflicting of several moral duties.)

Yes, but Kant does not recognize - in Kant's point of view there can only be a conflict between conditional duties and unconditional duties, and therefore the conditional duties have to give way. So, in other words, there cannot be an insoluble conflict of duties.

(But if I return the deposit . . .)

For Kant that is really a simple case. Your duty says, 'return it' and your heart says, 'no', but your heart has nothing to say.

(But what about my duty to treat other people as ends and not as means? I seem to be treating some people as means to my own end.)

No, no, no. The deposit means something which belongs to Mr. X or his heirs, and no other consideration enters into this transaction. Of course this man has also duties to his family, and if he can't get the money he may beg. He is free to do so. Whether he will be successful or not, that of course has nothing to do with the morality of these actions, only whether he has good or bad luck.

(He doesn't conceive of real moral conflict?)

No, no. When he gives his favorite case - well, the case which is of course controversial morally, of the two men on a shipwreck, and the one pushes the other away and this fellow drowns and he is saved. He has committed a murder. He has killed an innocent man. There is no question for Kant that this is a moral judgment on that, and Kant says only these things cannot be punished by courts, for certain considerations, but that has nothing to do with the immorality of the act itself, because it cannot be punished by courts, it is impossible to bring it under human, or punitive law, because no one is likely to obey it out of fear for human law. I mean, should he be hanged afterwards or drown now, and the drowning now is a practical certainty, the hanging later is uncertain, so on purely - you know, it wouldn't be a wise law. Therefore, one shouldn't make a law of this kind. But for Kant it is a clear case of murder. Sartre gave once the case of a Frenchman, you know this case, in occupied France. The mother was the only non-collaborationist in the family and he wanted to join the Free French. That he felt was his duty. And then - but in order to do that his mother would die, because she would be alone with a collaborationist family. Kant would absolutely deny that it is a conflict of duties. He is under no obligation to go to London; he has to obey the government for the time being; and therefore he can't contribute to the death of his mother. You can say that is Kant's privilege to say so but still the point is whether Kant's doctrine is not in these matters consistent.

(In this sense, that existentialism does not prevent Kant . . .)

No, existentialism is distinguished - no, that is an easy question. Existentialism, to the extent to which it articulates, because what Jaspers says about these matters doesn't reach the level of articulateness and therefore we can't really discuss it, to the extent to which it is articulate it simply denies Kant's fundamental assertion that the purely formal categorical imperative

will supply all men with identically the same moral principles. You know. I don't know how they get away with this because fundamentally what they have is also formal. You know, that is a right of human nature. But that is a long story. Yes?

(Inaudible question.)

You can't return it. You can't return it. Because in this case you will come in fact - you are cooperating with a murderer. I don't want to keep the property. I give it to a neutral party, namely, the police, and tell them the reason why I do not return it to you. You don't steal, you don't embezzle. That's a simple case.

(Inaudible response.)

Well, if you have a ground of suspicion I think Kant would say not to take any chances; go to the police and tell that man - I hope it was not your friend - I gave it to the police. You can't have it, and I told them I didn't give it to you because I suspected you wanted to shoot X.

(Inaudible response.)

No, but this case still does not - it is a hard case I would not deny that, but for Kant it would not be, because the citizen doesn't have to make political decisions. A political decision has to be made by the government and the citizen has to obey the government. I don't know how Kant would have judged the actions of the Resistance in France. I do not know. You know, whether he would not have condemned it as immoral since the legal government, Petain, prohibited it.

(I wonder, aren't there problems of finding which universal acts you are going to subsume the case under, like in this case the French might say that this is not really the government, or is this really the government, this kind of usurper. . .)

No, you can't. I'm sorry, that is decided by the rational - well, let us wait, we will get a simple answer to that. This question cannot arise. Yes?

(When someone is confronted with alternatives of action . . . several inaudible words. . . and there are two moral principles, one subordinate to the other, but in the case of a rational decision, does the situation itself dictate to or contribute to the decision?)

Well, surely, but that would not in itself affect the morality of the action. For example, the eight or nine year old child would not be able to say, yes, you have to go to the police and give them the gun, but he would know that he cannot return the gun to that man. I mean, if he is aware, if he was present - no, no, I believe a good eight year old child would say, I'm sorry, my father is not home, I can't give it to you. And if the father had some sense he would have locked up the gun I think. Yes? So it would really be no problem for the eight year old child. But let us not lose ourselves in all kinds of questions which arise, because you will get some really macroscopic examples when we come to Kant's rational public thought, that is to say, of the rational moral law in the strictest sense.

Now, Kant makes this point, and that disposes of Mr. ____'s argument (question concerning anarchy) I think. The only society, the establishment of which is an absolute and first duty, is civil society. It is not as Locke, and Rousseau, and, by implication, Hobbes, had said, we are fools if we do not enter society, but Kant says it is a moral duty. Therefore, civil society is the only society which is itself an end, and the end which every human being ought to have. He is not free not to - anarchism is immoral. Let us see. The end, civil society is a right of man under public law to compulsory power. As a moral being you are obliged to respect the rights of men. You cannot effectively respect them and have them respected except under government. As far as in you lies you do everything to make possible the degradation or enslavement of your fellow men in the absence of government.

(Yes, that can be asserted.)

Kant asserts it. Now, shall we first continue? Yes? A right is a condition of external freedom. You cannot do any more - I mean for every moral action - you need some external freedom, be it the freedom to return a deposit, where you have to take it out, or the freedom to save a drowning man, or whatever it may be, you need freedom of movement, external freedom. Now, right is a limitation of the external freedom of each to the condition of his agreement to the freedom of everyone else, insofar as that limitation is possible in accordance with or through a universal law.

You see, if we start from the angle of morality we are not free to act morally, or to act in any way, if we don't have freedom of movement, or external freedom. Now, therefore there must be freedom for every human being. But if everyone were free to act as he pleases there could be no freedom, no certain freedom for anyone. Therefore, the freedom of each must be limited to the condition that it is compatible with the freedom of everyone else. A simple example: the freedom to drive a car is limited to the condition that everyone else can drive a car. If you couldn't drive you would make all kinds of fantastic movements with your car which would prevent any other man from driving. And the implication is, furthermore, that this limitation must take place in accordance with or through a universal law, and not by arbitrary acts from time to time. Because, otherwise, there could be no guarantee that the freedom of everyone would be secured equally as that of everyone else. So, the phenomenon from which Kant starts is freedom. Freedom in itself is amoral. It must be limited to become moral. The primacy of freedom, or to use a stronger and clearer term, which Kant used, in the Idea of a Universal History, in the fifth proposition, 'the greatest possible freedom'. If you limit freedom - that is implied - you have to show a good reason for limiting it. The burden of proof rests not on him who claims the freedom but on him who limits the freedom. A thought with which everyone of you is very familiar from daily practice, especially of the ADA. Only such freedom - such limitations of the freedom of anyone are permitted, and are required, for making possible the same freedom for everyone else. If you take the freedom of selling heroin, and you say, well, I give everyone else the freedom to sell heroin, why is this nevertheless not a legitimate freedom from Kant's point of view? Because the freedom to sell heroin means really the freedom to pursue one's happiness in a specific way, namely, the seller of heroin tries to get money. That is one way of pursuing happiness by selling heroin. Yes? Now, this freedom to pursue his happiness, this exactly interpreted, namely, in terms of freedom to see heroin, is incompatible with the kids' pursuit of happiness, because they get into trouble. Therefore,

the legislator is free to take away that freedom. Now, this notion of freedom is purely a priori, which means it is not derivative from any previous end. No freedom for what? That is the crucial point.

Kant, I think, is the classic formulator of the freedom which is not freedom for a purpose. That is constantly emphasized. Why? We must listen to Kant's explicit reasons. The only end which could precede right is happiness, and happiness was of course the starting point of all other natural law doctrines preceding Kant, whether you take the Thomistic form or you take the Lockean form. Whether, in other words, happiness means substantially virtue, or whether happiness means comfortable self-preservation, both meant happiness. Kant opposes both schools of natural law by his complete divorce of right from happiness. The reason is that happiness is radically subjective, empirical therefore. What X understands by happiness is something radically different from what Y understands by happiness. The argument of Locke already, and of Hobbes to some extent. And, as you may remember, that Locke did not make the pursuit of happiness a basic right but only self-preservation, or comfortable self-preservation, and the principle was this: while there is an infinite variety of opinion as to what constitutes happiness there is a crude and sufficient agreement as to what constitutes the conditions of happiness, namely, life, liberty, and property. And therefore if we guarantee life, liberty, and property, we have an objective standard, a standard admitted if not universally at least generally, because most people see that verity that in order to be happy you must be alive, you must be free, and you must have some means of support. Happiness, being entirely subjective, cannot justify any legitimate compulsion. Clearly. If you compel a man to act in a certain way, because you say that it is for his happiness, then he can justly reply, what you call happiness I regard as unhappiness. There is no standard for judging that. You see, these important elements of present day social science relativism is already in Kant, but much older than Kant, already in Locke.

Now, let us turn to a specific passage. Have you the beginning of this second - and at the end of the third paragraph, the section where he explains what freedom means. Tell them the page.

(It is page 417 in the Modern Library, at the end of the paragraph on the page.)

This right of freedom belongs to man as the member of the commonwealth, insofar as he is a being who is capable of having rights . . .

No, 'as man, this right of freedom belongs to him, the member of a commonwealth, *qua* man, insofar as man is a being who is capable of rights'. But, there is a word which I omitted in German, ueberhaupt. 'Who as such is capable of rights.' Now, what does this mean? Man as man is essentially who is capable to possess rights. That follows from the fact that he has duties. I'm speaking to you, Mr. ___ (student who raised question of anarchy) especially. The fundamental phenomenon is the moral law. By this I know that I am subject to a universal law, to which every other possible rational being is subject. Therefore I have a right, derivative from these duties, I have a right with a view to any other possible rational being, necessarily. I do not have to answer at this stage the question whether there are in fact any other rational beings. If a man has no right everyone could do to him what he pleases. But to have human rights means to be free, and to be restricted in one's freedom only to

the extent to which that freedom in itself requires it. Namely, because your freedom might be endangered, or restricted, by the freedom of others, by the possible others, if you don't want to think of your freedom. The possible others. And, therefore, there must be a way to guarantee men freedom in consistence with other possible rational beings, and that is right. I mean that is all; you can say law; the German word Recht means just, right, and law. That is just as the latin word jus. It can't be changed.

Now, what are the consequences of the very idea of right? The freedom of everyone. The freedom of everyone, and that means that no one can interfere with this freedom on grounds of the happiness of that man. Now, what Kant wants to say is this: if people restrict the freedom of other men they frequently do it without any regard for the other fellows' happiness. Well, think of any criminal in or out of jail. Yes? He interferes with your freedom, and is perfectly willing to make you miserable, provided he gets what he wants. And everyone would say that he has no right to that. The interesting cases are those where people interfere with your freedom out of care for your happiness. That is the point which Kant wants to avoid, because if a man has a right to restrict the freedom of another man out of care for that other man's freedom, that means, politically speaking, the resignation to paternal despotism. Whether he has the paternal despotism in a state or whether he has it in a faculty doesn't make any difference, it is paternal despotism. There are people, I believe somewhat irrational - paternal despotism, within certain limits, I think is a great convenience, but some people simply don't like to have a paternal despot merely because they feel, I want to do it my own way, and even if I make it rather more complicatedly I preserve that freedom. Kant regards this not merely as a preference but as an absolute necessity, because every compulsion is based on a notion of what constitutes the happiness of the other fellow, is subjective, and therefore cannot be the basis of lawful compulsion. The only possible limitation is the equality of the restriction, and its universality. If all men are limited in their freedom, all members of society, by a universal law, then no just complaint is possible.

So, in the first place freedom, and in the second place equality. Equality means that no one can compel anyone else, except through the law. The crucial practical implication is that hereditary inequality is a priori unjust. In other words, equality of opportunity, as it was called after Kant, is a demand of natural public law. Kant has nothing against inequality due to other reasons, inequality due to heredity, which means the access of a very gifted man to high governmental office is locked by the wholly accidental fact that he is not a nobleman. There is no reason for that. All reason is against it.

You see the great difficulties which arise here? I mention only one point. Studies which were made in the nineteenth century and which I think are today generally admitted that the feudal order, in its origin, was an absolutely sensible order. In other words, that a part of the population undertook the defense of the rest. And this defense, given the military technique of the time, required a certain cavalry, and these men naturally, as being the only defenders of the community, had to get special privileges. The whole administration of justice, and whatever else, must be given to people who are armed. Therefore, these substantive considerations entering into the character of the society, whether it doesn't require these or these arrangements, are disposed of by the simple and unqualified demands of inequality due to birth is unjust, under all conditions. Then, one could immediately raise the question, which is often raised: what

about inequality due to property? Now, if you say, all right, every man should be free to earn as much property as he wants, that is equality of opportunity, then what about inherited property? Well, this problem has been disposed of by certain laws in the twentieth century, but Kant did not take this into consideration. You see, a very strange and not a a priori principle of distinction between hereditary rank and hereditary property. One sees here already a great difficulty coming in, but you wanted to ask something?

(Yes. On what grounds does Kant make the distinction between a minor and an adult?)

That is, well, that is indeed an empirical question. But, all right. The a priori statement speaks only of beings capable of using their reason. Now whether X or Y is capable of using his reason is - the whole question regarding X is an empirical question. But it raises the question of subsumption, as we said before, namely, in an empirical case. By the way, where he speaks of equality in the second paragraph of the section there he says the equality of a man in state as the subjects of the same is compatible with the greatest inequality both of size and degree of their property, and of bodily or intellectual superiority, or one over the other. Do you have that? So much so that the well-being of one depends very much on the will of the other; for example, the poor on the will of the rich, so that the one must obey and the other command. The example, as the children to their father, the woman to the man. See, Kant never thought of an equality of the two sexes, Miss ___. The equality is strictly among men, but you are not surprised because that was generally known in former times. And a person of your sex - how was she called who began this movement in England in the late eighteenth century?

(. . . inaudible answer . . .)

Thank you very much. Good. You know, I read a funny passage in Balzac and I was quite surprised, when he speaks of 'exposed incest' (?), exposed from murdered incest (?), and then he says something immediately following which presupposes that the incest survived the murder. A very funny thing. I will show it to you later. I mean, Kant was, in a way, very negligent in that question. That's true.

Now, what he would say, by the way, is this, regarding the children. If the father compels the child, that of course he doesn't do, according to Kant, entirely by his own power, that is a power which the law has given to him. No one has any compulsory power which is not due to the law. Now a just law, a good law, would permit compulsion of the child by the parents, and of the wife by the husband, but would never tolerate compulsion of one adult by another adult, because that would be done by the sheriff and other public officers who do the compelling as an action of the commonwealth.

Let us see now. Here is a passage before he turns to self-sufficiency, or however it is called.

(On page 419, Modern Library, about the middle of the paragraph.)

No man may enter into the class domestic animals which can be used for all services the master pleases and which are maintained in service without their consent as long as the master wishes, even though

he is subject to the restriction not to cripple or kill them, which may, as with the Indians, be sanctioned by religion. Man may be considered happy in any condition if he is conscious that his condition is due to himself, his ability, or his earnest effort, or to circumstances for which others cannot be blamed. But if his condition is due to the irresistible will of another, and if he does not rise to the same status of others, who, as his co-subjects, have no advantage over him as far as his rights are concerned . . .

That's a hard proposition, isn't it? I mean, that the only thing which can make men miserable is if the law prevents them from being able to rise to any position to which his talents entitle him. In other words, if poverty prevents him - why should legal inequality be a greater reason for happiness or misery - mind you, I'm not speaking of morality now, only happiness or misery - why should legal inequality be a great reason than, say extreme poverty for feeling miserable? That is, I think, an empirical question. Rousseau thought that way.

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

No, happiness cannot be. Nothing can be said about happiness a priori. In other words, what I am driving at is this: that somehow the consideration of happiness does enter, that this doctrine of equality and freedom, as he presents it, makes it possible for everyone to be happy. This consideration somehow comes in in a kind of after thought. I looked at a book by the only present day Kantian I know, Professor Ettinghaus, formerly at Marburg, who is the only one who is still a Kantian, not a neo-Kantian but a Kantian, and he formulates Kant's principles simply as follows: the fundamental right is the right of man to seek his happiness as he understands happiness. So, in other words, there is no right to happiness. Clearly not. You cannot demand from society that they make you happy. But the fundamental right is to seek happiness, the pursuit of happiness, as you understand happiness. But of course the crucial implication is that it must be compatible with the same right in everyone else. So, happiness is somehow presupposed but as a remote condition rather than as a necessary implication. Whether this will work out we must see.

Now we come to the third point that we must raise, the self-sufficiency, or independence. Independence is a better word.

The principle of the autonomy or self-sufficiency of a member of a commonwealth as a citizen . . .

No, autonomy is really not a good word. I would say independence.

that is, as a co-legislator, may be stated as follows: as regards legislation, all who are free and equal under pre-existing public laws must be considered equal but not as concerns the right to give these laws. Those who are not capable of exercising that right are nevertheless, as members of the commonwealth, obliged to obey these laws and are thereby entitled to the protection of the law but not as citizens.

Yes, now let us see. In other words, while every man has the right to

freedom and equality not all have the right to the vote. On what does the right to the vote depend?

(Fundamentally on sort of being your own master and not being obliged to serve anyone except the commonwealth.)

In other words, under certain economic conditions. That is already difficult how such things can enter a strictly a priori doctrine. Yes?

(. . . inaudible question. . .)

Yes, but here one could say here is an a priori doctrine, and then looking at the empirical arrangements of man he sees that these and these empirical arrangements are incompatible with that, but here we have a part of the intrinsic a priori order, which makes a property qualification of some sort absolutely essential. How does this follow? How does this follow? In other words, Kant, as every other political teacher, when it comes really down to a political problem, must introduce prudential considerations. I mean, that was the old argument of Jeffersonian democracy, of Rousseau. It was the same thing. A property qualification of some kind. He who has not a certain economic independence, either by having landed property or a shop owned by him, who is otherwise a hired hand or an employee, is not capable of having full citizen rights. Kant accepts that. I think that is the point where I think we can get a more concrete picture of the impossibility of such a pure a priori doctrine. Of course you could say that post-Kantian democracy has been altered and therefore that it is a much more strict a priori doctrine. You know, by abolishing all property qualifications it has gotten rid of this self-contradiction of Kant.

Do you have the note on this page, where he gives an example of the domestic servant?

(No, he doesn't have it.)

Well, at any rate, he discusses the case, for example, the domestic servant, the shop assistant, even the barber, are not members of the state, and have no right to vote. But, on the other hand, the tailor, who makes a suit for me, he can be a citizen. And also the wig-maker, to whom I give my hair, he is a citizen. But the barber not. And he concludes, 'I confess it is somewhat difficult to determine the conditions, to raise a claim to the status of a man. . . several inaudible words . . . You see, here Kant himself admits a great difficulty for drawing a line on a strictly a priori grounds. It is of course impossible. The consideration was very simple. The consideration was of course partly the interest of the propertied people not to be out-voted by the needy and partly the consideration that in order to be able to judge of matters of common concern you must have some experience of your own of managing things which the merely hired man would not have. He is, economically, a kind of child, so to speak. He gets a fixed salary just as a child gets an allowance. Such notions were underlying this. And Kant accepts what was in fact a political and prudential consideration, he accepts them as a priori doctrines. This is of course absolutely impossible.

Now we come to the doctrine regarding the legislative body. The last paragraph of this section.

(On page 421.)

All who possess the right to vote must agree on this basic law of how to arrive at public justice, for if they did not there would be a conflict of law between those who agree to it and those who do not, which would necessitate a still higher level principle to decide the issue. Since each general agreement cannot be expected of an entire people only a majority of votes must be considered to be the best that can be attained. In a large nation even this majority will not be that of the voters but merely that of delegates representing the people, but then this principle of being satisfied by majority will have to be presumed as having been accepted by general agreement, that is, through a contract, and hence, this principle would have to be presumed to be the supreme reason for constituting a civic constitution. In the foregoing we have an original contract upon which alone can a civic and therefore completely legal constitution among men be established.

Now, that is a very great question - what does he speak about now? Does he speak about the legislator or about the establishment of society? What do you think? I believe about the establishment of society not about the legislator himself. Now, society can be established, and must be thought to be established, by the majority of a representative body. It is not necessary but then the question arises, why the majority. - Is there an a priori principle here? Why a representative body which would mean - that of course is based on considerations of convenience. That is absolutely dark.

And this notion of the social compact, the idea of a compact which might have been made by the majority of a representative body, is an old inheritance. This notion must be pursued as an idea of reason not as an historical fact, and, as such, is the guide of the legislator proper.

Only such laws are just to which the whole people, in its right mind, could have given its consent. In this paragraph which you began reading, 'it is a mere idea of reason which however has its indubitable practical reality' - do you have that?

namely, to oblige every legislator to give us laws in such a manner that the laws could have originated from the united will of the entire people, and to regard every subject, insofar as he is a citizen, as though he had consented to such an expression of the general will. This is the testing-stone of the rightness of every publically known law, for if a law were such that it was impossible for an entire people to give consent to it, as for example, a law that a certain class of subjects by inheritance should have the privilege of the status of lords, then such a law is unjust. On the other hand, if there is a mere possibility that a people might consent to a certain law then it is a duty to consider that the law is just, even though at the moment the people might be in such a position, or have a point of view, that would result in their refusing to give their consent to it if asked.

Now, what does this mean, this idea of reason? The legislator can be a

monarch as well as a body of men, as he had made clear. How far do the preceding principles guide the legislator in giving just laws? Is a given law compatible with the right of each to pursue happiness as each sees happiness provided this right is compatible with the same right of all? That he has to ask himself. So he does not need any approval by a representative assembly. This consideration alone suffices. We can state it more generally as follows: every law is just, or at least cannot be regarded as unjust, if it is compatible with the rights of man as previously defined.

Of course there is a great difficulty to which we will come later. If the basic proposition of Kant's moral philosophy is that the notion of happiness is hopelessly subjective, and therefore it cannot be the basis of any rational teaching, but if this is so, why should the right to pursue happiness have this crucial importance? Where does the dignity of the right to pursue happiness come in when happiness itself does not have any status. That seems to be a hopeless difficulty and therefore the only way to start, in order to understand Kant's political philosophy is to forget about happiness and to start from freedom, as he in fact does, from freedom as the necessary indication of the moral law. We cannot do our duty if we do not have freedom. And this freedom must be possessed by every human being, equally, and therefore the consequence which he develops here.

And there comes in another consideration. This freedom of man, this freedom which every man necessarily has, cannot be restricted for the sake of virtue. That I think is the crucial point. Because virtue, it is of the essence of virtue to be voluntary. To compel people to be virtuous is absurd. Therefore, a clear line must be drawn between virtue proper and . . .

(Here the tape ends. Lecture went on for undetermined time.)

We begin today with a somewhat broader consideration because we have been too occupied with specific passages, and we have come across certain great difficulties in Kant, and we must see how they can perhaps be understood. Then of course we have to conclude our discussion of the second and third parts of Kant's essay on Theory and Practice. And I regard it as entirely possible that we will not find time for the excellent paper which Mr. ___ - he isn't here? So, this remark was superfluous in the absence of Mr. ___.

For our general orientation I believe it is wise to start with this famous quarrel of the moderns and the ancients, as it appears in moral and political philosophy. And I will be very brief because I think you are familiar with this matter. Now the issue can be stated as follows. Virtue or self-preservation, by which I mean is virtue irreducible, something praiseworthy and estimable for its own sake, or is the value of virtue derivative from its being necessary for self-preservation? This is connected with the following difference. From the classical point of view, irreducibility of virtue, there follows the primacy of duty, whereas, if we start from self-preservation there follows the primacy of rights, natural rights. The modern view, based on the principle of self-preservation, implies that morality is in the service of self-preservation. Self-preservation can of course always be expanded to comfortable self-preservation, as I have said frequently. In other words, a utilitarian, or calculated, understanding of morality goes with this view. In addition, there is another feature characteristic of these doctrines of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, and this is indicated clearly by the title of Spinoza's work. This ethics is meant to be a geometrically demonstrated ethics. And Spinoza has it in his book title but Hobbes and Locke had it very clearly in famous passages of their works. The ethical teaching of these men has this character, that it starts from certain axioms, say self-preservation, and the whole ethical teaching is deductively derived from that, and the whole ethical teaching, including the political teaching, has the universality and certainty of a mathematical system. So, one may say, and even use the language of Hobbes himself, that this ethics is meant to be an a priori teaching. That is one important link between Kant and this modern thought.

The difference is only this, that, whereas the a priori teaching of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau is based on self-preservation as an empirically known fact, Kant refuses to accept any empirically known fact as a principle of morality. Which is an enormous change, but still it is not unimportant to keep in mind that a rational a priori ethics was intended by these thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Now let us turn to Kant. His first point is the attempt to restore genuine morality, non-calculative and non-utilitarian morality. In this respect he returns, say to Plato and Aristotle, versus Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau. But, and here comes in the difference between Kant and Plato and Aristotle, morality consists primarily in the recognition of the rights of man. That is to say, Kant accepts here the doctrine of Rousseau, you can say, because Kant is closer to Rousseau than to Hobbes and Locke. The doctrine of Rousseau, but gives it a new meaning. Now, as for the close connection between Kant's moral teaching and Rousseau's political teaching, one example, or rather the central example, is sufficient.

Kant called the formulation of the moral principles the categorical imperative.

The categorical imperative meaning that the test for the morality of a maxim is its capacity to become universalized. If I have the maxim to get money by hook and by crook, and I may perhaps do this maxim, but then if I want to be an honest man, I have to submit it to a test. The test is a strictly formal one. I do not consider the common good, I do not consider the nature of man; these are material considerations which have to be completely left out. I only see whether this maxim is capable of taking on the form of a universal law to which I am subject. If this is not possible then the maxim is immoral. And if it is possible it is at least not immoral. Whether it is positively moral or not is a somewhat different question.

Now, this notion of Kant's, that morality consists in the universalization of a maxim, that is to say, in imposing upon myself a law which I have given to myself, because I am the one who universalizes the maxim so that it becomes a law and then impose that law on myself. This is bodily taken over from a certain notion of Rousseau's. Rousseau, in his Social Contract, raises this question: how do I as a natural man, concerned with my private or particular interests alone become a citizen, a man concerned with the common good, with the good of the community? And he finds a very simple device. I have desires, I have all kinds of foolish or not foolish desires. For instance, a desire not to pay any taxes. That is all right, but in the moment I begin to act politically, that means, in the moment I enter the assembly of the people - in the case of a direct democracy - I can't say I don't like taxes. I have to give this desire a different form, namely, as we all do when also in ordinary talk - there ought to be a law against paying taxes. But here I do it in this more specific way that I propose it as a law. Now, then, it does no longer mean that I don't like to pay taxes. It means that this assembly, or the sovereign people, will not impose any taxes under any conditions on anyone, and then I will see what happens. I mean, not only will there be contradictions on the part of others but I myself in my great folly will see that what I want is absurd, because how many things are necessary for my own good as a member of the community and for the good of all which can only be done properly through the payment of taxes. So, the test is fundamentally the same. Rousseau characteristically does not say universalization but generalization, but the formal structure is the same. By generalizing my wish, by giving my wish the form of a general law, I can see whether this wish is compatible with citizenship or not.

And in this same context Rousseau uses an expression that by entering civil society man remains as free as heretofore. Why? Because this law which I obey, namely, a law establishing taxes for example, is one which I have imposed on myself in my capacity as citizen, as distinguished from a mere foolish private man who has all kinds of selfish desires. So, this crucial point, the generalization of the will by giving the will the form of a law, and this law is fundamentally self-legislation, a law which a man imposes on himself, is bodily accepted by Kant but, as it were, in a way de-politized. It is a no longer question of a decision of a citizen of this community but of man as a member of the universal society of all rational beings. I shall not minimize this difference, but it is also important to realize the very profound agreement.

So, as I say then Kant takes - in Rousseau this whole teaching of the general will in all its implication is derived from the axiom of self-preservation, just as it was in Hobbes and Locke. So we can call Rousseau's whole teaching, and certainly that of the Social Contract, as one especially important form of the self-preservation morality. Now, Kant takes over that content of that

self-preservation morality but gives it an absoluteness which it did not possess in the pre-Kantian version. Naturally, it couldn't have that absoluteness as long as it was derivative from the desire of self-preservation which is an empirical fact and in addition a fact open to all kinds of difficulties as you know, not all men always prefer self-preservation to other considerations, and so on, and so on.

In other words, Kant makes ethics a truly a priori doctrine, no longer derivative from self-preservation or anything else. Needless to say, that if we make a distinction between self-preservation and the pursuit of happiness, which in a way is possible, Kant does the same to the pursuit of happiness. The pursuit of happiness is as much out of this fundamental consideration as self-preservation.

Now what is the practical meaning of this? On the basis of self-preservation there cannot be true universality. Self-preservation is not universal. This is true only - and of course that was what men like Locke especially meant by that - it is true for all political and crude purposes where we do not care about mavericks. Most people most of the time do not want to be killed and defend themselves against attacks and that's that. So, in other words - if this principle is not universally valid but has only a crude average validity for most cases, then you introduce in fact the principle of expediency. I will explain this in a few words. Because that is the issue with which everyone of you as a mere newspaper reader is familiar. The issue of freedom of speech in this country. There are two ways in which the freedom of speech can be understood, the right of freedom of speech. It can be understood as an absolute rule, and it can be understood as a rule of thumb. As a rule of thumb it would mean roughly this. The alternative to the freedom of speech as it is ordinarily understood means very severe censorship. Now, there is a certain experience with censors which shows that it is rare to find reasonable censors. They would make all kinds of foolish things and annoying things and therefore it is wiser to say, expedientially, prudentially, not to have any censorship. It's a good point. But this implies of course that in given situations the unpleasantness of censorship may be the minor evil compared with very great dangers. But if freedom of speech is an absolute sacred right considerations of expediency can of course never be adduced for limiting it. And you know from the political discussion, if you have not read Walter Burns' book on this subject, that the libertarians prefer the absolute rule in fact. I mean they are sometimes frightened at it and therefore they have not the slightest right to speak of absolute rules but that is one of these things. But, at any rate, the libertarians are inclined to regard freedom of speech as an absolute rule and not as a rule of thumb.

Now, here we come to an understanding of Kant. Kant who is, in this respect, very close to the libertarians, tries to establish these fundamental rights as absolute rights against which considerations of expediency can never be used. Kant divorces the rights of man doctrine from its utilitarian basis, and thus makes the rights of man sacred. From a utilitarian view there cannot be any sacredness, but Kant does this - someone asked me a few days ago - was this not Mr. ___? - about Rousseau's use of the word sacred. At any rate, that is the point. In Rousseau's doctrine it is really very hard - Rousseau speaks all of the time of the sacred character of the social contract and so on and so on, but that is a difficult thing to say for Rousseau. If the function of the social

contract is my self-preservation ultimately it can't be more sacred than my self-preservation. And that is only sanctified by the fact that it is the strongest power in me. Kant, by divorcing the rights of man doctrine from all considerations of a utilitarian or calculative nature, is enabled to make the rights of man doctrine sacred. And I think the great impact which Kant had, and which I think he still has on many people who have no use for his theoretical philosophy, is due to this fact.

Now, how does he proceed? Now, in order to understand Kant's philosophy of right I believe it is necessary to consider the alternatives, and I will do this briefly. Let us take the simple-minded and old view, as stated by the classics. The purpose of civil society is to make man virtuous and happy. Read Xenophon's Memorabilia, Book 3, Chapter 2, for a very brief statement that the function of the general is to make his soldiers happy. Read it.

Now, what is Kant's implicit argument? First, regarding virtue. Civil society can not make its members virtuous. Only the individual can make himself virtuous. Civil society can only produce legality, external compliance with the rules of action, or the laws, but not morality. Civil society cannot bring it about that people do the right things in the right spirit. It may coerce people into doing the right things but it cannot bring about the right spirit, because that must arise in the individual himself. So, in other words, the utmost that civil society can do as far as virtue is concerned is to produce external decency. Of course one could say, why not external decency. That is of some - because decent practice will lead in many cases, if done properly and in sufficient kind, that people come to like that practice. That they find pleasure in decency. And if they are attracted by decency itself the original motivation, praise and blame, or spanking, becomes irrelevant and then they are genuinely virtuous. That's Aristotle's way of putting it. Kant dismisses this possibility completely and I believe Mr. __, you will find the passage where Kant refers to the problem of external decency in the text - did you notice that?

Now, what about happiness? The purpose of civil society is to make its members happy. The answer is: happiness is hopelessly subjective and therefore it cannot be an objective of civil society.

Now, then, let us rephrase the problem in the way in which it was done by the modern thinkers. The purpose of civil society is to establish the conditions of happiness, for however you might conceive of happiness you need life, liberty, and freedom, freedom of movement. Fundamentally, say self-preservation is the condition of happiness. We are not happy by the fact that we are alive, but we cannot be happy if we are dead. That's a simple argument. So self-preservation is the condition of happiness. Self-preservation requires peace and right is the order of peace, right is the order which makes possible peace. That's Hobbes point, but to which the answer is fairly obvious. This peace may be the peace of the cemetery. And that we do not know. You know, peace under Nero. Therefore, let us say the purpose of civil society is to make possible the pursuit of happiness, which is not possible under Nero. And that means of course immediately the pursuit of such happiness and such pursuit of happiness as is compatible with everyone else's pursuit of happiness. This was something of course which was underlying the Declaration of Independence but is also meant by Kant. But not quite.

Why did Kant not leave it at this view, that the purpose of civil society is to make possible the pursuit of happiness? Now, one could argue as follows. If happiness is hopelessly subjective it is perhaps difficult to claim a right to the pursuit of happiness, although one could argue as follows, and that is certainly what Kant means. Given the radical subjectivity of happiness no man can have a right to impose his notion of happiness on anyone else, or, differently stated, everyone has a right to his notion of happiness, and, hence, to the pursuit of happiness as he understands it.

But, there is another consideration. Happiness is not the only motivation of man. Now, happiness of course is meant to be all-comprehensive; wealth, honors, health, beauty, natural or artificial, and all these things for happiness. But, in spite of its comprehensiveness it is not the only motivation of man. There is also the motivation of duty, the moral motivation, which is radically different from the motivation of happiness. For this reason the pursuit of happiness cannot be the only purpose of civil society.

Now, then, we have two, and only two fundamental motivations of man: happiness and morality. They are radically different. Not incompatible, but radically different. Yet, fortunately, they have something very important in common. Each of them requires that man be free, i.e., externally free. I mean we are not speaking now of moral freedom but freedom of movement. You cannot pursue happiness as you understand happiness if you are not free, if you are a slave, for example, or if you sit in a labor camp, or what not.

But, here a question arises. Does morality really require external freedom? Can a slave, or the subject of a vicious tyrant, not act morally? What do you say to this question? I myself am groping for an answer and don't believe I have the solution to this. I repeat my question. Can a slave, the subject of a vicious master, or can a non-slave, the subject of a vicious tyrant, not act morally?

(I think he would have to be able to act morally unless one would destroy the distinction between the phenomenal world and the noumenal world.)

Yes, it is connected to that, but we don't have to rise so high, but one can say, as far as one can speak at all about such matters, there is historical evidence, as everyone has seen, that people in the most incredible forms of oppression have acted morally. There was Seneca, the subject of that vicious tyrant Nero, and quite a few other men. Well, we had some examples in our own time, under very vicious tyrannies people acting virtuously.

So, there seems to be a difficulty to demonstrate the necessity for external freedom on grounds of morality. But, still, one can say one thing without any hesitation. Let us take a man - I read this example in a discussion by a German Kantian - people in Germany who tried to be decent to the Jews for example, in the Nazi times, and especially in the more advanced period, during the war, that really meant they wished to do that but they - if they had done it there would have been a very real danger and a moral certainty of instant death under tortures, and of course, this is perfectly intelligible, they did not do what they felt they ought to do, because no one can be expected to be a hero or martyr of the first order. But we are not now concerned with such a particular question, we are concerned with the principle. What follows from that? A man who is not free - I mean in the sense of a man who is a slave or

the subject of a vicious tyrant - cannot act morally with safety. That is, I think, a perfectly defensible assertion, and a necessary assertion. But I raise this question, and every man of any humanity would say that this is an important consideration, that we should be able to act morally with safety, that our decent impulses should not be destroyed immediately by some gustapo or however the thing is called. But I raise this question. Is this fact, that if we are not free we cannot act morally with safety, a moral consideration proper in Kant's sense? Meaning, a moral consideration perfectly free from considerations of happiness.

(I have a slight difficulty right here. It seems that you can find exceptions to this in much the same way you found exceptions to the slave who can act morally, because certainly aren't there occasions where a slave, a non-free man, can act morally in safety?)

Can act with safety?

(Yes.)

Yes, all right. In other words, you could argue against Kant on Kant's grounds, if I understand you correctly.

(Yes.)

You can never be sure - there is never absolute certainty that he will be tortured to death for his moral actions, but there is absolute certainty that this action is morally demanded. Yes? That's the point you make. Sure. But that is fundamentally what I am driving at.

So, that seems to me a great difficulty, that freedom as Kant understands it, external freedom - I'm not now speaking of freedom of the will in the metaphysical sense - external freedom is a kind of in-between, between a requirement of happiness and a requirement of morality. And it is more evident that it is a requirement of happiness than it is a requirement of morality. I wonder whether a deep ambiguity in Kant's moral teaching is not hidden in this assertion, that the fundamental right is a right of freedom. Yes?

(Doesn't Kant admit that even if you couldn't act morally with safety you would yet have to act morally?)

That is the point which I tried to make. In other words, the consideration of safety is a consideration of happiness, yes? Now, if you make this sharp and ruthless distinction that moral considerations are, not necessarily opposed, but radically divorced from considerations of happiness, then this follows. I repeat what I said. Whether the fundamental ambiguity of Kant's moral teaching, and also the political teaching, is not centered in this very point. This permitted him to take over the pursuit of happiness which was based on a utilitarian basis and give it a problematic sanctity because it also seemed to be a demand of morality. If this is so, the consideration of happiness would have become obvious in the course of Kant's argument, the more detailed argument, whether he liked it or not. Yes?

(. . . inaudible question. . .)

No. That is developed for example in the Foundations for the Metaphysics of Morals. It follows not from your desire, for your love of right. It follows from the point - I mean the prohibition against suicide follows from the categorical imperative. I can only sketch it in a very crude way. The categorical imperative, which demands the universalization of a maxim - you may commit suicide if a universal law permitting everyone to commit suicide is rational, is not self-contradictory. Now, to show that this is self-contradictory, Kant makes another assumption. Kant contends that the categorical imperative, in order to be applicable, must be pictorialized - that is the best word which occurs to me. Kant . . . several inaudible sentences . . . and the most reasonable way of doing that is to conceive of this universal law as a natural law proper. And then the formula is this. If nature has constructed man in such a way that the same desire that urge, which makes him to cling to life could also be used under certain conditions for destroying life . . . several inaudible words . . . So, in other words, your self-preservation derives not from the right to self-preservation but from a duty to self-preservation. Whereas suicide is a very great crime, a sin. The right of self-preservation is derivative, from Kant's point of view, from the duty to self-preservation. Just as in Aristotle. In Aristotle's thinking everybody is obliged to stay alive because of his duty to the common good. In one way or the other no one can foresee death . . . several inaudible sentences . . . We must come back to this question when we come to Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Yes?

(You view this problem both in a theoretical sense and a practical sense . . . remainder of question inaudible . . .)

Yes, but that is a very long methodological introduction. What are you driving at? Well, all right, if the master is an honest man he will of course never command the slave to do something indecent, or unjust, or improper. The problem only arises if the master is unjust, and then the question is morally clear. If the master commands the slave to something immoral, say to murder another man, he won't do it. The danger is that if the master has the right of life and death over the slave he may kill him. The question is whether the slave, and if he is a perfectly moral man, would still not commit the murder. But of course it would be much more desirable for the slave if there were a guarantee that he could never be commanded to something immoral, so that his moral actions would be saved. And that is highly desirable, I believe our natural feelings would say it. But the question is whether this demand for a world safe for morality is strictly speaking a moral demand and not a demand based on considerations of happiness. And I think according to Kant's line of thinking one would have to say that it is not in itself a moral demand but a demand based on considerations of happiness. And this would also go to show what I am trying to show that the foundation of Kant's doctrine of the rights of man is not simply morality but something which involves freedom, freedom which is required both for morality and the pursuit of happiness. Morality and something intrinsically morally neutral, but with the edge, to put it mildly, in favor of the morally neutral. And that raises all kinds of questions.

By the way, regarding this question about suicide I know that it is not regarded by all people as identically proper and there is a very simple statement of the moral problem of suicide in a book which you never read I believe, by Agatha Christie, Towards Zero, which is very neat, and if you have much free

time you might read it. The statement is made that it is absolutely impossible to say of any man, however hopeless, that he cannot be needed in unexpected ways by other people. I mean, fundamentally an Aristotelian way of thinking, only Aristotle thinks more of the polis than other individuals, but it is frequently the same.

(Is it reasonable to say that the slave who is forced to murder would thereby, to get out of it, be forced to commit suicide?)

No, this is not suicide, because he is a murderer and the whole moral will is entirely on the part of the master. Certain philosophers, the stoics, or some stoics, would say that suicide is permissible under certain conditions, perhaps under such conditions. Seneca himself.

(But what if the masters say, you steal this or I kill you, I mean it is not life for life, and if the man were ordered to do a very low level . .)

Yes, but strictly speaking, here is a question between life, i.e., the preservation of life, i.e., a consideration which is morally neutral, and the other is something unqualifiedly morally bad. So, strictly speaking, he could never do that in order to save his life, from Kant's point of view. But that comes back to the question we discussed last time, whether Kant's analysis of the complexity of moral problems is adequate, and I will refer to that later.

Now, let me first continue my argument. Whatever the reasons may be, not the pursuit of happiness but freedom, external freedom, is the starting point of Kant's reasoning. Such freedom is not possible if anyone else can arbitrarily restrict it. Hence, the purpose of civil society is to make possible freedom by restricting the freedom of each soul so that it is compatible with the freedom of everyone else. And this requires restriction by public enforceable laws, not by ad hoc decrees. Only restriction of freedom for the sake of freedom is legitimate. Not restriction of freedom for the sake of morality, say outward decency. That is a very great problem.

Now this principle leads - I come now to the more political conclusions, to the prohibition of hereditary privileges of any kind. For example, entailed estates - is this the proper English expression? It is impossible because it restricts the freedom of many, of most, in such a way that some people, the majority of the people, are at a disadvantage. The case of hereditary property is, according to Kant, entirely different. Whether these reasons are very good is another matter. I remind you only of these facts.

One can say freedom, as Kant understands it, means equality before the law, and equality of opportunity. Hereditary privileges restrict equality of opportunity. Hereditary property, even very unequal hereditary property, does not, according to Kant, restrict the equality of opportunity. The principle is this. The restriction of freedom must be made only by law, by universal and equal law, not by personal dependence. That is again in Rousseau. Unfreedom means to be personally dependent on someone else, like the slave or the serf. The free worker, domestic or in a factory, is not personally dependent because there is a contractual relationship which he can terminate at any time, whereas a slave or a serf does not have this freedom.

But Kant also takes for granted that the right to vote must be denied

to those who are employed, of course on a contractual basis, by private persons. We have read this passage another time. And we see here in this little example how considerations of a prudential nature enter here, in this allegedly a priori principle.

Now the legislator must be guided by the principle of freedom and equality, freedom, that is to say, the freedom of the pursuit of happiness, and therefore a policy of paternal despotism is necessarily unjust. It is not the task of the legislator to contribute to the happiness of the subjects. That is paternal despotism. A free society is one in which the government has no other function but to protect the freedom of each to pursue happiness as he understands it. And equality means equality before the law as well as equality of opportunity.

Now at this point I think we will turn again to the text, and in the second part of the relation of theory - do you have this section, where he says, 'consequence'? Yes, in line 4. Let me say only a word about it.

Now, Kant links this up in some way, the legislator must be guided by certain considerations, and these considerations are called by Kant the 'idea of the original contract'. Let us see what Kant says about it.

(On page 422.)

Instead, this contract is a mere idea of reason which has undoubted practical reality, namely, to oblige every legislator to give us laws in such a manner that the laws could have originated from the united will of the entire people, and to regard every subject, insofar as he is a citizen, as though he had consented to such an expression of the general will. This is a testing . . .

You see, what does he mean, 'insofar as he is a citizen'? Insofar as he has the right to vote. Yes? He is not a domestic servant. Go on.

This is a testing-stone of the rightness of every publically known law, for if the law were such that it was impossible for an entire people to give consent to it, as for example a law that a certain class of subjects by inheritance should have the privilege of the status of lords. Then such a law is unjust. On the other hand, if there is a mere possibility that a people might consent to a certain law then it is a duty to consider that the law is just, even though at the moment the people might be in such a position or have a point of view that would result in their refusing to give their consent to it if asked.

Let us stop here for one moment. Now, you see, we have to raise this question here. Why is it necessary to state this principle guiding just legislation in the form of a possible consent of the whole people in their right mind? Why is this necessary? Why does Kant not simply say that the legislator ought to be guided by the eternal principles of justice, namely, freedom and equality as previously defined? That is strange. We can understand it by looking back to Kant's source, Rousseau.

Rousseau demanded the actual consent of the people and not someone acting as a legislator on behalf of the people. The actual consent if the citizen body

assembled. And he regarded this, and only this, as an effective guarantee against tyranny. Because if this legislator, this sovereign, is the citizen body assembled, then what can happen to the people as a whole? Every possible public officer is dependent on them and they can throw him out at a moment's notice. That Rousseau thought politically of an effective guarantee, and therefore he demanded the actual consent. Kant refers to that in a somewhat earlier passage. Here, on page 420, the paragraph beginning with 'all right'.

All right depends upon laws, a publically known law determining what everyone shall be legally permitted or forbidden to do is an act of the public will from which all right proceeds and which itself cannot act contrary to right . . .

'And which therefore' - no, no, 'and which' - no, that's not properly translated. 'That is an act of the public will, from which (namely, the public will) all right proceeds and which (namely, the public will) can therefore not possibly do injustice to anyone'. The public will cannot do injustice to anyone because it is the source of all right. Go on.

For this purpose no other will is possible but the will of the entire people, because through this will all men decide about all men and, hence, everyone decides about himself. For no one can be considered unjust to himself. . .

'No one can do injustice to himself'. Volenti non fit injuria. No injustice is done to a man who wills that the thing be done. Yes.

This basic law, which originates only in the general and united will of the people is called the original contract . . .

Oh, no, that's another matter. Stop here. This here is a restatement of what Rousseau said. The only guarantee against injustice is that all law originate in an assembly of everyone to be subject to the law. Because no one will ever vote for a law which will be harmful to him. Well, questions arise on this ground because there are majorities and minorities, but let us disregard this subtlety for the time being. But still one can say the people as a whole will not be tyrannized by a popular assembly proper. Mind you, not a representative, but a town meeting, where everyone is present who will be subject to the law, and the decisions are made by a majority vote. It is not sensible to say that the town meeting is tyrannizing the town. Yes? This is a perfectly reasonable statement, at least a tolerably reasonable statement, if understood politically. But why should, then, this reference to a possible will of the whole people in case the legislator is a monarch? Why is it not sufficient, as I said before, simply to refer to the eternal principles of justice? Kant drops this effective guarantee, namely, that the people assembled are the legislators, and yet keeps a remembrance of that.

This throws light on what happens through the divorce of the rights of man from the empirical and prudential considerations which were underlying Rousseau's argument. And it is very interesting that Kant does not simply return to the pre-modern notion, that the legislator must be guided by what we can call the eternal principles of justice, which he has to consider as the presumptive will of the whole people in its right mind, which, I think, boils down in effect

to the same thing, but it is characteristic that this formula of political origin survives somehow in this doctrine.

Now let us proceed. Where you left off there comes a long passage which we read last time and I will only state my conclusion from it. Yes, it is about page 422-423. We have noted this last time that the fact is awkward that the legislator must not be concerned with public happiness. You remember this point that he admits here that the laws will be made primarily directed towards happiness, public happiness, prosperity of the citizens, a rising population, and so on. Kant can't tolerate that, because happiness cannot be the primary consideration. Therefore he must construe these actions for public prosperity as actions required for the mere existence of the legal order, especially against a foreign enemy. Well, if you want to you can do that but it is not what we primarily mean by such measures as measures for public health for example. From this it follows that public happiness cannot be so completely vague as Kant says happiness in general is.

And we note here also a passage where Kant says, in this context, that we have to obey a tyrant for the sake of the principle of freedom. Can you imagine how Kant would construe that? Freedom requires the sanctity of the laws, because the laws are the only protection of freedom. Now, if there is a rebellion against the de facto government, however tyrannical, you admit you act on the maxim that you may destroy the established legal order which is the condition of every possible freedom, and therefore you contradict yourself. Well, we will find more examples of this same thing later, when Kant speaks of the absolutely criminal character of active resistance to tyranny. Here, on page 423, second paragraph.

From this it follows that all resistance against the supreme legislative power, all instigation to rebellion, is the worst and most punishable crime in the commonwealth, because this destroys the foundation of the commonwealth. The prohibition against rebellion is absolute, even when the supreme legislative power, or its agent, the head of the state, has violated the original contract and he thereby, in the opinion of the subjects, loses the right to legislate, because the supreme power has authorized the government to be run thoroughly tyrannically. Even in this case no resistance is allowed the subject as a countermeasure. The reason is that under an already existing civic constitution the people have no lawful judgment as to how the constitution should be administered, or, if one assumes that the people have such a power of judgment and have exercised it contrary to the real head of the state, who is to decide which one is right? Neither can do so, being judge in his own cause. Therefore, there would have to be a head above the head of the state to decide between the people and the head of the state which is self-contradictory.

Now, one more passage, if it is in this edition. No, it is not in there. When he discusses the question of revolution, including tyrannicide. Any revolution is based on a maxim which would make insecure every legal order, and introduce a condition of perfect lawlessness, state of nature, where all right ceases to be effective. And then he comes to this point which is very revealing. What is underlying the fact that people rebel, or go against a tyrant.

disregard of the principle of right, based on the typical delusion to introduce the principle of happiness when it is a question of right. That the people are made utterly miserable by that fellow is an irrelevant consideration when the question of right is concerned. Which is a necessary consequence of this whole principle.

Here in this context there is also - Kant has a very interesting paragraph about moral conflict which will be of interest to some of you with a view to question of Sartre which we had discussed last time . . .

(change of tape)

. . . there can never be an insoluble conflict of duties, because the most we can have is a conflict between an unconditioned or absolute duty and a conditioned, however high it is, and then of course the conditioned duty has to give way. For example, if one tries to prevent a calamity of a state which threatens by the treason of someone, and the person meditating treason is the father. Now what is the situation? Must the son be silent and allow his father to commit treason? Then he incurs moral guilt. Or must he denounce his father to the authorities and his father will be drawn and quartered? That's also not so good. Kant says very simply, to prevent high treason is an unconditioned duty, to prevent the misfortune of the father is only a conditioned duty, namely, only insofar as the father had not made himself guilty of a crime against the state. Then it is perfectly simple, you have to denounce that father. The denunciation that the son makes to the authorities will be made by him, perhaps, Kant says, with the greatest disgust with life but compelled by necessity, namely, moral necessity. Physical necessity has nothing to do with it. That's it. Are you satisfied? I thought that this should at least be mentioned here.

(How does Kant distinguish between absolute and conditioned duties?)

Well, here he gives you an example. You have the duty to honor your father. But that is not the highest of all duties. Yes? If the father of an individual is a very infamous person that is bound to affect the exercise of that duty. That is clear. For example, if the father commands his dutiful son to do all kinds of impossible things the dutiful son is under no obligation to comply. So, the duty to honor one's father is not the highest of all duties. The duty to protect, insofar as it lies in one, to protect the whole order of right is a much higher duty, and, therefore, the lower duty has to give way.

(That is, on the basis of the relationship of the duties to the protection of the world order right has a higher priority?)

Yes, I think Kant would argue this: what is here at stake is something which in the last resort makes possible any possible honoring of parents. And I could imagine how he would answer. Who is or who is not a parent depends on the institution of marriage. Marriage is a civil institution and something which supports the whole civil order has a much higher dignity than anything rendered possible by the civil order. That's a defensible - I mean . . .

(Does he have an equipment of prudence to distinguish between the very close conflicts of duties, which is absolute and which conditioned?)

Well, here I hand it to you. The principle is this: what is morally

the cause is higher than what is morally the effect. Yes? You have some difficulties.

(I just wondered what you thought Aristotle's answer might be to this kind of situation.)

I believe the same. May I add only one point. Aristotle, I believe, would only omit the perhaps. He would be sure that this would be done. That I believe. Yes?

(Isn't the difference though that Aristotle would say that it depends on the kind of society? If you are living under a tyrant, a terrible tyrant, and your father is planning something against him . . .)

You are quite right. I simply forgot that. I was thinking of an ordinary decent society, but surely that would be a material difference. Surely. But Kant doesn't speak here of treason against a tyrant, he speaks of treason generally, and so I assumed it would be a decent society.

There is also a very - now, they don't have the notes.

(They have a couple but not all.)

Does he have the note where he discusses - when he says, 'no right in the state can be . . . ' the 26th note?

No right in a state can be kept under cover by a secret mental reservation, least of all the right to revolution, which the people claim as belonging to the constitution, because all laws derived from it must be conceived to have sprung from the public will. Therefore, the constitution would, if it permitted revolution, have to declare this right publically as well as the procedure by which to make use of it.

That is a very interesting example. I mean, that no sane legislator, or maker of a constitution, would insert a paragraph under what conditions a revolution against the constitution is possible I would take for granted. But that does not cover the whole point. Those of you who have studied Locke will remember that famous dormant right of the people to disestablish the legislator now in existence. Now, of course Locke implies that this should never be invoked by any sensible person except, say, in the extreme misgovernment against which there is no other relief except an armed rising. The notion which is developed, as you will remember, in the Declaration of Independence, with Lockian words, no light and transient causes. This right, in other words, is normally dormant.. From this it follows that it is extremely unreasonable to pronounce it, to shout it from the rooftops.

I read to you a passage, which I found somewhere, by Gierulieux(?), a French protestant who lived in Holland. Gierulieux held, in Locke's time, that it is better for public peace that the people do not know the true extent of their powers, meaning, the right of revolution, 'The rights of the people are remedies which must not be wasted while applied in the case of minor wrongs. They are mysteries which must not be profaned by exposing them too much before

the eyes of the common world. When it comes to the destruction of the state or religion then these remedies can be produced. Beyond that I do not think it evil that they should be covered with silence'. I think fundamentally that was the opinion of Locke as well. From Kant's point of view, such a prudential consideration is absolutely impossible. Now, I do not say that this prudential consideration is necessarily true, but Kant precludes the very possibility of such a thing.

Now there is here - we can't read it in this connection - Kant speaks about the British constitution, about the revolution of 1688, which of course must be a thorn in his eyes, because it was the act of a glorious rebellion and publically acknowledged by the English people. And he has to make some minor mis-statements but I think they are just due to ignorance. For example, Kant says that the revolutionaries of 1688 inserted the paragraph that James abdicated the crown because they didn't have the courage to admit the principle of revolution. As far as I know, that clause was introduced in order to appease the extreme Tories and not the Whigs. The Whigs did not have any hesitation to cashier a king. But the Tories were guided by the divine right of kings notion, and were greatly embarrassed that they should . . . inaudible . . . William and Mary, and therefore they used this legal fiction, that James II had abdicated. But that is a minor point of a purely historical interest.

What is more important is this criticism of Hobbes. He agrees absolutely with Hobbes' demand: resistance, certainly active resistance, is a crime under all conditions. But, Hobbes goes a bit beyond that. Will you read that remark about Hobbes?

Hobbes is of the opposite opinion. According to him, the head of the state is not obliged to anything by contract and he can act contrary to law and right against the citizen in whatever way he might decide regarding him. This proposition would be correct if that which is contrary to law and right were understood to mean a kind of injury providing the injured with a right against him who has acted contrary to law and right. But stated generally, as Hobbes does, the proposition is terrifying.

Let us leave it at that. Now, again the translation is not good, because he says, 'this proposition would be quite correct if what one understands by injustice or injury such a lesion - if lesion is the proper English word - which concedes to the injured party a compulsory right, a right of compelling, against the injuring party'. That is not in the translation. That's absolutely crucial. In other words, Hobbes tried to do it as Kant: the subject, or the people as a whole, have no right of compulsion in any way against the sovereign, but they have the liberal right to say, you did wrong, which according to Hobbes they have not.

But here is a very great difficulty, to which my attention was drawn by a commentator. According to Kant all right is connected with compulsion. What does it mean then that the people have a certain right which is not accompanied by the compulsion, in principle? I think that is a very strong point. And to that extent Hobbes was more consistent, you see, because he simply said, if there is no right of compelling the king then there is no right whatever. And since Kant accepts the principle the right is necessarily a right to compel.

That was I think a crucial point.

Mr. (student who read paper this lecture) has told us Kant's solution out of this dilemma: freedom of the pen, freedom of the press, so that the government, or sovereign, will hear what he or his underlings did wrong and will act.

In the sequel, Kant makes one very important point. A perpetual religious establishment is necessarily unjust. The reason is this. Because it means to free people of a certain creed which they might reject when they become more enlightened, and that is against the nature of man.

In order to understand what Kant means in his fight against the principle of happiness, as distinguished from right, - does he have the appendix to the section here? Yes, this paragraph on page 428.

Nowhere do people engage in practical pursuits speak with more pretentiousness derogatorily of theory and neglecting all pure rational principles than on the question of what is required for a good constitution. This is because a legal constitution which has existed a long time accustoms people to its rule by and by and makes them inclined to evaluate their happiness as well as their rights in the light of the conditions under which everything has been going quietly forward. Men fail to do the opposite, namely, to evaluate the existing constitution according to concepts provided by reason in regard to both happiness and right. As a result, men prefer this passive state to the dangerous task of seeking a better one. They are following the maxim which Hippocrates urges doctors to keep in mind: judgment is uncertain and experiment dangerous. In spite of their differences all constitutions which have existed a long time, whatever their faults, produce one and the same result, namely, that people become satisfied with what they have. It follows from this that in considering people's welfare theory is apparently not valued but all depends on practices derived from experience.

That's all. 'not valued' is a bit misleading. 'If you consider the welfare of the people there is no theory strictly speaking but everything depends on a practice which follows experience.' I think that is an enormous thing. Does it impress any one of you? The principle of happiness leads to conservatism. That is the objection. Well, there are extreme cases where people rise in rebellion but generally speaking if the point of view is happiness and happiness is radically subjective, as we know, and people can feel happy under all kinds of conditions, under paternal despotism, and even under a very oppressive despotism, provided it affects a certain class of the population and not them, they wouldn't mind it - the consideration of public happiness to conservatism. Hence, only morality, or the principle of right, not happiness, must be the guiding consideration. In other words, the truly progressive force, not revolutionary, because revolution is streng verboten, the truly progressive force is not happiness but the principle of right.

I think that is extremely revealing of Kant. Kant really thought only by this kind of doctrine can one lay a foundation for genuine progress for political institutions. The principle of happiness is perfectly compatible with muddling

through and going on with what we have. I believe it is not sufficiently recognized that the enemy of Burke, interestingly, is not Robespierre and Danton, but Kant. That is really the opposite. I mean if we are concerned with a theoretical understanding. For practical purposes Kant was of course an absolutely powerless professor in Koenigsberg who couldn't do anything. But since ideas have consequences, as someone said, that is not a sufficient consideration. That is really the opposite pole.

(What about Rousseau?)

When you read Rousseau's political writings proper, Poland, Corsica, and what not, you will be amazed how sensible - as the letters written from the mountains, which concern Geneva. Very moderate. That Rousseau's principles, as he stated them in the Social Contract are extremely revolutionary I would be the last to deny. A man who says that in practically all countries of the world, except Geneva, there are no laws, because the laws have not been given by the sovereign people but by some monarch or prince of course justifies revolution all over the world. But that is not his practical proposal in any way, and the mere fact - you only have to read the chapter in the Social Contract on the Roman election, which is, I believe, the fourth book, chapter seven, to see how very realistic he was. I mean, he recommends there a kind of gerrymandering which is so ingenious that the cleverest political boss must be humiliated in reading it. No, no, Rousseau had much more political understanding, much more, and this was connected with the fact that he started with the principle of self-preservation, happiness, or however you want to call it, and not from the Kantian principle. There is an enormous difference. But there is a kinship. I would not deny that. But I think that Kant draws this out with much better clarity.

And a purely antiquarian question, but a question of some curiosity, begins to bother me, whether Kant knew Burke's writings.

(Doesn't he talk about the Parisian philosophers in his reflections?)

No, Burke didn't know Kant, surely not. Incidentally, in this writing here he refers explicitly to Danton, but criticizes him. Kant was absolutely - the only day in which Kant was said to have interrupted his daily promenade, which was so regular that people used it for regulating their watches, was when the news came to Koenigsberg of the capture of the Bastille. No, he was passionately political, but it was a politics which Napoleon, at any rate, would have called ideologie, in the Napoleonic sense.

Now, I think a few words should be said about the third essay, on the relation of theory and practice in international law, because this is more immediately connected with the question of philosophy of history, and I would like to say a few words.

Kant begins as follows. One cannot love mankind if there is no prospect of its continuous approximation to the good. Kant means here by love not love in the sense of benevolence, which you can have also in absolutely hopeless cases, but love in the sense of deriving pleasure from looking at it. One cannot enjoy the aspect of the mankind if we are sure things will go on forever and ever as they have been. Now, that of course can be questioned, because

how much we are willing to look at it with pleasure depends very much on our expectation. Really and radically hateful and disgusting people are not too frequent. And even in evil men there are sometimes things to admire, perhaps the energy of passions. So, I don't see that we must accept this argument, either you believe in progress or you will become a misanthrope. There have been quite a few people who have been very gay and light towards the human race although they knew that good people are rare and will always be rare.

Kant here takes issue with Mendelssohn, who was at that time well-known as a popularizer of Wolffian philosophy. Mendelssohn had taken the old-fashioned view that there is no progress of morality and happiness in the human race, and since this is a fact we must assume that it was not the intention of providence that the human race, as race, should progress, but rather individuals. Kant, in opposing Mendelssohn, assumes progress of mankind in regard to the moral purpose of its existence. He does not prove this assumption, and we already know the reasons, but I would like to state them.

Kant argues as follows. I have a moral duty to work for the moral improvement of posterity, and, hence, I am morally obliged to assume the possibility of such improvement. Unless the opposite, the impossibility of such improvement, is demonstrated - the impossibility of such improvement cannot be demonstrated by history, just as little as its possibility, for that which has not succeeded hitherto should also never succeed is an impossible inference, because that does not even apply to technological matters - he speaks here of aviation, that aviation has not succeeded up to 1793 or so does not prove of course that it may not succeed later, and in this respect, Kant has been so vindicated, as vindicated as one could possibly wish. So, in other words, history doesn't mean anything here. The decisive point is this. It is not self-contradictory that such a progress may take place and in such a case the moral duty to believe decides. It is not self-contradictory that the human race progresses morally. But I am morally obliged to believe in such a progress. Otherwise I cannot act with the necessary conviction. I cannot act morally with the necessary conviction, and therefore I must believe in it.

Besides, Kant says, we have some historical evidence, and that is moral progress in our time. We have been eye-witnesses. What does Kant mean by that? That appears from that other writing of Kant's, called, The Conflict of the Faculties. It is a conflict between the higher faculties, theology, law, and medicine, with the lower faculties, philosophy, and where of course the lower faculty proves that it is the one which ought to be subservient. And here is one of the rare cases where Kant makes a joke when he speaks about theology and says philosophy is said to be the servant of theology. All right, Kant says, but the question is whether it is the servant who carries the train of theology or rather the servant who goes ahead with a candle in the hand. And Kant of course assumes the latter.

Also in this writing he speaks of the problem of progress when he discusses the lawyers who at that time were not legal realists, or anything of this kind, but perhaps the most conservative part of the population, interpreting the positive law in all its feudal premises. Now, Kant says there is one undeniable proof of a moral inclination, and that is the enthusiasm, with moral improvements, shown by many Germans on the occasion of the French Revolution. That was wholly disinterested because that was a change in France of no concern to the Germans

and yet they were - what could they think except a deep, benevolent sense of right for the Revolution? I believe this argument will not strike us today after we have gone through some massive debunking, among other things, as a very good argument, because there was no one in Germany, certainly no commoner, who had not come to blows with the nobility, because of the many petty indignities which were inflicted on the - especially the educated part. One only has to read Goethe's novel, The Sufferings of Werther, and other books of this kind, to see how very urgent and practical this doctrine was of a nobility still having privileges which had become obsolete and only annoying. But this only in passing.

So, in other words, we are morally obliged to believe in progress and with some empirical grounds for that. How will this progress come about? That is identical with the question: why can the disappearance of the tension between the duty to obey the law and the unjust content of the law not be brought about by conscious of men. That is really the crucial problem which leads to Kant's philosophy of history. We are obliged to obey the laws. But the laws may be immoral. And then there is a very difficult situation. This situation can only be solved if the tension between the duty to obey the laws and the content of the laws is disposed of. Kant assumes that it is impossible that this tension can be abolished by conscious human action. Conscious human action would mean revolution, and revolution is forbidden. In other words, Kant also answers here the question why can't the intellectual progress not be the cause of institutional and moral progress. Now this passage we should read.

(It is not in this.)

It is not in this? Well, I will try to translate it, if I can.

We can expect a completion of this purpose - meaning a just social order - only from providence. For men, with their projects, only start from parts, and mainly stop at any parts, and while their ideas extend to the whole their influence cannot extend to the whole, especially since their projects contradict each other and they could therefore hardly unite themselves out of free will for the implementation of such a comprehensive project, the establishment of the just order and universal peace.

Now what does this mean? The ideas, that means, reach not farther than the influence, and therefore the ideas cannot bring about social progress. Social progress can only be brought about by something which does not depend on conscious actions of men, and therefore the whole story, which we know by now, the antagonisms of men, the passions of men, and the troubles into which men come, war, unbearably expensive war, and evermore damaging wars will lead people gradually to the desire for peace, and also governments see that they cannot be strong if they don't give a considerable degree of freedom to their subjects, because free countries prove to be stronger than a military form of un-freedom, and so on, and so on.

Then when he speaks, in the immediate sequel, of this trend towards a just society and perpetual peace, he mentions all kinds of things which he has already mentioned in the Idea which we have read. He also refers to the public debt, this famous invention, which he admits is an ingenious remedy in order to make possible wars and wars and wars, but it is also a remedy which eventually destroys

itself. I remember the passage in MacCaulay where he pokes fun at those enemies of the public debt who always prophesy misery, and then the public debt has risen and risen and risen, and the grandeur and power of the British Empire has risen in proportion. But I know Kant took here the old-fashioned view of things.

In this connection he makes one point which is also very characteristic of Kant, that popular government will be peaceful. Are you familiar with this argument? I mean it did not require the genius of Kant to invent that. You find it clearly stated, for example, in Thomas Paine's Rights of Man. Do you remember a discussion of this proposition of the opposite point of view, a very powerful one?

(Declaration of Independence?)

Sure. Right near the beginning. I don't know whether Hamilton discussed a thing like that. Also in this connection he brings up one famous Marxian problem. He says, although it is not in the nature of man according to the ordinary order that men abandon freely, voluntarily, something of their power - you know Marx's famous thesis that no class gives up voluntarily - Kant says however, but still it is not impossible, and therefore it is possible to hope for a peaceful development in the direction of a public and ultimately a global federation of republics, because - the reasoning is very simple - in a monarchy the man who decides on war and peace doesn't have to expose his life. Other people have to do it. And, therefore, if the other people who have to do the fighting will decide about war and peace there won't be war. This is an extremely charming but wholly untrue argument, especially since it was made in Prussia shortly after Frederick the Great, who was not so averse to be very close to that.

Now, we try to sum up. We do not learn anything of great importance from this third section but it only confirms some points we have read in the Idea of a Universal History.

Now, what conclusions are we tentatively entitled to draw from our previous discussion? Kant effects a synthesis, we can say; tries to effect a synthesis, between classical political thought and this modern political thought, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke. That he is concerned with restoring some principles of the classics is clearly shown by this very emphatic reference to Plato, and especially to Plato's Republic, in the Critique of Pure Reason, when we read selected passages from it. But the content of Kant's political philosophy is of course entirely non-Platonic, non-Aristotelian, and is almost bodily taken over, with some minor adaptations, from Rousseau. But Kant gives this teaching of Rousseau a moral dignity and a sacredness which it could not possibly possess in Rousseau because of the utilitarian deduction of the whole teaching. In effect - and that is a French thing - such synthesis, which they always require, if they are not a mere compromise, they require an entirely new plane of thought.

I would put it this way. If you have a certain premise, in which two opponents fight it out, then there will always be eclectic solutions, compromises, but they as a rule are weaker, and made by weaker men, than a clear position. That could never be called a synthesis. A synthesis means to resolve this conflict by going over to another plane of thought, and that means to say that something which was common to these opponents is abandoned.

Now what Kant abandons is clear. Kant was the first philosopher to divorce morality, clearly, from happiness, purpose, and prudence. Purpose comes in of course in Kant in some way, and we shall see this later. But still the principle is settled. That is to say, a premise all these earlier thinkers, however opposed they might be to each other, took and argued on the basis of happiness, purpose, and prudence. But, still, the difficulty is this. The doctrine which Kant takes over from his predecessors, and especially from Rousseau, and which was - I will use a convenient term - (writes on blackboard). I don't know whether all of you have heard this term: eudaemonism, meaning, a moral teaching guided by considerations of happiness. And Kant, as a matter of principle, rejects every eudaemonistic ethics. And that means really every ethics, philosophic ethics, preceding.

But the doctrine which he embodies, which he sanctifies, this Rousseauan element, was in itself a eudaemonistic doctrine. The consequence, I believe, is this, and I have tried to show this by a closer argument, that Kant's doctrine itself, in spite of its non-eudaemonistic character, is, in its principle, as it appears in his political philosophy, means freedom, neither clearly eudaemonistic nor clearly moralistic in a sense. Until further notice I believe that is correct.

Mr. __, next time we will read your paper. From now on we must proceed at a somewhat busier pace. I believe it is really necessary, to understand these things as well as we can, that we must work much harder . . (end of tape)

(end of lecture)

. . . and that is not meant as a criticism, as a radical criticism, of your paper. You did not have a point. Is that correct? You studied the material carefully, and thought about it, and various observations and reflections occurred to you, but there was no single point to which you were driving. I say this because I would like to know. I was waiting for it, but it didn't appear to me. What was that?

(I'm not sure yet.)

I mean I don't say this is absolutely necessary, but if it is, it facilitates the discussion, and if I have not been able to discern it, and if it is in, then you should tell us.

(Well, it seemed to me there were these two themes, one, that the truly republican society is the rule of law and the law is sovereign, and also that in some sense there must be power, kingship . . .)

Yes, sure.

(And this is also related to the idea that in some way the mechanical forces of the phenomenal world, that is, brute power, must be made effective or must be made conditions for the realization of free . . .)

That was what came out at one point, where you referred to this dual - in other words, the only fundamental issue which you raise, as far as I can see, and this seems to be confined by what you are saying now, is that at some point the characteristically teaching, the dualism of the phenomenal and noumenal, is to be discernible as the background of his political philosophy. Is that it?

(But that this is related to the problem of rule of law, because this is why the law can't - the law is ultimately derived from the noumenal world of freedom but it must apply in the world of force, so that in a sense it can't apply . . .)

I see. Yes, that is an original way of stating the problem, and you brought it out with one point of especial importance regarding the dualism within each individual as subject and as member of the sovereignty. It is a pity you did not elaborate that. I mean, I have not thought of it and I do not know whether it leads somewhere, because I didn't think of it, but it certainly has to be investigated. That the relation between law - I mean law as Kant means it here, namely, rational law, the dictates of pure reason - and force must have something to do with the difference between the noumenal, or the thing-in-itself, and the phenomenal, that I think is clear. I wish you would have elaborated that for the benefit of all of us, including myself.

(I don't know enough Kant.)

Yes, all right, but, still, at any rate, we agree it is a real problem. I will come to that later.

Only a few points. You say that Kant defines the state in terms of law rather than of force. Primarily that is correct. But later on you said 'rulers

and being-ruled is brought in in addition to that'. That I cannot quite agree with, because when you say law you say a legislator and those to whom the law is given. I mean, in the very idea of law ruler and ruled are implied. Even if the rulers are the citizen-body who assembled give the law for the town then the individual, as not a member of the assembly, in his ordinary non-political life, is of course subject, whereas in the assembly he is a member of the sovereignty. There is no difficulty there.

(I was trying to imply the distinction between this and some liberal notions of law in which the idea of obedience is gotten rid of entirely.)

Well, that one could say is - how could one call such a theory? I mean, radically wrong. You could also say, utterly unrealistic, or whatever you want. There is no such thing as a law in which there is not at least, which does not imply, the possibility of obedience. Yes? Of compliance, or however you call it.

(Yes, but it seemed to me he used law to get rid of the notion of coercion, that the existence of law does away with coercion.)

Yes, well coercion is very unpleasant, but still particular laws, the laws we have, do have most of the time such coercive elements. You know, there are certain difficulties which arise on the higher levels, say the relation between the executive and the legislative, or between the federal government and the state government. There the question is sometimes raised: do these laws really have a coercive power proper? The example of Arkansas seemed to show that there is some coercive power because if you send soldiers somewhere that always means coercion. But, on the other hand, it is hard to imagine a use of soldiers for coercing either the congress or the supreme court. Whether it is theoretically possible I simply do not know. But even admitting that there are quite a few laws which are not coercive, but there are always some laws around which are coercive. That this is not pleasant is certainly true, but what can you do about that? Then we would have to hear a strong argument in favor of anarchism, and that is really another matter. But that can always be tried.

Now, you said you would have liked to discuss Kant's notion of autonomy and compare it with Aristotle's notion of self-sufficiency. Why did you not follow that? Why did you resist this temptation?

(I thought my paper was too long, and besides that I thought you would refute me.)

Wouldn't you accept, assuming that were true, to quote a very famous man, wouldn't you prefer a minor modification, wouldn't you accept a minor modification in order to get a major instruction? But it shouldn't be a modification in the first place. But, all right, it would be very interesting to do that.

You referred to another problem of comparison when speaking of Kant's forms of government versus the Aristotelian regimes. That can be dealt with fairly simply. What is the precise relation? I would like to make the remark that what Kant says about this subject is absolutely Rousseau. There is no originality of thought. Now what is the difference between Aristotle's concept of regimes and this concept of forms of government?

(Well, they are both constituted out of groups of people, but, in Kant these people have sovereign power. I don't believe in Aristotle there is such a thing. And, also, I'm not sure in Aristotle that people who give form to the state are supposed to be representative of the state.)

That's it. I see. So, in other words, in the Rousseau-Kantian notion the sovereign is everywhere the same. The people. What Kant calls the republic could be called a somewhat qualified democracy. Now, these qualified democracies - qualified because people who are hired workers are not citizens - these sovereign people may delegate the executive power, not the legislative power - let us even say - no, not in Rousseau the legislative power, let us take a somewhat broader view, the Lockean, and to some extent, the Kantian view. The democratic people may delegate the power, the legislative, and perhaps the executive, power, to one man, to a group of men, and they may retain their power. So, in other words, here we have a difference only of forms of government not of sources of power; whereas in the Aristotelian doctrine, the monarchy and the aristocracy is of course ruling in its own right and not in a right derivative from the people. The monarchy and aristocracy in Aristotle are not representing the people. They rule in their own right. Whereas in the modern notion, which has of course a scholastic pre-history, all governments are derivative from a fundamental democracy. And that is a crucial difference.

But the form in which Kant states the problem is in principle the Rousseauian form. Only a republican regime can be legitimate. That meant in Rousseau, more clearly than in Kant, only an order of society in which the legislative power remains in the hands of the whole citizen body. The executive power ought to be delegated for the sake of orderliness and freedom and so on. And that may be delegated to one man and to a small body of men or to any combination they desire. But the legislative power belongs essentially to the people assembled. In other words, in Rousseau's case it must be a direct democracy. Representative would already be a defect, because if you have a representative democracy, according to Rousseau there is already the possibility of an independent interest of the parliamentarian. The whole issue in the nineteenth century, say in the first thirty years of the nineteenth century - now it is obsolete - between parliamentarian and direct democracy - you know, it played a special role in France, but you have it in this country too - all attempts go in the direction of direct democracy, referendum, initiative, and last but not least, public opinion polls, mean of course the sovereign must be the people themselves and not their representatives; the idea being that the representatives may form an interest of their own. For example, in certain cases say, regarding their compensation, they write their own ticket. You know. And an interest of their own, a class interest, or a caste interest, may develop, which is incompatible and therefore they can no longer be a hundred percent representatives of the people.

Now, as for the unjust war, Kant says, on the one hand, very clearly that there cannot be an unjust war, because an unjust war presupposes the existence of a legal order, and since there is not yet legal order, a federation of states to which all states are subject, the distinction between just and unjust remains entirely arbitrary, because in every case judge and accuser are the same person. Therefore, the concept of unjust war is thrown out by Kant just as it was thrown out by Hobbes, and the whole typically modern tradition of international law, whereas in pre-modern natural law the concept of just war had an important status.

But here a difficulty arises which is similar to that which arises in

Hobbes' political doctrine in the problem of domestic affairs. Hobbes says it is impossible to make a distinction between the just and unjust ruler, because if you can make such a distinction you are the judge of your sovereign, and that must be rendered impossible. But on the other hand Hobbes teaches that civil society must be established, a prince must be established, in order to safeguard the rights of man. And here you have an objective criterion for saying whether the prince is just or unjust. Does he or does he not safeguard the rights of man? And he is caught between the horns of this dilemma, never solved it. Hobbes, in other words, is compelled to admit that there is a possibility of an objective distinction between the prince and the tyrant, and he is compelled to deny it, because if he would admit it he would admit in principle the possibility of legitimate resistance. You can resist a tyrant. And he doesn't want that, because it leads to anarchy. Anyone might come and say, yes? Certainly, you have here a situation where there is no clear established judge who decides the issue. And, on the other hand - but, all right, let us forget, let us then say no distinction must be made between prince and tyrant; but then he gets into another difficulty, because another question arises. Why should I obey the prince? And this question cannot be answered on the basis of positive law, because positive law is of course derivative from the prince, and the authority can ultimately not be established by positive law. We have to turn to natural law. Hobbes, therefore, has to develop a natural law teaching, which is said to issue in the uncriticizable power of the prince but which of course acts also as a criterion for judging of the actions of the prince. If everyone has the right of self-preservation, then this right, with its implications, naturally at the basis of the power of the prince, limits the power of the prince. Inevitably. And Hobbes never solves this problem.

Now, something similar happens in Kant. He says there cannot be an unjust war, but by indicating clearly what the character of the just war is he admits the possibility of an unjust war. For example, if someone - let us assume that the war must not be waged with means which make impossible future confidence and trust between the warring nations; the use of poison. You send an attractive woman, you know, over to the commanding general of the hostile army and she poisons him and since he is the only able general you win the war. According to Kant that is absolutely impossible, because that destroys the possibility of trust. Yes? All right, but if someone does it does not the war, by this very fact, become unjust? I think that is the same difficulty in which Hobbes was and fundamentally for the same reason.

Now, there is another point which you also raised which shows a great difficulty, and that is the right to dissolve the league of nations after it has been established. What was your reason for this suggestion of Kant in your opinion? You gave the reason but I forgot it.

(Yes, I thought he was afraid of tyranny.)

No, because a league of nations, as you rightly said, would not be a tyranny. I mean, a league of equal nations. No, I believe it is simply a consequence of the dogmatically preserved principle of the sovereignty of each nation. If the sovereignty of each nation is sacred, by natural law, or by rational international law, then it must be preserved under all conditions. And then he must very absurdly, it seems to me, insist on its maintenance; although in this stage of a league of nations, this state of a league of nations would be morally

and judicially higher than that of mere sovereign nations surrounded by lawlessness. It is not clear how it is worked out . . .

(change of tape)

. . . a proviso would obtain in both cases, that it may be dissolved, and there is no visible reason why this permission should be granted. Then it would not be a league of nations but simply one over-powering colossus forcing it. That is clear.

Now I come to the most interesting problem but I really don't know what to say about it, and that is what you said about this dualism about the phenomenal and noumenal. In each man, qua member of the sovereign body, of the legislative body, he is an end in himself, but qua subject, mere subject, he can be used as a means. That was your point. It would be very interesting if you could prove that, but I am sure of one thing, that Kant did not mean it. What occurs to me is this. Aristotle says we rule our body despotically, that is to say, as a master rules a slave. Our body has no inherent dignity. Yes? Good. Now, from this point of view one could say, assuming that it is a just government, the government too could also participate in this right to rule our body despotically, which would include such rights as inflicting capital punishment, under certain conditions, or even to have - how do you call this, if you are spanked publically? What is the English term for that?

(Public whipping.)

Yes. In other words, here this thing-in-itself, wholly lacking dignity, the mere body, is publically whipped as a punishment for certain kinds of misdemeanors, and the dignity of man is in no way affected by it? Yes? I mean, do you mean such situations? What Kant absolutely rejected was mutilation of the body as punishment, cutting the ears off and this kind of thing. Capital punishment is all right, and as far as I have seen, there is no objection to public whipping, I mean of grown-ups.

(I didn't mean quite that. I meant simply that the passive use of citizens by the state, or the sovereign . . .)

Yes, what is that in the case of punishment? In the case of punishment someone is, for example, condemned to jail with perfect justice. Kant discusses that. But that is because he has fulfilled, not the punishment, but the unjust action, and since he entered society with the understanding that his freedom would be restrained to the extent, and only to that extent, that it is compatible with the freedom of everyone else under public laws. In the moment he acted against that, for example by committing an act of theft, and therefore unlawfully restricting the freedom of someone else, it is perfectly in order that he be punished for it, and the punishment consists in a very severe additional restriction of his freedom, but since this was provided for by public law he cannot complain. If he had not stolen it wouldn't have happened to him. It is even a recognition of him. One can develop this thought along these lines as it was developed later on by Hegel. It would really be disrespect for his human dignity not to punish him and to regard him as - how shall I say it - as an idiot, you know, as an irresponsible person. Precisely because you respect him you want to bring this infraction - this disorder must be brought back to order

by means of punishment. I mean, there may be something - I'm sure that the problem of the phenomenal and noumenal man must come in somehow, but I do not yet see clearly how.

(It seems to me that he goes out of his way to talk of the political mechanism, and people as units in that mechanism, very often in this . . .)

Yes, and I know he used the expression 'automaton' once.

(And he gave several examples in the essay of people who simply have to pass on their orders, and he quickly turns to their other function as active members.)

Yes, I wish Mr. ___ and Mr. ___ (students scheduled to read papers in future classes) would think of this problem, whether they can get some greater clarity about that, how far this automaton, or mechanism, of civil society creates a problem for the dignity of man as Kant must have meant it. It is perfectly possible. I only don't see that.

I see more clearly another difficulty, which I mentioned last time, and I do not want to say that it is perfectly clear in my own mind. I think we must work together to achieve some clarity. Now, this refers to one paragraph, the only place where I think your presentation was not adequate, and that is paragraph - does he have the original editions with the paragraphs?

(No.)

Well, Kant's discussion of why it is our duty to enter civil society - you remember that? Kant has always said, it is not a matter of prudential reasoning, that it is good for my self-preservation or my pursuit of happiness, to live in society and therefore also to accept the conditions of society, but it is our moral duty.

Now, I would like to prepare our reading of that with a few general remarks. The whole argument of Kant, as developed in his Metaphysics of Morals, but also partly in his more occasional small writings. The basis of that is freedom, external freedom, as the natural right. What is the basis of this assertion? Is freedom, in this sense of external freedom - meaning freedom to move, freedom to make your own decisions - is this freedom required for morality? It is impossible for a slave to act morally. Freedom would simply be required for the pursuit of happiness; for pursuing happiness means, according to Kant, to pursue happiness as I understand happiness. Happiness is not objective but strictly subjective. The lack of freedom means, in the best case, that someone else imposes on me his notion of happiness which is as subjective as my own. I say in the best case. In the worst case he may simply want to make me miserable, and then of course what right has he to do that? But precisely if happiness is so radically subjective why can the right to the pursuit of happiness be sacred? If one says that freedom is required for acting morally with safety, it is a concern with safety, i.e., with well-being, with happiness, which is the rationale of freedom. What then is the moral ground of right of freedom? You must never forget that for Kant considerations of happiness as such are not moral. They are not necessarily immoral of course, but they are not simply moral.

Now, I am morally obliged to treat any human being, not merely as a means, as a tool. I must recognize the dignity of every human being. Kant doesn't say that but one could almost say, because he is created in the image of God. You must never forget that. But Kant does not say that. I'm morally obliged to treat every human being as a free being, as a being which has the right to make his own decisions. But in all matters, or in any way he sees fit? No. He has this right only to the extent that he grants the same right to everyone else, including myself. Then from this it follows, I am morally obliged to respect the dignity of man also in my case. I must therefore claim for myself also the right to make my own decisions. But does not the moral slave as a moral being make his decisions, for example, by refusing to obey an immoral command of his master? The duty to respect the dignity of man refers to man's moral potentiality. Everyone must have a chance to become actually moral. Whereas actual morality does not require freedom, as is shown by our moral slave. Freedom is required for becoming moral. Think of the slave when he was eight years old, or seven years old. Perhaps the moral slaves were not born as slaves but required their morality by being free men. But what is that which makes it practically impossible to become moral if one is not a free man? What is the difficulty? Now I appeal to your own observations and reflections. What is it which makes it practically impossible, or, to be more careful, extremely difficult, to become decent for people? What is that?

(. . . inaudible response . . .)

Yes, but you see there are difficulties. Sure, habituation, I'm thinking of that, but not all conditions are equally favorable for habituation and there may be a kind of lower limit beneath which habituation to virtue is, humanly speaking, impossible. Descartes discussed this once in a somewhat jocular vein when he was attacked by an adversary because he was a nobleman. He said he was sorry, he shouldn't have said that, but after all it doesn't make any difference where you make your first steps in virtue, that is, whether you make them on the castle of a nobleman or you make them among the camp-followers in an army; you know, the female camp-followers in an army. The nasty thing was that the mother of this adversary had been such a woman. So, there are different conditions.

Kant seems to say, the condition is freedom, in the sense of not being a slave. Is this a sufficiently good analysis of the difficulties obstructing a decent upbringing? Do you see the point? I mean, we are not speaking now of actually moral people. After having become moral, they will act moral under all conditions, and prefer all kinds of tortures and death to a moral act. But what about people who are not yet habitual? Then external conditions play a very great role.

What I'm driving at is this. If this is a consideration of Kant, and this I do not know, and I do not believe that it is, for the reason that for Kant habituation does not play as great a role as it plays for Aristotle - but even assuming that it were, and then it would be a reason of some importance, then freedom, i.e., not being a slave, is by no means the only or the most important consideration. There may be living conditions, this theme which is now mentioned every day in the newspapers, broken homes, you know, slums, and this kind of thing - no, really, there is a problem here: juvenile delinquency, yes? In other words, this reasoning would lead you as much to the so-called welfare

state as it would lead you to Kant's Rechtstaat, the state of right, which, strictly, restrains from any welfare operations as such. I really do not know.

I repeat my question. Let me finish that and then we argue. What then is the basis of the assertion that there is only one natural right, the right of freedom? Man use the natural right to freedom because they have the duty to act morally. If a man is not free he can be forcibly prevented from doing many things which it is his duty to do. That would apply of course to our moral slaves as well. He can be prevented from doing this by immoral men, his masters. Given the fact, the fact, that some men are immoral, there is needed a protection for the right to act morally, and therein lies the moral necessity of coercion, i.e., of the state, because there are some immoral men, there don't have to be many. And that means that some men, or, in principle, all men, may be prevented by the others from acting morally. And therefore there is a moral necessity of freedom.

But in this case, if we argue in that way, we admit one thing, that the doctrine of the just society based on the freedom of each rests on an empirical fact that there are some immoral men. Kant demands an a priori deduction. We do not need the knowledge of the fact that some men are immoral. The phenomenon of the moral law itself implies that some men may be immoral. Obviously. The a priori possibility of immorality is the legitimation of the state as an organization meant to protect man's unimpeded right to the execution of the moral law. That would be a perfectly moral deduction.

The state cannot have the function to protect any alleged right to act immorally, or even to act according to discretion in morally indifferent matters. That's an entirely different proposition. Is that clear? Well, I try to be as loyal as I can to Kant's theory of morals, and then I can achieve a deduction of the right of freedom as a right to act morally, unimpeded by any possible immoral man. It makes sense to me. Now, let us see what Kant in fact does, but before we turn to that let us see whether the argument is improper, inexact, unconvincing at any point. I really would like to learn that, and I hope you will also learn from each other.

Well, to remind those of you who do not remember the discussion of last time as well as I remember it, the point was this. I have the strong impression that Kant's right to freedom is a hybrid, the real basis of which is the right to the pursuit of happiness, which we all know, where happiness means the right to happiness however I understand it. A hybrid of this right to the pursuit of happiness, on the one hand, and the right to act morally, on the other, which right would be derivative from the duty to act morally. And the peculiar advantages as well as the peculiar obscurities of Kant's doctrine are based on this invisible switch from happiness to morality, which, for him, would be a particularly grave thing. And that is the background of my present presentation. Do you see any problem here?

(I was wondering if Kant had anything of this notion that there cannot be such a separation of freedom and morality. In other words, that freedom is involved in the very constitution of a moral act, and a moral act is only moral . . .)

Sure, but this freedom, the moral freedom proper, of which people were

aware all the time, even prior to Kant naturally, exists of course in a slave as well.

(Does it?)

Ask Father Buckley (a catholic priest present in the room), who knows better than anyone of us the traditional teaching. It is not pleasant to act morally and create all kinds of other problems, but the possibility of it - what would be the alternative? It would be that the moral freedom of man is at the mercy of any crook or crooks. Then, morality means in the best case the use of certain peculiar opportunities, which opportunities do not depend on us but depend on chance. What would come out of morality?

(Well, I was just wondering that Kant might have some slightly different conception . . .)

Yes. I would like to find out what that is.

(If, perhaps, the notion of self-respect might not be an integral part of . . .)

I tried to consider that. But where would it enter? Then it would mean that you can never have or use another man as a slave. Yes? Because as a slave means, according to Aristotle, as a willing tool. That it did not contradict, in Aristotle's opinion, the dignity of man, is another matter, because he understood by slaves in the strict sense nitwits. But if he is not a nitwit and has become a slave by virtue of having become a captive then of course you have to respect him as a human being. It is perfectly compatible with respecting someone as a human being to give him the task to bring in wood or to bring the manure to the field. I mean, you must not be squeamish here. You know? If you have some high notions of what befits a gentleman that does not come in when we speak of the rights of man as man. That is not in any work; any labor, is as such, if it is labor, respectable of course. I mean, unless you speak of criminal acts or simply indecent acts, which could not be called labor.

(What about the citizens of the state ^{who} have the quality of self-mastery? Is Kant identifying this in any way with self-respect?)

Yes. You see, that of course would be the point, but where you decide it is hard. What is the decisive difference between the moral doctrines of the rights of man, which Kant embodies, and the Platonic-Aristotelian notion? In the Platonic-Aristotelian notion all rights presuppose a natural fitness. For example, such a right as the right to be a freeman presupposes that you are fit to be a freeman. Not everyone is fit to be that.

Now, let us really see how the classical argument runs. A freeman means the right to be master over your own property for example, if you have any. But what does this mean? Are you fit to be a master of your own property if you are completely incapable to administer it, if you squander it, or if you use it in an absolutely foolish way?

Now, let us see how Plato argues that out and see how we come to the practical notion. Such a man is not fit to administer his property. He shouldn't have

property. He should be assigned a function where he has a responsibility which he can master. For example, say he has to do certain limited routine work under considerable supervision and as little discretion as possible because he is sure to make a bad use of it. Whether that is technically slavery or not is not now our concern. But let us radicalize that, that this thought leads to the conclusion that every man must be assigned that function and that property which he can do well and use well. This presupposes, in other words, the rule of perfectly wise men, who do the assigning. Plato's Republic is the document.

Whatever you may think of this proposal, and it has a certain logic in it, because it draws our attention to the vagueness and ambiguity of the common notion of being one's own master or being a freeman. It certainly will not be possible, as Plato clearly enough indicated. But that is an important point. It is not possible. Hence, what is the consequence? We must replace the demand for the uncontrolled rule of wisdom by another principle, wisdom diluted by consent. These other non-wise people must somehow approve. And that means of course since they would never approve of something unqualifiedly wise some mixture between wisdom and non-wisdom is the best thing you can have. That is what Plato and Aristotle of course mean. But that has a very grave consequence.

This mixture, say the politically just, the politically just cannot have the absolute sacredness which the simply just would have, and therefore it is possible, under certain conditions, to tamper with it, because it is a rule of thumb rather than a sacred law. And all the difficulties of Plato and Aristotle are connected with that. One can very well say, 'I want to have a clear rule, not a rule of thumb, perfectly rational and universally valid rules'. That is the concern of many other people, one of them, by no means the least of them, is of course Kant.

Now, where do we come in here. Let us come back to the political problem. From Plato's and Aristotle's point of view there is in the first place no question that all members of a society do not have to be citizens, active citizens. Kant admits that, and Kant draws a line not greatly different from the line as Plato and Aristotle drew it. I mean, hired workers, people who are not economically independent, should not be citizens. But the crucial question is slavery. Plato and Aristotle would say, although from the strictest point of view Plato either rejects slavery altogether or Aristotle limits it to a kind of slavery which is of no practical importance, feeble-mindedness; for practical purposes they admit of course slavery as established, and that means that men taken as prisoners of war or otherwise taken by force can be used as slaves. It is not in accordance with the highest and strictest principle of justice but with this rule of thumb. Kant, by taking a severe principle, doesn't have to raise the question of fitness at all, and simply decides universally the respect for man as man makes it impossible to have any slaves. Is this clear up to this point?

Therefore, also more important is of course, while it is humanly more attractive than what Plato and Aristotle said, all the more urgent is it to come to the question: what is the rationale of that? That we like it and that it also seems to be much more humane in its consequences is not - that must at least be spelled out. I mean, what is spelled out by the word humaneness. We cannot do it in the way in which Bentham seems to have solved the simpler problem, as I read somewhere, that the question of whether men are by nature

fit or not fit for slavery is an irrelevant question. The only question which we have to raise, he says, is whether slaves suffer. And they do suffer, and that settles it. Which of course is a bad argument because people in penitentiaries also suffer, and the question is not settled by the fact that they suffer. Therefore, mere considerations of human compassion are not sufficient. And that is the question with which I am concerned. What is the rationale of Kant's right of freedom?

Kant states the problem really, in one way, with an amazing clarity surpassing everything else, because, as I said last time, his predecessors started from the right of self-preservation or from the right to the pursuit of happiness. And that lacks the sacredness which Kant's right of freedom has. This old-fashioned argument up to Tom Paine has a certain crude solid plausibility and is sufficient for chasing all tyrants from the face of the earth. And in this respect it has done a lot of good but also occasionally some evil. And I would not have any objection to that, but Kant, being a severe thinker, and a radical thinker, says that is not good enough. We must have a sacred right. And that would mean a right connected with our moral duty and not with our mere animal desires for our self-preservation, comfortable self-preservation, pursuit of happiness. And also, more important, comes the question, is really Kant's political philosophy linked up strictly with his moral philosophy? And I indicated how one could construe that. The strange fact is that Kant did not give such a strict construction, deduction of the right to the freedom of each from the dignity of man or from the moral law.

Now, how Kant proceeded becomes very clear in this paragraph, number 44, of the Metaphysics of Morals. Read it very slowly and I will correct while we go.

(You were speaking of this contrast between classical philosophy and Kant, and I was wondering how the importance of experience comes in here. It seems to me important but I don't know . . .)

Kant would say, the moment you bring in experience, for example, say the experiential fact that we cannot help pursuing our happiness as you see happiness; in that moment you destroy the sacredness of the whole thing. You bring in phenomenal things and we are concerned only with - and you can never get true and genuine principles of morality by starting in this way.

(Yes, that seems to be the point then, if you completely disregard experience and you want to talk to people and convince them of your moral standard or your moral ethic and they tell you, yes, but in experience, I mean, when I experience something I can't act out of duty, I act out of other things, and he replies, well, you just have to anyway . . .)

Kant would say, then you can never act morally. You can prudentially and can be a very clever crook, but you will be a crook. Clever crook meaning you will never do things that will put you in jail, to say nothing of more unpleasant places, and you will even get a good reputation - Kant grants you that - but a good reputation which is not really deserved, because you act morally for immoral reasons, for the sake of your reputation, not for the sake of your duty.

- (It seems that if a person doesn't have a lot of experience, say in making moral decisions, it would be very easy for him to say that, but what kind of an argument could he give to transcend the elusive and vague factor of the importance experience in moral actions?)

We have taken this up. Where was your question when we discussed the example of the eight year old child?

- (Yes, and I didn't understand . . .)

Yes, well, I can't blame you for that, but still we have to take it up again and more coherently when we come to Kant's Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals is a short writing of about 100 pages to which we will devote three or four meetings. I can't go into that now. Yes?

- (When a person is already moral he does not need to be morally trained. We use this institutional slavery to make moral the immoral man.)

I see, but that is of course utterly immoral. You take these very small children, and if they have never had any inkling of that the natural impulse in them towards morality is silent, and so they will become criminals. Sure, but the trouble is that political freedom alone, I mean if there are no slaves in that society, is not sufficient. Then the question of so-called social conditions making for such schools of criminals also will come about. In other words, it is perfectly imaginable that mere penal laws are not sufficient for very young people against such influences. You must have heard about that. The people who talk about social conditions all the time. If that is so, then you are driven by this reasoning, not necessarily to Kant's state, which is in principle limited to the establishment of a legal order, and its preservation, and nothing else, you may be driven with equal right to something approaching the welfare state. Yes? I say approaching, it doesn't have to be a full-fledged welfare state. And that shows that Kant's reason leading up to the demand for freedom as the fundamental right is not this reason. He did not think of these poor children trained to become thieves. He must have thought of something else. What this something else is we do not know.

- (I wonder whether maybe there is a negative argument that Kant could make, and that is that if you have a society where men are not free then those who are ruling over them are being forced to act immorally, so that perhaps the requirement of freedom could be set forth as something to prevent others from acting immorally on the free men.)

There may be something in what you say, but can you give an example?

- (If one man is a slave that means that he is being used as a means by some other man, so that the man who is using him as a means is not acting morally, and in a society the more slavery there is the more immoral action there is on the part of those who use these slaves.)

I see. In other words, you would argue as follows, and let us see whether that works: the moral forbids it, to use a man merely as a means, but the establishment of slavery says, enables men legally to use men as mere means.

Therefore slavery is absolutely immoral and since slavery can manifestly be prevented by legislation whereas moral virtue proper cannot be produced by it, this may very well be what Kant meant. But I would still say, if that were so, Kant's argument would be - in other words, that what you say is not good because it would show the possibility of a strict moral deduction, a deduction of the fundamental right from moral law. And that is what one would expect Kant to do. I must see whether this works. I can only say that Kant did not do that. Kant must have had another motive. That would be, if what you suggest works out, and at the moment I see no difficulty; that would be to state it more clearly than Kant himself would state it. There is nothing surprising in that. In these matters, Kant shows an amazing lack of clarity and an amazing imprecision. Just to prove this little point that Kant's way of writing was very strange-- Mr. ___ (student who read paper earlier) did you find in your edition the passage about the murder of children by poor boys?

(No, it's not in there.)

Now, listen to this sentence: 'Regarding the preservation of children who have been exposed for reasons of neediness or shame or have even been killed on that account' - mind you, regarding the preservation of children who have been killed. And then in one place that the state has the right to lay on the people for the preservation of these children. Kant added 'killed children' and forgot to see that they have no place in it. I mean, that is not a very exact way of writing.

(It would seem that you get the imperative from the idea of freedom. If you are in a situation and you want to decide what to do and you see a lot of things happening around you and instead of looking at them you totally disregard any experience that is going on and you have a picture of the ideal person whom you believe in and you think this is the way men should be and this is the way we should head, instead of looking at things going on around you; you look at this ideal man and you don't see him in the future the way he would have to be but you take him out of the future and put him right here, right alongside this experience, and you make this the real object you look at when you decide what you are going to do, and so the only way you can do that, totally negating experience, you get this sense of duty and sort of say I'm going to do what is dutiful because if I let anything else get into it I may be letting experience influence me and I can't do that because it is most important to do the things in terms of getting . . .)

Duty is not an idea. It is of the essence of an idea that it may or may not be realized and that does not depend on you. A duty is something which you have to do, and the fact that you can do it is implied in the fact that it is your duty. You must keep the ideal man completely out of the picture. Really, it would lead us too far now. We will come to the fundamental rights of Kant where he explains that. By starting from ordinary orientation we say about a given individual he acted decently, or he is a decent man, and another human is a crook. An ordinary everyday occurrence. And Kant contends that this apparently extravagant notion of what morality is is implied in every situation. We must study that, but we cannot go into that now. Mr. ___?

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

But Kant says you can do that. I mean, regardless of what the latest census says. You can do them. That is implied in the very fact that they are your duties. But that leads us too far. We must finish now this part of the argument.

Now, we come to Kant's reasoning in which he speaks about this fundamental point. Now read carefully.

It is not from any experience prior to the appearance of an external, authoritative, legislation that we learn of the maxim of natural violence among men and their evil tendency to engage in war with one another . . .

No, no, that is not quite it. 'It is not experience by which we are informed about the maxim of violence which men have and of man's malice, as a consequence of which they fight with each other prior to the appearance of an external, powerful, legislation.' Go on.

Nor is it assumed here that it is merely some particular historical condition or fact . . .

'historical condition' isn't there. 'It is also not a fact.' Yes.

that makes public legislative restraint necessary. For, however well-disposed or fair-minded men may be . . .

How does he say it?

However well-disposed or fair-minded men may be considered to be of themselves, the rational idea of a state of society regulated by law must be taken as their starting - point. This idea implies that before a legal state of society can be publicly established, individual men, nations, and states can never be safe against violence from each other. And this is evident from the consideration that everyone of his own will naturally does what seems to be . . .

Oh no, no, no. 'And this shows from the right of everyone to do what he thinks right and good, and in this respect not to depend on the opinion of another man.' Yes.

Hence, unless the institution of law is to be renounced, the first thing incumbent on men is to accept the principle that it is necessary to leave the state of nature, in which everyone follows his own inclinations, and to form a union of all those who cannot avoid coming into communication, and thus subject themselves in common to the external restraint of public, compulsory laws.

Yes, now let us wait. So, then what is the point which Kant makes? And I ask you especially Mr. __, if there you recognize anything of your reasoning in this remark of Kant? Even if all men were in fact just, Kant says, the state would still be necessary. The necessity of the state derives from the right of each to do what he thinks to be right. This necessarily leads to insecurity and to the legitimacy of violence, because what I think right may very well be different from what another man thinks right, and therefore

violence necessarily follows. Think of a fish. I think it belongs to me, you think it belongs to you, we have no judge. In other words, the old Hobbesian argument, but not derived from the Hobbesian root, self-preservation. Everyone has a right to do what he thinks to be right. But why does this follow?

I try again. Man is obliged to act morally. According to Kant's hypothetical premise here, the men in question do act morally. Kant says you may think them as fair-minded and kind as you wish, but - so, in other words, these men are all men of good will. But you could say, very well, they may be men of good will and fair but perhaps it is difficult to say what is the right thing in complicated circumstances? And, therefore, dissension and violence. But, need for authority, and especially educated men of long experience, people we call popularly judges, because the complexity of the questions is such that not everyone can judge them. Yet, as we have seen from the famous example of the eight year old child, the moral law is clear in all cases. There is then no legitimate difference of opinion regarding right. If all men are assumed to be men of good will perfect harmony would follow. What then is the rationale of coercion, of the state, or what is this peculiar character of the right of each - how did he put it - to do what he thinks to be right? Why is this right of such a nature that it necessarily leads to conflict? Even perfectly virtuous men would need the state.

Now this of course has been said before. For example, I mention only two examples in the discussion in the Summa of men in the state of innocence. Would government have been needed in the state of innocence, according to Thomas Aquinas, Father Buckley?

(Yes.)

What is the main reason?

(To organize action for a common goal. Even if they are all virtuous, even assuming that no one is evil, you still have a number of people who will have common goals. By some means you have to organize action to achieve those common goals.)

Yes, but is it not equally important, to say the least - I looked up the section: First Part, Question 96, Articles 3 to 4 - is not equally important for the Thomistic argument the inequality of men? Even the angels have a hierarchy of understanding and therefore all the more men. Now, this of course is completely out.

Now, the other part of the argument was developed by Monsieur Simone, Yves Simone, in his book, Theory of Democratic Government, where inequality is completely disregarded deliberately and the point is this, that no rational decision is possible as to various equally good means for the common good, and therefore the need for authoritative decisions. That is roughly the argument of Simone. But neither is Kant's argument. Let us read the conclusion of this paragraph.

Men thus enter into a civil union in which everyone has it determined by law what shall be recognized as his, and this is secured to him by a competent external power distinct from his own individuality.

Such is the primary obligation on the part of all men to enter into the relations of the civil state of society.

No, not this one. At any rate, I read to you the end of the paragraph:

There must exist in the state of nature a provisional external mind and kind. If that were not so there would not exist any command to leave the state of nature.

In other words, the necessity for government, for coercion, is based on the fact of private property, which is of course also a Rousseauian thought, as you know.

Again I raise this question. Man is morally obliged to live, that is to say, not to commit suicide. He has the right to appropriate food, clothing, shelter. But why does this require private property in lands and houses? There are powerful reasons in favor of that based on the nature of man. Think of Aristotle's criticism of Plato's communism. This reasoning is in no way divorced from considerations of happiness. Yes? Aristotle says it would be unbearable never to be alone, not to have any privacy, which is a very powerful reason, but clearly not an a priori reason. Things are better taken care of if there is individual responsibility and not the responsibility of everybody as there would be in communist ownership. These substantive, not formal, considerations are used by Aristotle against communism and in favor of private property.

But where does private property come in here, in Kant's argument? We can say that private property is the equivalent to this right of everyone to do what he thinks right and good. Given this right there follows, essentially, conflict even assuming perfectly wise and virtuous men. That is the difficulty.

I mean, we have to think of this fundamental right because that is only another expression of the right of freedom. The right of freedom means the right to do what you think right and good. Because a slave, obviously, has not that right.

Now, I think it is of some importance to look at the passage which is not in your edition. It is in the introduction to this Metaphysics of Morals, where Kant has a paragraph entitled in very big letters: the inborn right is only a single one, freedom, independence from any other man's compelling arbitrariness. To the extent to which it can co-exist with everyone else's freedom in accordance with this genuine law is this only original right which belongs to every man by virtue of the fact that he is a man. And Kant shows what this implies, and the quality of a man to be his own master is also the right of an ... German phrase ...

('Untainted man.')

Is this a legal term? How do you call a man who has never been condemned by a law court?

(A clean record.)

All right, let us leave it at that. 'Of every man with a clean record.'

Now the next point is: the right to do that against others which in itself does not harm them, provided they don't accept that. For example, to communicate to them one's thoughts, to tell them something, or to promise them something, whether true and sincere or untrue and insincere, because it depends entirely on them whether they want to believe me or not. That belongs to the fundamental right of man. You see, there is something which is not too moral. That is the great difficulty.

Now, I can easily see many prudential reasons in favor of such a right. The very simple consideration, if man did not have the right to lie then where would you get the police force and even the statute books to make this stick? If you want to have some reasonable and unencumbered freedom then you must take it easy in these matters. You can state it also: if that were not true a severe rise of censorship would necessarily come in, even preventive censorship. I mean, there are practical reasons, prudential reasons, for allowing this kind of freedom, which in fact exists. I mean, think of any advertisement, constantly insincere and untrue promises that a certain toothpaste will save you your teeth for the rest of your days and no one regards this - but a very moral man wouldn't do it. But, still, the legislator, in his wisdom, allows these kinds of things, and other things too. But the extraordinary thing is that a man with the moral severity of Kant includes this in the only innate right of man as man. And therefore I have the feeling that there is something not too moral implied in Kant's doctrine of freedom. Concessions, which are perfectly defensible on prudential grounds, but which are not defensible as sacred. That is the point I am making.

You see, for this reason, the right to do what one thinks right and good - if that is understood to begin with, if people are of very indifferent morality, and that must be granted to them, we must assume that; then of course it leads to violence, in itself, and then of course you must have coercion. But this right linked up with a hypothetical premise that all men are good and virtuous and sufficiently wise does not lead to the justification of coercive government.

Incidentally, according to the Thomistic teaching, this government in the state of innocence would of course not be coercive but would only be directive, naturally. Surely. But here we speak of coercive government . . .

(change of tape)

. . . but that is a very far cry from the strict moral prohibition against slavery to the political equality of all men. Now, in Kant, we saw this last time, the legislator, or the sovereign, must be guided by eternal principles of justice, naturally. But at the same time he must be guided by the consideration that he must not give a law which the whole people in its right mind would not have imposed on itself. If you speak of the eternal principles of justice, that is the old-fashioned, classic orientation. But to make the will of the people the criterion for justice, that is the Rousseauian orientation. Kant identifies with that, and the reason for the identification is the right to act as you see fit, which, prior to the establishment of government, means in fact a right to do everything that he wants. Well, it makes sense.

I mean, even in Hobbes there is a subtle distinction between moral and immoral. When Hobbes says the right of self-preservation, the right of self-

preservation means the right to the means for self-preservation. Obviously. I mean, if I do not have the right to the means for self-preservation I cannot preserve myself. And then the question arises, what about the right judgment of the means? And there are all kinds of people with all kinds of judgments. So if you want to have a strict a priori law, you cannot make any specification regarding the judgment and can only say only wise men can be the judges of what is conducive to the self-preservation of Mr. X. Because as Hobbes wisely, but empirically, observes, that Mr. X has a much greater interest in his self-preservation than a wise man. Because a wise man may not particularly care for his self-preservation whereas Mr. X can be presumed to care very much for his self-preservation. Therefore, we must say that anything which anyone may regard as a means for his self-preservation is justified as such. And then practically nothing remains which cannot be rejected, which can be denied as a possible means for self-preservation. Therefore, for this reason, and for this reason only, does every man have the right to do anything prior to civil society. Now, civil society of course abolishes that immediately and establishes law and tells everyone what he may or may not do. This survives somehow in a strange way, but in a very important way, in Kant's argument. That would be my provisional answer to your suggestion.

(Well, I have kind of a vague idea that somehow when we were talking about freedom that we were not talking about it exactly in the way that Kant did.)

That may be. That would be bad.

(If freedom is acting in accordance with a law, which you impose upon yourself, and in accordance with a maxim that ought to be able to be universalized, then couldn't you argue that you have a moral duty to set up that kind of state which would make it possible for each man to act in such a way that it could be universalized?)

But the trouble is that there is no direct linkage in Kant between the categorical imperative and this crucial part of his teaching. I mean, the fundamental right is defined as the right - to repeat again, lest I make any slip. Freedom, to the extent to which it can co-exist with the freedom of everyone else according to universal law, is this only original right belonging to every man by the very fact that he is a man.

For example, let us take this freedom to speak truthfully or untruthfully, sincerely or insincerely. It fulfills this condition. It can very well co-exist with the freedom of everyone else under universal law. As a matter of fact it exists in fact. You may advertise another toothpaste as untruthfully and insincerely as the fellow now does. Nothing prevents you, and no trouble arises from this fact. Whereas morally you do not have the right to do that. In other words, this freedom is much laxer than that freedom to which you are entitled as a strictly moral man. The difficulty remains.

But we must now stop and take it up next time. There are also quite a few particular passages in today's assignment which need discussion, and so I believe we will need at least part of next time's meeting for this discussion, and still I believe Mr. ___ should have his paper ready with the danger that he might not be called upon to read it next time. Now, let me figure out if this

would happen. I see already one point. We won't need any additional papers because we won't be able to do the other things I hoped to do. We must be very glad if we can come safely through Perpetual Peace and the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals. Perhaps we can add an additional meeting at the end of the term. That depends also on my time - where we will have an overall discussion of the issues on which I touched in the beginning and which are naturally reflected in the course of the succeeding discussions.

(What will be the next work we take up?)

Perpetual Peace and the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals.

(End of Lecture)

. . . to reconsider the subject we have been discussing last time and which somehow broke down in a great difficulty. I will try to present the problem again, but I would like to ask you for criticisms, and not only for criticisms of what I am going to say, whether it is historically correct or not, but also to keep in mind the state of the discussion in the social sciences today. After all, we must not forget for one moment that if we leave this room where we discuss the principles of Kant's political and moral philosophy we are confronted with a world where such questions are declared to be either meaningless or certainly not manageable by human reason. And we must never lose sight of this possibility, and see how far what we learn from this most important issue, most important from the point of view of our time.

Now, I begin with the observation we made when we studied Kant's philosophy of history. The characteristic of this philosophy of history is that Kant is concerned with the philosophy of history but has a certain hesitation regarding its development. And we traced this to the distinction between moral progress and institutional progress. An institutional progress may reasonably be expected, but that is not necessarily a moral progress. And since it is moral progress alone which ultimately counts, hence the hesitation.

This difficulty, it seems to me, is also underlying Kant's philosophy of right, or law. This is of a strange ambiguity. When we approach it at first glance it seems to be based on a right to the pursuit of happiness, and this creates some difficulties because happiness is radically subjective according to Kant. What then is the meaning of the right to the pursuit of happiness? Therefore, one wonders whether this philosophy of right is not based on morality, as Kant understands it. But this also leads to difficulties.

Now, last time we discussed this question. Is it possible to deduce the principle of Kant's legal philosophy from his moral philosophy? And that was controversial. But I would now say what I should have said last time, that it is really, from Kant's point of view, impossible to deduce the principles of his legal philosophy from his moral philosophy. And as proof I referred to a statement of Kant's which we will discuss next time, which occurs in Perpetual Peace, in the later part, that the practical solution of the problem of the just society does not require, as people are in the habit of saying, a nation of angels. The just society can be established in a nation of devils, provided these devils have sense, meaning provided they are shrewd calculators. Now, if that is so, then the legal philosophy, the study of the just society, cannot be based on morality.

Let me remind you again of the statement of the problem in historical terms, which I tried, and which I think is helpful. Kant's teaching, moral teaching, or political teaching, can be described as a synthesis of pre-modern thought and modern natural right. Now, the pre-modern thought I characterize, for the present purpose, as follows. There is a fundamental distinction between the noble and the just, on the one hand, and the useful, on the other. Whereas modern natural right is based on the premise that the just is derivative from the basic needs of man. The morality which is legitimate is a calculative morality. We have to be decent for the sake of peace, self-preservation, and so on.

Now, In Kant's teaching this modern natural right teaching as developed

by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, and especially Rousseau, requires a sacredness which it did not possess before. How is this transformation achieved? Kant, as it were, asserts that the content of the modern natural right teaching, especially as developed by Rousseau, is in fact the chief content of the moral law in all its majesty. The moral law with all the majesty which this supplies commands us in the first place, and above everything else, to respect the rights of man as defined in the modern development.

Now, by thus integrating this modern natural right teaching into a strictly moral context this modern natural right teaching retained the peculiar realism which it claimed to possess. Some of you will know very well what I mean by that, but I will still explain it.

The development of this modern natural right from Hobbes on, which is fundamentally different from the traditional natural law teaching, and the reasoning underlying this modern development was this. The traditional natural law teaching was primarily a teaching regarding man's duties. Now, the question is: what should induce men to perform their duties? This was a virtue, as Locke called it, unendowed. You were praised for it by the right kind of people, but there was no endowment. What these men tried to do was to show that there is a necessary coincidence of morality properly understood, narrowly understood, with self-interest. And the crucial step was, starting not from duties but from rights. I mean, we don't need a reason for asserting our right to self-preservation. Yes? That somehow takes care of itself. That is a desire, an urge, a passion, however we call it, in ourselves very forceful. And by deducing all the duties and obligations of man from this right to self-preservation, or other rights enforced directly by passions, they believed that they were establishing a realistic teaching, not appealing to high goals, but to the most massive and the most solid, because so elementary, passions of man.

Now, by integrating this modern natural right teaching into this context of a moral law, Kant retains, as it were, the peculiar realism of this modern doctrine. I mean, it is as little starry-eyed as the teaching of Hobbes and Locke, from this point of view. That he preserves.

But, on the other hand, what Kant has to do in order to give this natural right teaching a truly moral status it must be divorced from calculation. This Kant achieves by divorcing this modern natural right teaching from purpose. This teaching regarding right is right regardless of what our purpose is, regardless of whether our purpose is diabolical or angelic. I mean, these are of course exaggerations. I refer to Kant's expression 'a nation of devils'. A nation of men of ill-will. And take at the opposite pole a nation consisting of men of good-will. The rules of right would in no way be affected and would be, as it were, equally attractive. A nation of devils who have sense would do it, and a nation of angels who have sense would also do it.

I must here again refer to paragraph 44 of the Metaphysics of Morals, which we read last time, where he says that his whole legal teaching, the whole teaching regarding the state, is valid even if all men were presumed to be perfectly just and men of good will. That is the opposite pole of the devils. But the conclusions are the same.

Now, how is this possible? There must be a meeting-ground of the angels

and the devils, and that we can easily see. Regardless of whether we are angels or devils in this sense we need external freedom. How can I put into practice my diabolical purposes if I do not have external freedom? On the other hand, how can I put into practice my angelic purposes if I do not have external freedom? Because the moral slave, while he will be moral, he will of course be prevented from doing quite a few things he ought to do by the fact that he is not free. So, external freedom is neutral to the purpose. External freedom is morally neutral, and therefore the state, which is derivative from the basic freedom, is also morally neutral. Which is perfectly compatible with the fact that for moral men the state is a moral duty, because he needs the state for his moral purposes, whereas the devils need the state for their devilish purposes; i.e., for being free, safe in using that external freedom.

Perhaps we can find a parallel to that in Kant's theoretical philosophy. You remember the old situation. There was developed the mechanistic science of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and Kant preserved the integrity of this mechanistic, deterministic, science in its sphere. Cognition is limited, cognition proper, to cognition in terms of the universal deterministic mechanism. But in the case of morality, again, Kant saves this correlative to the modern mechanistic, deterministic, science, namely, the modern natural right doctrine, by saying that the morality is chiefly concerned with rights in the Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseauian sense. Kant saves science against Hume by introducing the notion of synthetic judgments a priori. In a similar way he saves modern natural right by the categorical imperative. In other words, the moral sceptic will be defeated by Kant's notion of a purely, strictly moral law or rational law. But the content remains the same as it was between Hobbes and Rousseau.

Now, let us consider this from another point of view. One can perhaps say that what Kant says about this fundamental character of right, the preservation of equal freedom for all and nothing else, that this describes the minimum requirements of living together. And as confirmation of that I quote to you a key passage from Aristotle's Politics, third book, 1280b1ff, which applies as much to Kant as it applies to Locke and Rousseau. 'In an alliance', Aristotle says, Aristotle discusses here the question of the difference between an alliance and a city - 'In an alliance neither of the parties concerns itself to ensure a proper quality of character among the members of the other party. Neither of them seeks to ensure that all who are included within the scope of the treaties shall be free from unrighteousness and from any form of vice. Neither of them goes beyond the aim of preventing its own members from injuring the members of the other.' In other words, if such an alliance prevents them - he is speaking of commercial alliances - that people are killed, murdered, robbed, defrauded, and so on. That's all. They do not care out of what motives these things are done. It is merely a prevention of mutual injury in the strict sense of the term.

But it is a cardinal issue of goodness or virtue, of goodness or badness in the life of the polis, which always engages the attention of any state that concerns itself to secure a system of good laws well-obeyed. The conclusion which clearly follows is that any polis, which is truly so-called and is not merely one in name must devote itself to the end of encouraging goodness or virtue.

The end of the polis is the common good in the sense of common effort

devoted to goodness, to virtue, and not mere prevention of mutual injustice. Kant takes, just as Locke and Rousseau before him, the narrower view.

Now, if that is so, if these are really minimum requirements for any cooperation then there is no question that this freedom implied here belongs to every man equally, for it is deprived of any standard, since it is deprived of any purpose. And this freedom, as Kant says, cannot co-exist with the freedom of others if it is not limited by universal and equal laws with a view to the equal freedom of each and of all. More than that, freedom may not be limited except with a view to making possible the equal freedom of each. Everything else is a trespass. Now, all the other points of Kant's doctrine follow from these premises.

Now, Kant may be said to outline the minimum requirements of any possible human cooperation, in isolation from every other consideration. This is absolutely indispensable. One could say this is in a way the most important thing any man could do. Doesn't Kant in fact include in that what is called the second table of the Decalogue? Is this not necessarily implied in the prohibitions against murder, theft, and so on, and so on, if you speak of these minimum requirements? And this would explain the strange moral appeal which Kant always had. And the interesting point, which distinguishes Kant from the Biblical statements, is that Kant gives the same sacredness, you could say, which the Bible gives to the prohibition against murder, and so on, to the political consequences. From the Biblical point of view slavery is a legitimate institution under certain conditions. The Bible does not forbid slavery in the way in which it forbids murder, or theft. Now you remember perhaps the statement more exactly than I do which Lincoln made about the terrible injustice of slavery when he compared it with acts of defrauding people? Does any of you remember the exact phrase of Lincoln? "Defrauding people of the fruit of their labor, and robbing them." In other words, Lincoln felt it this way, that slavery is as terrible a crime as murder, robbery, theft, and so on. Now, Kant has a theory for that. From Kant it follows necessarily that because of the fact that he based his whole doctrine on this one right of man, the right of freedom, that the political consequences acquire the same sacredness as the common prohibitions of the second table of the Decalogue.

But there is also of course the following difficulty. Kant, by taking his bearings by the minimum requirements of living together, arrives at a minimum notion of the purpose of civil society. On this level, all men, or almost all men, can very easily be equal, as Kant contends they ought to be. Yet, very strangely, according to Kant, equality is affected adversely by property or non-property. You remember that he makes a distinction between an active and a passive citizen guided fundamentally by the distinction of property and non-property. The question arises: if equality can be adversely affected by difference of property, why not, with greater right perhaps, by inequality regarding virtue, as an older view was? So, in other words, the purpose of the state is to safeguard the freedom of each under equal laws. Why not other laws? For example, from Kant's point of view, it is a moral duty, but only a moral duty, and not a legal duty, to cultivate one's talents. These South Sea Islanders who live in a state of dormancy under banana trees, if they live under banana trees; they neglect their duty, but it is not a duty which could be enforced by any law. In practical terms, that means that the prince of these people, the chieftain, who has felt a stir in his heart has no right to compel his

subjects to get out of that state of dormancy. That would be an interference with their freedom. Nor, on the other hand, must he prevent them from getting out of it. That is not any government's business. How can Kant permit compulsory education? I think he can do it only in a very roundabout way, but not in a straightforward way.

Now, we have seen already in some passages, both in the Metaphysics of Morals and in Theory and Practice, that Kant condemns any religious establishment as, in principle, illegal. More precisely, if it is meant as a perpetual establishment it is illegal because it means to freeze to a certain stage of their intellectual development. In other words, this law prevents as far as in it lies a higher development of the people. That of course the government may not do, but not, on the other hand, may the government encourage it because that goes far beyond the minimum requirements, which is the preservation of freedom strictly defined.

We have read another passage in Theory and Practice, and I must remind you of it, in the criticism of Hobbes. If the supreme power gives laws which are immediately directed towards prosperity, toward happiness, prosperity of the citizens, population, and so on, then this is only as a means for securing the legal order, i.e., the order meant to guarantee freedom, especially against foreign enemies. So, in other words, the prosperity of that people can never be a direct goal of civil society. It must be justified in a roundabout way. For example, you need prosperity so that the state can defend itself and the state must be defended for otherwise there would be no protection of freedom. Which is a consequence for all this kind of early liberalism, I believe it is called. You know, what was called later on the night watchman's state, which is of course - to identify historically what Kant means. And the same, as I said, would apply to compulsory education. Of course you could easily deduce that from experience. You must defend your country and wars are won by the better educated soldiers. In 1866, or was it 1870, the Germans said, the German schoolmasters, meaning in the grade classes, has won the battle of _____, because they had compulsory education in Germany at that time, rigorously enforced, and not in France. But obviously that is a roundabout way and I think there are more direct reasons why compulsory education is desirable. And here also, in the Metaphysics of Morals, he says, 'the right of public finance and police, the latter taking care of public security, convenience, and decency'. Why does decency come in? Outward decency? 'That the same for outward decency as negative cases being not blunted through public begging, noise on streets, stench, a public lust, as violations of the moral sense, makes it easier for the government to rule the people by laws.' In other words, that this is in itself undesirable and a disgrace is not the reason. The only reason is the sense of right for the legal order.

I would like to mention another passage from what we have discussed last time in order to show the difficulty here. Kant discusses, in the Metaphysics of Morals, the legal, moral basis of punishment, and the crucial point he makes is this: that the criminal is punished not because he has willed the punishment as the strictly contractual doctrine says - if I have not signed on the dotted line, by entering this society I will all the punishments which become due if I transcend the law - but Kant says, no, the reason is because he has willed the crime, not because he has willed the punishment. No one can will the punishment, Kant says, but he has willed the crime, and the crime is by implication a denial

of the principle of eight, namely, of equal freedom for all.

And then Kant discusses at great length, and without undue sentimentality, the question of capital punishment, and he strongly favors this. He even gives some examples where he shows that the more honorable man would prefer capital punishment to imprisonment.

And now he comes to this conclusion. If civil society would dissolve with the consent of all its members, which, by the way, is very hard to see how this could be possible if it is a duty to enter civil society - Kant is really in a way a loose writer in this book. I gave you that example of the state caring for murdered children last time. For example, if a people inhabiting an island would decide to separate, in this case the last murderer who is still in jail must be executed first, so that everyone gets that what his deeds deserve, and the blood-guilt not rest on the people which has not insisted on this punishment. So, one can see then how this follows with perfect necessity from a serious concern with justice. The fact that these people happen to dissolve their society is no reason why this murderer should go unpunished, unpunished in the proper form. That's of course true, but if you think for one moment of this nation of shrewd devils who are also supposed to be members of such a society it is hard to understand.

In other words, what is hard to understand is this, how the intrusion of strictly moral considerations into Kant's legal philosophy is possible. When he discusses marriage, for example, and gives this very strange definition of marriage as a contract for the life-long mutual use of the sexual organs of the other party, then of course he has in mind, deliberately, the lowest form. So that any higher considerations, like fidelity, and so on, should be completely out of consideration. And he gives in a strictly external definition the minimum requirement of marriage. Yes, but, on the other hand, the reasoning underlying that definition of marriage and its obligatory character is the sense of the dignity of man. Concubinage, and so on, would be incompatible with the dignity of man, which is a strictly moral consideration, has nothing to do with this minimum requirement of equal freedom of all of which he has spoken.

So, I would say that without morality one cannot accept Kant's state, because from a Hobbesian-Lockian point of view it is much too moral, and with morality one cannot stay within it, because then it is too poor for that purpose. And it seems to me that is a consequence of the fact that Kant tried to find a formula for right and the state which would be equally acceptable for a consistently non-moral man and for a consistently moral man. And this neutrality apparently is not possible. That may be possible partially and occasionally but not as a matter of principle. I have not succeeded in my efforts to come beyond this point.

Now, this is all I want to say in general. There are a few other remarks we might make on the Metaphysics of Morals later. But first I would like to know if there is any point which you would like to take up.

(Would'n't there be a very great tension between the sacredness of freedom and its moral neutrality?)

It depends. Coming from morality, sure. One could put it this way. The highest form of duties from Kant's point of view, are those duties with regard

to the rights of others. There are duties, for example, with a view to the happiness of others, that you should be kind and helpful to others, but that doesn't have the same strictness as the right, the natural right the legal duties have. Also there are duties about yourself, for your own perfection and development, but they also have a less urgent status, a less high status than these duties regarding the rights of others.

Now, as a moral man you will take these most seriously, but, on the other hand, if you are a devil, in this sense, but want to be consistent, and there are strong practical reasons for consistency, because chickens come home to roost, and this kind of thing - in other words, if you are a shrewd devil, then you would arrive at the same conclusions, these and these things have to be done. I must grant the same right to others as I want for myself. Otherwise I would become a public enemy in a very short time, and any special privileges which I might get by my own cleverness and shrewdness must be so that they don't in any way interfere with this guiding principle. So, for example, if I get rich quick and have therefore much influence, power, and so on, yet my title is not bigger than that of the poorest beggar. I was only perhaps more industrious, perhaps more lucky. These are things for which no man can with reason be blamed. That is what I think Kant is trying to do. It certainly doesn't work in Kant's case. I have the impression it can't work under any conditions, because of the strangeness of this abstraction from purpose altogether.

But it also has, in a certain region, a great plausibility. If you think of what modern people, especially the more generous liberal modern people, feel, where the simple sense of moral decency immediately turns into a sense of certain political demands. You know? I don't know of any great thinker who has elaborated this position as clear. Because the common liberal view, which is based on something like British empiricism, or a later development of this from Kant in John Stuart Mill, lacks this moral passion. I mean every utilitarianism is always open to this famous objection, that it doesn't give a reason why I should be concerned with the greatest happiness for the greatest number. The categorical imperative gives such a reason. But these historical effects and advantages or disadvantages of course can never be decisive considerations. One simply has to understand the position in itself. Mr. __?

(I'm wondering what you make out of these passages in the Idea for a Universal History, for instance, when he talks about transforming a society into a moral whole . . .)

Yes, but he also speaks about the automaton, and don't forget that this philosophy - look at the philosophy of history. There is a strict parallel. You have here an historical process which is driven, if you can say a process is driven, by greed, ambition, the desire of dominion, all this kind of thing, and people get out of this hell only by virtue of calculation. You know, he is too unpleasant. We must have the police, and later on we must have an international police. That is what Kant says. But at the same time this order, the just society, as Kant defines it, and the just international order, are a demand of the moral law. It is a very strange thing. You can have a pure automaton in which no moral movement of any kind enters and which brings about a society which is however demanded by morality. And Kant here again is not quite consistent because he has to admit that sometimes a push given by a public-spirited

prince or citizen in the right direction is really needed to get there. I think the only explanation is that Kant tried to preserve the apparent benefits of such a strictly calculative utilitarian political morality as developed by these three men and yet give it a dignity and a sacredness which it did not in itself possess. At the same time this doctrine lost much of its flexibility in the process, because the sacredness meant also of course inflexibility, and a certain prudential shrewdness which these men have, especially Locke, was lost in the process. The simple proof of that is what Kant says about revolution, that civil society is established for the sake of protecting this freedom, of which every man has a sacred right. Now, the tyrant destroys that freedom, as far as in him it lies, and yet under no circumstances is active resistance, to say nothing of revolution, permitted. Why? Ultimately because freedom requires the sacredness of the legal order. By destroying, or tampering with, the legal order now established and grossly misused by the tyrant you make doubtful the principle of the sacredness of the legal order. Why can't you say with equal right that the freedom which the legal order is meant to preserve is more sacred than the legal order itself? And also other things which we have seen. Also these remarkable things regarding peace which we will discuss later.

There were some other points which we discussed last time. For example, I do not know, Mr. P (student who read paper in preceding lecture) whether you noticed that, of whether that is in the edition which you used, when Kant discusses the problem of revolution, he takes up this question. What about the execution of Louis XVI, or for that matter, of Charles I? That is very interesting. Now, Kant says, the assassination of a prince is not as horrible a crime as a public execution, because the murder can always be a mere act of passion. It is not a public denial of a legal principle, whereas what the English did in 1649, and the French in 1792, is a public denial of the most sacred principle. When I read the story of the assassination of the last czar by the Bolsheviks, I always contrasted that with the dignity of the British in 1649, or at least with the attempt at public dignity of the Jacobins in 1792, that they did it openly in front of the world and took the responsibility instead of shooting the czar and his family in a cellar somewhere which seemed to me a gross disproportion between the political significance of the act and the manner in which it was done. And Kant, accepting this principle, that revolution is under all conditions the most horrible crime, because whereas every other crime may very well go together with an admission of the principle of the legal order a revolution is the explicit denial of that principle.

I'm sure there are more points in what we discussed last time. Do you remember any point of importance which would need discussion? There is also a point which is not uninteresting and shows how Kant saw how these things might happen. The discussion of the National Assembly in 1789, that he felt that Louis XVI, by calling together the National State he really had abdicated his sovereignty by this very fact. In other words, what happened in 1789 was in itself, in the first months of the revolution, was perfectly legal, but then in the moment in which they tried to do something which from Kant's point of view was absolutely criminal, namely, to punish a former prince, for the way in which he had conducted things.

One cannot completely exclude by the way in discussing Kant's doctrine of revolution that he made some concessions to the situation. These things were written in 1795, that is to say, after the collapse of the French Revolution,

and the great resurgence of the anti-revolutionary spirit came to the rest of Europe, especially Germany. That one must take into consideration.

(To what extent does he think there is any community prior to the founding of civil society?)

Yes, Kant was not particularly interested, as I think he makes quite clear, in so-called historical questions. That's clear. Whereas these historical questions were very important for Rousseau and Locke, they were not very important for Kant. It is a pure a priori construction for Kant. A civil society is essentially preceded by such a thing as property. Yes. Meaning, the fact that a man can own mine and thine is in itself independent of the existence of civil society. It can only have a provisional character, because the property is not protected by law and also for the same reason the marriage as such is as such a pre-political institution, although it will never reach its full legal status except after it is protected by civil society.

(What about the notion of a nation existing prior to civil society?)

You mean if there is any historical evidence of anything like that having existed, or what?

(. . . inaudible response . . .)

Yes, sure, the whole romantic doctrine is this way, that the nation, the ethnic group, is primary, and it produces, in a certain stage of development, for its purposes, the state. Just as in the more liberal doctrine you have a similar notion of the relation of society and the state, only in the case of this German doctrine it is the ethnic group and in the liberal doctrine it is society. But as for the existence of such things it is extremely difficult to say. Because that I have been told by a man who saw these people who lived in South America and was with an extremely primitive tribe and there seems to really be nothing which one could call civil society because they live together for some time, hunting, or whatever they do, and cooperate reasonably for this purpose, but then if for one reason or another, or maybe because they want to, a part branches off and goes off and they never see each other again. They are hospitable and part of the hospitality of many such tribes is that one has to offer one's wife to the guests. But he noticed that any views of this offer would not have been liked because the natural passions are not destroyed. But the question arises, is this really a primary stage of human life or not rather the cave stage? This is impossible to answer empirically because people living under these conditions have no record. That might be the last stage of a once flourishing empire for all we know. So, I think empirically it is not answerable. The doctrines of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of course assumed, for theoretical reasons, and they believed it also on empirical grounds, that men lived in a pre-political stage. I mean, there is also a classical thesis about this. Plato, in the third book of the Laws, discusses that, you know a few herds who survived a deluge on mountains. Pre-political. But I don't know if one can say, because in many tribes which were destroyed there was always found the remains of a government and a rudimentary judicial process, not necessarily leading to punishments.

(I don't really understand your remark, that without morality one cannot

enter the legal order but with it one cannot stay within it. Does that mean that the devil would not be able to reconcile himself with living in a perfectly just society as Kant defines it or he would not accept Kant's justification of it.)

Perhaps, you elaborate such a doctrine which is really consistent from the point of view of the shrewd devil. Kant contends he did not do that, and as a proof I gave the example about marriage. What has a devil to do with considerations of the dignity of man? I mean, concupiscence, complete promiscuity even, except limited by the strict consideration it must be managed in such a way there will not be constant conflict. That of course is a perfectly sound consideration from this point of view. You know, just as property must be managed in such a way that there won't be constant fight about land and houses, so there must not be constant fighting about women. Sure. Police reason. But where does the dignity of man come in? That it is a morally unbearable situation that two people of different sex have disgraced themselves, which is more or less how Kant would put it, by having intercourse with each other, and that the only way in which they can restore their self-respect is that they are married. No, that is a moral reason. But, all right, you can say that Kant was not always consistent, and then let us re-write this Metaphysics of morals and let us make it strict. Perhaps it can be done but I don't believe that this was due entirely to slips on his part. It had also to do with a serious problem. For example, think of what he says about public education, as concerned with public propriety and decency. There the moral considerations enter already. Well, that was a very great problem all over Europe but I believe the seat of that was Germany. Since the late seventeenth century an effort was made to get a hard and fast line separating the law from morality. I mean the notion that not every moral requirement can be legally enforced was of course always known, but people didn't try to draw a hard and fast line, because the line had to be drawn differently under different circumstances . . .

(change of tape)

. . . but there are limits. For example, if this man is really about to die of hunger, and your place is the only one in the neighborhood where he can get some food in such a case, many legal systems say: you can take it away by force. Most states have some means for taking care of people who are poor without their fault. One can say in general there will be a line, somewhere there will be a line. I mean, there will be duties of kindness which by their nature cannot be enforced. Think of the example of the feeling of gratitude, that a man who is incapable of feeling gratitude - but it is impossible to make a law. In the moment that gratitude becomes a legal duty it ceases to be gratitude. Obviously. So, there are limits, at both ends, but where to draw the line between is hard to say.

Now, these rationalists of the late seventeenth century, the most well-known of whom is a man called Thomazzi(?), they began with that, and then there were some men in the nineteenth century who really did draw the line - up to that some people said Kant and others said Fichte - but this was in a way the practical interest underlying that, that a distinction has to be made, and this very rigorous rationalist tried to draw a very clear and unambiguous line. The question is whether this can be done, whether that is not necessarily a matter of judgment and circumstances.

How far is this an answer to your original question?

(I guess the initial grounds of the appeal in terms of the principle of freedom without interfering with anyone else - of course you can justify the welfare state . . .)

Yes, that is very hard. The only Kantian I know, at least in Germany, and in England it is Paton, but in Germany it is Ettinghouse (?), and he tried to show, given a certain state of economy, different from Kant's time, for example, monopoly, or cartels, would reduce the freedom of individuals to zero, or almost zero, without a law establishing that, simply a consequence of the economic arrangement, then it is the duty of the state to restore the balance by respecting the freedom of minorities, and he went so far as to state that a partly planned state is absolutely defensible, from Kant's point of view. But then the question becomes absolutely a prudential question. No one can foresee whether under the certain conditions, once you admit the principle of a partly planned society, this must not be transformed into a completely planned society. That I would say, without going into the niceties of economics, that is impossible to decide on the very general grounds of Kant. The moment one makes these concessions, compelled by the state of affairs, for example that is now in Germany, then one admits again that the line which Kant tried to draw cannot be drawn. Well, if we call this moral (writing on the black board) that part which is not as such must not necessarily be enforced by law. Let me put it that way. And this is the legal which is also morally required and can at the same time be enforced by law. That's Kant's point. Now, the question which I have in mind is this. Can this line be drawn in a universally valid way? That is what Kant argues. That is I think impossible. And therefore Kant gives too much or too little to morality by that. As I say, he must construe the right of civil society to the demand for compulsory education as required for something for which it is not really obviously required. Or if you take what he says about public decency, that this must be meant as a kind of training of the people in obedience to the law, which is not what the legislator really means. There are also the difficulties to which the so-called night watchman state is exposed. I mean, I have nothing against a state practically proposed under given conditions, that is not the point, but whether it really gives us full clarity about what civil society essentially is. And Kant apparently draws his notion of civil society to this particular thing which has under certain conditions very great advantages; but advantages, however, which do not have the character of sacred rights, but of sound rules of conduct. There is a difference, you know. We discussed the example of the freedom of speech. In other words, the freedom to say anything which does not create an immediate panic. That is a sound rule of thumb. And a certain inflexibility follows from Kant's doctrine which is this very appealing, to many people, not only in Germany, and yet which is not science.

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

That is only a dictatorship of the proletariat as a provisional measure.

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

No, the Marxist notion somehow stems from Kant, but in a complicated way and one crucial step of course is Hegel. For Hegel the problem of the difference

between legality and morality ceases to be important, not because Hegel was not concerned with morality, as some people say, but because he felt - one could state it perhaps as follows. Morality is something which is of course never universal, but which always exists and there is no moral progress proper. There are always conscientious people, in all kinds of societies, who do the things which the ideas of their society require in a selfless manner. They always exist, and they are the salt of every society. But there are different societies, and societies in different stages of reasonableness, and what you have in the final state - and Hegel thought that was a constitutional monarchy of the early nineteenth century - morality also has this conscientiousness, also has the proper object, the perfectly proper object. You now allow to conscientiousness the right, whereas formerly people did conscientiously things of questionable right. For example, say a decent Spartan was of course as decent as any man could ever be but he did conscientiously very questionable things, in treating the slaves, the helots, and so on, and so on. Now, in the nineteenth century, after the French Revolution, there is no longer a necessity for anyone to do conscientiously the wrong things because there is now in existence a rational society.

Now, Marx takes this over with of course one crucial point, a very crucial point, and says that this state of 1820 or whatever, the Adam Smithian laissez-faire economy, is so crude and unjust, as Hegel himself had admitted, that this cannot be the rational society. Number one. And, number two, he said, and in this respect he follows another pupil of Kant, namely, Fichte, that the true solution of the moral problem consists in - well, to use a word now already common - on self-realization, in such a way that the sensual part of man comes into perfect harmony with the rational part, with reason. And that means that morality consists in a conquest of nature, a conquest of nature which cannot be limited to the conquest of man's sensual nature, but must also mean the conquest of nature as a whole.

Now, if this process, according to Fichte, is an infinite process, which, if it were thought to be completed would make absolutely unnecessary, because of the perfect rationality acquired, any coercive society. So Fichte, in other words, has this notion of a classless stateless society of men who have become perfectly rational, and therefore their whole activity will be rational self-determination and self-realization. But that was an infinite process, and could never be achieved within history.

Marx, following Hegel, says an infinite process as such is absurd, it must have an end, and the end is the communist society in which these conditions will be fulfilled.

So, it is too narrow to say, as you put it, economics will be - no, man is the master of nature, and the economic apparatus, and all this kind of thing, can now easily be controlled by man, and will be the activity of the community as a whole, and take up only a small part of the time of everyone, and other parts will be devoted to other activities of a higher kind. That is I think what Marx meant. And that comes somehow, as Marx knew, from German idealism, but with considerable modification of course.

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

Yes, but that is I believe a somewhat watered-down version of what Marx meant. I mean, the significance which this change has, the socialization of the means of production, is unmistakably there, that this means the final step of the liberation of man.

Well, what shall we do Mr. __? Do we have time to hear your paper?

(It's up to you.)

Do you think I have such dictatorial powers? Let us not only listen to authority but to reason as well. Will we have time for discussion? That's the question, because we will have forgotten all these things. How long will it take? About twenty minutes? All right then.

(Student reads paper)

First, one point, where I am not sure whether you understood Kant, regarding the reservations in peace treaties. How did you understand that?

(In his first preliminary article, that no treaty of peace shall be held valid, which there is tacitly reserved matter for a future war, he points out that states may be driven to the point of mutual exhaustion and make a treaty which contains such a tacit reservation in regard to certain old claims which could be elaborated later at a future time but he holds that such a treaty is made in bad faith and therefore it is not really a treaty of peace but merely an armistice.)

In other words, Kant is speaking of tacit reservations? That's clear. You understood that?

(Yes.)

And of course it makes absolute sense. I only wanted to make sure you saw that it was not a matter of explicit clauses . . .

(No, no, people acting in bad faith holding something back . . .)

Yes, giving up a certain province, yes? Because they can't go on any more, like the French after 1870 and then . . .

(. . . hoping to get it back.)

Yes, where the question of course arises, if one takes the situation in which it was a part of the country always belonging to that country, and the others came under foreign dominion, can one blame these people? One cannot always discuss matters of international law under the premise of the hydrogen bomb and its implications.

(I agree with the motive of people in making these reservations.)

Yes, sometimes it is perfectly legitimate.

(I assume that Kant criticizes that.)

No, I saw that, only I wanted to make sure that these tacit reservations were meant. Now, you brought up another point regarding Kant's hope from republican governments. Kant's premise that republics are more peaceful than kingships because in a kingship the man who makes the decision does not have to do the fighting, and mostly not even his family, whereas if the people decide, who have to do the fighting, they will avoid wars. And you question that. And I agree with your question but let us be clear. What would a defender of this opinion say? Just as the defenders of free trade say - you know, those people who said that free trade has never been given a chance. Did we ever have, all over the globe, republican government?

(No, I hadn't assumed that was Kant's argument. I thought he said that in any given state a republican form of government would be more likely to preserve peace, even though it was confronted with autocratic government. I didn't realize he was assuming that if all governments were republican . . .)

No, no, that what Kant says is not defensible I would agree with you, but let us state it better than Kant himself did, as some people have done; and they said just as the value of free trade has never been given a fair chance, because there were always tariffs, protection, and this kind of thing, one could say that republicanism, in this sense, has never been given a fair chance. Think of prior to the first world war. Obviously there was no republicanism to speak of, only in this country. But then at the first world war there were at least three big military monarchies: Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. That there was a very strong war party in France is undeniable, but I believe that the relative strength of war parties was surely greater in Germany, Austria, and Russia. Now how was the situation at the second world war? The second world war was staged by clearly non-republican regimes: Germany and Japan. And so there may be something to that. But let us also look at the other side of the picture. Did you ever read Walter Lippman's Public Philosophy? Now, what is his argument?

(That the public opinion has often been wrong in its assessment of the necessities of statecraft.)

No, as it applies to our problem, peace.

(I'm afraid I don't recall.)

Well, if I remember well, Lippman makes the point that an intelligent diplomacy, which includes of course also intelligent peace treaties, have become much more difficult since the emergence of democracy than they were before, and if you think, for example, of Lloyd George's great drive, that made impossible a sane arrangement at Versailles, and Clemenceau too of course. I mean, if that had still been a matter for a small group of poised and sober men, acting on the basis of long experience of the difference of European states with one another, a much more intelligent - for example, I'm absolutely sure that this famous clause of the Versailles treaty regarding the guilt of Germany would never have come up, and this was one of the real causes, the deepest causes, of German resentment, more than the territorial losses, because it was really an untrue statement to say that Germany alone was responsible for the outbreak of the first world war. And Clemenceau just put it through with the approval

of large masses of the patriotically excited public in the western countries who had undergone this terrific suffering too. You know, it is complicated but I think one could say that while to some extent - no, we have to consider something else. We have a certain history of republics of the past. Now, what about the situation in antiquity? It was a well-known fact, there were as many wars decided enthusiastically by the assembled people as decided in cabinets of princes. I mean there were not these particular reasons of feudal etiquette, as it were, which played a certain role in the feudal and early modern period, but there were other silly things which were the cause of war. But, on the other hand, one could say that a great concern with the conveniences of life and with the rising standard of living, and all this kind of thing, which didn't play any role in classical republics, of course increased the love of peace in modern times. But all these things are considerations of a prudential nature, you know, of weighing the weight of various elements in the situation and not justifying anything, and like Kant's apodictic assertion that republics as such are more decent. And why should they be? Because if they are more, if the republican regime is more legitimate than the despotic regime, as Kant says, that does not necessarily mean that it is more peaceful or better.

Now, that was one point I thought we should mention. There is another point behind it though. It has a pre-history, this Kantian notion. You can say this: republics are peaceful and that means the people are peaceful and the kings are war-like. More generally stated, people are good. The nobility, or the court, is wicked. Le peuple sont bons, the people are good. This played a very great role from Rousseau on. For example, in Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy, where they describe the simple Russian people, in contrast to the upper classes. Now this goes back to an old story; in Machiavelli that is developed. The cause of the people is morally superior to the cause of the great, because the people want very little. They want to have their little property, and their lives of course, their liberty, and the honor of their women. That's all. They don't want to lord it over others. Whereas the upper classes want to lord it over others, therefore are aggressive and vicious. Machiavelli of course understood this in a very practical sense, namely, they can't afford more, that the maximum they can reasonably hope for - it is not that they were morally better, but under the influence of Rousseau that switched over into the notion that they were morally better. Well, if you take the Marxist teaching, while the Marxist would never say the proletariat is morally better, but we have still the same structure. For some reason or other the cause of justice coincides with the cause of the proletariat.

And then of course there is this other problem. What about the feasibility in the foreseeable future of perpetual peace, according to Kant?

(As I understood him, he was not optimistic about the feasibility. At least he gave us no grounds for optimism.)

Yes, let me see whether I find this statement now. I can't find it at the moment but Kant regarded it as impossible in finite time. It is an ideal goal. Not more. But this alone, I believe, is fatal to the project, because if it is an infinite goal that means there is perpetual war as much as perpetual peace. Even more so. And then how can a responsible statesman act on this vague possibility which will never become an actuality at any time. He

will be irresponsible.

- (This is true, and I think Kant's prescriptions would suggest that if his rules were followed the scope and destructiveness of war might well be increased, if the statesmen had attempted to fix their minds on the goal of perpetual peace. They would form alliances which would allegedly be the nucleus of a league of nations, and this could easily generate hostilities and competitive anxieties which would increase rather than diminish the number of wars.)

Yes, but I think such a thing as perpetual peace, which would mean a complete change of the character of politics - I mean the completeness of the change is incompatible with the gradualness of the process. I mean the qualitative change from a policy directed towards perpetual peace from an ordinary policy simply contradicts the gradualness of the process. In the meantime the good people would be at a constant disadvantage compared with the wicked ones.

This question regarding the forms of government, to which you referred, now what precisely does this mean and how is it related to the classical notion of the regime?

- (As I understood Kant, His description of the republican state, which he felt to be desirable, he said that the mode of government is incomparably more important than the form of sovereignty, and by the mode of government he apparently means whether it is republican or despotic, and by republican he means whether the executive and legislative powers are separated, and it seems to me that if this is the most important thing then it ignores the question of the substantive policies the regime pursues. The substantive policies seem to me more important.)

Yes, one could say it is much more general and formal than the classical notion. The most important thing for Kant is the form of the regime, as he calls it, forma regiminis, the form of the government, as distinguished from the form of the empire, forma imperi. Now, the latter is only one man, a few, or all, autocracy, aristocracy, or democracy. That is less interesting. The interesting and important point is whether the form of the government, the form of the regime, is republican or despotic. I mean, the interesting thing is that Kant preserves in a way the classical notions, but the crucial consideration is the form of the regime, because that is decisive for the spirit of the society.

- (I don't follow that argument in Kant.)

Well, look it up and let us read this section. 'Lest one mistakes a republican constitution for a democratic one the following things have to be noted'. Do you have that? Page 13 in this edition.

In order not to confuse the republican constitution with the democratic, as is commonly done, the following should be noted: the forms of a state, civitas, can be divided either according to the persons who possess the sovereign power or according to the mode of administration exercised over the people by the chief, whoever he may be. The first is properly called the form of sovereignty,

and there are only three possible forms of it; autocracy, in which one; aristocracy, in which some associated together; or democracy, in which all those who constitute society, possess sovereign power. They may be characterized respectively as the power of the monarch, of the nobility, or of the people. The second division is that by the form of government, and is based on the way in which the state makes use of its power. This way is based on the constitution, which is the act of the general will through which the many persons become one nation. In this respect, government is either republican or despotic. Republicanism is the political principle of the separation of the executive power in the administration from the legislative. Despotism is that of the autonomous execution by the state of laws which it itself has decreed. Thus, in a despotism the public will is administered by the ruler as his own will. Of the three forms of the state that of democracy is properly speaking necessarily a despotism, because it establishes an executive power in which all decide for or even against one who does not agree; that is, all, who are not quite all, decide, and this is a contradiction of the general will with itself and with freedom.

The crucial point, of much more importance than the mere numerical question, one, few, or many, is of course the question of how the state makes use of its full power, and this question, of how the power is used, is decided by the distinction between republican and despotic. In this respect, I would say that the only and fundamental difference is the difference between republicanism and despotism because while this can be expressed to some extent in institutional terms it means at the same time necessarily a radical difference of spirit. Therefore, republicanism is the crucial point and not whether you have an autocratic, or aristocratic, or democratic governor or prince.

Behind this is Rousseau. I mean, Kant reformulates the teaching of the Social Contract and makes it a bit more amenable to a large country and with a monarchic head. The sovereign is necessarily the people. That is the principle of the republic. The sovereign, that is to say the legislator, because legislation is higher in rank than execution. So, the legislator, or the sovereign, is necessarily the people, and such a government is republican, regardless of whether it delegates the execution to one man, maybe to one hereditary family, or to a few, or to all.

Now then what is the precise difference from the classical notion? I think one could state it as follows. There is, from this point of view, one and only one legitimate regime, a regime which is in its roots democratic, but in its execution non-democratic, meaning, the spirit of the execution should be democratic but it should not be in the hands of the people. This is not only the wisest arrangement, to have - well for practical purposes it would mean to have a legislative assembly - Kant doesn't want to have a direct sovereignty - a legislative assembly in control, and then you have, say a prince, as the executor. Or you may also have a group of people. But that is from Kant's point of view not only the wisest arrangement but the only legitimate arrangement. And what this means in practice you can see more clearly from Rousseau, who was much more thorough in this matter than Kant, and Rousseau drew this conclusion, but he thought only of a direct democracy: wherever you do not have a sovereign or legislative body which consists of the citizen body

assembled you do not have laws. I mean, the mere arbitrary commands of a sultan who can be strangled tomorrow with the same right with which he now had someone else strangled. Even if it was correct legal procedure that this fellow was hanged, as a law given by the sultan, who has no right to give a law, it was of course not legally right. So, in other words, only in Geneva are there laws.

- (Does Kant make the same statement when he remarks that every form of government which is not representative is properly speaking without form? Could you substitute the word law for form?)

Where is that?

- (The beginning of the next paragraph.)

Yes, it is an uniform, in German. How could you say it? Non-form? A misform?

- (Formless?)

Yes. It could also mean, like ungluck, misfortune. But what he means in fact there is no question. What he means is that every form of government which is not representative, because the legislator is in one and the same person also executor, is surely illegitimate from Kant's point of view. Consider, for example, if a monarch like Frederick II, who was surely both the executor and the legislator, but since he regarded himself as the first servant of the state - that means that he was in fact obeying the true sovereign - which is of course not what Rousseau meant.

The crucial point I would say is this. The question of the best regime simply disappeared and is replaced by the question of the only legitimate regime. There is therefore no possibility of a variation, say, for example, this in this kind of circumstances. That would apply to only technical things, administration in the narrow sense of the term. It could no longer be a serious political question.

What is the present day form of this Kantian thought, because it doesn't begin with Kant. It begins at least with Rousseau. I mean, regarding perpetual peace. In one way Kant's prediction has become true although in a way which Kant did not foresee in any way, namely, the emergence of weapons of such a destructive power that it becomes impossible for any sane person to consider war as a sound means of policy. To that extent of course Kant has understood the over-all tendency of this modern society to bring about a state of affairs in which war can be considered as a means of policy only by an insane person. That is what he means. To that extent Kant's problem is related. But the switch from this state in which war is still possible, is still feasible, to one in which it is absolutely impossible; regarding that we cannot learn anything from Kant it seems.

There is one more point to which I would like to draw your attention in case that is in your edition, in this long note to the definitive articles, in the first definitive article. That is very important.

- (That is on page 11, in the foot-note, at the beginning of the last paragraph.)

The validity of these inborn rights which are inalienable and belong necessarily to humanity, is raised to an even higher level by the principle of the juridical relation of man to higher beings, for, if he believes in them, he regards himself by the same principles as a citizen of a super-sensuous world, for in what concerns my freedom I have no obligation with respect to divine law which can be acknowledged by my reason alone, except insofar as I could have given my consent to it. Indeed, it is only through the law of freedom of my own reason that I frame a concept of the divine will.

In other words, a divine law proper is absolutely impossible, because I have to assent to it. Only by this act can it become obligatory on me. And the reason which Kant gives is this. That only by virtue of the moral law, of the moral law, which is in me, can I get any notion of a possible divine will. God, as it were, has to show cause why I should agree to his law. Yes.

With regard to the most sublime reason in the world that I can think of, with the exception of God, say the great eon, when I do my duty in my post as he does in his, there is no reason, under the law of equality, why obedience to duty should fall only to me and the right to command only to him. The reason why this principle of equality does not pertain to our relation with God, as the principle of freedom does, is that this being is the only one to which the concept of duty does not apply.

You see, you must not underestimate, whatever you think of this kind of problem, what this means. That is one part, as you shall see, of the meaning of Kant's moral philosophy. Let us state it as follows. The traditional notion of moral philosophy, the Platonic-Aristotelian one, was that we must derive morality from an understanding of the nature of man, and that applies especially to justice. What does justice mean? We have to consider man's sociality, the fundamental character of human relations, and so on. Yes, that is very well, but it leads to one great difficulty. What about God? Is God subject to the principles of justice? An immensely important question, in any theistic age of society. That is one reason, an explicit reason, why Kant wants to divorce moral philosophy from a consideration of the nature of man. The principles of morality must be so as to be applicable to any rational being, God included. Because if we do not accept that, what will happen? Then we will say, rules derivative from human nature cannot be applied to God. And so God's justice is something entirely different from human justice. Which means, for practical purposes, God can do what he wants. We have no possibility of criticizing him, of judging him, and that means in practical terms, if a theologian comes with a certain theological assertion he has an infinitely better ground for any assertion he can make than we can have. Because we admit that the principles of morality of which we speak are derivative from man. And it is a presupposition of the old discussion that God is infinitely different from man. Of course we must speak of God's justice but that is analogically. It doesn't have the same meaning as in the case of man. And that was a very great problem.

Now, Kant cuts that Gordian knot by his declaration. The moral principles, the true moral principles, are not limited to man. They would apply to any

rational being, including God, and angels of course, if there are such, would not have in any way a higher status, morally, than man. The equality is not merely an intra-human equality, it is an intra-rational-creature equality.

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

God is excluded for the reason we gave here, because God is holy, which means there is an essential and necessary coincidence of God's will with the moral will. Therefore, God has no duties because his will is intrinsically good. Only such beings can have duties whose wills are not intrinsically good, and that applies to man.

In this spirit, Kant gives the following interpretation of the Fall - you see, Kant has a brief piece called, The Presumptive Beginning of Human History, which means it is a rational interpretation of the first chapters of Genesis, and things appear in a very different light. Now, what happens then after the Fall? 'So man had entered into an equality with all rational beings, whatever their ranks might be.' You see here even God is not excluded. 'Namely, as regards his claim to be himself an end, who has to be regarded as such an end by everyone else, and cannot be used by anyone else as a mere means for other purposes.' In other words, that God can treat us as a potter treats clay, to quote Jeremiah, is absolutely illegal, because we have to be treated as ends in ourselves.

That is I think one of the reasons why Kant developed this radical moral philosophy, to have a secure basis against any possible theological objections to the perfect sovereignty of man, because morality itself binds God himself and he knows these principles. There is not a mystery of divine justice. Divine justice is in itself perfectly translucent as all justice.

Someone wanted to say something?

(I don't see why the traditional notion that morality was derived from human nature clashed with divine justice, because human nature, in the traditional sense, was not meant as physical nature but was a transcendental nature . . .)

No, no. Let us be precise, and let us think for example of such a discussion as you find at the end of Aristotle's Ethics, where Aristotle discusses the relation of man and gods regarding the virtues, or, rather, what are the virtues which gods could possibly have? And then the question comes up: well, temperance? Could the gods be temperate? This is shocking, the notions that gods should be temperate. He simply means that that is a virtue much below any god. What about justice? It's absurd. That gods cannot have dealings, business dealings, and therefore the question of justice could never arise. Whether this argument is good and exhaustive is not the point. Aristotle regards it as important to say that moral virtues cannot be ascribed in any sense to god, or gods. Now, the old religions, the Greeks, and certainly the Biblical religions, of course ascribed moral virtues, and especially justice, to God, and all theologians speak of that. And the crucial question is what does that mean. For example, if the Biblical God punishes up to the fourth generation, one could say, from the point of view of the Hebrews, that is unfair. A reasonable legislator will not punish the children, innocent children, from

the crimes of their parents. And the theologians will answer: well, what do you know about divine justice? And that played a tremendous role in all these discussions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. And Kant took the last step. Let us not talk of justice if we do not know what divine justice means. Let us call it divine power, or what have you. But Kant took the last step by saying there is no need for any analogy of human justice and divine justice in these kinds of things, where we imply that analogical justice is not what we mean by justice. And he cut the Gordian knot by saying that the moral law is not in any way derived nor dependent on or related to the nature of man, but it is related to rationality as such, and therefore would apply, in a univocal way, to men, to angels, and to God. That was surely one great motive for Kant's moral philosophy, and we find a trace of that here. That is a very long question and I do not see at the moment how to enter into it. It is crucially important regardless of whether one believes in God or not, because the self-understanding of man depends very much on whether man is viewed as necessarily and essentially the highest being that is thinkable. Not more. I mean, no scientist would say that such a man must be. That is not the question. But the question is on what notion people act. The impossibility of visualizing in action any higher being than man, which we find very frequently today, has something to do with this thing. Even granted there are such beings, in the decisive respect we are their equals. We are mortal. We are weak. But the highest in us is absolutely equal. In other words, the pride of man arose by virtue of this. You see, if you take the opposite view, a crude, materialistic view, that of course is not very impressive because it denies the difference between men and brutes, so that is not particularly flattering. Kant says there is an absolute gulf between men and brutes, but in such a way that no possible gulf exists above man. That has infinite practical consequences.

Is there any other point which you would like to bring up?

(end of lecture)

There will be some repetition involved, because I'm trying time and again to clarify this thing which we have been discussing, namely, what is Kant's work about. And I think we should do that now and then ask Miss ___ to read her paper in the second half of the class.

First, I remind you of Kant's statement, which I referred to already in the beginning of the course: Rousseau has straightened me out. And that means the supremacy of practical reason and the dethronement of the contemplative idea. The highest quality of man consists in morality, and morality means, from the outset, the recognition of the rights of man, plus the political consequences of this. So, in other words, morality means the modern natural right teaching as developed especially in Rousseau.

Now, this doctrine of the rights of man has been developed in a conscious break with the classical idea of virtue and on the basis of self-preservation as the principle. Furthermore, this new doctrine, from Hobbes to Rousseau, owes its power to that break with the notion of virtue. As Burke put it, the catechism of the rights of man is easily learned, and what was referred to was this. A man is much less inclined to perform his duties than to claim his rights, because the one requires a great effort and a great self-denial and the other is very natural to men.

Now, Kant accepts that, with an important modification. But if we look back for one moment to Kant's philosophy of history we see here that the basic needs, the selfish needs, sanctioned by the modern natural right teaching, are recognized by Kant as the driving force of history. This self-preservation, with its derivatives of avarice, and comfortable self-preservation, and so on, is the power which is the driving force of history, and brings about the just society. Kant no longer defines the just society, as we have seen, in terms of self-preservation, but self-preservation, with all its implications, the passions, as they were understood by Hobbes and his successors, are the driving force of history. And that is of some importance.

Still, the doctrine as developed prior to Kant lacked the moral character proper, and Kant gives it the moral character while retaining the peculiar 'realism' of this modern doctrine. Now, in order to give this Rousseauian teaching this moral character proper Kant has to find a foundation which is sanctioned both by morality and non-morality; by morality, otherwise you cannot give it a moral foundation; by non-morality, otherwise we will not get the contact with this Hobbes-Rousseau doctrine. In other words, this doctrine must equally be acceptable to a nation of angels and a nation of devils, Hobbesianly self-preserved.

Now, this condition is fulfilled by the state, by the Rechtstaat, and Kant is really the originator of that Rechtstaat insofar as the whole doctrine is based on right as derivative only from the natural right of freedom. Freedom, and the necessary implication of freedom, namely, restriction of freedom so that it is compatible with the freedom of everyone else under universal laws; this is needed both by angels and by the devils. Angels now means moral man, because the angels need the freedom for their purposes and, on the other hand, the devils need the freedom for their purposes. Now, if both are simply prudent they will want the protection of that freedom and that protection is not consistently possible except under law. If the devils have sense, as Kant put it,

they must wish the restriction of the freedom of each with a view to the freedom of all under universal laws. And the same applies to the good man. Hence, the right to freedom is the only native right, not the right to virtue . . .

(change of tape)

. . . self-preservation and property and so on is nullified, whereas the right to freedom, as Kant understands it, is rather confirmed by capital punishment; for the right to freedom, as defined by Kant, means the right to be subject to equal laws. This right to be subject to equal laws is confirmed if you are electrocuted. Obviously. Because the right to freedom means necessarily the right to be subject to equal laws, and it is by virtue of your subjection to equal laws that you are punished.

Furthermore, to mention this in passing, the right to freedom guarantees religious freedom because there is no need whatever to restrict that freedom for the sake of equal laws, and also the exclusion of all hereditary privileges, as we have seen.

The paradoxical consequence of Kant's new procedure is that we have a morally neutral state as a moral duty. So that the most important duty which man has has to do with the recognition of the rights of man, and therefore with a need of entering this society guaranteeing the rights of man, and yet this state itself is morally neutral insofar as it is perfectly acceptable to the nation of devils. The state cannot be concerned with virtue because virtue would bring in a principle of restriction of freedom which is not required by the compatibility of the freedom of each with the freedom of everyone else.

Now, I drew your attention last time to the fact that any action of the state for the development of man's faculties, such as compulsory education, constitutes a great problem for Kant. And so does an activity of the state directed towards public prosperity, as distinguished from the protection of freedom. Or outward decency. What the state does for the sake of outward decency, say in preventing prostitution, or visible prostitution, can be defended by Kant only in a roundabout way insofar as this is necessary perhaps to make the citizens more willing to obey the law, in general, but not for its own sake. Yet, on the other hand, the regulations of Kant in his philosophy of the state regarding marriage is obviously based on a moral consideration proper, because it is based on the recognition of the dignity of man as man, and not -- a wholly non-diabolical consideration.

Now, the difficulty is this, to summarize this point. The difficulties which become particularly visible as a consequence are, first, the unqualified prohibition of revolution against the most tyrannical government. We have seen these passages. That creates very great difficulties. Because you are supposed to be under an obligation to obey your government which destroys freedom for the sake of which government is said to exist, and Kant nevertheless -- why does Kant want to have it? Why does Kant want to have the unqualified prohibition against revolution? That is a characteristic argument, characteristic of Kant as well as it was of Hobbes. Well, all right, I will take this up immediately afterwards.

And the second point is that the legislative power can only belong to the

united will of the people, because only the people united cannot be unjust to anyone. Rousseau's argument. Rousseau's argument that the general will cannot be unjust and it is needless to say that it is much too sweeping an assertion to be acceptable, but a certain formalism is characteristic of both difficulties.

Now, I would like to bring up a few points which we had mentioned last time in discussing the first half of Kant's Perpetual Peace. In the first place there is preliminary article number 5. Will you read that please.

No state shall by force interfere with the constitutions of a government of another state.

No, I'm sorry, I meant number 6. Not the heading but the text, the first part of the text.

These are dishonorable stratagems, for some confidence in the character of the enemy must remain even in the midst of war, for otherwise no peace could be concluded. The hostilities would be generated to a war of extermination. War, however, is only the sad recourse of a state of nature where there is no tribunal which could judge with the force of law, by which each state asserts its right by violence, and in which neither party can be adjudged unjust, for that would presuppose a juridical decision. In lieu of such a decision, the issue of the conflict, as if given by a so-called . . . insensible . . . God decides on which side justice lies. But between states no punitive war is conceivable, because there is no relation between them of master and servant . . .

'of superior and inferior'. Yes, that is really a bad translation. Now, what does Kant here say? No one can be declared an unjust enemy. Why? Because Kant in the same section lays down rules of unjust conduct in war, the use of assassins, and so on, and so on. Now, why is it not possible to say of a given state that uses such schemes that its war is unjust? Let us make this clear. The point is not peculiar to Kant but it is interesting that Kant also asserts that. Do you see? Here is a certain course of actions, clearly declared to be unjust. Why is it not possible to signify the state which uses such practices as unjust?

(Because the reason Kant has for holding these practices as unjust is simply because they jeopardize subsequent dealings not because they are intrinsically unjust. There is no standard for judging them as unjust.)

No. That may be true of other things which are called unjust that they are called unjust with a view to a certain presupposed purpose but that doesn't alter it. If someone commits actions of a certain kind, for example if he tries to cheat, to get more than he deserves, we say he is unjust. Why should the same not apply to states?

I read to you a passage from the Metaphysics of Morals. 'Who is an unjust enemy He whose openly declared will reveals a maxim according to which if it were made a universal rule no condition of peace among states would be possible.' So, Kant has here a definition of the unjust enemy. So, even if your point were correct and sufficient, namely, that such actions reveal a maxim which

if made into a universal law would make impossible, it would mean that this state is unjust. Then what is the precise reason why a state cannot be declared an unjust enemy? Kant states it in a passage which you read.

(Because there is no juridical system between states.)

Aha. That's it. So, in other words, Kant links up the moral judgment to, and makes it depend on, the legal problem as to has jurisdiction. What does this imply? Kant does not go beyond that but that was already settled by Hobbes and the tradition from Hobbes. What alternative view could one take? Even granted that there is no competent court is it not possible to make moral judgments without there being a competent court? Don't we do that all the time? We have no power of jurisdiction and no legal consequences can follow from any judgment we make and yet these judgments are of some importance for guiding ourselves and others. So, what is implied here?

Now, what was the traditional view, the pre-Hobbesian view? Now from the pre-Hobbesian view, which is partly visible in Grotius' Right of War and Peace, there are certain individuals who have by nature the right to pass competent judgment, meaning regardless of the establishment of civil society or not; take a state of nature. And these are the men, say the wise men of wisdom and justice; they have a natural right to pass judgment, which right will become qualified and will become obsolete in civil society; that's another matter, but in the nature of things such men's judgment should count. If there is no positive law available.

Now, the Hobbesian doctrine, and that applies to Locke and Rousseau as well, is that this right is denied. There is no one who has by nature the higher right to judge than anyone else, and that follows quite naturally if the basic thing is self-preservation, and that means there is no one who is not a party to any conflict. Think of two fellows in the state of nature who have a disagreement. Aristotle would say, well, one of them may very well be a much wiser man and he should naturally guide the other fellow. But Hobbes says this wiser man is as much concerned with his interests than the unwise, the unwise fellow; and therefore he can't be trusted. Therefore there is no jurisdiction possible until there is established an impartial court of law, ie, government.

So, then, the principle is this. Since there exists an equal right of everyone, all jurisdiction is derivative from the social contract. There cannot be a natural jurisdiction. That is surely the case. But what is the motive behind that? I mean, one shouldn't be too 'cynical' and should assume that from time to time there are really human beings who are fair in their judgments, even if their own interests are involved. I don't think that this is a fantastic proposition. What then is the motive behind this seeming cynicism? Or deeper than that seeming cynicism?

Well, that is the same difficulty which applies to the classical notion of virtue altogether. What does it mean that the virtuous man shall rule? That sounds very reasonable. But how does that look in practice? I mean, you have to have some legal provisions. Now, how do you do that? I mean, is it so easy to recognize a virtuous man? By FBI people or even by most intelligent members of the FBI? It is difficult. So, people use then some practical

substitute for that, and that is, for example, old wealth, the presumption being that old wealth supplies the condition on the average most conducive to virtue. In other words, there is the possibility of giving a legal expression to virtue and its requirement is at the bottom of the whole thing. People want a legal certainty, a clear law, with as little room left to arbitrariness of judging as possible. That was the reason. The concern with the legal certainty. Aristotle always says when he speaks of moral decisions in the Ethics - well, the concrete decision has to be made as a sound man on the spot would judge. Aristotle refuses to judge because he knows that cannot be done if you don't know the circumstances. But that of course means that the wise man, or however you call him, has a great discretionary power. And everyone concerned with legal certainty doesn't want that.

Now, the great concern of Hobbes and his successors was with the legal certainty, just as in their more theoretical concern mathematical certainty. In the field of human affairs, legal certainty. And from this point of view Aristotle seemed to be so terribly dangerous because the legal certainty was not given and of course could not be given, by the nature of the case.

Now, Kant accepts this, Kant, with his concern with absolutely certain a priori moral and political philosophy, reinforces this tendency rather than weakening it. That I think is behind this point. And that is the characteristically modern question which you always find since the seventeenth century: who is going to be the judge? As if Plato and Aristotle had been so naive not to see that this is a question, but they had answered it. There is no other answer but to say the man who are really competent. Of course it is a great convenience if you have it clearly established by law that this man is a judge in these and these matters and B in other matters. But that does not completely solve the question whether A and B are competent in the non-legal sense of the word. Competence in the legal sense is assured by proper appointments or elections, or whatever it may be, but that does not give you an answer to the ultimately more important question of the true competence, as distinguished from the legal competence.

Now, another point regarding definitive article number 1, note 2. That was this long note of which we read a part last time. The definition of external freedom there, do you have that?

Juridical and, hence, external freedom cannot be defined, as is usual, by the privilege of doing anything one wills so long as he does not injure another, for what is a privilege? It is a possibility of an action . . .

That we don't need. A little bit later, when he says 'as regards my freedom'.

My external, juridical, freedom, is to be defined as follows: it is a privilege to lend obedience to no external laws except those to which I could have given consent.

Yes. In other words, external freedom does not consist in being subjected only to reasonable laws. Now does Kant say subjection to laws to the making of which I have been able to contribute my vote, even if the final decision goes

against me. That was Rousseau's point. Kant takes a middle line between - the classical view would have put it as follows. A man is freely subject only to reasonable laws, because then his word and the word of the legislator are identical. On the other hand, one could also take the democratic view of Rousseau: a man is free if he can contribute to the making of this law by his vote because then he has at least the possibility of having the vote on his side the next time.

Now, what is the basis of this contention? To repeat. For Kant it is not important that you have the vote. The absolute monarch may very well have given the law but if the law is such so that you could have accepted the law then it is a just law. Now, what is the reasoning of Kant? The legislator, according to him, must be guided by the will of the society as a whole, let us say by the general will, in Rousseau's terms. There is no need, according to Kant, that the legislator be the citizen body assembled. It is perfectly possible, from Kant's point of view, that the monarch is the legislator, but the monarch must be guided by what could have been the general will of the community. That is a subtle but important difference. Kant does not say that the legislator must be guided by reason, as Plato and Aristotle had said, but by the general will, and yet the general will seems to be a substitute for that. Now, why is the general will and not reason taken to be the standard for legitimacy? Now, in his writing Theory and Practice, in his section against Hobbes, he says, 'a law which determines for all what they might or might not do legally is the act of a public will from which all law proceeds and hence which must be unable to do injustice to anyone'. The general will owes its respectability to the fact that it is a sacred will. It cannot do injustice to anyone. Why? No other will is capable of that except that of the whole people since, in this case, all make a decision about all. Hence, everyone about himself. And no one can do injustice to himself. Do you see that? That is of course a Rousseauian thesis, but in Rousseau that was enforced by the fact that everyone was really present, whereas now in this the monarch is said to be guided by the presumptive will of the people. Do you see that point? Do you see the construction? In the case of any law, made by the citizen body assembled, the citizen body decides about the citizen body, and the citizen body is of course a friend of the citizen body, and will not be inimical to it in the way in which a tyrant might be inimical to it. Therefore, no one can be harmed in this respect. But what is the implication of that?

(There are no basic disagreements in the city.)

Yes, sure. That's one very good point. When Rousseau discusses that, after having established that, he has long chapters in which he says under what conditions can such a general will be effective or really exist. And then he says there must be a reasonable homogeneity of the people. If you have a stable minority, for example, religious, racial, or whatever it may be, there is no guarantee whatever that the majority will be fair to the minority. If there is a homogeneity so that any law of any significance affects equally all then there can be no major disagreement. Rousseau, because he is not an a priori theorist, goes into these matters. Kant, by virtue of the strict a priori character of his doctrine, cannot enter into these matters.

But the queer thing is this, that these legal fictions, as we might call them; namely, that the citizen body will not do injustice to the citizen body,

and hence to any particular citizen, becomes sanctified, in Kant's doctrine, beyond recognition. And I believe that the discredit into which so-called political philosophy has fallen is partly intelligible by the fact that most of these critics in the nineteenth century were confronted by the Kantian and similar doctrines.

(In Kant, in contradistinction to Rousseau, there would be a general antagonism among the particular individuals in a civil society, would there not? I mean, it would be a rather dangerous thing to have them all . . .)

Think of the man of avarice. Now, what are these passions? The antagonism arises from the fact that all have more or less the same - well, the famous story of Charles V and Francis I of France. Francis said, 'what my brother Charles wants I too want'. Milan. And therefore the fact that they had the same value was the only reason why they had conflict. So in this case, two avaricious men had the same passion, but this passion constitutes the antagonism. Now, if this is to be expressed in the form of law, say, there should be no provision for poor people, they would fully agree, and they would vote for that law, although they would like each to have the property of the other man. That is exactly the trick of Rousseau, that by the transformation of the selfish desires into the form of a law the selfish desires are disposed of. I always give the simple, primitive, example, that selfish people don't like to pay taxes, sure that is their nature, and then they come into the assembly and then there is no longer a question of the expression of their desires but of giving their desires the form of a law. Then it means no longer 'I don't like to pay taxes' but 'there ought to be a law that no one should pay taxes', and then they come to their senses. That is an enlargement, and in many respects a deepening of the thought, which is what Kant is trying to do. That would not create any difficulties. The difficulty would come out if there are really stable antagonisms of groups. For example, rich and poor. And if they have all the same right it is theoretically possible that the poor would confiscate the wealth of the rich, or if you have a system which favors the rich then the opposite might happen, not exactly of course confiscation but taxes would be distributed in a way not very acceptable to the poor. And Rousseau goes into these matters, but Kant does not do that. In other words, the point is this: Kant does not say the laws must be reasonable, because he accepts the Rousseauian formula. The Rousseauian formula, however, has the purpose of replacing the danger - let me begin again: The old notion that the legislator should follow reason in giving his laws has one great danger from this Rousseauian-Kantian point of view; namely, that the legislator might give laws which the people don't like at all, and which might be incompatible with their freedom. The legislator might impose high standards of public cleanliness, and of education, and of what have you, which the people don't like at all. Therefore, in order not to be exposed to the demands of a moral and/or very well-meaning man of reason, you simply say, no, that is not the point to be considered, the people must agree to the laws. But then the question of course arises, the people may be very emotional, foolish, or unjust, and all this kind of thing, and Rousseau's solution was then this general will doctrine. In a simple formula one could say this: there are two elements in a sound practical political arrangement. First is intrinsic wisdom, and second is acceptability, or consent. The classical doctrine put the emphasis on the wisdom, and it was a secondary matter of strategy how to get the consent and if need be also to force consent. The modern doctrine, seeing the great

difficulties, especially for freedom, of the primacy of wisdom, said, let us start from the consent point of view and see how wisdom will fit into that later. That was the Rousseauian doctrine, and Rousseau, being consistent of course, said, the general will in order to be acceptable must be infallible, because if it is not infallible why should we be subject to it. And Rousseau tried to have a construction which would give the general will the greatest chance of being sensible, but of course there could never be a full guarantee. And that of course is a problem, in this form, in all democratic societies that the certainty of a law having been passed by democratic procedure makes it binding, however you state this, and morally binding too, and yet the possibility of this democratic law being very unjust and being very foolish. There is no institutional solution to this problem of course, but for the general understanding of the situation I think one must keep these two opposite starting-points in mind.

(Would you distinguish between Rousseau and Kant at all in this matter of mutual individual antagonism, to the civil society? It seemed to me that Rousseau was more concerned with creating a moral community, with substituting moral unanimity for individual passions whereas Kant is more concerned with letting the passions struggle so that men may engage in self-development.)

There is perhaps something to that. And that is also the reason why Rousseau preferred a small society, a city, rather than the large territorial state. Rousseau was greatly concerned with the question of how to get a bond keeping the people together and making them fellow-citizens without any strings attached to that. Yes, but could not one say on the other hand that this is a very serious problem? Is not the alternative which Kant has, where the bond would be self-interest alone and the moral duty alone, and not the other things - I mean, is Rousseau not here morally realistic in this point? That is, there must be something in addition to mere calculating self-interest, on the one hand, and moral duty, on the other. Is there not something in between? And one can loosely say that Rousseau said the real bond is patriotism, which is morally higher than enlightened self-interest but morally lower than pure morality. That is I think the issue between the two, in this respect.

Now, only a few words on definitive article 2. What is the crucial point? The moral law dictates; reason from the throne of the highest moral legislative power, condemns war as a legal procedure altogether, and makes the state of peace an immediate duty. This state of peace would, strictly speaking, require a world state. A civitas gentium, Volkerstaat. Which eventually should comprise all nations of the earth. But the peoples don't want that. And what can be done? A negative surrogate has to be introduced; namely, a federation which prevents war, a federation which should ultimately be universal. That is a surrogate. More cannot be expected. But this surrogate implies that all states preserve their autonomy or sovereignty, and therefore this federation can always be terminated at the discretion of each member. The simple conclusion from that, to quote again from the Metaphysics of Morals, paragraph 61, is that eternal peace, the last goal of all nations, is an idea which cannot be executed. What would be the best translation of the term eine unausführbar Idee? An idea which cannot be realized. Yes, but then what is the meaning of this teaching regarding perpetual peace if we have only approximations to perpetual peace, which means, in other words, that there will always be war? How, then, can a fundamentally peaceful policy, directed towards the abolition

of war, ever become defensible as a policy of a responsible government? There could be mitigations, all kinds of mitigations - well, some of them have been achieved in the eighteenth century regarding civilian population, and so on, and so on. But, as we have seen, that depends so much on the military technology, which is independent of moral considerations, that the practical meaning must be zero.

The last point, and that is immediately before - at the end of the definite articles, the last paragraph. Will you read that please.

(Page 23.)

Since the narrower or wider community of the peoples of the earth has developed so far that violation of right in one place is felt throughout the world, the idea of a law of world citizenship is no high-flown or exaggerated notion. It is a supplement to the unwritten code of the civil and international law, indispensable for the maintenance of the public human rights and hence also for perpetual peace. One cannot flatter oneself to believing that one can approach this peace except under the condition outlined here.

That is very remarkable. First we have heard that eternal peace is a dictate of moral reason. Now, every dictate of moral reason guarantees itself, according to Kant, the feasibility. Thou oughtst, hence, thou canst. Now, here we see that it is not sufficient to refer to the moral law regarding peace. You have to enter into different considerations in order to see that the idea of such a cosmopolitan law is not a fantastic and exaggerated notion of right. We have to go into empirical considerations; namely, the fact that there is now world trade. It amounts to that. Is it not strange then? I mean, should not this cosmopolitan law, as a strictly rational law, not be at all in need of any empirical considerations? Do you see the difficulty? Well, it will be taken up more fully I think in the sequel. I ask now Miss ___ to read her paper.

(student reads paper)

Now, there are a few points which I will mention briefly. The passage regarding Puffendorf and Bartoll(?), and the other international lawyers. What Kant means I believe is this - I don't remember the exact passage - Kant denies that there is an international law proper, following of course Hobbes, because an international law would mean a law not dependent on a sovereign. There would have to be an international sovereign if there is to be international law. Therefore, there cannot be international law proper, and these books by Grotius, Bartoll, Puffendorf, can be no more recommendations by private people, which of course lend themselves easily to misuse by unscrupulous machiavellian politicians. You see, they invade another country and they say, well, Puffendorf, paragraph 155, and Grotius, paragraph 217, say that can be done. That is what I think he means, but that is not very important.

As for the other points which you made, you seem to be particularly attracted by Kant's statements about miracles. Now, why does Kant say, and that didn't become quite clear to me, that miracles are impossible?

- (It would be self-contradictory to assume that the first cause which has set up the natural mechanism has not done a good enough job so that it has to interfere occasionally with . . .)

Is this a good argument? In other words, it means this: God has created the world, and his original plan was not good enough at given points so it has to be intervened later, and that would mean a bad job. But is this a good argument? I mean, is this the meaning of miracles in the religious tradition? Perhaps a miracle is meant to be something radically different from the ordinary occurrence to draw men's attention to the omnipotence of God. But Kant has another point which is perhaps more important, and that concerns the knowability of miracles. You see, miracles cannot have any effect wished by God if they are not knowable as miracles. These by the way are old stories, not stemming from Kant. And Kant's point is that miracles are not knowable because: there is an event, an external event, and you will naturally approach it with the question of why did it happen. You seek causes. But the causes for which we are bound to seek are natural causes. In case we do not find a natural cause natural reason dictates that we should suspend judgment. Because there may be hitherto unknown natural causes. That played a very great role in these centuries. If it is true that miracles are not knowable then any wise god, and God is wise, would not do - use miracles.

Now as to your point, which is more immediately relevant to our discussion, nature guaranteeing perpetual peace. How is this compatible with freedom? We are morally obliged to strive for peace, but nature forces us into peace. How is that compatible? You raised this question.

- (We are not obliged morally to work for peace unless we can be given a reasonable indication that it can be achieved or unless it cannot be refuted that it can be achieved.)

Yes, or, differently, the guarantee of a natural process leading to peace is not absolute.

- (Kant says we have no certainty or clarity . . .)

In the nature of things we cannot have it. And therefore there can only be a probability of such a trend but no certainty.

That is connected with the question you discussed towards the end of your paper, when you spoke of these two types of politics, moral politics versus the Machiavellian. One argument which Kant makes is this, which should perhaps have been emphasized a bit more: the Machiavellian politician is guided by considerations of prudence in the lowest sense of the word, and the goal, the objective, towards which that prudence works, is power. How does this prudence work? What is the character of the working of this kind of prudence? Forecasts. Predictions. This and this measure is likely to lead to this and this result, whether favorable or unfavorable. One part of Kant's argument concerns the quality of such predictions or forecasts. What does Kant say about that?

- (That they can't be absolute because there are so many empirical considerations.)

In other words, we cannot know the future. There can only be a probability, which of course in all important questions is much too weak. If we want to have any knowledge relevant for our actions it can only be given by morality. We find a discussion of this subject in a place somewhat surprising when you think of Kant, namely, in Churchill's Marlborough. I believe it is in the sixth volume, if I remember well. There Churchill discusses the Peace of Utrecht and raises this question: that was a prudent action at that time but very controversial in England. Now, a hundred years later, say around 1810 or so, the wisdom of that would have been vindicated completely, because the graveness of the French danger was there. But another hundred years later, when the French danger had faded into insignificance and Germany was the danger, to say nothing of now, the situation was entirely different. Well, you can apply this to any historical act which, if you knew all the consequences, would have been different. For example, in 1945, the victory over Nazi Germany seemed to be an undisguised blessing and the policies of men like Neville Chamberlain seemed to be simply foolish, and yet two years later the situation had become so that one said, well, maybe Chamberlain didn't go in the right way about it but if there had been a possibility of getting a German-Russian war with the neutrality of the West it would have been infinitely wiser. Churchill knew that of course all the time but he said - what was that phrase, 'one link in the chain of destiny at one time'. Churchill foresaw what would happen. The Nazi danger was so pressing that no possibility of a different policy was serious, except the mitigations he suggested regarding the land in the Balkans and so on. Now, after Churchill had stated this principle he says, well, if we cannot be guided by considerations of the unknown future, and being guided by what we can now know and foresee, this always means a severe limitation on the wisdom of our actions; what can we do? And he says there remains some principles which we must certainly apply under all conditions. And he said somewhere - I don't know where that was - not inflicting unnecessary sufferings on human beings, and the honor of warriors, and fidelity to covenants. These are principles with which one must comply in every situation and there one is safe. Regarding the prudential things no safety exists. Now, that is a confirmation of Kant from an unexpected quarter, because I have no reason to assume that Churchill is a Kantian in any sense.

You also did not emphasize enough, Miss __, one point, when Kant speaks about this philosophy of history and the things which make for conflict and peace. What about religion, in this context? We must take this up later anyway, but still - because that is very important.

(Religion is in itself a unifying influence as it is practiced but the vehicles of religion separate peoples.)

In other words, the historical religions are divisive. A purely rational religion would be unifying, but historical religions are divisive just as languages. And what is the unifying social force?

(Commerce.)

Commerce, yes. I think Kant is in perfect sympathy with this development of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The influence of religion, i.e., of the historical religions, is to be replaced by the influence of commerce. And this commerce should of course go together with a rational religion, i.e.,

a unifying religion. These are great formulas which have had a tremendous success in all western countries.

Now let us turn to the first edition of the guarantee of the guarantee of perpetual peace, of eternal peace. Now, what is the main point?

(That nature understood as a mechanism and God's providence offers certain indications that peace can be established without men's morally willing it.)

Yes, but what is the precise point? Which Kant makes here quite clear. The teleology is not theoretically known. What is theoretically known is only the mechanism of nature. For theoretical purposes, Kant says, the teleology is extravagant. I mean, there are some traces but to develop this to a complete teleological doctrine we are not entitled. But if we start from the moral certainty, for example, say the demand to pursue perpetual peace, we are entitled on this basis, on the moral basis, to consider the mechanism whether it is not conducive to this morally required end. It is not theoretical knowledge. That is the crucial point which Kant makes everywhere. So, in other words, the fact that nature guarantees the feasibility of perpetual peace can only be asserted or seen if we know the moral necessity of perpetual peace.

One must say however that the formulations of Kant are very ambiguous. Sometimes he says that the mechanism of nature makes perpetual peace necessary. And that would of course mean that we can predict it, predict its coming about in the natural course of events, but he also has to qualify that.

(There is a similar question about the use of the word 'legal'. He sometimes uses it to mean any relationship of law and sometimes the republican constitution is the only relation consistent with the rights of men. At least in the translation.)

Yes. In which passage do you find that?

(I cannot find it right now.)

The point is this: nature favors the moral intention, but it does not compel men, so that the freedom remains unimpaired.

Now, when he speaks about the republican constitution, this passage I think we must read. About the nation of devils. That is very important.

(That is at the bottom of page 29, in this Little Library edition.)

Now, the republican constitution is the only one entirely fitting to the rights of man, but it is the most difficult to establish and even harder to preserve, so that many would say the republic would have to be a nation of angels, because men with their selfish inclinations are not capable of a constitution of such a sublime form. But precisely with these inclinations nature comes to the aid of the general will established on reason, which is revered, even though impotent to be practiced. Thus, it is only a question of good organization of the state, which does lie in man's power,

whereby the powers of each selfish inclination are so arranged in opposition that one moderates or destroys the ruinous effect of the other. The consequence for reasoning is the same as if none of them had existed and man is forced to be a good citizen even if not a morally good person. The problem of organizing the state, however, hard as it may seem, can be solved even for a race of devils if only they are intelligent, and the problem is, given a multitude of rational beings, requiring universal laws for their preservation, but each of whom is secretly inclined to exempt himself from them, to establish a constitution is such a way that although their private intentions are wicked they check each other with the result that their public conduct is the same as if they had had such intentions.

'such evil intentions'. So, you see, that makes it perfectly clear. The political problem is an amoral problem although it has moral significance.

A problem like this must be capable of solution. It does not require that we know how to attain the moral improvement of man but only that we should know the mechanism of nature in order to use it on men, organizing the conflict of the hostile intentions present in people in such a way that they must compel themselves to submit to coercive law. Thus, a state of peace is established in which laws have force. We can see, even in natural states, which are far from perfectly organized, that in their foreign relations they approach that which the idea of right prescribes. This is so in spite of the fact that the intrinsic element of morality is certainly not the cause of it. A good constitution is not to be expected from morality but, conversely, a good moral condition of the people is to be expected only under the good constitution.

Let us stop here. 'A good moral training, a good moral education, can only be expected from the good constitution.' That is a very important point, because if this is so, if the moral education of the people is something which may contribute to the genuine morality of the people, why should it not be the purpose of civil society to take care of such a moral education? Or, as Kant puts it elsewhere, if outward decency civilizes man, which does not mean to say moralizes, but still creates a preparation for moralization, why should not this external decency belong to the functions of civil society? That is completely dark in Kant.

In the next paragraph, when he speaks about law of nations, let us read the beginning of that.

The idea of international law presupposes the separate existence of many independent but neighboring states. Although this condition is itself a state of war, unless a federative union prevents the outbreak of hostilities, this is rationally preferable to the amalgamation of states under one superior power, as this would end in one universal monarchy, and laws always lose in vigor what government gains in extent. Hence, a soulless despotism falls into anarchy after stifling what seems to be good.

Yes. But here you see again an empirical consideration entering. There

is no a priori reason why there should not be a universal state which by the fact that it is one state would make impossible any war between parts of mankind. But there is of course a very great practical consideration to which Kant refers, namely, the feasibility of such a universal state, and whether that is compatible with freedom. This question cannot be settled by a priori reason, and yet it is an important part of Kant's allegedly a priori doctrine.

Kant notes in the sequel, as we have read before, that the difference of religions can only be provisional, if there is to be perpetual peace, whereas the spirit of commerce, which is such a unifying thing, is not to be provisional. That was the new society which was of course visualized by quite a few people since the seventeenth century - Locke plays a great role there, Montesquieu, and Mandeville, and Adam Smith, and of course Kant himself too. By substituting commerce for religion one will lower men's aspirations but make them much more tractable and nice people to each other. That was this idea. And that could be said both by atheists and by theists of course, theists like Kant, but it was not compatible with adherence to religion in the traditional sense of the term. Yes, one could say, a federation of republics united by the religion of reason. That is the concrete proposal, and you see here immediately that this is not an a priori proposal, because we have no a priori knowledge of the effects of commerce.

In the second edition, the secret article to perpetual peace, I believe that was written by Kant somewhat with tongue in cheek. Because the government cannot possibly reconcile it with their own dignity to admit that the philosophers are important. It must be a secret article that the philosophers be permitted to contribute their books and articles on perpetual peace.

(And also the philosophers might find it compromising to their dignity to declare openly that they were the author - according to the first paragraph.)

Which is that?

(In the first paragraph, second edition.)

No, that does not refer to the philosophers. That refers to the governments. No, the dignity of the philosophers is not involved.

Here Kant makes this famous remark to which I referred you before that the lawyers, the jurists, look down on the philosophers. You see, in the old organizations there were. . .

(change of tape)

. . . he makes here the point that contrary to the claims made by the jurists for example philosophy and not law is truly the higher thing, and the more delicate thing regarding theology, where he says philosophy is said to be the maid of theology but one doesn't see whether philosophy carries - how does he translate it?

(Whether she precedes or follows bearing her train.)

Yes. In this edition it is in quotes, so it is possible this formula is older than Kant. I do not know, and it is not of great importance.

Now, the appendices are indeed very important. I think we take up the second appendix now and the first appendix next time, because that is shorter. Now, the subject of the appendix is the relation of morals and politics, and Kant contends that they are compatible but with the understanding that politics must be subordinated to morals. And Kant's general political formula is: the shrewd-like serpents, and the moral formula is: without guile, like the doves. And he contends that these two demands can be reconciled. Now, in order to show how this is concretely possible Kant establishes a principle by which everyone can recognize whether a policy is moral or not, and that principle is the publicity of the maxim. Not of the particular measure; that is not the point, but the maxim guiding the measure. Can this be publicly defended or not? If it cannot be publicly defended it is certainly immoral. If it can be publicly defended it is not necessarily moral. So, publishability of the maxim is a necessary but not sufficient condition. Now, of course there are quite a few maxims which are not moral, from Kant's point of view, but which are publicly defensible. Do you know of any maxims which are immoral, from Kant's point of view and yet publicly defensible? It is worthwhile to consider that point. Three occur to me immediately: 'my country right or wrong' is publicly defensible. No one will lose an election or become unpopular with his society if he says that. When Steven Douglas said, in the controversy regarding slavery in this country, that in a conflict between a negro and a crocodile, he is on the side of the negro, whereas in a conflict between a white and a negro he is on the side of the white, and this is of course generally acceptable everywhere. I may not have quoted literally but you see this, that, in other words, he feels a community between himself and the negro as a human being confronted with non-human beings, like crocodiles, but if it is an intra-human - did I not pronounce this correctly? Crocodile. All right. But if it is a conflict between a group of human beings with another group of human beings he sides with his own group. Well, you probably know other examples of the same kind of statements which can safely be published and would not create any quarrel. But for this reason, Kant says, that the principle stated is only the necessary but not a sufficient condition.

But let us also consider it from the other point of view. Kant regards the principle of tolerance as a demand of morality. What about the principle of tolerance in a society based on intolerance? Is it there publicly defensible? I think it depends very much on the circumstances.

In other words, what Kant seems to condemn absolutely is any temporizing. Any temporizing implies non-publishability of the maxim. Only in important matters, at any rate. Now, Kant gives the following example: the right of rebellion against a tyrant is not publicly defensible. Hence, it is wrong. Well, what do you say to that? Meaning this, you can never make a law, say a constitutional law, in which there is a legal provision to the effect that if the government becomes tyrannical the people may resist. Because if there is to be a clear legal provision then there must be legal arrangements for how this can be arranged and then of course the people would be the governor and not any government. That is Kant's point. But no government made the governor by the constitution, I mean no king, will permit that, will accept the government under any such condition. What do you say to this argument?

There is something very strange here. If you look that up in the section on civil law where he speaks of that: 'is sedition or rebellion a legitimate means for a people to throw off the oppressive power of a so-called tyrant' Do you have that?

(It is on page 48.)

What does he say after 'tyrant' in your translation?

(There's a Latin phrase.)

Yes, exactly. That's very interesting. He says, 'a man who is a tyrant, not by his title, but by the exercise.' The distinction is this, and that distinction is of course very old: there are two types of tyrants: tyrants who lack a title, meaning the mere usurper; and the other is the man who has a title, the legitimate prince, who is tyrannical by the exercise of his power. Now, Kant is here limiting the question very interestingly to rebellion against the legitimate ruler ruling tyrannically. Kant seems to allow here of rebellion against a usurper. I have never found elsewhere in Kant an allusion to this very important distinction. But what about this point - is this really true, that it is impossible to maintain in public^{ness} principle that tyrannical rule gives the people the right to rebel? And does it necessarily frustrate any possible desire of the people to rebel if these conditions are given.

(. . . . inaudible . . .)

No, that's easy because that's simply a part of the law of the country and the conditions under which this law can be applied, or the manner in which it can be applied, are perfectly provided for by the positive law. The legal order is not for one moment interrupted by an impeachment, whereas a rebellion means of course a suspension of the whole legal order. That's an entirely different proposition. But take Locke's thought for example, that there is a right of the people to rebel, a right which is normally dormant and will become active only in cases of extreme misgovernment, is a right, which of course doesn't allow of a clear legal formulation, and therefore will not be a part of any written constitution - but I see a reason why this should not be defended, although of course it would have to be defended judiciously in order not to induce people to make a revolution for every little and transient cause. That's a matter of policy.

(Of course the Declaration of Independence is not a constitution but it is a public document that states this.)

Yes.

(It is interesting to see the example of this carried further, I believe, in the soviet constitution where there is a provision that any one of the republics can secede from the soviet union.)

That's a different story. In a mere federation, a mere federation that is understood; that can be terminated according to the discretion of any of the federated members.

(I was thinking that now when there seems to be a widespread belief in

the doctrine that states as well as people have a right to their own self . . .)

Determination?

(Preservation in all cases. Kant's idea is less out of the way as far as ordinary belief is concerned.)

No, on the contrary, Kant's doctrine has had a terrific success I would say. If you think of the famous formula, 'open covenants, openly arrived at', that is a consequence of Kant. The most radical consequence. Surely it is not surprising. Just as many other parts of Kant's doctrine are very well-known today from practice. The question is only whether they are unqualifiedly beneficial.

(People could argue on the basis of present day theories that even a tyrannical government has the right to preserve itself since all governments have the right to preserve themselves.)

Yes? And where is the difference? Kant doesn't deny that.

(In a way, if this doctrine becomes popular or becomes wide-spread then perhaps what he says is there. In other words, maybe he was looking forward to the time when everybody was sufficiently enlightened so that then these principles would be more or less public thought, that there is no right to overthrow a tyrannical government.)

No, I don't see it, because Kant is in this respect consistent. A tyrannical government has the right to preserve itself, ultimately on moral grounds, because some order of civil society is preferable to anarchy. That's the point.

(But the empirical fact would seem to have been altered as a result of the success of Kant's doctrine. That is to say, what Kant says is less publicly defensible . . .)

Today. Oh, I see. How would this affect the thing? How would this affect the over-all situation? From Kant's point of view the world has become more moral than it was in the eighteenth century, because no right of revolution is sacrificed. I see. That's true. That's Kant's answer. That's moral progress.

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

There is the moral obligation to obey the established government regardless of how it is governed. You are morally obliged not to do certain things which are commanded, immoral things, but rebellion is the crime, the sin.

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

Yes, but not quite. In a best state, a republic, as Kant calls it - the republic is in a sense morally neutral but the republic is unqualifiedly morally superior to the monarchy, because the principle of freedom and equality is recognized in a republic and it is denied in a non-republic.

(One thing is very curious, that if the revolution is successful apparently the ousted king can't do anything about it.)

Yes, sure. You mean that means profiting from injustice. Yes, sure. That is the trouble with this kind of analysis because it cannot be absolutely moral without getting into trouble.

(Well, I think that's why he hasn't mentioned the usurper because I don't think in his doctrine there is such a thing as an usurper.)

Yes, but look at this case, that a fellow, having sufficient armed men, and the others are frightened, kills the ruling king, or expels him and his family, and becomes the ruler of this community. He has come to power clearly by a legal crime of the first order, and if the adherents of the expelled monarch would rally and get hold of that and execute him for high treason, I think Kant could not well object to that. I think he makes here an interesting exception in favor of the legitimate prince - the question is: let us assume this fellow has ruled for a generation, or so; then I think Kant would have to use this horrible argument, which, however, all political men have always used, that time has a political, and also therefore a moral, meaning; a prescription. I don't see how on the basis of a priori reasoning you can establish it but you need inductive reasoning for that. Stability. And then it is a matter of prudential consideration. A new revolution is perhaps preferable because this usurper has misgoverned the country so much, but if this usurper would have to rule to the satisfaction of everyone, for one or two generations, whereas the legitimate family has misgoverned the country I believe that would be a consideration important for every political person. But how Kant could build it into his scheme I don't see. But I found it remarkable that Kant alludes at all to this old distinction. As far as I can see at the moment it is the only place where he does.

Now, there are two more passages we have to discuss, when he speaks, in the next paragraph, 'if a neighboring power has grown to a tremendous size'.

(On page 50.)

If a neighboring power becomes formidable by its acquisitions and thus causes anxiety we cannot assume because it can oppress that it will and does this give a lesser power the right to attack it without having been injured by it? A state which made known that such was its design would produce the fear of evil even more certainly and quickly, for the great power would steal a march on the smaller, and the alliance of the smaller powers would be only a feeble reed against one who knew how to apply the maxim, divide et impera. This maxim of political expediency, if made public, would necessarily defeat its own purpose.

Surely, it proves that it is imprudent to utter this maxim, but does it prove the injustice of the maxim? For example, Gomulka may wish to be in the position of Tito. He cannot possibly express this opinion or the maxim on which this opinion is based, but can such a wish on his part be called unjust? It is hard to see.

universally valid. He proposes another transcendental and affirmative principle of public right, 'the formula would be as follows'. Do you have that?

(On page 52.)

All those things which stand in need of publicity in order not to fail their end agree with politics and right combined, for if they can attain their end only through publicity they must accord with the public universal end, happiness. And the proper task of politics is to promote this, that is, to make the public satisfied with its condition. If, however, this aim is attainable only by means of publicity, that is, by removing all distrust in the maxims of politics, the latter must conform to the right of the public, for only in this is the union of the goal of all possible.

Do you see any problem here? Is this a sufficient guarantee of the morality of maxims of public law? If the maxims need publicity in order to achieve their end? You see there is a different case here. Let us see what Kant is trying to do. Formerly he said there are maxims which can be published and yet be immoral, namely if the government is so strong, so powerful, they they can publish their maxims without any fear, and yet the maxims are immoral. But if the maxims are of such a nature that they must be published - in the case of the gangsters this is merely an act of insolence that they publish their maxims. They could achieve what they want even without publishing them, because there is a force. But what, a maxim which needs publication, publicity, in order to achieve its goal? Are they necessarily moral?

(. . . inaudible response. . .)

Yea, sure. Think of the Holy War of Islam. It would be absolutely impossible without publicity of the maxim. And from Kant's point of view that would not guarantee its morality at all. Or think of Hitler's anti-jewish policy in Germany. It would have been impossible without the publication of the maxim. And it is a question whether that agrees with morality. Certainly not from Kant's point of view. You see what Kant is driving at. It is not this particular formula but some formula of this nature had to be found if there is to be absolute certainty regarding moral knowledge, a priori knowledge of what is right and wrong.

(Did Kant distinguish between something which is printed for the sake of making people aware of something from one which is published for the sake of convincing people of something?)

I think convincing is meant because he means by maxims. The laws must of course be published in order to become effective. That goes without saying. But Kant speaks here not of the publication of laws or of regulations or orders but of the publications of maxims.

(Does he mean that it is something the moment I see it I will say 'it is true'?)

I can judge of the intentions of the government. And that is exactly what the Nazi government did. Of course it also used force to prevent resistance,

but without a considerable appeal to public opinion the whole thing would have been impossible.

(Yes, but even so, as I understand Nazi Germany, it wasn't the first time, but the twentieth time that people agreed.)

Well, there is something to that. The Nazis did not state that they had the firm intention to prepare another war in order to recover the powers which Germany had lost in the first world war and beyond that; that would have been absolutely impossible to admit because the first world war generation was still too preponderant, and the young classes were only growing up. But as for the policy of abandoning all democratic procedures proper, and especially the anti-jewish policy, that was open and no one could have any doubt about it. On the contrary, the delusions were rather that people said, oh, they won't do it, for some reasons, but that they meant to do it was very clear.

But I believe there is no question as to the impossibility of Kant's solution to this problem. The interesting question concerns the motive, and the motive is, as I say, to have - do you remember the example of the eight year old child who can say with certainty what is right and wrong - something of this kind, a perfectly evident truth guiding politics, was also required for getting this solution. Because if there were no such rules, if there were rules which required prudence for their proper application, the a priori doctrine would fall down to that extent.

(Perhaps this formula is intended for the use of the moral politician to guide him through the contingencies of empirical politics and not for the use of anyone with the judgment of . . .)

No, what he says is that he wants to give a formula which would allow anyone to judge whether given maxims of a politician agree or do not agree with morality. Really. Go back from the end, when you have such a formula like Wilson's 'open covenants, openly arrived at', what does it mean? Such covenants cannot be immoral. I mean, the point is not altogether good, because much of immorality of course consists in one's inability to defend what one is publicly doing. Otherwise immorality consists to a considerable extent in deception. Well, generally speaking, for Kant I think the root of immorality consists in the fact that a man regards himself as an exception. This and this is a law, a moral law, but I make an exception in my case. I want the others to be moral. That is, generally speaking, true of men, but I myself would like to make a minor exception in my favor, and of course that I can only do stealthily. And therefore deception, or concealment, is of the essence of immorality to that extent. Now, universalize that and you arrive at this use.

(Yes, but, as you suggested, this formula does not save one from prudential considerations or even from Machiavellian considerations. It depends ultimately on success.)

No. Kant contends that this allows you to draw a clear line between a Machiavellian and a moral policy. That he contends. A Machiavellian policy which is not publicly defensible. More precisely, a Machiavellian policy is not a policy which is in need of publicity to be successful. Well, I give you an example, to see what Kant means. The policy recommended by Machiavelli

in the Prince was to liberate Italy from the barbarians. That was defensible at least in front of all Italians. I mean, that the Spaniards and French had other opinions about that, as occupying powers, is another matter. Clearly. But what Machiavelli meant of course was this. This goal of liberating Italy must be achieved by hook and crook, and this might very well mean the extermination of number of Italian princely houses and perhaps the destruction of some Italian republics, who preferred their autonomy to becoming just parts of an all-Italian state. This Machiavelli did not say because that was not publicly defensible because at that moment quite a few princes and republics would have said they would prefer to have the Spaniards in Naples and the French maybe in Lombardy rather than lose our independence to an Italian monarch. So, Machiavelli's policy in this case not only did not need publicity, it was incompatible with publicity if it was to be successful. Hence, immoral. That happens sometimes.

But the question is you can have it the other way around, where, if an immoral prince, immoral in Kant's sense, has taken hold of a people as a whole, then the moral policy is not publicly defensible. The moral policy would become frustrated by publication.

(Even the moral politician, seeking to use this formula, would he not have to engage in prudential calculations, whether or not the universalization . . .)

Yes, sure. Absolutely. That Kant would assert. He has to wait for the opportune moment. Kant admitted this much. Sure. Yes, but I think Kant would say the moral politician can say this. I will not make any constitutional changes unless there is the proper opportunity for that. But you meant to ask whether he can say that? Whether he would not become suspect to everyone else? Look at the policy of Roosevelt in the preparation for the second world war. If Roosevelt had ever said: I'm sure we must enter that war, but I will prepare American's entry into the war in a way which will be tolerable for the majority of the American people, that would have ruined that policy. Sure. And the moral politician would be in a similar situation. He would say: I don't make any revolutions but if there is an opportunity for it then I will not hesitate to exploit that opportunity. Very well. Something of this kind is probably true.

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

No, I think the maxim is stated in this form. The maxim is, living in a non-democratic, non-republican, state: I will never work for the forceable overthrow of this non-republican regime but if such an overthrow would take place without my affecting it in any way I will prevent as far as in me lies, a restoration of the non-republican regime. That's a maxim, and cannot be publicly defended, although it is a maxim which Kant himself would state. I think one is able to say that.

(Is it possible that Kant was really was setting over these maxims with a view to the recognition of a universal enlightenment? That would seem to be the only condition which would begin to make practical sense.)

I can only say that he certainly presents them as universal. Well, his notion was apparently this: up to now there has been government by cabinets,

and government by cabinets meant of course secretive policies. The maxims could never be known. But if we have republican government, which is by its nature public, you know because the real debates take place not in a cabinet but in public assemblies - you see, you must not forget that is the same Kant who was sure that the republican governments as such by their nature are inclined to peace whereas monarchical governments by their nature are inclined to war. If this proposition sounds naive I refer you to other naive utterances of Kant. That is not the only case. And also the story of the eight year old child.

(Besides, if everyone were enlightened why would it be necessary for the secret clause in his articles of definitive peace which contradicts the second appendix? It has to be secret.)

In other words, a republican government would not regard it as so incompatible with its dignity as a royal government. Yes. Sure.

So, next time you, Mr. __, will read a paper, and then we have Mr. __ and Mr. __.

(end of lecture.)

Now, in this first Appendix to Perpetual Peace there are two points which should be noted because of their importance. Now, Kant says here - that is the discussion of what Kant regards as the fundamental alternatives, the Machiavellian and the moral positions. Kant starts from the premise that there is such a thing as morality, or honesty, and it must have the right of way over against calculative prudence, because if you understand the meaning of the term then you see that morality, or honesty, is in its inner meaning something intrinsically good, which cannot be said of calculative prudence.

The argument of Kant consists, one could say, of two parts. The first one is this: calculative prudence, or predicting science you can say, cannot give us any certain guidance as to what will be profitable, but morality can tell us with certainty what is right. So the only certain guidance can be given only by morality.

Kant turns then to what can be called the strong point of the realists, of the Machiavellians. The factual basis of right will always be force. Kant admits that, but distinguishes this true premise from a problematic Machiavellian conclusion, namely, that force will never bow to right, or force will never abdicate. The argument is familiar to all of you from Marx. There is no possibility of a peaceful application of the bourgeois. To this Kant replies as follows. This conclusion is necessary indeed, if there is no morality, but if there is morality the conclusion does not follow at all. Kant's point stated in more general terms is: the Machiavellian or empirical politician does not know anything of the possibilities of man. He knows how man ordinarily behave but he is blind to the fact that men need not behave in that way, to the possibilities of man. And this I think we must keep in mind for the discussion of Kant's whole moral doctrine, because that distinction is really crucial. A prediction finds its absolute limit in the fact that man can act morally. So, there is never a certainty in this respect.

I think we turn now to one passage which will lead us immediately over to the moral teaching of Kant proper, and that is this. In the first Appendix, the seventh paragraph from the end. Give me your edition. I wonder whether it is complete in your edition. No, I think he omitted that.

(Page 40 in this edition.)

In order to make practical philosophy consistent with itself we must first decide the following question: dealing with the problems of practical reason must we begin from its material principle, the end as the object of free choice, or from its formal principle, which is based merely on freedom in its external relation? From which comes the following law: act so that thou canst will that thy maxim can be a universal law, be the end of thy action what it will. Without doubt, the latter determining principle of action will stand first, for, as a principle of right, it carries unconditional necessity with it, whereas the former is obligatory only if we assume the empirical conditions of the ends set before us, that is to say, that it is an end capable of being practically realized. And if this end, as for example the end of perpetual peace, should also be a duty, this same duty must necessarily have been deduced from the formal principle governing the maxims which guide external action.

Now, the first principle is the principle of the political moralist, the problem of constitutional, international, and cosmopolitan law, are . . .

The political moralist means the Machiavellian.

. . . are mere technical problems. The second, to our formal principle on the other hand, as a principle of the moral politician who regards it as a moral problem, differs widely from the other principle in its methods of bringing about perpetual peace, should be desired not only as a material goal but also as a state of things resulting from our recognition of the precepts of duty.

Now, that is an extremely telescoped statement of Kant's whole moral philosophy. And also of course a very crude statement. But let us leave it at that for the time being. No end can be unconditionally obligatory, because every end requires a means for actualization, and whether the means are available or not depends on empirical enquiry. Therefore, we cannot take our bearings in morality, which consists of unconditional demands, by any ends. We must take our bearings by a formal principle, Kant says. By the way, he doesn't say here 'material good' but 'physical good'. But that is not very important, because in the sequel he speaks of our physical or moral advantage, treating them simultaneously. Therefore this inexact translation is not very valuable. You see, what we say already in Kant's political philosophy, that the principle of right is independent of the purpose for which that freedom is needed, the same applies to Kant's moral philosophy. Why that is so, why the aim or purpose is given a secondary position - it comes in in Kant, and it comes in in a very important way, but in a strictly derivative way; the moral end can be posited on the basis of the formal law. For example, if the end is man, that man can never be used as a mere means, this follows from the formal moral law, and is not a presupposition. Why Kant proceeded in that way we must try to see. Yes?

(Isn't he forced, though, to formulate the formal law in such a way that it would not involve empirical impossibilities?)

That, he declares, is not necessary. I mean, that is taken care of by the nature of reason, the formal imperative being a dictate of reason. And reason cannot, it seems, contradict itself, although there is a certain difficulty created by the dialectics. We must see how Kant lays a foundation for this formal ethics.

Before we turn to this question we may do well to remind ourselves of the way in which Rousseau stated the problem, because there is no question that Kant's doctrine has been developed on the basis of Rousseau. How does Rousseau put the question? The doctrine of the general will. Everyone enters society as a selfish being, for the sake of his self-preservation, calculating that if he does not live together with others under law he will not be able to preserve himself. And now the question arises as to what is happening to him when he enters society. He enters it under the conditions that he be equal with everyone else, and not to be personally dependent on anyone else, but of course that he must be subject to the power of the community, which would protect each in his self-preservation. This protection takes place in the form of the execution of equal laws. So, everything depends then on

in the form of the execution of equal laws. So, everything depends then on the law, because the execution of the law is obviously dependent on the law. The law in a such well-ordered republican society everges in its intrinsic justice by the generalization of the particular will, as Rousseau calls it, meaning - I have said this many times but I must repeat it - I don't want to pay any taxes. I transform that into the form of a bill that no taxes ought to be paid, meaning, that what is to begin with only my selfish will takes on the form of the will of society, the will of all, and therefore I have to suffer from the foolishness of my will as much as I may gain from any advantage. The justice of the law is achieved by the generalization of the particular will. Here, you see, the justice is not defined in any substantative terms, of commutative or distributive justice, or anything of this kind. It is defined exclusively in terms of the generality.

Now, Rousseau goes one step further, very clearly only in a single passage of the Social Contract, Chapter 8 if I remember well. 'By virtue of civil society man acquires the moral freedom, which alone makes man truly master of himself, for the impulse of mere appetite is slavery, and obedience to the law which one has prescribed to oneself is freedom'. Rousseau does not speak here of civil freedom but of moral freedom, but there is an important parallel between the two, because also the political law which is voted in a public assembly, where everyone has the vote, is of course in a sense also a law which I impose upon myself, even if I remain in the minority. And that is what Rousseau means, that in a well-ordered state everyone remains as free as he was heretofore. He does not obey any law to the making of which he has not contributed. In this sense, he obeys only laws which he has imposed on himself. But in a more radical way this is true of any moral law which is a law which man has prescribed to himself, and therefore morality is identical with freedom.

One could say of Rousseau that the same is true of Kant, that the political law, in a republic of course, is a prefiguration of the moral law. In both cases man obey only laws which they have imposed on themselves. Morality is identical with self-legislation. Identical. So that if you do not obey a law, which you have not imposed on yourself, you are sub-moral. Not necessarily immoral, but sub-moral. This is the crucial teaching of Rousseau, but not developed by Rousseau in any way, which Kant takes over and to which he gives the basis.

We must now turn to the philosophical writings of Kant proper. We take now the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, because we started from the periphery, from the political consequences of Kant's teaching, and that is a perfectly legitimate procedure because only in this way one understands much better what the thinker in question is driving at, in practical terms. What political, massive practical, conclusions follow from this moral teaching? But of course what one misses by this procedure is the understanding of the reasoning of the thinker himself. What brought Kant into the direction of this teaching regarding perpetual peace, constitutional law, and so on, which we have discussed. Up to now we left it at the remark, which is all right as far as it goes, that this tradition had been developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and Kant takes it over, but by taking it over into a different context he finds a new basis for it which it did not have before. But from Kant's point of view, from the point of view of Kant's systematic exposition it is of course different. The new foundation is the beginning and

the acceptance of, say, Rousseau's teaching is a consequence of his alleged discovery of the true principles of morality. We have put, in other words, the cart before the horse, but for sound pedagogical, and other, reasons, but now we must turn to the horse. And that we will do now and ask Mr. ___ to read his paper.

(student reads his paper.)

The last part was somewhat speculative but I appreciate very much the effort which has gone into it. A few mentions I can mention; there were too many to take cognizance while you went.

Now, I think it is perfectly correct what you said that according to Kant the moral statesman, and I assume you take a very broad-minded and intelligent statesman, has no higher rank than the moral artisan. I believe that is correct. But as for the distinction you made between Socratic wisdom and Socratic ignorance I would say, both from Rousseau's and Kant's points of view. They are identical, namely it means to know the limits of human knowledge, that is ignorance, but on the other hand, to know well what is within man's competence, that is positive wisdom. You meant that.

(I want that they didn't distinguish between them. They seemed to put them together and confuse them, I thought.)

No, not confuse them. I think that would require a long study, but their assertion is that they are identical. Their assertion. That is not merely a conclusion which we can draw.

You made at a certain point a distinction between two kinds of inclinations which I did not understand.

(The distinction was that Kant always talks about inclinations, desires. He uses rather mild terms, and doesn't use 'passion'.)

That is correct.

(And the question I ask is it may be easier to believe that the categorical imperative could control inclinations but it might be harder for us to accept that it could control passions.)

For Kant that is no problem. The difference is this: 'inclination' is a traditional term, the meaning of which has somewhat shifted in Kant. The natural inclinations, as natural inclinations, are, in the traditional teaching, of course, unimpeachable, and passions would be more or less perversions of the natural inclinations. Now, whatever the relation between inclinations and passions may be, it goes without saying for Kant that we can control our passions, and a sign of our lacking morality is if we do not do that. But that certainly has very much to do with the question of the peculiar meaning which the term 'inclination' acquires in Kant, to which we must turn later.

Then, you noted the silence on justice on the first few pages and you said, because justice is independent of the will. Did you say that?

(I said we could think that justice would be a virtue. It would be good,

whether the will was good or not.)

No, no. That is certainly not what - Kant implies what I meant by a previous remark, because justice necessarily implies a good will. I mean, a man who doesn't have a good will cannot be just, whereas Kant asserts you can be temperate or courageous without having a good will. I will take this up later, but I had to take issue with what you said.

And then there was a final point, regarding common sense and common understanding. If I understood you correctly, you said that Kant refused to accept the reference to common sense which Hume's critics had made, but in his moral teaching he bases himself on common sense. Is that the point which you made?

(That would be the problem, but it is solved because he is talking about different things.)

Aha.

(Its always understanding in the first case.)

Yes, but that is not very clear. One could say this, in such moral matters common sense is competent, but if questions arise which require special training and special efforts common sense is no longer sufficient. So, for example, common sense is perfectly clear, according to Kant, regarding the moral law, but as for the theoretical understanding of the moral law common sense is not competent, and therefore Kant has to write his book. A simple man of honesty knows as much about morality, according to Kant, as the wisest man might know. But, as for the status of morality, and the relations, for example, between freedom and necessity, of course he doesn't know anything, because one has to study in order to get clarity about that. Otherwise the paper was quite satisfactory.

Now, let us first consider the Preface which you rightly considered also. A few points should be added perhaps. Now, Kant begins with the traditional distinction of philosophy and the three sciences, physics, ethics, and logic. This distinction is not the Aristotelian distinction but a distinction which was made in the school of Plato. It is older than the Aristotelian distinction. And Kant says it is perfectly all right. Only one has to see the ground of that distinction and Kant gives that ground. And the most important consideration here is this, that as far as the material philosophic disciplines, physics and ethics, are concerned, as distinguished from logic, the distinction is based on the distinction between nature and freedom. An exhaustive distinction. There cannot be a third philosophic discipline from this point of view, because there is no alternative to nature and freedom, and physics deals the laws of nature and ethics deals with the laws of freedom.

Here the usage calls for some attention. The subject of moral philosophy is the moral law. The moral law was traditionally also called, although there are minor distinctions, the natural law. The precise difference, if I am not mistaken - Father Buckley will correct me - is this, that the moral law was a term applied to part of the law of the Old Testament, consisting of the moral law, the ceremonial law, and the judicial law, whereas the law of which moral philosophy proper speaks was called the natural law. Is this not substantially the situation?

(As far as I know.)

At any rate, there was, - for example, I remember from Hobbes' statement, all writers say the moral law is identical with the natural law, and that must have had some pre-history. Otherwise he would never have written it that way. But, at any rate, the moral law could be called the natural law. Kant makes it clear here by his usage that the moral law cannot be called in propriety the law of nature. It can only be called the law of freedom. So this indicates already one very grave point. The moral law has nothing to do with nature. This is already indicated by this usage.

Furthermore, Kant makes it clear that these three disciplines, physics, ethics, and logic, are partly empirical and partly purely rational. The purely rational he calls a priori, the empirical he calls a posteriori. Now, these terms had originally a very different meaning from the meaning which they acquired in Kant. The original meaning was that a priori reasoning means reasoning from causes to effects, from what is earlier, prior, to what is later, posterior, whereas a posteriori reasoning is reasoning from effects to causes. But then, as far as I can see under the influence of Leibnitz, a priori reasoning came to mean reasoning from concepts, the concepts, the essence of the thing, being necessarily the cause of the thing. Reasoning from concepts as distinguished from experience. And Kant gives the distinction this meaning which since his time has become rather generally accepted: a priori reasoning is reasoning which is in no way based on experience.

You observed, I'm sure, that Kant uses here physics and natural philosophy as synonyms of course. That was still the old usage, familiar to you, in this country, from the society in Philadelphia founded by Benjamin Franklin. How is it called? Institution, or association, for natural philosophy? And natural philosophy here means simply natural science . . .

(change of tape)

. . . Kant makes another distinction which must not be misunderstood. Kant has spoken of the fundamental distinction of philosophy into physics, ethics, and logic. He had not referred to metaphysics, which, according to the Aristotelian tradition, was a part of philosophy. Why did he not do that?

(He said there is a metaphysics of ethics and a metaphysics of physics, that metaphysics has two parts and each is a sub-division.)

That is the error which I try to dispel. Kant did not mention Metaphysics because metaphysics, in the Aristotelian and traditional sense, is not possible according to Kant. Let us call that transcendent metaphysics. This is impossible. But there is a metaphysics which is possible and that we may call immanent metaphysics, and this immanent metaphysics is, in the case of nature, the metaphysics of nature, which is the a priori doctrine of nature as empirically accessible, and the metaphysics of morals is also one which is absolutely within the limits of human reason. So, the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of morals are disciplines, rational disciplines, within the limits of human reason, disciplines possible on the basis of the criticism of pure reason. That is necessary in order to understand Kant's usage. Metaphysics of nature has nothing to do with metaphysics old-style. It is something like the most general part of Newton's physics, not more than that. The status

of the metaphysics of morals is somewhat different. Now, just as metaphysics of nature is the basis of empirical physics, metaphysics of morals is the basis of a corresponding empirical discipline, which Kant calls practical anthropology. Practical anthropology is the empirical doctrine regarding morals. Kant had written such a book. Well, he gave lectures on this subject regularly and they were published: Metaphysics in Pragmatic Intention. Its character appears perhaps most clearly from the following remark: somewhere there he distinguishes between psychology and anthropology. The book would ordinarily be called, I believe, a psychological book, but Kant refuses to call it that way because psychology is a discipline which would deal with the soul as an incorporeal substance. We know nothing of the soul as an incorporeal substance. He calls this discipline anthropological because it is strictly empirical and deals with man's inner experience as empirically known, with a view to - however, to that extent it has a practical meaning - with a view to the improvement of men, to the training of men, with a view to both happiness and morality.

After having made this distinction, Kant states a reason why a strictly a priori doctrine, strictly non-empirical doctrine of morals is necessary. Kant contends it is necessary not only for theoretical reasons, in order to have tidyness in our philosophical theory, but it is also necessary for moral reasons. Do you remember the reasoning which he gives for that? Why does morality demand, and not only theoretical tidyness, that morals be strictly a priori?

(One reason he gives is that there wouldn't be any other sure basis of morality; you couldn't base it on experience because you can't know it completely.)

More precisely, to the extent to which we are guided decisively by experience in our moral judgments to that extent our moral judgment is not pure, morally pure. Morality is of such a nature that it can only be a priori or not at all. The reasons we will gradually see.

Now, there is a passage which we should read. Page 51, bottom.

Since my purpose here is to direct to moral philosophy I narrow the proposed question to this: Is it not of the utmost necessity to construct a pure moral philosophy which is completely free from everything which may be only empirical and thus belong to anthropology. That there must be such a philosophy is self-evident from the common idea of duty and moral laws. Everyone must admit that a law, if it is to hold morally, that is, as a ground of obligation, must imply absolute necessity.

In other words, that alone proves it. A law derivative from experience cannot have absolute necessity. Which is, by the way, today generally admitted. So, since the moral law has this character it cannot be of empirical origin.

He must admit that the command: Thou shalt not lie, does not apply to men only, as if other rational beings had no need to observe it. The same is true for all other moral laws properly so-called. He must concede that the ground of obligation here must not be sought

in the nature of man or in the circumstances in which he is placed but sought a priori solely on the concepts of pure reason, and that every other precept which rests on principles of mere experience, even a precept which is in certain respects universal, so far as it leans, in the least, on empirical grounds, perhaps only in regard to the motive involved, may be called a practical rule but never a moral law.

Yes, you see here another reason, to which I referred before. The moral law must be of such a kind as to apply equally to all rational beings, men or non-men, i.e., angels and gods. That is a crucial point.

Now, this I mentioned on an earlier occasion, that this had a pre-history, and had something to do with all the great questions of divine justice raised by various theological doctrines, and where some theologians were inclined to say that God's justice cannot be measured by human notions. Or, to state it differently, if you define justice in human terms, as Aristotle did in his Ethics for example, then this justice cannot be applied to God, as Aristotle says, because God does not engage in exchange, commutation. This kind of justice would be wholly inapplicable to that.

And prior to Kant, Leibnitz had already made a change in this respect. The traditional definition of justice was: justice is the perpetual will to give everyone what is his, what belongs to him. But does anything belong to man from the point of view of God? Is not everything which is man's, by this very fact, God's? Therefore, God cannot be just or unjust to man. Man is God's property. Therefore, Leibnitz says, for this as well as for other reasons, we must define justice in such a way that it is equally applicable to God and to man, and he defined it therefore as: love tempered by wisdom. Benevolence tempered by wisdom. Benevolence tempered by over-all considerations of the needs of the whole universe, for example, is justice. And that of course is applicable to God as well as to man.

But we must keep this in mind, that this is one major motive for Kant for his a priori ethics. Ethics cannot be based on the nature of man and on man's natural inclinations, because this leaves us unprotected, if I may say so, against God, and Kant wants to find a principle which binds God as well as man. And here of course from this it follows immediately that the moral law cannot possibly be called a law of nature, a natural law, because it cannot be derived from any nature.

In the immediate sequel there is also a passage of some importance. Will you read that?

Thus, not only are moral laws together with their principles essentially different from all practical knowledge in which there is anything empirical but all moral philosophy rests solely on its pure part.

Applied to man it borrows nothing from knowledge of him, anthropology but views him as a rational being, a priori laws.

In other words, the applied morality, we could say, gives a priori laws but considering the peculiar character of man. The simple example is this: the pure will, or the good will, of which Kant speaks, that applies equally

to all rational beings, but duty does not apply to God, because only such a rational being can have duties as is in any way limited, as has to himself some possible opposition to the pure will. That is what he means. There is a certain modification of this unqualified moral law with a view to man in general without however being based on any empirical principle.

No doubt these laws require a power of judgment sharpened by experience, partly in order to decide in what cases they apply and partly to procure for them an access to man's will.

That's all we need. You see, Kant here admits the importance of a power of judgment sharpened by experience. There is a certain tension between this admission and other remarks which we have read and of which you gave us an account. We must see what is finally the Kantian view on this subject.

In the sequel, in the next paragraph, Kant speaks very emphatically of the distinction between legality and morality. One could put it this way: if there were no distinction between legality and morality, morality would not have to be a priori. Let us read.

A metaphysics of morals is therefore indispensable, not merely because of motives to speculate concerning the course of a priori practical principles which lie in pure reason, but also because morals themselves remain subject to all kinds of corruption so long as the guide and supreme norm of their correct estimation is lacking. For it is not sufficient to that which should be morally good that it conform to the law . . .

To the moral law.

. . . to the moral law; it must be done for the sake of the moral law. Otherwise the conformity is merely contingent and spurious, because, though the immoral ground may indeed now and then produce lawful actions, more often it brings forth unlawful ones. But the moral law can be found in its purity and genuineness, which is the central concern of the practical nowhere else than in a pure philosophy. Therefore, this, that is, metaphysics, must lead the way, and without it there can be no moral philosophy.

That is all we need now. Now, what is an example of what Kant means, between a moral teaching, which induces us to act according to law but not for the sake of the law? Well, a simple example is utilitarianism. When you are told a moral action consists in actions for the greatest good of the greatest number, nothing is said as to your motive, you may do that out of calculation, because you say that, generally speaking it pays if you are a nice fellow and that is that. But you say generally speaking it pays, because there are cases in which it pays not to be a nice fellow, especially if you are not detected. That is the impurity which Kant has in mind. If we want to have laws which are not subject to any qualifications of a prudential or experiential nature then these laws must be a priori. They alone guarantee not only that our actions are materially good but that they are also good in their motives.

Legality can be induced by calculation, by empirical motivation. But that means also there is no universal necessity here, because no empirical

rule of prudence is without exception, whereas Kant wants to be sure of a law which has no exceptions. Well, generally stated: if we are commanded to act morally this allows of no exception. If you take a very specific rule, like returning deposits, there exceptions are possible but on the general level exceptions are impossible. Therefore this cannot have empirical basis.

Now then, Kant speaks in the sequel - you mentioned it in your paper - of the purpose of this particular writing of the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. That is really, one can say, a kind of first draft of the Critique of Pure Reason. The two books supplement each other, and of course in very important respects the Critique of Pure Reason is much more subtle and elaborated, but on the other hand the moral pathos appears more clearly here.

(Don't you mean the Critique of Practical Reason?)

Did I say - Practical Reason of course. Many more things could be said about the Preface but leave it at that, and turn now to the first section. Now, the difficulties are overwhelming, and I will try to see how I can begin a discussion. I am almost sure we will need the next meeting for further discussion of this section which is of some practical importance to Mr. ___ and Mr. ___ (students who are to read next two papers.)

Now, Kant says first: the good will is the only thing which is unqualifiedly good. And he says in the sequel, to make this quite clear, that the good will is the highest good in the world or outside of it, meaning, it applies to God as well as to man. It is very hard to come to one's senses, if I may say that, if one is confronted by these two very powerful pages, and says, 'is it not obvious'. That is at least the reaction I always experience whenever I read these two pages. And yet there are certain obvious difficulties.

I will ask you generally first. Do you see any difficulty in Kant's assertion? Or does it make full sense that everything else, everything else, however good it may be, can be misused, and the only thing which cannot be misused is the good will? I mean, lest we are impressed by some very great achievements of man, very great capacities. Yet, but they surely can be misused. There is no question. And Kant says, if there is anything which is unqualifiedly good, and even the highest thing, can only be that which is radically immune by its nature against misuse. What about that?

(The difficulty is putting will above nature itself. That is applied to God as well as man, taking the whole range of its extension.)

Yes, yes.

(I mean, for example, to make an immediate objection, there is divine reason or intellect.)

Kant would say that God's intellect is perfectly good only because it is connected with the divine, i.e., good, will.

(In the traditional notion this is rooted in the nature that reason guides will.)

Exactly. That Kant tries to exclude. Yes?

(One question which comes to my mind is what happens if someone in a position of authority, like a general of an army, and he has the best will in the world but he doesn't have the substantive knowledge that saves his men.)

Yes, but one could say this: if he lacks this knowledge because of guilty ignorance then of course he is morally guilty and it is his bad will because he didn't acquire the knowledge. If he was imposed, say a man who was a very good butler is imposed by a foolish oriental monarch as a general of his army, then he is of course guiltless. He simply obeys this authority and he can't be blamed. A good will means in Kant necessarily that you make every effort to do the right thing. In other words, a full endeavor is required, but if your endeavor is extremely limited, if you are paralyzed for example, in the possibility of your endeavor, then you are not guilty for that. So, it is only the good will, which includes the maximum endeavor possible, that is what Kant implies, that good will is the only thing which is unqualifiedly good, and even the highest good, because every other good depends, as far as its goodness is concerned, on being well-used, i.e., used by a good will.

(I wonder if this statement is intelligible. Otherwise men wouldn't accept the distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds.)

Kant denies - we can say that only after we have criticised successfully and legitimately Kant's teaching regarding the pure will, the good will. Then we must of course raise the question of what induced Kant to present this teaching, and then we may find one of the roots in the peculiar teaching of the Critique of Pure Reason, but Kant claims to start from scratch here, not presupposing the results of the Critique of Pure Reason.

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

Yes, the actions are implied in a way. Let us take the example given by Mr. ___. A very great statesman, who acts virtuously on a large scale. He could act in this way because he had a very good upbringing, both at home and maybe from Harrow of the University of Chicago, and other things, and furthermore because he has marvelous natural gifts. But what is really the object of praise strictly understood? I mean, we praise all kinds of things, a marvelous house, and we praise the owner, and that is of course silly because the owner may not have anything to do with it except that he paid the architect, and no one is to be praised for the mere possession of money. So, what precisely is worthy of praise? Now, the traditional teaching is that praise attaches to the act of virtue. That he had a good upbringing is not his merit. It is to some extent his merity that he lent himself to being brought up well and not to run away from the paternal despotism of his parents at too early a date. But still, the merit is more of the parents than of him. Similarly, that he has great gifts, even outstanding gifts, is not his merit. What is meritorious, strictly speaking, is the use he made of these opportunities. The good will. And Kant finds something spurious and superficial in our ordinary praise, because there we do not make a distinction between what is truly the merit of this man, strictly understood, and what is not his merit. That he got these opportunities is not his merit. That he accepted them is his merit, i.e., the good will. That he is the point he has in mind. And one could say the same about the architect; that is at least Kant's assertion.

The architect who builds his house, for which we praise him and not the wealthy owner, what did he do? He made a good use of his native faculties. He cultivated them properly, and so on, and so on. But the faculties were given. We have to praise - he has to praise God for that. I use this expression deliberately because you will see that it is of crucial importance. I say this in hopes of proving it.

What Kant is concerned with is with isolating the elements for which alone man is fully responsible. We can state Kant's thesis from the outset as follows: morality is freedom. Morality is autonomy. The purity of morality consists in its autonomous character, in man's himself determining. Now, all things given to him are not dependent on his determining. What is dependent on his determining is only the use he makes of it, i.e., the good will. So, in other words, the Kantian doctrine of the good will, while appearing at first glance as a teaching inspired exclusively by the concern with purity of form is at the same time concerned with man's freedom. The two things shift into each other and they are not easily distinguished.

But I would like to proceed as follows and link it up with an older discussion of which I happen to know. Now, I start first as follows: simply confronted with the text, one could say, why is there only one thing which is unqualifiedly good? For example, why not speak of many beauties of art and nature which exist? Why not say there are many kinds of goods? Kant's answer would seem to be that they can be misused. To which one could very well reply: what you call misuse is a distortion and therefore not a misuse proper. It is not a use at all. If someone takes a noble work and uses it for ignoble purposes one could rightly say it is not properly called a misuse. It is a distortion, and therefore not a use at all. He uses a part of it, taken out of the context, which is no longer a use of the whole thing. But one could argue as follows: perhaps. Now, let us take the admiration for something beautiful, a pure feeling of admiration for something beautiful. How can this be called qualifiedly good? Kant's answer is it may distract us from something more important, and therefore it cannot be something unqualifiedly good. If you surrender to some beauty, say a play, and neglect your old grandmother, who needs your help badly, that is the most improper use of your time. So, in other words, only the most important thing can be unqualifiedly good. Not that other things are not good in themselves, but there are times and circumstances for that, whereas there are no times and circumstances for decency. For particular acts of decency of course, but in every case of conflict, the demands of decency or morality override that. Still, however this may be, this is not unimportant because it implies one thing, that there may very well be other good things which do not derive their goodness from the most important good. Granting that the good will is the highest, that it has the right of way, that does not mean that all good things are derivative from it. And therefore that creates a certain problem.

But I come now to the main thing, and that is a discussion which we find in Plato's Gorgias, in the first section. Some say rhetoric is the most wonderful thing, the highest art, but he has to admit that there are crooks who misuse it. The art of swaying people by speech can be used for bad purposes. He admits it. To which Socrates replies, in substance: then rhetoric cannot be the highest art. The two assertions, rhetoric is the highest art and rhetoric can be misused, are contradictory. We must seek for an art regulating the use of rhetoric. This would be the queen, regulating rhetoric. We must

seek for an art which cannot be misused. This art, we may say, is called by Socrates phronesis, which in Latin is translated prudentia, prudence. The usual present day translation is practical wisdom. Practical wisdom cannot be misused because it is the faculty of using well anything. Hence, Socrates teaches, practical wisdom is the only unqualified good, or the highest good. Practical wisdom is that faculty which illumines choice. It is not identical with choice or will. That is a certain difficulty. But the difficulty is solved by Socrates, superficially, by the assertion that it necessarily determines the will. Therefore, virtue is knowledge. Into this difficult subject we do not have to go.

But there is one great difficulty. While practical wisdom, strictly understood, cannot be misused it cannot protect itself. It is exposed to certain dangers which are beyond the competence of practical wisdom. Well, a simple example from the present day is this: if such doctrines as Marxism, and there are always equivalents of such doctrines at all times in the world, can be said to endanger practical wisdom by their claim to knowledge regarding the future for example. Practical wisdom is essentially operative in a horizon of an unknown future. But if you know the future, or believe you know it, that affects necessarily practical wisdom. Say Marxism. In order to protect practical wisdom in our age it is necessary to criticise Marxism. But that cannot be done by practical wisdom. Think of a man of very great practical wisdom, like Churchill for example. He would simply not have the time or maybe the training for criticising Marxism. So, we need then something which Socrates also calls practical wisdom but which is not quite the same thing, namely, philosophy. Philosophy is that which protects practical wisdom, cannot be misused, and is the ground for all goods which man can possess. That I think is, very crudely stated, the Socratic-Platonic assertion, and with minor modifications that could also be said of Aristotle.

Now, here we have a teaching diametrically opposite to Kant's, because we can now say that Kant replaces practical wisdom by the good will. We shall see later that he identifies will with practical reason, but I mention this only, without trying to explain it. Kant replaces practical wisdom by the good will.

Now, let us consider another aspect of practical wisdom. Practical wisdom, as Socrates and Plato understand it, is in the service of happiness. With a view to what does the man of practical wisdom make his choices? With a view to happiness. The good will, as we have heard, as Kant understands it, is not directed towards happiness.

How are these two things connected? Practical wisdom, as it was understood by Socrates and Plato, is the perception of something, or implies perception of something. Say, crudely, of happiness and perfection. The good will is not the perception of something, and since the only possible object could be happiness or perfection, it has nothing to do with that, with happiness or perfection. I submit this at the beginning of our discussion.

Now, let us first consider the initial thesis again. Yes?

(If you substitute the good will for practical wisdom, would you not say that the good will also needs protection which would make philosophy

higher?)

That is a perfectly good point, and especially good, since, as you may have heard from the paper, if you have not read it, that Kant himself said that. He says at the end of this section: innocence, meaning the good will taken by itself, is something very good, but unfortunately it is so easily lost. Therefore, it needs protection, and that protection is philosophy. In other words, one could very well say that Kant's judgment regarding the good will as the highest is said in a certain contrast to the importance which he cannot help attaching to philosophy, a point to which you referred in your paper. Surely. But before we try any possible criticisms let us try to understand what Kant means.

First, I repeat the thesis: only the good will can be unqualifiedly good. Of, as Kant also says, only the good will is good in itself. And he also says the good will is the highest good, which however does not mean, as he makes clear, that it is the whole good, the complete good. The complete good requires both the good will and happiness, but of the two components the higher one and the overarching one is the good will. In this sense it is the highest good.

Now, let us consider some traditional statements about that. I read to you for example from Thomas' commentary on the Ethics: someone is called a good man simply with a view to the fact that he has a good will. But with a view to the fact that he has a good intellect he is not called good simply, but good in a certain respect, for example, a good grammarian, a good physician - that is fundamentally what Aristotle said in that passage in the Ethics. And what does that mean? Well, as in the case of Aristotle, always; he defers to what we ordinarily mean. If I say a good man, I refer to the goodness of his character. Otherwise I say a good political scientist, or a good musician, a good grammarian, or a good tight-rope dancer, whatever it may be. If I say simply he is a good man, then I mean his character, and as Thomas specifies, in perfect agreement with Aristotle, that he has a good will, because goodness or virtue means, according to Aristotle, a habit of choosing well. But choosing is the Aristotelian term for what he calls will. So, the essence of morality consists in the good will. That is nothing new.

He says in the sequel that the praise of virtue refers to the will not to the power, meaning, the power is an accidental thing, very important for the action, but not as such the object of the praise proper, because the power is something which he does not necessarily owe to his merit. And if there is no power whatever, and that may happen, the good will is sufficient. But, to repeat: if the power is available, and not made use of, then of course that is a proof that there is no good will. But, on the other hand, the absence of the power, being guiltless, the good will as good will suffices.

But Thomas makes it clear, however, in other passages, that the goodness of man consists in the good will, but the good will is not the highest good. For Kant goodness simply consists in the good will and the good will is the highest good. Now, from this simple example to which Father Buckley referred, we see that Kant raises the status of the good will.

For the preparation I believe that a few passages from Descartes are in-

portant. Which I would like to read. Passions of the Soul, articles 154 and 152: 'the generous men esteem themselves only because of their good will. In comparison with the good will they regard not only wealth or honor but even wit, knowledge, and beauty as very insignificant, because they are given. Only the right use of our free will gives us just reason for esteeming ourselves - but Descartes gives a reason which Kant does not give - because only the free will makes us somehow similar to God.' You see this theological implication is there not only in Kant but in Descartes as well. The boasting of the good will, if I may use this vulgar expression, has something to do with raising the status of man. And that thesis is of course developed at great length by Descartes in his Meditations, number 4. I think I can leave it at that.

So, Kant makes here a fundamental change but a change not wholly unprepared, and in this preparation Descartes' teaching regarding the fact that we resemble God most by our will plays some role.

The second point we have to make regarding the first paragraphs is this, which I repeat again: Kant mentions here all virtues in passing, why all the virtues are not unqualifiedly good: temperance, courage, generosity, and - what is the fourth - knowledge. They can all be misused. But there is one virtue which he just does not mention, because it would not make sense, and that is justice. I would interpret this as follows, as a provisional characteristic of Kant's moral philosophy: . . . inaudible several words . . . is unjust, as distinguished from the other virtues, and that means in other terms, as is confirmed by this statement, this apparently very early statement of Kant as to Rousseau's influence on him, 'Rousseau has brought me into right shape'. Kant learned to see the insignificance of theoretical achievements. Morality is the one thing needful. And Kant expresses what he means by morality by saying Rousseau taught him to respect the rights of man. Now the respect for the rights of man obviously falls under justice. Justice as the social virtue, is the central virtue in Kant and of course and in a somewhat new way of understanding, namely, the reference to the rights of man.

Now, up to now we have only considered Kant's assertion that the good will is the only unqualified good. One more word about this subject. The good will is the highest good, that is to say, it is that which alone can be imputed to man, for which he is fully responsible. He is not responsible for the gifts of nature and chance. The gifts of nature, and the specific activities, for example that one man is a general and another is a garbage-collector, are secondary, not to say irrelevant, compared with the good will. In this decisive respect all men can be decent because in this decisive respect the difference of capacities does not play any role. The simplest man and the highest genius are not in a different position. Equality is not based on either the fact that all men are equally the children of God nor on self-preservation, which allegedly is equally strong in all men, but on that for which man is responsible. The doctrine of the good will means, in the first place, that Kant isolates this element for which man is entirely responsible and gives it the greatest possible debt. So, seen in the perspective of modern times it is an amazing act of liberation of man from everything which is not dependent. In the City of God, 12th book, paragraph 10, Augustine is speaking of angels and not man but the same would apply to man as well: 'man was created with a good will'. Created with a good will. The good will

was an original gift. Nay? Otherwise, man would owe more to himself than to God. That of course is exactly what Kant rejects. Whether he knew of that passage or not is unimportant.

Kant tries to isolate the domain in which man is absolutely and legitimately sovereign. That is the similarity of Kant's moral philosophy with Descartes' attempt to discover a sphere in which no God, however powerful, can have power over man. Even if there would be a very evil genius, who would wish to deceive us, but in order to deceive beings he must create intelligent beings. A stone or a dog cannot be deceived. So, he must have given these beings understanding, but by giving them understanding he prepared his own downfall, because if they have understanding they can use it intelligently, and then they are no longer deceived. That is the sphere which is absolutely immune and given by the fact of man's rationality. Kant, for certain reasons which we can perhaps clarify later on, finds this sphere rather in morality than in understanding.

Up to this point, as I said, Kant has merely asserted that the good will is unqualifiedly good and the highest good. Now, he must prove it, because, although no great argument against Kant's assertion has come to the fore in these centuries, other people might have some objections.

Now, how does Kant prove it? I think we can read the beginning, the fourth paragraph.

(Page 56.)

But there is something so strange in this idea of an absolute worth of the will alone in which no account is taken of any use that, notwithstanding the agreement even of common sense, the suspicion must arise that perhaps only high-flown fancy is its hidden basis and that we may have misunderstood the purpose of nature in its appointment of reason as the ruler of our will. We shall therefore examine this idea from this point of view.

Of course that is a somewhat problematic argument from Kant's point of view, because it is based on the assumed knowledge of the intentions of nature, which premise is not tenable from Kant's ultimate point of view. But he thinks it is a good introduction to begin this way. How does he argue? What is the problem? Why did nature give us reason as the guide of our will? Now he argues as follows. If nature has given us reason as the guide of our will so that the will should guide us towards happiness nature would have acted unwisely, because we could have been made much more happy by instinct, by an instinct directing us towards happiness as well as towards the means of happiness. Therefore, happiness cannot have been the end which nature pursues.

But then there is another possibility, to which Kant refers. Maybe nature intended, and gave us reason for this purpose, that we should be able to recognize the beneficence of nature, or the beauty of nature, or the order and regularity of nature. Maybe this was the purpose for which we are intended. But, Kant says, for this purpose it was not necessary that we should have practical reason. For this purpose it would have been sufficient if we would have been given theoretical reason alone. The conclusion: man was not given

his practical reason for the sake of his happiness nor for the sake of his theoretical understanding, and then it follows that men were given their practical reason merely so that there would be a good will without any regard to happiness.

Now, while this is an entirely provisional argument perhaps it is worth considering for a moment. What are the difficulties? If men were meant for happiness, instinct would have been the best guide. But if men were meant for understanding, for contemplation, then he would not have needed practical reason. Man's possessing practical reason cannot be understood on these bases. Is this a good argument? Disregarding entirely the fact that from Kant's point of view teleological arguments cannot have cognitive power. But is it an articulation of the problem? Yes?

(If theoretical reason cannot be exercised without a body . . .)

That's the assumption when we speak of terrestrial beings.

(. . . and practical reason is needed in order to serve the purposes of the body, then practical reason would also be needed to serve the existence of theoretical understanding.)

Yes, something of this kind I think one could very well argue. I mean, one could say, if a being with a body, and all the impediments which the body creates to turn theoretical reason aside, would lack those incentives stemming from the bodily needs which come out only from the impediments to the satisfaction to the bodily needs. In other words, if the satisfaction of the primary needs were not given to man's reason, too. I think you meant that, didn't you?

(I didn't quite follow that. Weren't you adding to the argument the idea of universal history?)

No, no. I wasn't thinking of that at all. In terrestrial beings like man, the concern with contemplation is necessarily limited by the body. If the needs of the body were automatically satisfied then the incentive coming from the difficulties of satisfying it would not contribute towards the awakening of the theoretical interest. If one argues teleologically one could argue in that way.

What is the background of this whole discussion on these two pages? Did you see something through that? A historical background? Kant argues in the sequel as follows, and there you will recognize it immediately I think. If man had been given reason for the sake of his happiness nature would have acted very unwisely, because the use of reason towards man's happiness is fatal to happiness. Do you recognize something? That's Rousseau. In other words, this part of Rousseau is taken over by Kant. If man was meant for happiness his having reason is indefensible. Whereas Rousseau apparently drew the conclusion: hence, let us abandon reason, and return to the state of nature, Kant says; no, reason must have another function. It must not be in the service of happiness, it must be in the service of something else. To this criticism one could very well say that Kant speaks here not of the use of reason for happiness but the very silly use of reason for happiness, luxury and all this kind of thing. One could very well say that the teaching of the whole philosophical tradition had been that the wise use of reason for happiness

consists in limiting man's desires and not in expanding them. And the whole problem stated here arises from a foolish use of reason for man's happiness.

What then is the conclusion? That is in the third paragraph after the one we read.

(Bottom of page 57.)

Reason is not however competent to guide the will safely with regard to its objects and the satisfaction of all our needs which it in part multiplies, and to this end an innate instinct would have led with far more certainty. But reason is given us as a practical faculty, that is, as one which is meant to have an influence on the will. As nature has elsewhere distributed capacities suitable to the functions they are to perform reason's proper function must be to produce a will good in itself and not one good merely as a means, for to the former reason is absolutely essential. This will must indeed not be the sole and complete good but the highest good and the condition of all others, even of the desire for happiness. In this case it is entirely compatible with the wisdom of nature that the cultivation of reason, which is required for the former unconditional purpose, at least in this life restricts in many ways, indeed can reduce to next to nothing the achievements of the latter conditional purpose, happiness; for one conceives that nature here does not proceed unsuitably to its purpose, because reason, which recognizes its highest practical vocation in the establishment of a good will, is capable only of a contentment of its own kind, that is, one that springs from the attainment of a purpose, which in turn is determined by reason, even though this injures the ends of inclination.

What is happiness according to Kant? The most general definition which he gives? In the first paragraph he speaks of the whole feeling well and contentedness with one's condition. That's happiness. Now, let us take contentedness. Of course different people are content with different things, that goes without saying. But, still, Kant speaks here also that the good will carries with it a contentedness of its own. Did he not say that? Why then is the contentedness with things other than the good will radically separated from the contentedness going with the good will? Kant's concept of happiness is constituted by this perhaps arbitrary divorce. You see, if - let us assume that someone finds his happiness in the satisfaction with his character, disregarding the specific things which may arise on his faults, but let us assume that, that he finds his contentedness substantially in being a good man. What is wrong with that?

(Wouldn't Kant argue that that was merely accidental? There is no necessity for his happiness. Maybe in individual cases it would happen but it is totally unpredictable.)

I see. So, in other words, we are not under moral obligation to be contented with our morality. We are under a moral obligation to be moral. But still, could not one argue this way? As quite a few people have argued. If you are confronted with the two people, the one who does his duty for the sake

of duty but all his inclinations are against it, and the other does his duty for the sake of duty and yet he is inclined towards that. Would the latter not be the more harmonious man? That was the line of criticism which was started immediately after Kant and played a certain role for Hegel especially.

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

Something of the kind Kant could have said and that was also implied by earlier people which Father Buckley has in mind, that these contentednesses in their specific differences from other forms of contentedness cannot be understood before we have understood its ground, the ground being morality. . .

(tape ends here. Lecture continued on for an undetermined length of time.)

. . . to the third section of the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, because there are many obscurities still. And next time we will turn to the second section. If we find the time I would like, with your help, to link up what we have learned from the Foundations to our earlier discussions about Kant's political philosophy and his philosophy of history, because these things may have become obscure in the meantime, which happens to all of us.

Now, I begin by repeating Kant's main thesis in his moral philosophy. The good will is the highest good. This implies that all men are equal in the decisive respect, which is the highest respect. In the older statement of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau all men are equal with regard to self-preservation, and it doesn't make sense to say that this is the highest respect. And therefore the fundamentally democratic implication of the modern natural right teaching is sanctioned by the Kantian moral teaching to a much higher degree. If men are equal in the highest respect then obviously their equality means much more than if all men are equal in the most urgent respect, self-preservation.

Now, Kant's assertion that the good will is the highest good is not obviously true. Why not prudence in the Socratic-Platonic sense? Prudence which leads over into philosophy, why is not that the highest thing? Especially since Kant himself emphasizes the fact that philosophy is required for protecting the good will. The fortunate simplicity, as he calls it, of the practical common sense. The practical common sense, the common sense which everyone possesses is, according to Kant, self-sufficient in all moral questions. Remember the example of the right year old child? Yet this practical common sense easily drifts into ambiguity if it is not protected and it can be protected only by philosophy. From this point of view it would seem that philosophy rather than the good will itself is the highest good. So, we leave this as a question, we leave this question open, whether one is entitled to say, as Kant does, that the good will is the highest good.

There is one point only which I have to add, that philosophy thus understood, as the protector of the good will would seem to be higher than the good will because it necessarily includes the good will. You cannot be a moral philosopher in this sense, as Kant understands it, if you do not have the good will. Philosophy thus understood is, as it were, an expansion of the good will, but it is certainly based on it.

Now, then, what is peculiar to the good will? What is the peculiarity of the good will which justifies Kant, at least to some extent, in saying that the good will is the highest good? The good will is the only thing which depends entirely on man himself, which is in no way a gift. The will may be a gift but the good will cannot be a gift. Kant is then concerned with isolating and enhancing that which is entirely in our power. Kant could not have had this desire to isolate what is entirely within our power if men were not also dependant, if there were not things which are not in our power. Now, what is the formula of this dependence? Man have needs, desires. The goal of all these needs and desires can be called happiness. Man is dependent insofar as he is concerned with his happiness. Man is by nature inclined towards happiness. The inclinations are the gifts of nature. They are given. From this it follows that the good will must be radically distinguished from all inclinations. The good will is entirely the work of man, the inclinations

entirely the gift of nature.

This creates a certain difficulty, since happiness is contentedness, and there is a specific contentedness connected with the good will, as we have seen last time. Or is there any doubt about that? That is at the end of the seventh paragraph in the first section, on page 56, the last sentence of the first paragraph. Read that.

For one conceives that nature here does not proceed unsuitably to its purpose, because reason, which recognizes its highest practical vocation in the establishment of a good will, is capable only of a contentment of its own kind, that is, one that springs from the attainment of a purpose, which in turn is determined by reason, even though this injures the ends of inclination.

You see there is here a contentedness of its own kind, a specific contentedness going with the good will. Why then the radical distinction between happiness as contentedness and good will, which has nothing to do with happiness? Kant's implicit answer is this: in our striving for happiness we are primarily striving for the contentedness, whatever it may be, the contentedness of our desire for pleasure, or the desire for power, whatever it may be, whereas in the case of the good will the contentedness attending the good will cannot be primarily intended, if we are men of good will, but merely follows it. In this respect Kant agrees with Aristotle's analysis that the pleasure connected with virtuous action like a merely added end and are not the end itself. Let us take an example. If you enjoy mathematics, if you derive pleasure from studying mathematics, you would be a better mathematician than if you do it only under compulsion. But this liking is not itself, at any rate in an extremely good mathematician, is only following the activity. And similarly in the case of Kant here. If you are concerned with morality because you want to have the contentedness of a good conscience then you are not, strictly speaking, moral, because you want this contentedness and you want the morality only as a means for that.

One thing appears from these initial remarks. The concern with morality is, in Kant, the concern with independence. Why is that so? That is obviously not necessary. Can you understand this assertion, that a man can be concerned with morality and not be concerned with independence in the same way in which he is concerned with morality? Well, Father Buckley?

(. . . inaudible response . . .)

But even that is difficult to understand how Kant - but, I mean, without any reference to any other moral doctrine or any tradition when - Kant gives the impression at first glance that here is a man who has been more passionately and seriously concerned with morality than any other moral philosopher. By virtue of what does he make that impression? There is something in Kant which justifies that impression, that Kant is more concerned with morality than any other philosopher, where we do not use the Kantian interpretation of morality but a common sense interpretation of morality. Well, there is one word which occurs in the first section already and we will come to that very soon, and that is duty. There is a famous apostrophe to duty somewhere in the Critique of Practical Reason. Duty is that which ennobles man. Yes, but what does

duty mean? Is there an obvious connection between duty and independence?

(Taking it in a very common sense way, very often a person striving for independence, for a high degree of independence, might well have very moral rules.)

Yes, sure. That is one part of the story. But - Mr. ___?

(Duty would seem to involve almost the opposite of independence. It means subjecting yourself to something.)

Obedience. In other words, when we think of morality without any sophistication we think primarily of obedience. And not of independence. Although independence may come in somehow but it could not be the most obvious thing. And that is the problem with which we are confronted. Yes?

(I'm reminded of Burke's statement in the appeal from the new to the old he says, I think, 'Gentlemen, I implore you, if you concede that you have any obligations whatsoever, concede that they are not dependent upon your will'. And Kant seems to be trying to refute that.)

Yes, there is a difficulty here, although it is not so simple, but at any rate one thing we see immediately, Kant's concern with morality is not simply a concern with morality as we all understand it. There is some modifying factor, and we have to isolate that.

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

But there is always the other fellow. So that is not so simple. The Talmud is such a complicated thing that you will probably find statements to different effects. There are also statements which emphasize, in the strongest possible way, obedience. Certainly, we must see what the specifically Kantian reasons are.

Now, let us look back to Rousseau. Rousseau begins with self-preservation. Self-preservation, which is the fundamental right, requires the freedom of judging as to the proper means for self-preservation and it requires also the freedom of movement; namely, if you are not free to move you cannot take care of your self-preservation. This freedom must, however, be limited in order to be secure, because, since the same freedom is enjoyed by everyone else, there is conflict. The freedom must be limited by laws. The laws are, if they really deserve to be called laws, generalize particular laws. I have explained this often enough. I will something, it is my particular will. If I conceive of it as a bill I have to generalize it; say, I don't want to pay taxes. The bill says there ought to be no taxes, which means it is generalizes. Through subjection to such laws man's freedom is in no way impaired. That is the Rousseauian statement.

Now Kant says, as it were, this scheme is very good as far as it goes but it does not provide for morality, because here we are purely in the field of laws and political arrangements in the narrower sense. It doesn't provide for morality because its basis is self-preservation. But morality too is in need of external freedom. External freedom is required independently of any

purpose, we have seen, be it the purpose of angels or be it the purpose of devils. This external freedom must be protected, that is to say, limited in such a way so that it can co-exist with everyone else's freedom, through laws to which I have given my consent. Only by virtue of such restriction am I securely free, or truly free. Only by virtue of my subjection to a self-given positive law can I be truly free externally. 'Self-given' must of course here be intelligently understood. It means I must have my say in the making of the law. Even if I was voted down I still have my say in that vote. And so by obeying such a law, given by the citizen body assembled, I obey in a way only myself. The positive law proceeds from such acts of self-legislation, but the self-legislation it self takes place in compliance with a non-positive law which dictates that I ought to restrict my freedom in the manner indicated. The positive law says, taxes should be of this and this kind for this and this kind of people, but that there should be laws, generally speaking, that I should be a member of civil society, that is of course not the dictate of any positive law but of a moral law, preceding logically any positive law.

This moral law we have now to consider. I cannot sincerely respect a law which is not perfectly evident to me. Now, if a positive law is imposed on me and I think it is absolutely foolish, then I can still obey it, but not because this law itself is evident to me but because the duty of civil obedience is evident, because I say if anyone after the vote would still follow his own will what would happen to society? That is the evident principle. And not this particular law, which may be foolish. I cannot sincerely respect a law which is not perfectly evident to me. My subjection to the moral law must then be preceded by my examination of that law. Is this clear? Because this is part of Kant's argument, which we must separate, and these of course are old thoughts, the Stoics, and Plato. To repeat: I cannot respect a law which is not evident to me, and therefore I must be free to examine any law proposed to me, the moral law as well, to my critical examination.

Now, then it seems my non-subjection, or my inner freedom, precedes any subjection to law. This freedom must be preserved somehow in the subjection. More precisely, this freedom emerges only through the subjection. I must subject myself only to a self-given law. Do you see this important transition from a given law, which is fully evident to me, and which you have freely examined, to a law which you have given to yourself? That is the crucial difference between Kant and any earlier moral rationalist. The earlier rationalist would have always said, you must examine it, but not, you must have given it to yourself. That is the crucial difference, and we must try to understand that.

This freedom emerges only through the subjection to the moral law. Why is that so? Prior to the subjection to the moral law, what is your status? What is your status prior to the subjection to the moral law?

(Following your inclinations and doing things that will be useful to you in one way or another, and seeking happiness of one kind or another.)

In other words, you would follow only your needs and desires. That Kant presupposes, that a man who follows merely his needs or desires his pre-moral. The morality comes in only by virtue of a subjection to the moral law. But this subjection must be a subjection to a self-given law. Then the question more precisely is this: why must I not subject myself to a law given to me

or imposed on me? That is the more precise question. Or, more generally speaking, why can there not be an imposed moral law?

Now, let us first speculate a bit about that before we turn to Kant's argument. Why can there not be an imposed moral law? Now, who or what would have imposed it on me? I mean, there are not infinite alternatives.

(God.)

God, and/or?

(Nature.)

Nature. So that is really the alternative. But why should a law imposed by God or nature oblige me? Must I not know in advance that God and/or nature are good? Could our nature not be the work of a malignant spirit, to use Descartes' expression? In that case, our natural inclinations would be evil inclinations. And from this point of view it appears that the whole tradition, moral tradition, was 'naive', because it dogmatically assumed that our natural inclinations are good inclinations. Do you see that? It must first be established that nature is good, or God is good, before we can accept our natural inclinations.

No, I don't have my edition of Perpetual Peace so I can't settle it. But how does one argue against that? How did Descartes argue? This very suspicion that our nature might be the work of a malignant spirit is the work of our reason. No devil could have created rational beings without exposing himself to the danger of being found out by his rational creatures. And this means simply: reason is necessarily and intrinsically right. This essential character of reason sets an absolute limit to any power, evil or good, however great. And this is tacitly accepted by Kant, without any hesitation. Yet the intrinsic rightness of reason is one thing. The intrinsic rightness of our natural inclinations is an entirely different thing. We cannot begin from the assumption that our natural ends supply us with guidance. These ends need a legitimation by reason. We cannot begin with any imposed ends or with any imposed laws.

Another way of putting that - and I do not now go into the question of whether this is really a valid argument, in other words, whether you can assert the intrinsic rightness of reason without asserting implicitly the intrinsic rightness of our nature. I do not go into that. I state another argument: man is said to be directed by nature towards his end, the highest good, happiness, let us say, contemplation. But if we were by nature directed towards this happiness we would instinctively strive for it and mostly reach it, because, according to Aristotle, naturally is that which happens is always or mostly. And this, that man mostly reach happiness, is obviously not true. Man can make the natural end his end and he can fail to do so. He can make a true happiness his end and he can make an imaginary happiness his end. Hence, it is not the natural end as such which prompts him to choose it. What then prompts man to choose his natural end? It could only be another end, i.e., a prior end. Then he would choose the higher end for the sake of a lower end, because any other end can only be lower than the highest end. He subordinates the highest end to a lower end and this is absurd. The conclusion: no end,

but only a law which is not based on any preceding end, can supply man with guidance, and such a law must of necessity originate in man.

I mention now only one or two critical observations. With regard to the first argument, if reason is intrinsically right then of course the cultivation of reason is intrinsically right. Contemplation. This in itself would justify the lower end, self-preservation and society, without which it cannot be achieved by man. Now for Kant this way of arguing is excluded by the simple fact that contemplation proper, speculative metaphysics, is, according to Kant, impossible. That is this crucial argument, answered by this point.

As for the second argument, one could raise the question, why is it impossible and illegitimate that man chooses first a lower end and that he learns, or some learn, gradually, slowly, that this lower end is inadequate and points to another end? In other words, while originally the higher end is chosen for the sake of the lower end in the course of one's life the higher end establishes itself, for some men, in its character as the highest end. But these are, if you wish, purely speculative remarks, meaning, not based on what Kant explicitly says, although they are related to what he says.

And let us turn to the reasons explicitly given by Kant.

(Why does Kant reject contemplation?)

Because contemplation means theoretical knowledge. Now what theoretical knowledge is possible according to Kant? Only of the phenomenal world, not of the thing-in-itself, as Kant calls it, or true reality. Now, if there is no possibility of knowing true reality then the contemplative life cannot be the highest life, because that is not really contemplation, that is essentially something secondary and only qualifiedly good, because it is not knowledge of the truth, it is knowledge merely of the phenomenal world.

(In Aristotle, contemplation included also . . .)

In Aristotle there is no distinction between the phenomenal and the true world. What we see here is as true as any higher thing, only the question is the rank of the various - the distinction between a phenomenal world, which is accessible to our knowledge, and the noumenal world, which is inaccessible to our knowledge, doesn't exist in Aristotle. Now in Plato for that matter.

But the more important consideration is I believe the point which I tried to make and which has had a tremendous influence thinking after Kant, namely, to repeat: the traditional teaching, especially Aristotle, but also the Stoics of course, assumed that man has natural ends and that these are the ends towards which man is inclined by nature. And Kant raises the question: with what right do we regard natural inclinations as good inclinations? With what right do we regard ends imposed on us by our nature as good, or legitimate? This is of course implied in present day social science relativism. They have forgotten that. Maybe they never knew it. But that is of course implied. When you see their criticisms of utilitarianism, which is a very uninteresting form of the older view of morality, then you see - why can't you say what they really believe? These social scientists if they were honest, or, let me say,

if they would have the courage to express what they believe, they would be utilitarians - the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Why do they reject that? You are not to bound accept it. You are free to question any goal, however attractive or sensible that seems to be. That's fundamentally Kant's thought. It does not exist in Hume. Because all the traditional writing rested on the principle of the goodness of nature, but this goodness cannot be assumed. It must be established. Kant tries to establish it. Kant's argument roughly is this: once I know the good, by the categorical imperative, by the principle of morality, then I am even morally obliged to interpret nature teleologically, and therefore to regard our natural ends as good ends. But that can only follow the establishment of the moral principles, which cannot start from the assumed goodness of either nature or God. And you can easily see that this makes the impression, just as in another way Descartes makes the impression, that here a question is raised which had not been raised before, that prior to Kant, just as prior to Descartes, philosophy had been 'naive'. It has taken something for granted which must be examined.

(Doesn't this argument rest on the idea that there is something called reason which is totally independent of nature somehow. I mean, what would be the status of reason?)

Yes, well, you have read Descartes once? And what do you get? You come to universal doubt, and then you discover the thinking ego, thinking in the widest sense where it means really consciousness, not thinking in the strict sense. But consciousness, human consciousness, is characterized by having within itself reason. And it is this reason which liberates Descartes from the doubt by the discovery that the deceiving spirit would have - well, could necessarily be found out provided you are sensible. You know? In other words, if you are incautious he will deceive you all the time, but if you are on your guard, if you know that your will extends further than your judgment, once you know that, you are safe in principle from being deceived. So, here at this stage you know only the rightness of reason and nothing else. And then you have to establish a new argument, starting from the rightness of reason, establishing the goodness of nature. This order of the argument follows from Descartes' doubt.

(I wonder whether Plato did not do something of the same thing, by insisting on judging everything, even nature, in terms of whether it meets the criterion of rationality?)

I don't see with what right one can say that. But you may be right. Let me give you an example. You must not forget that the notion of the questionable goodness of nature is of course underlying modern thought in every respect. The simple notion of conquest of nature, what does it mean? You conquer an enemy, not a friend. Or, if you say control of nature, which has the same meaning - something that needs control. At the end of the seventeenth century, Pierre Bayle, an acquaintance of Locke, said that natural reason would lead to the result that there are two principles governing the world, a good principle, and an evil principle, independent of the good, that is to say, Manicheism, the old dualistic doctrine. That is only a figurative expression of the same thing which the expression 'conquest of nature' clearly means. One finds the first traces of this view, in the modern sense, meaning nature as something to be conquered by something in man, is already in Machiavelli. The difference

is obvious, for where does the conqueror come from?

(Nature.)

Sure. That's the difficulty. Or one must say that this reason is in a very strange way the free creation of man. Hobbes tried to do that. If reasoning comes into being only by virtue of symbols, signs, words, or numbers, that is to say, by virtue of artifacts which are clearly of human origin, then that which precedes the making of these symbols is not yet reason. But that of course does not dispose of the difficulty. How come that man is capable of making these signs? I remember now the example in one of the novels of Melville, some preacher says, on a boat on the Mississippi I believe, speaks of the goodness of nature, and, look at the beauty of nature, and your eyes; you can see. And the man to whom he says this is indignant about this optimism and says, 'I don't owe my eyesight to nature, I owe it to an oculist in Philadelphia.' Because he was born with very poor eyes. That is of course a very crude example but it has something to do with this general notion, this general notion of the questionable goodness of nature. Here in this case it is fairly easy to show the wrongness of this argument, because what did this oculist do? He imitated nature. Nature was accidentally deficient in this particular case, and this deficiency could be found out only by looking at the normal human being. So, in other words, all correction of nature presupposes nature as the standard.

But however this may be, to come back now to the more fundamental question, for Kant the goodness of the inclinations must be established. But this is not what Kant explicitly says, at least in the part which we have discussed. What he explicitly says in the Preface to the Foundations to the Metaphysics of Morals is this: the moral law cannot be derived from nature, i.e., from man's nature, because it must apply to all rational beings, and therefore it could be derived, if at all, only from reason, but not from man's nature, because the only thing we know in advance, Kant assumes, is that the moral law is the rational law. But it cannot be derived from man's nature. Also, the law cannot be derived from the natural end of man if that end is conceived to be happiness, because of the radically subjective character of happiness. Happiness means something to one man and something entirely different to another and it even means very different things to the same man at the same time. For example, if he is suffering from an illness, a very severe and painful illness, he finds his happiness in relief from that illness and in nothing else and after he is healthy for some time he forgets about it and then some other end, say a good meal, comes in, and so on, and so on. In other words, Kant simply accepts here the Hobbes-Lockian notion of the complete subjectivity of happiness.

I would like to refer only to one passage. Do you have the passage where we left off? At the end of the preceding paragraph, the last sentence.

Rather, their judgment is based on the idea of another and far more worthwhile purpose of their existence, for which, instead of happiness, their reason is properly intended. This purpose, therefore, being the supreme condition to which the private purposes of the people must for the most part impart.

What are these private purposes? 'Private intentions' would be a more

literal translation. What is that private purpose, that private intention, of man?

(. . . inaudible response . . .)

Happiness. You see, that is very interesting. It shows you immediately the connection with Rousseau. The concern with happiness is a private intention. The particular will, in Rousseau's language. Whereas the concern with morality is public. Public. I mean, the opposite to private is public. Here you see how close Rousseau is to Kant. One can also state it as follows. The concern with happiness is fundamentally selfish, morality is fundamentally unselfish, but unselfish in this more precise sense, directed towards the others, but the others understood as a whole, not just mere kind-heartedness to the first man you meet. Public. Social. As distinct from private. Because the categorical imperative of course explicitly states this sociality, publicity, universality. Yes? As opposed to the private. That is a clear indication of the meaning of Kant's doctrine, but only an indication.

Now, let us turn to Kant's analysis of the good will, which begins on page 50 of your edition, but we don't have to read everything here. Kant analyses the good will here not as the good will simply but as the good will must appear in a being where the good will finds resistance within the being. Now, in such a being the good will appears as duty, as some coercion which man has to exercise against himself. So, the analysis of the good will is here the analysis of duty, and Kant proceeds in three steps. The first step is that action from duty is fundamentally to be distinguished from action from calculation and from action from inclination. What then is immorality? In the first place, to do the wrong thing, say to murder. But that is not enough, not to commit murder. The other moral defect is to do the right thing not because it is right but for ulterior reasons. The example which Kant uses is the honest merchant who treats everyone honestly because honesty is the best policy and for no further reason. Then the higher, but still inadequate for, is to do the right thing - to do the right thing because it is right and for no other reason. For no other reason. For example, a case which Kant discusses, if someone does the right thing out of inclination, for example, it is man's duty to help his neighbors, but some people do that because they are tender and gentle. That is not sufficient according to Kant and you see when you read this discussion, four or five paragraphs after the last we read: 'to be beneficent whenever one is capable is duty'.

To be kind where one can is duty, and there are persons so sympathetically constituted who without any motives of vanity or selfishness find an inner satisfaction in spreading joy and rejoice at the contentment of others which they have made possible.

No. 'insofar as they have made it possible'. That's very important. Kant here casts some suspicion on the motives of gentle souls, that they are kind because that, to quote Nietzsche, is a form of the will to power. That happens. And then he gives an example of a man who is not kind by nature at all and is even in a situation where men in general would not be kind because in very great troubles and difficulties and at the end, and in this situation no selfish motive whatever could possibly affect, he pulls himself together and helps. Here is a clear case where a man does the right thing because it

is right and for no other reason.

Now, let us consider a third case which Kant does not express here. To do the right thing because it is right and because the consciousness of its rightness makes us do it gladly. Kant does not deny the possibility of that. But he contends that this gladness does not increase the moral worth of the action. For if I do the right thing for the sake of the gladness deriving from my doing it I do not act morally, for I am motivated not by rightness but by gladness. That's an important part of Kant's argument.

Perhaps we read the paragraph preceding the one about kindness. 'To preserve one's life is duty'.

On the other hand, it is a duty to preserve one's life, and, moreover, everyone has a direct inclination to do so, but, for that reason, the often anxious care which most men take in it has no intrinsic worth, and the maxim of doing so has no moral import.

Is this intelligible what Kant says? Do you respect a man who is a valetudinarian and whose chief concern is to preserve his life? Obviously not. So, while it is a duty to preserve one's life, this tremendous preoccupation has no moral worth, because it depends entirely on mere inclination.

They preserve their lives according to duty but not from duty.

You see, that is the distinction between legality and morality. It is legal what they do, legal in the sense of the moral law, but it is not moral.

But if adversities and hopeless sorrows completely take away the relish for life, if an unfortunate man, strong in soul, is indignant, rather than despondent or dejected over his fate, and wishes for death, yet preserves his life without willing it, and neither from inclination nor fear, but from duty, then his maxim has a moral import.

In other words, this is a clear case of a purely moral action, where no inclination or passion in any way enters. If we take this valetudinarian, one could say it is an inclination towards the moral law - no, no, that is wrong. Here there is an inclination which is generally in harmony with the moral law, but this inclination is not an inclination to the moral law. An inclination to the moral law, according to Kant, is impossible, because inclinations are essentially variable and particular, not universal and invariable, whereas the rule of duty are universal and invariable. Inclinations are subjective, radically subjective. Duty is objective. And therefore there cannot be an inclination to the moral law as moral law. This is the first point which Kant makes.

And the second one is: action from duty does not derive its worth from the result intended or from the end in view. In other words, if you see someone helping the poor it is not helping the poor which makes the action moral. Because every end, for example to help the poor, can be pursued also from calculation, say to become well-known as the benefactor of the poor, or it can be caused from inclination, people can't see suffering and therefore they give - that is not moral. That is just - how shall I say it - it is an

action which we would approve of because it is beneficial but it is not in itself a moral action. Or, differently stated: the action from duty cannot derive its moral worth from the result intended or the end in view, because the goodness of the end must first be established. If I say helping the poor is good, how do I know that? That people generally believe so doesn't prove it. That must first be established and it can only be established if there is a law, a moral law, to that effect, and only obedience to that law makes my action a moral action. Not the ends pursued by an action but the maxim according to which it has been decided upon gives it moral worth, and this means obedience to the law. Are these two points clear?

(The obvious objection to that would be: why would the moral law command being kind to the poor rather than kicking them in the face? Why is one better than the other?)

Why is it so, according to Kant?

(Well, that's what I'm worried about.)

Yes, but still, do you not know at least the verbal formulation of Kant's answer?

(Well, universal law, that fact that your action can be made into a universal law, but then again you are getting into - I mean, the fact that being good to the poor can be a universal law and being mean to them cannot be, I don't see where this is understandable except in terms of the effect it is going to have.)

Well, of course Kant would probably say you cannot speak of goodness to the poor as a particular case, you have to enlarge that. And then it means other people's happiness, and obviously to be concerned with other people's happiness means in the case of the poor to help them with gifts. This wouldn't necessarily be the case with non-poor people. So, the question arises then, can the principle, the maxim, 'the public be damned', of 'I do not give a damn for other people's happiness, can this be universalized? That would be the question. Can there be a law: men ought not to be concerned with other people's happiness? That is to say, whenever you are concerned with it you are acting immorally. Is this rationally possible? We come to that later.

This argument is leading up to the categorical imperative. Morality cannot be identical with calculation or with inclination, nor can it derive its goodness from the end as such. But one point I think he has to admit. Since the same end, say helping the poor, can be achieved by immoral, say in order to get a reputation, it cannot be the action as action. It must also be the motive, and you would of course take both together, to do the right thing in the right spirit. What Kant is driving at is this: that the right spirit alone would be productive of the right thing. That's the question. And therefore Kant can say, the right spirit, i.e., the good will, is identical with practical reason, as he will say later on. Whereas from any other point of view you must make a distinction between the good will, the right spirit, and practical reason, which tells you what the right thing is. Sure. But we must see how it comes out.

Now, after having made these negative determinations, Kant makes a positive

assertion a bit later. What he calls a third proposition, which is a conclusion from the two preceding ones: duty is necessity of an action from respect for the law. An action is moral if, and only if, it is motivated by respect for the law. I cannot respect, Kant says, the effects of my intended action. Let that effect be the well-being of a friend. I cannot respect that, I can be pleased with that, because I cannot respect any effect of the will. I can respect only the activity of the will itself. In other words, I can respect only that which gives life to an action. I cannot respect any effect or result.

Perhaps we read that in this third proposition.

The third principle, as a consequence of the two preceding, I would express as follows: duty is the necessity of an action done from respect for the law. I can certainly have an inclination for the object as an effect of a proposed action but I can never have respect for it, precisely because it is a mere effect and not an activity of the will. Similarly, I can have no respect for any inclination whatsoever, whether my one or that of another; in the former case, I can at most approve of it, and in the latter I can even love it, that is, see it as favorable to my own advantage. That which is connected with my will merely as ground, and not as consequence, that which does not serve my inclinations but overpowers it, or at least excludes it from being considered in making a choice, in a word, the law itself . . .

'the mere law.'

. . . the mere law, can be an object of respect and thus a command. Now, as an act done from duty it wholly excludes the intrudes of inclination and therewith every object of the will, and nothing remains which can determine the will objectively except the law, and subjectively except the pure respect for this part of the law. The subjective element is the maxim that I should follow such a law even if it thwarts all my inclinations.

Let us stop for one moment and see whether we understand that. Because we must not forget our problem. We have to understand why the good will, and nothing else, is the highest good. And now Kant is beginning to give us his answer. He indicates the answer already by making the distinction between the activity of the will and any effect of the will. The effects of the will are of necessity, according to Kant, of a lower rank than the activity of the will. That is part of the story. I can only respect, Kant says here, the ground of my will. The ground of my will, not the effect of it. Now the ground of my will is the law, the moral law.

But here a difficulty arises: if the law, the moral law, is the ground of my will, if the moral law is that which makes my will a good will, is not then the law the highest good? Because in having a good will I subject myself to the moral law. I regard the moral law as higher than my will. Must not then the moral law be the highest good? The good will is the will determined by the law, conditioned by the law, dependent on the law. How then can the good will be the highest good? There is only one answer possible. The law

must be the same as the good will. That is an wholly unintelligible proposition but necessary to make, and we must try to understand it.

How could this be understood? Perhaps the law is only *qua* willed, so that it cannot be without being willed, and being willed it is willed by the good will. Good will and law are identical . . .

(change of tape)

. . . this much is clear already at this point.

In this passage which we just read there is also another one: the good will is the subjective principle, Kant says. And the good will is the highest good. Yet, this highest good has its ground in the law as the objective principle, which again means that the law ought to be the highest good. But Kant doesn't say it of the law but he says it of the good will.

Now here a bit later in the next paragraph let us read.

Thus, the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect which is expected from it, or in any principle action which has to borrow its motive from this expected effect, for all these effects, agreeableness of condition, even the promotion of the happiness of others, could be brought about through other causes and would not require of the will of a rational being, but the highest and unconditional good can be found only in such a will. Therefore, the pre-eminent good can consist only in the conception of the law in itself, which can be present only in a rational being. So far as this conception, and not the hoped-for effect, is the determining ground of the will. This pre-eminent good, which we call moral, is already present in the person who acts according to this conception, and we do not have to expect it first in the result.

You see, that confirms what I tried to show you. The good will is determined by the conception of the law. Now conception does not mean here concept. The German is Vorstellung. The good will is determined by the law as thought. Of course by law as not thought it could not be determined. The law is only as being thought. It does not exist outside of being thought. And what Kant seems to imply here is that it cannot be thought without being willed. Now, let us try to understand that.

Let us start from the primary impression. The law is above the will, and is above human thought. Morality requires then as an indispensable, but perhaps not as a sufficient, condition, that we know the law as law. How else could we obey it? But to know the law as law means to know my being subject to it, and to know my being subject to the law means to respect the law. But to respect the law means to will it. To know the law as law and to will it are identical. This raises of course the very great difficulty: how can there be a bad will? Because we cannot call a bad will a will which is wholly unaware of the law. That would be a bestial will and not a bad will. That is a long question which we may perhaps take up at a later occasion. It is very obscure, the status of the bad will.

But we have to consider a few more passages to have all the evidence

together, which is available here in this section. Now, we come here to a long note on the sentiment of respect.

(What is then in this point that the problem of duty, as opposed to independence, two seemingly opposed things, would come together?)

Absolutely.

(. . . that knowing it means to be subject to it, which is the same as willing it.)

Yes. Knowing my subjection means to will it and thus to create the subjection. That is what I am driving at.

(Is this not what Hegel makes explicit in his Philosophy of Right?)

Yes, one could say - yes, surely, Hegel - this principle of Kant's is exactly like that. But only Hegel thinks that the formalism of Kant is impossible, for reasons which we may discuss later. Yes, that's correct.

Now, we should now read this long note on the sentiment of respect. In German, Achtung. One could almost say, reverence. At any rate, respect taken in the full sense, that is the meaning. Now, let us read that slowly.

It might be objected that I seem to take refuge in an obscure feeling behind the word 'respect', instead of clearing resolving the question with a concept of reason. But though respect is a feeling it is not received through any outer influence but is self-wrought by a rational concept.

In other words, we produce. Reason in us produces the feeling of respect.

Thus it differs specifically from all feelings of the former kind, which mainly refer to inclination or fear. For what I recognize directly as a law for myself I recognize with respect, which means merely the consciousness of the submission of my will to the law without the intervention of other influences on my mind.

You see, if one approaches Kant entirely from the outside and surrenders to the suggestions of his severe moralism one understands immediately, I think, the notion of a subjection to a law or obedience to the law, and the difficulty is to understand how this subjection to the law must be understood as self-legislation. That is the entirely new thing. Self-legislation must not be mistaken for something of which Aristotle and the Stoics speak and which they meant by autonomy, where it means that you understand, have full understanding, of the reasonableness of the law to which you submit, for that goes very well with the thought that this law does not originate in you, but in Kant the emphasis is on the origination in the subject.

The direct determination of the will by the law and the consciousness of this determination is respect. Thus, respect can be regarded as the effect of the law on the subject and not as the cause of the law. . .

Kant says this in order to reject the opinion that the law can have its origin in a feeling. That is the reason why he says that. The respect is only the subjective reflection of the acceptance of the law.

Respect is properly the conception of a worth which thwarts my self-love. Thus it is regarded as an object neither of inclination nor of fear, though it has something analogous to both. The only object of respect is the law, and indeed only the law which we impose on ourselves and yet recognize as necessary in itself.

You see, both. We impose the law on ourselves and yet as in itself necessary. Both are there. In other words, the intrinsic necessity would not be sufficient. It must originate in us at the same time.

As a law, we are subject to it without consulting self-love, as imposed on us by ourselves, it is a consequence of our will. In the former respect it is analogous to fear, and in the latter to inclination.

Let us stop here. The good will is the ground of the law, we have seen. Therefore, and therefore only, is the good will the highest good. To repeat: the assertion with which Kant begins, that the good will is the highest good, implies already the self-legislation. Otherwise, law would have to be the highest good. That is absolutely necessary. The good will consists in imposing the law on oneself. The good will is the highest good because the good will consists in legislation, not in obedience to the law merely, but in giving the law. Otherwise, the good will could not be the highest good.

The best neo-Kantian, Cohen, in his *Ethics*, writes: 'the pure will is the law of will'. That is, I think, strictly what Kant means. The pure will and the good will are the same thing.

At the end of the Critique of Practical Reason, the conclusion, there is a famous remark, which has been frequently quoted, that there are two things that fill the mind with ever-new wonder, the starred heaven above me and the moral law within me. Now, that is of course in a way perfectly intelligible that he uses the two different preposition, 'above' and 'within', and yet it is more than merely trivial, that Kant does not say 'the moral law above me'. That it is possible to say that is proven by Plato's simile: there is heaven, and there is something super-heavenly, as Plato says it, so Kant could well have said, 'the heaven above me', but 'the moral law still above heaven'. But he does not say 'the moral law above me', but 'the moral law within me'. And in this, the good will is the highest good, only if the law, with which the good will complies, is grounded in the good will.

Now, you have seen in this note, which we read, 'insofar as we are subject to the law we have a feeling analogous to fear; insofar as we have imposed the law on ourselves we have a feeling analogous to inclination!'. Does this remind you of an older thought with which Kant was of course thoroughly familiar? Did not people speak, long before Kant, of a mixture of feelings which has an analogy to fear and to something opposite to fear?

(The Biblical religion with the love of God and the fear of God.)

Sure, exactly. That, in a weakened form, is what Kant has in mind. In other words, what was, in the Biblical tradition, the feeling with regard to God, becomes here the feeling with regard to the law, to the moral law, as a self-given law. So, the law within us, the self-imposed law, takes the place of God. That one can definitely say, although Kant admits the existence of God and the postulate of the existence of God plays a considerable role in Kant, but yet that is derivative from this fundamental point now made. That is implied in this simple, innocent-looking, proposition: the good will is the highest good. In other words, Kant is one of the most important thinkers in modern times contributing to the radical emancipation of man, and that is in a way much more powerful and influential than what people like Machiavelli and Hobbes did, because it is not something low, self-preservation, survival, control of nature, and this kind of thing, but it concerns morality itself, morality itself, as understood in this way. And that I think cannot be emphasized too strongly. That is no longer an interpretation of morality as it was always understood. That is an interpretation based on very specific premises, the premises of modern philosophy, which give morality an entirely new meaning. And all these formulations which have become so familiar, self-determination, self-realization, and what not, they all stem from more. That is quite, quite, remarkable.

Is this point now clear, the crucial implication of this proposition 'the good will is the highest good'? It implied necessarily that the law, the moral law, cannot be above the good will. That is decisive.

Now, after having established this point to his satisfaction, Kant raises a question: what is that law? Up to now we have spoken only of duty, law, respect, in general, and we did not know what that law is. And Kant in the next paragraph gives the first answer to that question. Let us read that.

But what kind of a law can that be, the conception of which must determine the will without reference to the expected result? Under this condition alone, the will can be called absolutely good without qualification, since (several inaudible words) . . . nothing remains to serve as a principle of the will except universal conformity of its action to the law as such . . .

No, no. More precisely, 'since I have deprived the will of all incentives which could arise from compliance with any law, nothing remains except the general legality of actions all together'. Gesetzmässigkeit. Legality. 'Which alone should serve as principle to the will, i.e., I should never act differently except so that I can also, that I can will simultaneously, that my maxim should become a universal law. Here is the only real legality - perhaps I should say lawfulness, to obviate misunderstanding - Here is the mere lawfulness as such without assuming a law directed towards specific actions is that which serves the will as principle and must serve as a principle if duty is not to be an empty delusion.' And Kant contends that common sense absolutely agrees with this notion.

Now, is this proposition itself intelligible? I think it is a necessary consequence. The law is not imposed on us by God or nature. Hence, the law cannot be derived from anything. The law is absolute in this sense, irreducible. But what can it be? What do we know of it? We know only one thing, that the

moral law is the rational law. You can ask, how does Kant know that? And you can also say, here he simply follows the tradition, but assuming that the moral law must be the rational law, and it cannot have any content as such, then it can consist only in the form of rationality; i.e., unconditioned universality. And that means, in practical terms, I act morally if in acting I can will that the maxim of my action can become a universal law. And this sounds extremely far-fetched but Kant contends, and not without reasons, that common-sense agrees with that. I would agree with Kant that it agrees with common-sense to some extent. I mean, if we look around at ourselves or others, in what does immorality frequently consist? Not in a rejection of what we consider to be the moral law but in making oneself for the moment an exception from it. That means I act on a maxim which cannot be universalized. Only now, for me, at this particular moment of temptation, that is the maxim on which I act, if I act immorally. And that cannot be universalized because it is meant to be applicable only to me now or maybe applicable to me throughout my life. But still, it is an exception. And to the extent to which it is true that all immorality consists in taking a brief vacation from the moral law, and this brief vacation is incompatible with no vacation, universality. Up to this point Kant is right when he expresses this formula. In other words, it is not so far-fetched.

Very frequently, when we discuss actions, it occurs - I don't know what the equivalent in English is, but in German the German people say, 'Da kann ja jeder kommen'(?): 'Anybody could make this proposition'. You make a proposition, and the reply is, 'well, anyone could make that'. And then you see the absurdity. What would be the equivalent in English? There must be a colloquial expression in English for that.

('What would happen if everyone did that?')

Yes, that's it. And that is without any question a very important consideration to which we refer, and that is simply, in colloquial, common-sense terms what Kant stated as a principle, and therefore is 'abstract'.

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

Well, we take this up later, but I believe in this case one can say this: in this case, both A is B and A is non-B can be universalized without any difficulty. For example, you act on the principle that you would like to eat candy, or something of this kind and that is your maxim, and another makes the maxim to smoke. Both can be universalized without any contradiction. I worked this out in my last seminar on Kant but I forget it now. I think it is something of this kind. If a maxim can be universalized and can be universalized as well as its opposite, hence, it is morally indifferent. But if only one can be universalized, and not the opposite, then only the universalizable one is the moral one. That's very easy.

In order to see the difficulty let us turn to Kant's first example, which is one of these simple eight year old child examples. Now let us read that.

Let the question, for example, be: may I, when in distress, make a promise with the intention not to keep it? I easily distinguish

the two meanings which the question has, namely, whether it is prudent to make a false promise, or whether it conforms to my duty. Undoubtedly, the former can often be the case, though I do see clearly that it is not sufficient merely to escape from the present difficulty by this expedient but I must consider whether inconveniences much greater than the present one may not spring later from this lie.

So, Kant did give some thought to the technicalities of immorality.

Even with all my supposed cunning the consequences cannot so easily be foreseen. Loss of credit might be far more disadvantageous than the misfortune I now seek to avoid, and it is hard to tell whether it might not be more prudent to act according to universal maxims than to make a habit not to promise anything without intending to fulfill it. But it is soon clear to me that such a maxim is based only on an apprehensive concern with consequences. To be truthful from duty, however, is an entirely different thing from being truthful out of a fear of disadvantageous consequences, for in the former case the concept of the action itself contains a law for me, while in the latter I must look about to see what results for me may be connected with it, for to deviate from the principle of duty is certainly bad

That is not strong enough. 'Evil,' or 'wicked' would be the least.

Boese. Bad means something morally neutral. 'Evil' or 'wicked'.

. . . for to deviate from the principle of duty is certainly evil, but to be unfaithful to my maxim of prudence can sometimes be very advantageous to me, though it is certainly safer to abide by it. The shortest, but most infallible, way to find the answer to the question as to whether a deceitful promise is consistent with duty is to ask myself: would I be content with my maxim of extricating myself from difficulty by a false promise should hold as a universal law for myself as well as for others? And I can say to myself that everyone can make a false promise then he is in difficulty from which he otherwise cannot escape. I immediately see I could will the lie but not a universally lawful lie, for with such a law there would be no promises at all, inasmuch as it would be futile to make a pretense, or if they overhastily did so, would pay me back in my own coin. Thus, my maxim would necessarily destroy itself as soon as it was made a universal law.

And then Kant says therefore, 'That's it'. 'That is the solution of the moral problem'. What is the difficulty, Father Buckley?

(Well, it is the same problem I was trying to raise before, that the only reason why it can't be universalized is that it would be so inconvenient. I mean, because if I couldn't trust anyone else's promises, it would be impossible to live, to trust anybody. In other words, it seems to me to be the same as Hobbes' argument for self-preservation, that we have to do certain things. Otherwise life would be impossible with each other.)

In other words, you contend that the concern for happiness illicitly enters. Yes, we must take this up when we come to the second part because there the examples, at least two of them, are explicitly based on happiness, and therefore we must see with what right can Kant possibly do that. And that raises great difficulties.

(. . . inaudible question. . .)

Because that Kant knows in advance on the basis of the common moral understanding that calculation is not morality. That he knows. That is pre-supported by Kant and then he would say that here this moral common sense agrees with him. The merchant who is honest and doesn't cheat even a small child can be assumed to do it because that pays, and a man who does acts only because it pays, is still better than a murderer but he is not moral. That I think Kant assumes. Then he says: what is a moral man? A moral man obeys the law because it is a law, and does not worry about any consequences. And therefore the question is only: what kind of law can it be if it cannot be connected with human nature, and then he reaches this conclusion.

The difficulty which you had Father Buckley is this: how funny that this moral law, which has no consideration whatever for any consequences, is exactly what the doctor ordered for the patient. Sure. In other words, the real motive, one could say - why universalization is so reasonable, namely, man's sociality, comes out as a consequence of the mere rationality. Yes, that one can very well say.

(Why does he say that because there can't be trust in some cases there will not be trust in all cases? It seems to me that it isn't simply so.)

Yes, that would be prudential. Kant admits that. Kant says prudence would dictate to be honest because the complications of dishonesty are so great that it is - he says this, that mere prudence would dictate honesty. Kant claims that. He discusses the technicalities of dishonesty and finds them terribly inconvenient, but, Kant says, that has nothing to do with the moral issue. The moral issue can be found out only by considering whether this maxim, every man is entitled in distress to make false promises, and since this is extremely subjective, what you regard as being in distress is entirely different from another man, therefore the consequence will be that you encourage universal dishonesty. Can you will that? Kant says no.

(It looks as if Kant doesn't go much so against the grain of his argument as it appears. Apparently all he is trying to do here is what he says in the next paragraph that without quitting the moral knowledge of common human reason you will arrive at these principles. Apparently all he wants to do is to show that no matter how you start, whether you start from assumptions or from an everyday human being you still come back to the categorical imperative. It is not an argument from the prudential value.)

Surely not. If it were a prudential argument Kant would be absolutely destroyed. I mean, either it must be understood as a non-prudential argument or makes no sense.

Hegel, in his criticism of Kant's moral philosophy, sometimes gives a

very crude version and puts it this way that Kant's pure formalism amounts to that we can will something without contradicting yourself. That is a somewhat unfair formulation I would say. It means this: Hegel says, for example, that there should be property, or, say private property, and that there should be only common property. Are both contentions, each of which can be maintained without self-contradiction - once I accept private property then I contradict myself if I establish a principle incompatible with it. In other words, before the mere formalism can be given you must accept something non-formal. That is what Hegel is driving at by this argument. I think it is also unfair to leave it at this presentation of Hegel's argument because he goes somewhat deeper. In this particular case one could very well say that Kant could very well defend himself against Hegel, and say this: of course I make already a stand, namely, I want to make a false promise; and then I see whether this can be universalized. What Kant contends is that this material maxim - therefore, the matter comes in. Kant knows it cannot be merely formal. But the matter comes in from the maxim, but what makes the maxim moral is not the matter but its formal character of universalizability. And in this case the matter is promising, promising in order to get out of trouble, and I assume that this is a wise thing, because I act on it, but I add the specific qualification, and then I see - in other words, I assume from the outset that a world in which promises are impossible is not a world in which one could live. That's Kant point. That I assume, and then my universalization shows me that my maxim doesn't survive the test of universalization. That's the point. Every criminal, whether he says so or not, by his actions indicates his maxim. For example, if I want to go to the pictures and don't have any money I rob the first bank for my means. Of course you can state it in more general terms: if I need money I get it by hook and by crook. That is the maxim from which everything starts. But why is he a crook? Because he leaves it at the naively arising maxim without reflecting on it. What does a reflection mean, a moral reflection? He universalizes it. Everyone, when he needs money, should try to get it by hook and by crook. And the question is: can he will that? I mean, regardless of what he says, because he may be a great fool. But it would of course mean that the next person who wants money should rob him and that he should wish that. That I think is what Kant means. That he cannot possibly wish. His actions mean I may rob if I need money but the others should not rob. I do not believe the difficulty lies in this point.

The difficulty is rather this. To the extent to which the overall principle underlying all maxims is happiness, because in this case of the man he sees his happiness in the fact that he can go tonight to the pictures. The means for that happiness would be money, and he adds the maxim to get it: in order to pursue my happiness I may use any means which I believe are conducive to it. Now, this principle, this way of reasoning, presupposes a being which pursues happiness, i.e., not God. Now, I believe the difficulty would come up at this point. Kant wants to get principles which are equally applicable to all rational beings, including God, but since the maxim of happiness enters any human maxim which is to be universalized, is not by this very fact any universal law, i.e., a law which survives the test, relative to man? That I believe is the difficulty.

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

How could you act at all? No. How do you get any guidance if you do not

reach such material conclusions as promises must be kept?

(. . . insidious question . . .)

But Kant will never achieve what he wants unless he gets identical rules of justice applying to God as well as to man. In other words, the maxim, promises must be kept, would apply equally to any rational being, i.e., to God as well as to man. You see, the rule is derived from human situations, beings pursuing happiness, therefore compelled to make promises. While it is true that it is not the matter which constitutes the morality of the action, but its form, universality, yet the law which comes out by that, namely, promises must be kept, must be obeyed. Well, we come to that when we read the second part.

(Saying that the moral law means following maxims which can be made a universal law, which is consistent with a universal law, does this mean that the universal law in a sense rules over the action in that the real job of morality is to discover, like the traditional formulation of morality, i.e., to find out what a universal law or set of laws is, which are independent of us? That means the will is only active in dictating obedience to an already existing principle . . .)

That is, you can say, the traditional view but it is not the Kantian one.

(Isn't that what the formulation of the Kantian view leads to?)

No. For the simple reason that, in this case, the good will could not be the highest good. The good will would be simply subject to the law, and then the law would be the highest good. And then of course one could not even say that. One would have to ask for the ground of the law.

(Wouldn't these examples equally well . . .)

Yes, but that is no longer Kant. That's something else. And I think that is in the spirit of Hegel, although Hegel does not actually say that.

Now, what about this principle? The question here is: to universalize the maxim that I want to make a promise with the intention not to keep it. Is it so simple? I mean, in a crude way it is perfectly correct, a man who makes promises with the intention not to keep them is a crook. We all know that. But is this for a really thorough analysis adequate? The simple fact comes in that not all promises are kept and sometimes they are not kept immorally. For example, the old story: a fellow lends me his gun, and I promise to return it on the 12th of June 1958. On the 10th of June that fellow becomes mad. Everyone would say, of course you would be crazy, and not moral, if you would return it. Yes? Good. Kant too would not have the slightest hesitation. So, in other words, as a reasonable man, when I make a promise I take it for granted that it is possible that I may not be able to keep that promise and not for guilty reasons. A guilty reason would be that I borrow a hundred dollars, I waste it, and I cannot pay it back at the proper time. There is no possible excuse for that. But if it is the case of the gun, and the same could apply to any kind of thing we don't know. It could be a horse, and then a war breaks out, or an emergency, and all horses are requested by

the government. I can't keep the promise. It is impossible. As a man of some experience, I must know that it is not entirely in my hands that I can keep the promise, and I disregard even here the possibility that I die, which is also not altogether irrelevant, since I cannot keep promises very easily if I am dead. So, in other words, my good intentions to keep the promises may very well be nugatory. Now, then I make the promise with the awareness of the fact that I may perhaps justly not keep it. I cannot know in this particular case, that is perfectly clear. You take an article of mine, that is gun, there is no war, and you have no excuse. But there could be something which I cannot imagine at the moment, which would allow you not to return it to me, not because you want to rob me, but for just and good reasons. In other words, what does it mean then if I know already, that I make the promise with the intention under certain conditions not to keep the promise. That is not immoral but moral. I still can make an empirically clear distinction between the dishonest reservations and honest reservations. What I am driving at is only that the honest reservations belong to the honest course and therefore we cannot speak in Kant's simple way of unqualified and unconditioned validity. This formal law, as stated by Kant, is not the moral law. It is an abbreviation of the moral law good enough for practical purposes but not a law dictated by reason.

(In Kant's terms the reservations that you speak of would not be lies or deceit. The other person would know very well that such reservations are . . .)

Excuse me, yes. But if we speak of reason in such a context we want to have real and pure goals and not some base formulas which are sufficient in 99 cases. That's common sense.

(It's lies and false promises, is it not, that he is trying to get rid off)

All right, then we take up the question of lying, and say, is the universal prohibition against lying, which makes every lie immoral, possible? Then we have to make a distinction. Kant discusses all these problems . . . several inaudible words . . . Kant himself was forced to say, one is not obliged to say the truth, one is only obliged not to lie. Now, with a little bit of experience you know that to be silent may be the cleverest way of lying, namely, if the other fellow suspects A is B and you are silent you may seem to confirm A is B and you know A is not B. In other words, you have to go into particulars, and these rules which are simply and universally valid, if there are any, are by no means sufficient for acting morally. That I think is the difficulty.

Hegel discusses the problem as follows: we must say the truth. Absolutely. No question. But what if we don't know the truth? What then? You must say the untruth, because what is meant now is that you should be truthful, you should be sincere. So, you shouldn't say that you must say the truth but you should say you must say what you think. You are under no moral obligation to say the truth under all alternatives? For example, if you are together with a man and you think he is an abominable fellow. Now, are you under a moral obligation to tell him whenever you see him, 'you are an abominable fellow'? Of course no one would say that. So, what does it mean? Then you get to a

very complicated rule, with many ifs and buts and footnotes and corollaries, and then you are by no means sure that you have exhausted it, because evidently the day after tomorrow you may read in a novel a story which brings out another qualification. That is the difficulty. And Hegel brings this out very nicely in his Phenomenology of the Mind, when he says, morality incarnate speaks: one must always say the truth. And then of course this statement of morality incarnate proves to be untrue, because morality didn't think that you have to know the truth in order to say the truth. So, this pure speech of veracity itself is not veracious at all.

(Doesn't Kant himself take all these complications into consideration, when he says repeatedly in this essay that you can never know and never be sure when you are acting from these pure intentions?)

No. He means something different by that. We come to that next time. That is an entirely different proposition; because of the great sophistry of the human heart you can never know what prompts you.

(It still seems to me that I should be able to have a pure intention not to make false promises and to lie, consistent with the awareness that both of us have to make big assumptions.)

The trouble is exactly that the purity of the intentions while an important part is only a part of the requirement, because the complications which may arise, an awareness which, generally speaking, arises from experience and therefore - in other words, the old story of prudence comes in. And that this formula regarding untruthful promises where no promise must be made with the intention not to keep it, is a matter of course for all practical purposes. You know what we think of a man who makes promises with the intention not to keep them. But, still, while this is perfectly sufficient for all practical purposes, it is really a common-sensical abbreviation and not a precise statement. But what Kant demands are precise statements of universal validity. That's the difference. And of course if everyone would start from ends and purposes one would see in principle the place where qualifications come in. For example, it would immediately appear that the non-performance of a promise made in order to enrich oneself or to enhance someone else has an entirely different status than the non-performance of a promise which is not based on either ground, like the non-performance if you do not return the gun.

No, one could really show the strict absurdity. For example, truthful. Now, truthfulness is of special importance in all business transactions. Then, complicated questions arise. To what extent is a merchant, or not a merchant, but anyone who wants to sell something, obliged to reveal the defect of his merchandise? Well, I take it for granted that one should always do that, but I am fortunate enough not to be a merchant. Now, a merchant can get into great difficulties. In Cicero's Offices one example of this occurs. There is one lax moral philosopher and one strict one, I forget the names. I think one of them comes from Babylon. I hope the lax one, but I don't know. One of them says you have to divulge all the defects of what you want to sell, and the other says, no, of course not, because it would amount to this, that you must advertise, here there is to be sold a completely unhealthy house. You know it is not healthy for people to live in it, and you want to sell it, and you have to advertise in a truthful manner: this house not fit to live in. That means,

in simple language, that you must not sell it. Sure. Then, this lax man says it is absurd, and hence, you do not have to divulge the defects, and the fellow can find out for himself. Which is fundamentally the rule of Roman law. Caveat emptor is the rule. The purchaser should watch. I mean, you must not create - I don't know where the line is, but at any rate the Roman law was fairly lax in this respect. At any rate, Kant himself cannot deny that trade is incompatible with hundred percent veracity. Hundred percent. I'm not now speaking only of the concealment of defects. What about reasonable suspicion of a change of prices up or down. You tell this man: don't buy that today, tomorrow it will be fifty percent cheaper. Why is it not immoral for the merchant not to do that? Because he runs also risks. He runs risks of losing, for which it is a fair compensation that he should have also risks of gains. But however he may think about it, and it is perfectly clear that here there is a loose rule of veracity. I mean, I take here veracity in the strict sense: nothing but the truth, and the whole truth. There won't be a buyer. How can you achieve that by any formal ethics? You have to know the business, and the upper limit of decency compatible with this human activity. Now, if business is necessary, and Kant admits that, you know, the spirit of commerce, what are the consequences? The same applies to all human activities. Always the ends, the circumstances, have to be considered. And the question of whether you can have any rule of this kind, even the rule regarding murder, without any qualifications - one can easily deceive oneself. You can easily say that murder is absolutely forbidden. But what does that mean? That does not mean killing, because killing is permitted, and demanded, on quite a few occasions; capital punishment, war, self-defense, defense of people unjustly attacked, and so on. And then of course you can say that the killing of innocent people, but that is even already a great question whether you can say soldiers in an enemy army, are they necessarily guilty people? Well, then you will say, all right, the killing of innocent people except if the innocent people are members of a hostile army. But now we look at the war. The war is going on now and for some time in the remote past, where the distinction between the civilian population and the fighting population could not be properly made. All right, then, you say, all killing of innocent persons is forbidden except of the enemy population in war. Then there is a question whether you can even leave it at that. So, judgment, discrimination, will also come in.

(. . . inaudible question. . .)

Yes, but you see, the point is this. These other formulations, as Kant calls them, in the Critique of Practical Reason, are types, typical presentations of the moral law. That means symbolic presentations. The exact presentations are only as a help for us, for our orientation, simplified. It is very important that the formula that we must not treat any human being as a means is one of the typical formulas, and not the strict formulation. And it is characteristic of the post-Kantian tradition of Fichte as well as of neo-Kantianism, that they took that to be the formulation. But, all right, perhaps Kant errs, one could say; but perhaps it is not such an error, because there is a very great difficulty. In what does the decency of man consist?

(He gives himself his own law.)

But if he does not give himself his own law? So, in other words, is it

the dignity of everyone who has the face of a human being? Is that the English expression? Or, how do you say it? Jedermann der menschlichen ansicht hat (?), it is in German. Everyone who has a human face. Does this follow? The dignity of everyone who has a human face. Does this follow from the dignity of the self-legislating?

(Yes.)

How? And Kant means that . . .

(tape ends here. Lecture continued on for undetermined time.)

Kant Seminar (14 May 1958) Lecture 14

Now what shall I say? You made some points which were very good but you made also other points which were absolutely shocking. I must draw a middle line. To begin with, the last one, although I'm not sure it belongs to that - what was the example of the mother? I didn't quite understand that.

(Shall I reread it?)

Yes. If you could state it without rereading it might be better because I have difficulty understanding the written version.

(That a mother, loving her child, because of love, saves that child, and as a consequence would have to sacrifice her own life.)

How would this work?

(Take, for instance, that she rushes into a burning house, or she jumps into a lake, or something of this sort. I mean, there can be no question.)

Yes, that happens.

(A mother who does this, who out of love sacrifices her life for her child cannot be accounted as being morally respectable by Kant.)

Why not?

(Because, first of all, she doesn't do it out of conviction, she does it out of inclination, out of love. Secondly, she purposely, that is, consciously, quits her life, and uses her life merely as a means, as a means for saving her child.)

No, she endangers her life. She does not commit suicide.

(Not suicide, but it seems she knows ahead of time, if at all possible, that she knows she will die.)

If she knows it, then it would be suicide, and that would be an immoral action from Kant's point of view. But Kant would say that in such a situation you can never say more than there is a very great danger but not a certainty of dying.

(But that is a technical question.)

Yes, but it is very important as far as a moral judgment is concerned.

(But perhaps with more time I could have constructed an incident in which this was taken care of.)

But that you should really have done. I mean, if it were a clear case where Kant's judgment contradicts the moral judgment of morally informed people, then it would be a grave case. So, you stated it too generally. In addition, Kant does not say the mother is strictly forbidden, streng verboten, to love her child. He merely says that in itself is a morally neutral thing.

(That is exactly what I said.)

Oh.

(Therefore, this could not be the ground of her being moral.)

Yes, yes.

(. . . if she saves her child wholly out of love rather than out of any conscious feeling of duty, maternal duty.)

No, that's not so simple. It is not immoral for a mother to love her child. Also, it is not so that every action you must commit must be a fulfillment of duty. That's impossible. It is sufficient if it does not conflict with the duty. For example, if you have your three square meals a day, which are certainly sufficient for keeping you alive, so you cannot be excused of willfully endangering your life, and you wonder whether you should drink a cup of coffee in the tea-room or not, is a moral absolutely indifferent question. But you have to establish that. You can do it very easily, by some reflection that it is not - if you drink the cup of coffee you do nothing morally wrong and if you do not drink the cup of coffee you do nothing morally wrong either. So, it is really indifferent. And therefore, it is not forbidden according to Kant for a mother to love her child. He would say, on the contrary, that is normal for mothers to love their children, by a kind of natural necessity. This means that it is in itself not morally praiseworthy. But the moral demands concern the actions towards the child. And, for example, if she neglects her child and if she pampers the child then she would act morally wrong, but whether she is very overflowing or very niggardly in her sentiment of love is morally irrelevant according to Kant.

(I have very poorly stated it. There are two parts: the first part is a morally neutral action for which no special merit can be earned, such as, special merit for morality or human dignity; the second part, an immoral action, assuming that willfully or knowingly she sacrifices her life.)

Kant never said that you may not sacrifice your life morally. He never said that. I mean, he never said, for example, that a soldier who goes to certain death is an immoral man. I mean, provided that it is so that he is commanded or else on the basis of his judgment that he thinks it is absolutely necessary to do that for the country, he may do it of course. Kant is speaking here of a man who is committing suicide, he takes away his life and he does not even claim that it is a moral action. He only wants to get rid of the troubles he has. So, there is no question of a conflict of duties. It is a conflict between duty and mere amoral self-love, which by the conflict, becomes immoral self-love. That's a different case.

And also it was hard for me to understand why you find this so strange or amusing that Kant says that the man who is about to commit suicide should first think in moral terms over the impending action. I don't see that this is unreasonable. I mean, if he is mentally ill then surely he is completely excused, and one can't say anything, although that is a moot question, but let us take the official, or at any rate the accepted, view. But that someone if he does an action of gravity should first reflect on whether he may do it is not an unreasonable demand. We can say to everyman: pull yourself together before you make that decision. And that's all that Kant says. Think

whether you have a right to do that. The fact that you like to do it now, although the liking is not without pain, as you very clearly demonstrated, but clearly it is a matter of liking, he likes to be deaf, life is too miserable. That doesn't give a man the right to kill himself, Kant says. And then you would have to go into Kant's specific argument, whether that is a good enough reason for not committing suicide, which Kant gives. That would be better.

Now, the points which I thought very satisfactory in your paper, were these, although you overdid it a bit, but still that is perfectly all right. When you spoke of man as an end in himself and you somehow visualized that this has apparently very great advantages, this formula. For example, it would seem to exclude slavery, it would seem to. But you noted an ambiguity in Kant which I think was very well taken. To what does man owe this dignity, which no other earthly being possesses? Why can man alone be regarded as an end in himself, according to Kant? You noted here, if I understood you correctly, a contradiction in Kant. Does man owe his dignity to the fact that he is subject to the moral law or does he owe his dignity to the fact that he obeys the moral law?

(This is something I myself am absolutely unsure of.)

Yes, it is very ambiguous, and would make a lot of difference, wouldn't it?

(Yes, to men.)

Surely, because those who are subject to the moral law are all men, those who obey the moral law are not all men. And a great difficulty would arise. I mean, if Kant would say, man has a dignity, higher than any other earthly being, insofar as he obeys the moral law, well that would not have been a novelty, because that was said by everyone, but if it is said that man has a dignity, an absolute dignity, by virtue of the fact that he is subject to the moral law, which dignity of course would not be lost by committing any number of crimes and by leading any life, however degraded. That's a problem.

(If man has dignity by being capable, or, as you said, by being subject to the moral law, wouldn't people like insane people or morons still lose the dignity, because how could they possibly be subject to the moral law in a rational creature as such?)

Yes, that's the point.

(I mean, he still would exclude this as something which . . .)

Kant could perhaps argue as follows: there can never be absolute certainty, whether this man now insane or this insane man cannot recover his sanity. In the case of the moron, the natural idiot, it is of course harder to expect any improvement. That's true. It is a difficult question. I admit that.

(. . . insaudible question. . .)

I think this ambiguity, that Kant claims for every man as man, regardless of anything he does or wills what could reasonably be claimed for men who live

in a certain way - don't you see the practical advantage? The practical advantage is an unqualified, really unqualified, unqualified by anything, democracy. All men, regardless of how they live, have the same status. I mean, that is a grave assertion.

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

Yes, all right.. I know that. I am absolutely sure that Kant would give a proof of it without any qualification, but the question is on what grounds. Now, if man's dignity consists only in the fact that he is subject to the moral law, or capable of obeying the moral law, then of course every human being, not radically insane or not moronic, possesses. But the question arises - one could address the question to you: what is the ground on which you would say that no human being, however insane or moronic, can ever be killed?

(Well, more in the traditional sense, he is not an angel but a man.)

The crucial ground would be the fact that he is innocent, and that the only ground on which a man can legitimately be killed is if he is guilty of crimes of particular severity, be it murder or high treason or something of this kind. That's the problem. Yes, I don't know. I'm absolutely sure that Kant would have disapproved of the killing of insane people but what this ground is I do not - how could he argue? Because they are really not, in the strict sense, capable of reason. There is no question. How would he argue? There must be some abbreviation of the categorical imperative which would exclude the killing of any man except innocent men. I do not know. I would have to figure it out.

The other point which Mr. ___ made which was very valuable I thought was this: that you drew our attention to the fact that in this section of the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant, as you put it, bypasses the fundamental question. And that is correct. Kant refers repeatedly to this fact. Now, what is that fundamental question? Kant's argument in this section as well as in the first one is this: we judge in moral terms in everyday life. Kant tries to bring out the fundamental principle implied in all such judgments, and Kant says, contrary to the commonplace character of our ordinary judgments, this principle, baldly stated, is very paradoxical, that the basis of our moral judgment is not anything empirical, anything connected with human nature - the formal categorical imperative. Therefore there is a contrast between our ordinary familiarity with moral judgments and the extreme unfamiliarity of the principle of morality. Or, in other words: we talk of duty all the time. But if we try to understand duty, Kant says, we arrive at this extremely abstruse principle, and therefore the temptation is very great to say: is not duty in the imagination, a chimera, if it means that? This question is left open here and the answer is given, as far as we see an answer, in the third chapter. The difficulty is this, and that was very well indicated by Mr. P. Is not the duty, the categorical imperative, or however you call it, a fact? Is not the whole argument of Kant based on the factual character of such a thing as duty, or morality? Of course not morality in the sense that people live and act morally, that is very doubtful from Kant's point of view, but that men are aware of the fact that they ought to act morally. Is not this fact the fundamental presupposition?

In his Critique of Practical Reason Kant speaks of the moral law as a

fact, and the only fact of reason, as he calls it there. So, from this point of view, then the beginning of every moral argument, and perhaps even of every argument, would be the moral law. And that is the only solid basis, the only ultimate certainty, which man possesses. And yet here, in this earlier work, the moral law seems to be in need of a demonstration, or of a deduction, and this deduction or demonstration will be given in the third part. And this is an extremely difficult one and connected with Kant's distinction between phenomenal and noumenal worlds and so on, and so on. This is a very great difficulty to which Kant's whole doctrine is exposed. I mean, Kant moves here between two extremes, which can be stated as follows: on the one extreme is the moral law as the fundamental fact. There is, in other words, a kind of experience - it is of course not empirical experience - but it is man's meeting and encountering the law. The other extreme is where Kant says, also in the Critique of Practical Reason somewhere, the moral law is a postulate. According to the stricter doctrine, the moral law is a fact which gives rise to certain postulates, God and the immortality of the soul, but on the other extreme, as I say, the moral law itself becomes a postulate. And then of course: what shall we say of that? This is an indication of the very great difficulty in which Kant becomes involved by his attempt to make the moral law absolute, i.e., not allowing that it has a basis from which we can start to understand it.

We have now to turn to some details of this very long and very difficult section. And there were some leftovers, if I may use this term, from last time, namely, at the end of the third section, to which we turn now. I would like to make only one remark, which is not particularly appropriate at this moment, not indeed altogether inappropriate. It has just occurred to me that one point which is so striking to me in Kant was familiar to me for a long time and I just didn't put two and two together. Now what is so striking in Kant's moral doctrine, as well as in his political doctrine, is that the principles are independent of any purpose. In his philosophy of right, freedom, external freedom, regardless of the purpose, is the basis, and in his moral philosophy, as we see here, the consideration of purpose must not enter. We have to judge only of whether our maxim is universalizable, not the end. So, I may have whatever purpose I want, and yet this purpose is always called happiness or some aspect of happiness. This is uninteresting. This is morally irrelevant. The only morally relevant point is whether the maxim which I pursue in order to become happy, which I pursue for the sake of happiness, or for happiness as an end, whether this maxim is universalizable or not. Not the end but only a certain character of the means, if I may say so, is morally relevant. That is a very different - by the way, if one studies Aristotle's Ethics, first book, carefully, one would come across a similar problem, but into that I cannot go now. Yes?

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

No. I mean, that could lead to very extreme Machiavellian consequences, obviously. Because you can say in order to establish a world which is safe for virtue, let me put it this way, if that is the self-justifying end then one could argue that such a world, safe for virtue, may have to be established by non-virtuous means. Machiavelli's point. Romulus murdering Remus. And you say that is the last permissible murder.

(. . . inaudible response . . .)

No, Kant would simply say that way of arguing is wrong. You have not to think of what will come out of your actions. You simply take the maxim underlying your actions. For example: for a good end, or for a most praiseworthy end, which very rarely has to be done, once in century, is it not possible to make exceptions in favor of these rare and most praiseworthy actions? And Kant says no. The very principle implied in the maxim, exceptions, is proof of its wickedness.

(No, you do it simply because it is good to do it, not because of the fact . . .)

Yes.

(The problem is when deciding whether this is moral in itself to do doesn't one have to think of the end?)

Kant denies that. Kant denies that. Kant contends it is perfectly sufficient by looking, not at the particular action, because you are on the level of generality beyond the particular action, but of course the maxim covers the action - you want to commit a murder to make a country happy.

(Then I generalize it.)

You generalize it. You act on this maxim, and Kant would say the maxim has to be stated as follows: if a man believes, because he can't be certain, that by a certain action he commits his country will become happy, may he do that? And Kant says, universalize the maxim: everyone who believes that he can make happy his country by committing a murder may do so. And then Kant contends, I see that this leads to the legitimization of practically every murder, no, not every murder, but many murders, and is incompatible with natural . . .

(Wouldn't this legitimization lead to this: if I universalize it I will limit freedom.)

Freedom should be limited, because if freedom were not limited it would mean everyone could do what he wanted, which of course is incompatible with any notion of morality. That's the idea. Freedom must be limited, but not in an arbitrary way, Kant says. Freedom must be limited in such a way that the freedom of everyone else can co-exist with your freedom under equal laws.

(Did I understand your original problem, as you phrased it, was the question whether an action according to duty, regardless of considerations of purpose happened to coincide with the hypothetical imperative of happiness as an end?)

Not quite. I mean, Kant's - how shall I say - innocent shrewdness is much greater. Kant knows very well that in order to act morally sacrifice of happiness, in the ordinary understanding of happiness, is required, in principle, of everyone. But, if you speak, however, of the happiness of a society, it so happens that the universal imperative is very conducive, and quite innocently to the happiness of the society, for the simple reason that universality of reason has some relation to sociality. Law. One could say that in a way Kant puts the cart before the horse, instead of tracing to society this character of the moral law, instead of tracing it to society or sociality he traces

them to rationality and universality. One could say that. But Kant claims he is not putting the cart before the horse but giving the reason why we are under an obligation to be concerned with society. Take the simplest case, a purely social doctrine, utilitarianism. The greatest happiness of the greatest number. The question arises: why should that be? If the utilitarian tells you that what we mostly mean by praising and blaming is really that the action is conducive to the greatest happiness of the greatest member. Which in a crude way may be said to be true. The question arises: why should you do that? Why is the mere summation of happinesses of higher value than the individual happiness of you? To which the utilitarian cannot give an answer. But Kant claims he can give an answer because the moral law in its formal character tells you that you are under an ought to do such things the maxim of which can be of universal legislation. Whether that is sufficient or not is another matter, but Kant meets the issue.

(Taking it back to the terms by which I was trying to understand it, he seems to be saying, in this first section here, that reason has given him peace. It seems that his happiness is an end.)

Yes, that's Rousseau, but that is not a very profound argument, because one could say this argument is based on a very loose meaning of happiness. And Rousseau even would not agree with Kant at all in the way in which Kant stated it. If you take some of Kant's examples, it is reason which leads us beyond the elementary needs and makes us able to be concerned with non-necessary things, luxuries. Brutes do not have luxuries proper. Only man is capable of that. Through reason man is enabled to develop all kinds of unnecessary wants. And life becomes ever more complicated the more you have unnecessary wants. That is the meaning of the proposition that reason leads to unhappiness. But one could of course very well say that the wrong use of reason - didn't the philosophers say all the time: restrict your demands if you want to act rationally, because the prospects of your being contented are greater the less you want? That is not the argument of Kant's.

(Well, then he has a higher, so to speak, concept of happiness.)

Yes, sure. Then the problem would be entirely different, but that is exactly the point. An essential part of Kant's argument is of course - we come to that later - that he defines happiness in such a way that it cannot possibly be the goal of man. The goal of man. I mean, that is part of man's goal Kant does not - we come to that.

The point I want to make is this: this disregard of purpose, which is so characteristic of Kant's moral and legal philosophy - I read to you a passage from an earlier statement. 'I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceases only in death, and the cause of this is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight than he has already attained to, or that he cannot be content with a moderate power, but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well which he has present, without the acquisition of more.' That's Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 11. Now, what does Hobbes here imply? All men desire power, but for different purposes. Some want more intensive delight, intensive delight, that is to say, they don't need that power, they are fools, they only want more power for silly reasons. Others want more power for a sound reason, because

he can't assure the power and means to live well which he has present, without the acquisition of more. So, the perpetual and restless desire of power after power is independent of the purpose which man pursues. Power, thus understood, has the same moral neutrality as the freedom, the external freedom, of which Kant speaks. And therefore if one wants to understand Kant's indifference to purpose one would have to go back, at least one would have to consider also this concept of power which was developed by Hobbes for the first time, and which is also characterized by the disregard of ends or purposes.

To show that this is really something very new in Hobbes one only has to read earlier writers. That is of some importance by the way for the present discussion in political science in particular. I heard more than once the subject matter of political science is power. And from very different quarters. How come? If that is so obvious that no one thought of it until a short time ago, I mean until Hobbes. For example, if you read even such notorious analysts of power like Machiavelli and Thucydides, they say very little about power. I mean, I have no statistics but the word occurs very rarely. The term which Machiavelli uses much more is glory, and there is a very great difference between glory and power. And when you read, for example, the earlier discussions of the ends of men, in Aristotle, or in Thomas, wherever it is, health, beauty, wealth, glory, honor, and so on. Power is not mentioned. Perhaps by implication somewhere. But it is very characteristic that power did not appear in former ages as a particularly characteristic goal of man. That in itself deserves attention. And Hobbes, in the Leviathan, makes this power for the first time an important - incidentally that can be shown historically very simply because these discussions in chapter 11 and so are based on Aristotle's Rhetoric, but in Aristotle's Rhetoric power as a theme is not there, in the way in which honor, glory, and other kindsoof things are there.

Now, I suggested earlier already that power becomes so important because the end becomes less important. Now, what is the advantage of the orientation by power as distinguished from any ends? And therefore one must consider what power originally meant. In Hobbes the English term 'power' is ambiguous, and means two different Latin terms, which are not so easily distinguished in idiomatic English, and the one is potestas. One can easily prove this by comparing the English with the Latin version, both of which were made by Hobbes. So there is no question. The other is potentia. Now, potestas means the power to give commands, let us say. The power to give commands. A kind of political or legal power. But what does potentia mean?

(Force.)

Yes, but potency, which is a non-idiomatic translation. In other words, - but what allows Hobbes to identify them? And when he speaks of power he means somehow both. The potentia becomes the potency of this heavy object to fall. That's potentia. What does this have to do with the quality of a sheriff to make arrests, for example? It has something to do with it, as you see from the following consideration. Potency is distinguished from the act. The falling, the hitting, as distinguished from the potency to fall or to hit. But something similar applies to potestas, namely, there is also a distinction here, namely, between the power to command the exercise of that power. So, both are distinguished from the act, from the exercise, and the concern with power means therefore a concern with something which is not the exercise of that.

Why is this advantageous? It must promise some benefit, real or apparent. Otherwise it would never have been done. Now, if you look at the earlier statement, what about the exercise of power? Or the exercise of political power, the power of the husband, the power of the father, or the master, what about that? Well, this has to be ruled by prudence. But, in the case of prudence, we do not get universally valid rules to speak of, to put it mildly. That depends very much on judgment, as a prudent man would act on the spot, knowing all the circumstances. Now, advisors to political government, the most interesting case. That means policy, the use, the exercise, of political power cannot be subject to exact rules. But what can be subject to exact rules? The power. In other words, you can define decent things you may do or decent things, which is clearer, we may not do. Legal exactness, which has its advantages, great advantages, can be applied clearly to the case of power and not clearly to the case of the exercise of power. You cannot have laws, meaningful laws, which define prudent policy. You can hope to get by a certain system prudent governors, but they must use their judgment, whereas you can very well protect yourself against the possible or probably imprudence of your ruler by limiting their power. Similar considerations apply also to that other power. When Nietzsche, who took the Hobbesian scheme more radically than any other thinker, spoke of the will to power, whatever else that may mean, but he spoke of quanta of power. Quanta. Numberable; susceptible of exact knowledge. In brief, I'm inclined to think that the concern with power, indifference to ends, had something to do with the concern with exactness which plays such a role in modern times. But that is a guess. I do not know whether it is true. Of one thing I'm certain, that there is a connection between this Hobbesian concept of power with its indifference to any purposes and the Kantian concept of freedom with its equal indifference to purposes. And we must not forget, and we will see this when we go on, how important the concern with exactness is in Kant's doctrine. He is looking for universally valid, apodictic rules, i.e., rules of perfect exactness. That is I think a major point characteristic of the modern development. Never entirely uncontested, that's clear, but unusually powerful.

(This somehow ties in with hedonism, doesn't it, since power is always the means to realize some desire?)

But the object of desire is different. The object of desire is qualitatively different.

(But if we look at this notion of power closer I think it would break down into the distinction of pure pleasures and mixed pleasures.)

Yes, but that is very complicated, and would lead us far away now. Surely, it is somehow connected.

(Recent social scientists have been saying that it is impossible to measure power. Would you then expect them to be giving up the notion of power as the central concept of political science?)

No. What I said refers only to the origin. But the indifference to purposes is certainly observed, and secondly I think they are looking for models in order to study power situations in various villages of the United States. The mere notion of models here, does it not have something to do with the

concern of the hoped-for, ultimate, possibility of quantifying. I guess they mean for the time being they are not advanced enough to speak of power in quantitative terms, but the better our tools become - what do they want to do? Do they not want to measure power, ultimately? I wonder. The last thing I heard, in more concrete terms, was an address given to the Political Science Union a few years ago by a man who had made observations on power situations in a village in Montana, and he had made observations that the only case which had come up was a controversy about the location of the football team, where one group of people had their weight against another and he thought this was the right beginning for finding out what the political power situation was in that small town. And I had the feeling that what he was driving at was that the thing would be completed if he could only say: so and so much percent power is located in this area and so and so much power is located in that area. But I may be mistaken. I have not been a profound student of this.

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

In the case of freedom I think it is so that this whole continuum is meaningless if it is not meant to be used for saying how many degrees of freedom and how many degrees of bureaucracy and how many degrees of downright coercion we have in a given society. You know? I mean, in other words, you must not overestimate every little change of this movement and one must keep one's eyes fixed at the goal at which they are really driving.

(I was wondering, if they really do despair in attaching quantitative value to power they will have gravitated back to the notion of ends.)

They think that? In a way there is something true in what you say, because the ends do come in under the heading of value. No, surely. What is a value? A value is - what do they say a value is?

(. . . inaudible response . . .)

No. No. They learn something from economics, if I am not mistaken, that you can do something with statistics, given the fact that the values are not so terribly individualized as you might think, whether there are some values which are desired by large groups of men and so you can therefore do something with the help of statistics.

(. . . inaudible response . . .)

No. I think values play a considerable role. I think that is the classical point. An earlier stage of political science believed in interest, and the guiding point was interest, a conflict of interests, labor, and so on, and so on, but then they found out that this interest doesn't work so well. In other words, interest itself is too derivative a thing - or to state it simply, interest is still too rational, because there is some calculation involved. Given this state of life of a farmer, and he is dependent on the weather and on exporting and so on, that is then his interest. And the so-called irrationality of man, allegedly uncovered by psychoanalysis and other things, is one major reason, I believe, why interest lost its crucial importance, and they left it at this perfectly irreducible thing: I like it, or I dislike it. And then I can still find out some statistical regularity. I think the place of ends

is taken now by values as irrationally posited beginning of any 'reasoning' taking place in social matters. Mr. Cropsey, do you agree with that or not?

(. . . inaudible response . . .)

Oh. I see. That is very helpful because I was always bothered. Did they mean by values preferences or principles of preference? I see. That is now settled. I am very happy. Because I thought, for example, shall I say an apple is a value or health is a value? You see, an apple is obviously valuable if you want to be healthy, or maybe for your pleasure for that matter. In the one sense the apple would be the value and in the other sense the principle, i.e., either health or pleasure, would be the value. So, that is now settled.. Not the principles of preference but preferences. How do they arrive at any generalities from this point of view?

(Well, by a kind of mathematical application of the preferences. Functions.)

I see. For example, the preference for this car and others have preferences for other cars. We call that cars, and disregard whether it is this or that car.

(. . . inaudible response . . .)

Oh, I see. I see. But you don't need any more principle of preference.

(. . . inaudible response . . .)

But perhaps not in economic theory. Oh, I see. It would be so universal as to be applicable to every economy. You only have to find different variables.

(. . . inaudible response . . .)

Well, let us return as fast as we can to Kant.

Well, I was going to say that it isn't quite fair to attribute this view to all the social scientists.)

My, no. I know that. And lest I appear too tyrannical, let me say, as a footnote, I know how much confusion there is in social science. But let us now return to Kant.

Towards the end of the first section, Kant had first asserted the perfect self-sufficiency of common sense, or pre-philosophic moral understanding. You remember this view of Kant's which found its most extreme expression in that statement elsewhere that an eight year old child could settle all these questions. But then Kant goes on to say that moral philosophy is needed for the sake of morality, so there cannot be a self-sufficiency of the pre-philosophic moral understanding. This theme is then continued at the beginning of the second section, in a number of passages, where Kant explains that a strict metaphysics of moral, an a priori metaphysics of morals, is needed not only for theoretical reasons but also for practical reasons, for moral reasons. Why? Do you know the answer to that, Mr. ___? (Student who read paper earlier this lecture) Why do we need for our actions, for our moral actions, a moral

philosophy, although the conscience, as we may call it, was presented as self-sufficient?

(Because too many empirical elements enter into the common moral feelings.)

More precisely, the ordinary man is not aware of the strictly a priori character of the moral law. He does not know that any consideration of happiness vitiates the moral decision, and therefore a sophistry, a natural sophistry, of the conscience takes place in which the place of duty is taken by the concern with happiness. And this can be prevented only by the clarity about the fact that duty has nothing whatever to do with happiness, and that can be done only by philosophy.

Now, let us see where we will begin. I believe we begin with this note. I'll tell you because we have different editions. The tenth paragraph. We should read that. 'It appears from what has been said that all moral principles have their seat completely a priori in reason in their origin'. Do you have that?

It is clear from what has been said that all moral content has its seat, and origin completely a priori in the reason, and happens in the commonest reason just as truly as in what is speculative in the highest degree. Moral contents cannot be obtained by abstraction from any empirical and hence merely contingent knowledge. It is exactly this purity in origin that makes them worthy of serving our supreme practical principle for right action, and as we add anything empirical we detract in proportion from the genuine influence and from the absolute value of actions. It is not only very necessary from a purely speculative point of view but it is also of the greatest practical importance to derive these notions and laws from pure reason to present them pure and unmixed and even to determine the competence of this practical or pure rational knowledge and to determine this entire faculty of pure reason, pure practical reason. In doing so, we must not make a principle of pure practical reason dependent on the particular nature of human reason, though in speculative philosophy this may be permitted, and even necessary at times, since the moral laws ought to hold true for every rational creature we must derive them from the general concept of a rational being.

That is very important. Kant seems to indicate here the possibility of a derivation of the moral law from some preceding knowledge. It must not be the knowledge of the essence of man but the essence of a rational being without the specific character of man. You must never forget that Kant is always thinking of God, and possibly of angels, but certainly of God. And what Kant will do in the third section of the Foundations is such a deduction of the moral law from the concept of a rational being in general, not in particular man. At this point there is still some dependence of Kant on the older view. Now, that is not quite in accordance with Kant's intention. Kant's intention is precisely not to deduce the moral law from any preceding knowledge and therewith to give it absoluteness. That is one great ambiguity.

All of morality has need of anthropology for its application to man, yet in this way, as in the first step, we must treat morality in-

dependently as pure philosophy, that is, as metaphysics, as complete in itself - we must fully realize that unless we are in possession of this pure philosophy not only will it be vain to determine the moral element of duty in right actions for purposes of speculation but it would be impossible to base morals on the genuine principles. This is true even for common practical purposes but more especially for moral instruction which is to produce pure moral disposition, and to engraft them on men's minds for promoting the greatest possible good in the world.

Let us stop here for a moment. Kant had said before - we couldn't read that - that it follows from the understanding of the moral law as an ought that there needn't be a single case of a moral action. The ought is independent of any action complying with the ought. And Kant even spoke of the impossibility of knowing it. For example, if anyone of us commits a moral action we can never be certain that it is purely moral because of the sophistry of the human heart. That is not too difficult to understand, because self-love, as Kant observes, takes on all kinds of subtle disguises and we can never fully know whether we were fully pure in our intentions . . .

(change of tape)

. . . therefore, the mixing of moral and non-moral motives was much easier. Therefore, moral progress itself, and not merely legal or institutional progress, depends on Kant's actions, on his moral philosophy. And therefore this great difficulty which we found in Kant's philosophy of history, that we have a clear line of institutional progress towards the just society without having any guarantee that this institutional progress will also be moral progress. In practical terms, self-seekers, shrewd self-seekers, living in a just society, may be the end of the process. No one dedicated to justice for its own sake, all shrewd calculators. And that is something which is revolting. And Kant says, as he indicates here and also in some other passages, there is the possibility of helping men towards moral progress, and the most important thing is of course clarification of the moral principles, as Kant tries here.

But I would like to emphasize again the importance of this casual remark, which is not merely casual, as we will see later, that Kant admits here the necessity of deducing the moral law from a preceding knowledge of the essence of a certain kind of being. Not a human being, but rational beings as such. And we must keep this in mind.

We can skip the next paragraph, for the reason to which I alluded on a former occasion.

Everything in nature works according to laws. Only a rational being has the capacity of acting according to the conception of laws that is, according to principles. This capacity is will. Since reason is required for the derivation of actions from laws, the will is nothing else but practical reason.

Let us perhaps stop here. 'Will is nothing else but practical reason'. That is an extraordinary assertion which occurs more than once in Kant. According to the traditional view will and practical reason were of course

different. Will belongs together with appetite, desire. Will is distinguished from appetite simply by being rational desire. That is indicated here by Kant by 'conception of laws' or 'conception of principles'. Desire as desire has - non-rational desire is not aware of laws. It simply jumps at the particular object which it desires. Rational desire, or will, contains a rational element. For Kant it would be the conception of laws. This is the traditional distinction. Now, Kant makes a great step and says will is identical with practical reason. Well, it is a surprising statement in itself but it is not altogether surprising after what we have heard. Why? Why must Kant identify will and practical reason?

(Because of this problem of priority, that if the will is the highest thing in the world then it can't be subject to reason.)

Yes, yes. Sure. That's the point. In other words, when you make a distinction between will and practical reason, you say good action consists of a) willing, and b) apprehending. But there is no apprehension of the good preceding the will, according to Kant. In other words, whereas the traditional notion of morality was based on the distinction between the how and the what. You have to choose the right thing, the what, in the right spirit, the how. Kant's doctrine somehow amounts to this, that the how, fully understood, guarantees the right one.

It has also a very great consequence. If the will is identical with practical reason, and the reason as reason is of course infallible, as reason, what follows for the will? There can only be a good will. That is a very great question for Kant. Can there be a bad will? Because if willing as distinguished from desiring means to subject yourself to the law which you have imposed upon yourself - a bad will means not subjecting yourself: I did not will. We skip now a number of paragraphs. We must come to the center of the discussion. We skip nine paragraphs. Well, in the meantime Kant makes a number of distinctions which are very important because Kant expresses himself in that terminology, but they are not so difficult to understand. Kant uses here the term 'imperative'. 'Now the imperative,' he says, is the formula for command. Commands are in order only when we speak of a being whose will need not be good. God cannot be subject to commands, but man is subject to commands in various ways. Therefore, imperatives are in order. And the crucial point is to distinguish the various kinds of imperatives. And Kant distinguishes between hypothetical and categorical imperatives, in the first place. The moral imperative is categorical, you can see that. But what about the hypothetical imperatives? And you see, by the way, how present reasonings link up with Kant. There are two kinds. Problematic imperatives, and assertoric imperatives. These are not the moral imperatives. Now, what is the problematic? That is extremely simple. If you want to use dog food for example, you know that you get this in boxes and tins, and there is a prescription how much you should take out and perhaps even a prescription how to open it. This is a hypothetical imperative because it is based on the hypothetical premise that you want to feed your dog. If you want to feed your dog, given this state of civilization, you have to do that. There are infinite imperatives of this kind. These are the only imperatives, by the way, which present day orthodox social science admits. But Kant says there is another imperative which is not categorical, nor hypothetical, but assertoric. In the case of the dog, or in the case of the umbrella, or whatever you take, you can say: 'well, I don't want it. I don't

mind getting wet.' And that solves the problem of the umbrella. There is something where you can't say 'I don't mind it', where every man necessarily minds, namely, he is concerned, and that is happiness. And therefore the imperatives of happiness have a different status than the imperatives of skill, as Kant calls it, technical imperatives.

And we turn to the section which begins, 'There is however one purpose'.

(Page 75.)

There is one end, however, which we may presuppose is actual in all rational beings, so far as imperatives apply to them, that is, so far as they are dependent beings. There is one purpose not only which they can have but also which we can presuppose that they all do have by a necessity of nature. This purpose is happiness. The hypothetical imperative which represents the practical necessity of actions as means to the promotion of happiness is an assertorical imperative. We may not expound it as merely necessary to an uncertain and merely possible purpose . . .

Like feeding your dog.

. . . but as necessary for a purpose which we can have a priori and with assurance assume for everyone because it will always be its essence.

You see, that is very important. Man is essentially, and not only concerned with his happiness - that is not merely empirical knowledge, it is knowledge of the essence of man, following from the fact that man is a dependent, or a needy, being, to which he referred at the beginning of this paragraph, which as such is necessarily in need of completion, of fulfillment, of filling, if you want, on every level. This is of the essence of man as a dependent and needy being. That is a a priori knowledge.

Skilled in the choice of means to one's highest welfare can be called prudence in the narrower sense. This, the imperative which refers to the choice of means to one's own happiness, that is, the precept of prudence, is still only hypothetical. The action is not absolutely commanded but commanded only as a means to another end.

Let us stop here for a moment. Why does Kant call an imperative leading to the natural end of man which, according to Kant's admission, is necessarily pursued by every man, why does he call such an imperative hypothetical? Is it not as assertorical, we can say, as the end? Because if it is necessary to will the end is it not necessary also to will the means for that end? Now, how does Kant solve this difficulty? He has already answered it here, because in this case the action, say not to offend people unnecessarily, which is a rule of prudence, this, namely, not to offend people necessarily, is demanded not for its own sake but for the sake of happiness. The action is not commanded with a mere Thou Shalt without any Because added to it. Therefore, it is hypothetical. A categorical imperative is one which states Thou Shalt and no Because added to it. That will make clear the next paragraph.

Finally, there is one imperative which directly commands a certain

conduct without making its condition ~~save~~ purpose to be reached by it. This imperative is categorical. It concerns not the material of the action and its intended result but the form of the principle for which it results. What is essentially good in it consists in the intention, the result being what ~~in~~ may. The imperative may be called the imperative of morality.

The term which Kant uses here for intention is _____, which is perhaps not identical with intention. It is hard to bring it out. But the term is familiar to you, to many of you I suppose, from Max Weber. When Weber spoke of an ethic of intention and distinguished it from an ethic of responsibility. This has something to do with Kant, with the Kantian usage. True morality, according to Kant, is concerned only with the purity of intentions. Let the result or success be whatever it will. In Weber's definition the ethic of responsibility is one which is concerned with the result. Now, that has a very great practical consequence because, in political matters especially, a certain kind of pure-intention politician says: I do the right thing and I have no responsibility for the consequences; whereas the prudent statesman will of course consider the consequences.

How was the line drawn in pre-Kantian times? Do you know Father Buckley? I mean, after all we must draw a line somewhere. No one can be responsible for all unforeseen consequences of his actions.

(They would probably say, if it could be foreseen then the person is responsible but not if it couldn't be foreseen.)

Yes, sure. In other words, you have to take the trouble to find out what are the presumable consequences of your action, and you are responsible for your action to that extent, and you can't have the plea of mere intention, that your intention was good, without having done that. Kant divides it rather sharply. Because you cannot possibly be responsible, say in political actions, where it is clearer, for the consequences, an action may have a hundred years afterwards, on the basis of perhaps the misuse of the good fruits of your action. Or any unforeseen thing. That's impossible. You can have responsibility only within the limit of what you can foresee, and that means of course that you have to make a certain use of historical analogies and experiences, you know, in order to have some balanced judgment of what is reasonable to expect.

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

Give an example. That's important. In all moral matters discussions are vain if there are no examples.

(I was thinking of the example of in order to tell the truth and follow the categorical imperative great harm would come to a perfectly innocent person.)

Yes, but Kant says there is no obligation to always say the truth. You must never lie.

(But what if the situation were such that the bandits rushed in and your

mother was upstairs and they were looking for her in order to kill her, and you remained silent when they asked you if she was upstairs; you knew they would rush upstairs immediately. The only way you could possibly save her would be to say she is elsewhere.)

Yes. Where Kant says you must not lie. That's true. So, there is at least one case in which the categorical imperative as authentically interpreted by Kant leads to terrible consequences and the man who has a good conscience for not having lied should have a bad conscience.

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

Yes, there are such cases in which it is the easy way to follow one's conscience in that sense. I read last night a sentence in Schiller, a German poet who was to some extent a pupil of Kant's, to my surprise I read about a Dutch statesman of the fifteenth century. I'm sorry I don't remember literally, but the main point was this: he took the easy way. He followed his conscience, meaning, that was very simple to save the conscience, according to the general rule, and he had not to think through the complexity of the situation.

Kant's doctrine is somehow based on the premise, and that is of course a very dangerous assumption, that no terrible consequences will follow from the categorical imperative as he stated it. That is surely implied. And that is a great assumption. In other words, Kant can have this absoluteness of these rules, which is so conducive to the purity of ~~moral~~ actions only at the heavy price of abandoning prudence as the traditional test, which always requires careful examination.

But the most important subject for us in this present context I believe is this question of happiness. Here we see, and that will be of crucial importance for the categorical imperative, all men necessarily and essentially pursue happiness. Therefore - we see already this - a categorical imperative which would be incompatible with happiness of man as man, is impossible. Do you see that? Because the categorical imperative says you must universalize your maxim but in every maxim any man has happiness is implied, because every maxim is directed towards happiness. Is this not clear? Therefore, by the universalization of the maxim the requirement of happiness, of men in general, is preserved. That is the solution to your difficulty why the categorical imperative becomes terrible in the wider sense. The provision for happiness is preserved by the fact that the moral law, as we can know it, can only consist in the universalization of a human maxim and every human maxim is directed towards happiness. Towards one's own happiness but the universalization means it is now directed towards the happiness of everyone. Take an example: it is your maxim to get rich by hook and by crook, and the reason is that you think it is very helpful for happiness in the ordinary understanding of the word. Now, you universalize it, and you see it cannot be universalized. So, you have to drop that. But the fundamental motive, the concern of man with his happiness, of which this, to get money by hook and by crook, is only a specification, this universal concern is preserved. And therefore, the categorical imperative can never lead, according to Kant, to a conclusion which is incompatible with the existence of human beings seeking their happiness. It may very well be incompatible with your happiness here and now but again one may say that it is granted by the general moral belief of mankind that the sacrifice of an

individual's temporary happiness for a higher cause is implied in the very idea of morality. That I think is the insurance against terrible consequences.

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

Kant would draw this conclusion, that the maxim of the ascetic cannot be universalized. I mean, how would you state the maxim of the ascetic? Because there are many kinds of ascetics. But let us take a crude, vulgar notion. In other words, I can act on the maxim that I should deprive myself of all possible pleasures. Kant would say, universalize it, and see that you cannot will it. He would argue exactly as in the case of suicide. He would say this: conceive of this maxim as a law of nature, that there would be a nature in which beings have been created by nature capable of pleasure and pain who should never satisfy pleasures. Since pleasures are connected by nature with the whole bodily life of man, for example, appetite for food and the necessary pleasure when you take in food, there cannot be something morally evil with pleasure as pleasure. If you would, on the other hand, try to universalize the opposite maxim, the maxim of the voluptuary, and say that no pleasure must be forgone, and try to universalize that, you will see that you cannot arrive at a coherent system, because the pleasures of some men are clearly incompatible with the pleasures of others. That is what Kant would argue. Whether that argument is good is another matter. However, if you put it in a different way I think what would happen to you would be this: that you would get a maxim, let us call it A, ascetism, which is universalizable, but the opposite maxim is equally universalizable, and then the consequence would be that ascetism of a certain kind is perfectly compatible - is morally innocent. You can, if you like, become an ascetic, and if you do not like, you can become a man who moderately enjoys pleasures. That could also be possible. Kant does not say that ascetism is necessarily wicked but he would say it is also not necessarily good. It is indifferent. That I believe he would say. One must argue it out and not see only whether it is a general proposition but whether it can be universalized, which is not necessarily evident at first glance. The fact that all kinds of moral schools teach moral doctrines of which they say they should be universal does not yet prove that they can be universalized. That would have to be made apparent. Let us take a simple example, a vegetarian: every man ought not to eat anything but vegetables. That can be universalized. The human race would not perish. But the other maxim, everyone should eat in addition to vegetables also meat, can equally be universalized, and therefore the issue of vegetarian versus non-vegetarian is not a moral problem. It is a problem which is morally indifferent and which can be decided on medical grounds or grounds of taste and so on.

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

That is what Kant says, but in order to see whether Kant's proposition functions it is however not enough merely to give vent to the impression that it seems incredible but one must really enter into Kant's argument and try to see whether it is so manifestly impossible as it appears to you. But it is really not so simple because the strong basis Kant has, of which I doubt that it is sufficient, is that very much of what we all mean by immorality consists in regarding oneself here and now as an exception. That is frequently true. There is no question. But whether it is always so, as Kant contends, that's another problem.

I would like to finish only one point regarding the problem of happiness, and that is in the middle of the next paragraph.

For law alone implies a concept of an unconditional and objective, and, hence, universally valid necessity, and commands our laws which must be obeyed, even against the inclinations. Counsels do indeed involve necessity but a necessity that can hold only under a subjective condition, that is, whether this or that man counts this or that as part of his happiness.

Let us stop here. Kant had said in the first place, happiness is the necessary end of man. Well then, it would seem that it is very respectable and it is sensible for our moral exertions. But now we hear that this is not so because happiness is subjective. In every reflection on the means for happiness we think of this or that part of happiness or this and that combination of parts. This subjectivity makes it impossible to build any doctrine on happiness.

There is one more passage in the paragraph after the next.

If it were only easy to give a definite concept of happiness the imperatives of prudence would consistently correspond with those of skill and would likewise be analytical. Or it could be said in this case as well as in the former that whoever wills the end wills also necessarily according to reason the only means to it which are in his power. But it is a misfortune that the concept of happiness as such, as indefinite concept, that, although each person wishes to attain it he can never definitely and self-consistently say what it is he wills. The reason for this is that all elements which belong to the concept of happiness are empirical, that is, they must be taken from experience, but because the idea of happiness is an absolute whole, the maximum of well-being is needed in my present and every future condition. Now, it is impossible even for a most clear-sighted and most capable but finite being to form a definite concept of that which he really wills. If he wills riches, how much envy, anxiety, and intrigue might he not thereby draw on his shoulders? If he wills much knowledge and wisdom perhaps it might become only an eye that much sharper to show him as more dreadful the evils which are now hidden from him and which are yet unavoidable or to burden his desires which already sufficiently engage him with even more needs. If he wills a long life who guarantees that it will not be a long misery? If he wills health at least how often as not has the discomfort of the body restrained him from excesses into which perfect health would have led him. In short, if he is not capable, on any principle and with complete certainty, of ascertaining what would make him truly happy? Omniscience would lead him to this.

And the conclusion which Kant draws later on in that paragraph is an ideal not of reason but of the imagination. And therefore it cannot have any status. In other words, Kant says when you look at the clear and simple statement on happiness of Aristotle in the *Rhetoric*, which is more elementary and popular than that of the *Ethics*, and for this reason more easily intelligible - Aristotle has there a simple enumeration of what constitutes happiness:

moderate wealth, health, good looks, good friends, many friends, and so on, and so on. You know, what we ordinarily understand by happiness, and this isn't in one sense subjective at all because this statement of a Greek made in the fifth century is immediately recognizable today under entirely different conditions, because these are the things which man naturally esteems. Aristotle was familiar with the fact which every child knows that for some people who are up to all kinds of mischief it would be much better if they were paralyzed, and would not be able to do it. So, there is no great moral discovery here. Aristotle knew that. How would he have argued it?

(. . . inaudible response . . .)

Sure. In other words, the accidental consequences are something which has to be taken into consideration and indeed it would be good to find the core of happiness in something which cannot even accidentally be missed. And perhaps there is such a thing. But certainly these lower goods, genuine goods, like health, and so on, are essentially goods, given a bodily being like man, but they indeed themselves are in a way of very little importance compared to the real goods, but they are not so unimportant that one can simply dismiss them. Think of a politician or political scientist who says that since health can be so frequently misused let us forget about public health. A plague has so many advantages, to get rid of juvenile and other delinquents, or so. This could be the case but still it doesn't strike us as a sensible way of looking at this, because there are more proper ways, although perhaps inconvenient ways, of handling the problem of juvenile delinquency.

At any rate, this destruction of the meaningfulness of happiness is absolutely essential to Kant's argument, and yet its preservation is equally important, because, as we shall see when we come to some of the examples, without the desire for happiness presupposed we can never reach the maxim in question. For example, why am I under an obligation to be kind to other human beings? Because my maxim always to be rude and unfriendly and unobliging if made a universal law, everyone ought to be as rude as he can, leads to the consequence that if I happen to need other human beings I would be in a poor position. But the legitimacy of the argument depends entirely on the presupposition that I, who universalize, is the maxim, want to be helped in need. Why? Because I am dependent as a human being, dependent on help, in principle, not necessarily now, but as a human being I am essentially dependent on the help of other human beings, and I seek happiness. Without the presupposition of happiness the categorical imperative does not give its content, at least not a very important part of its content. That is the problem. And therefore it seems that I must say this, a very formalized notion of happiness, that of which you are sure that it would make you content. And that may differ from man to man and from situation to situation. That alone strictly speaking can preserve it, but whether that is possible, whether if we do not assume certain substantive elements of happiness, such as those mentioned by Kant, anything can be said is an open question.

Now see we didn't come very far. We did not even come to the formulation of the categorical imperative. We must do that next time. How we can finish this book in these two meetings is very obscure to me. Of course one could say, let us stay together until seven. I would be willing to do that but I believe it would not be practical because there are limits to what the flesh can bear.

(end of lecture)

I begin by reminding you of the broader context again so we don't lose ourselves completely. I began this course by bringing to your attention Kant's statement on the influence of Rousseau on him. He learned from Rousseau the decisive lesson of the supremacy of morality and this supremacy of morality means almost the same as the supremacy of the recognition of the rights of man. Starting from that authentic utterance we understand Kant's moral philosophy in the following terms: Kant takes over the modern natural right teaching, especially in its Rousseauian form, and gives it a sanctity it did not formerly possess, namely, a sanctity of morality proper as distinguished from a utilitarian calculating morality. Now this modern natural right teaching was meant to be emphatically 'realistic', that is to say, not based on virtue and not even on happiness as the end, because of the subjectivity of happiness. Objectivity can be found only in the conditions of happiness, such as life, self-preservation, liberty, which means judgment on the means for self-preservation, and external freedom for the pursuit of happiness, and, lastly, property, which also may be called pursuit of happiness.

Now this Kant takes over. He limits the basic right to freedom, external freedom, and this freedom is required both for morality and non-morality. By non-morality I mean, in the Kantian context, always happiness. Both for happiness and morality we need external freedom. Kant takes over the modern natural right teaching and integrates it into morality proper. He combines the advantages of this realism, embodied in the modern natural right teaching, and of moral purity. Now if this can be done, nothing could be more desirable. I think all the problems of Kant are rooted in that, because the realism allows him to develop his philosophy of history, where by purely amoral, or immoral, means the just society is produced. The moral purity asserts itself in the assertion that only legality but not morality would be produced, and yet there is some strange interlocking between legality and morality, between the process towards the externally just society and the right spirit which makes the whole thing more satisfactory.

Now, turn now to the more central teaching. External freedom is required for any purpose, which means it does not presuppose any specific purpose. It is defined without any regard to purpose. The same is true of morality. Morality means action from duty as distinguished from action from inclination. Hence, the ground of morality cannot be sought in any ends, all ends being comprised in happiness. In other words, the goodness of the natural inclinations cannot be presupposed. The goodness must be established after the principle of goodness, i.e., morality, has been established. Therefore, we cannot base a moral doctrine on the natural inclinations, as it was done in the past. In other words, if the ground of the moral law is the natural law the moral law is given to man or imposed on man. It is imposed on him by God or by nature. We would have to know first that God or nature are good before we can bow to a law which they impose. Therefore the moral law must be self-given. The conclusion: the genuineness of morality required the emancipation of morality from God and from nature.

Now, first we have to consider the passages in the second section which refer to that. And that requires a problem of coordination of the two editions. That's hard since this section is very long. Starting from the end of the second section, the sixth paragraph.

Among the rational principles of morality there is the ontological concept of perfection. It is empty, indefinite, and consequently useless for finding in the immeasurable field of possible reality the greatest possible sum which is suitable to us, and in specifically distinguishing the reality which is here in question from all other reality it inevitably tends to move in a circle, and cannot avoid tacitly presupposing the morality which is also explained. Nevertheless it is better than the theological concept which derives morality from a most perfect divine will. It is better not merely because we cannot intuit perfection . . .

No, 'because we cannot intuit his perfection.' In other words, we have no knowledge of his perfection

It is better not merely because we cannot intuit his perfection, having rather to derive it only from our own concepts of which morality itself is foremost but also because if we do not so derive it, and to do so would involve a most flagrant circle in explanation, the only remaining concept of the divine will is made up from the attributes of desire for glory and dominion combined with the awful conceptions of might and vengeance, and any system of ethics based on them would be directly opposed to morality.

So, in other words, a theological foundation is impossible. Now, regarding nature. We can perhaps read first where at the third paragraph after this.

In every case in which an object of the will must be assumed as prescribing the rule which is to determine the will the rule is nothing else but heteronomy.

In other words, whenever an object, something given, is the basis of the moral will, whenever something external to the will is taken to be the basis of the good will, the rule is nothing but heteronomy.

The imperative in this case is conditional stating that if or because one wills this object one should act thus or so. Therefore, the imperative can never command morally, that is, categorically.

Take the simplest case: if you want happiness you have to act morally. But your acting morally is predicated on the condition that you wish to be happy. You are not commanded to act morally period, but you are commanded to act morally or else. And this 'or else' is the reason, the condition, for acting morally. That he means. Therefore, it is not a categorical demand, because of the addition of the 'or else'. Now, let us see.

The object may determine the will by means of inclination, as the the principle of one's own happiness, or by means of reason directed to objects of our possible volition in general, as in the principle of perfection, but the will in these cases never determines itself directly by the conception of the action itself but only by the incentive which the foreseen result of the action incites in the will, that is, I ought to do something because I will something else. And here still another law must be assumed in my person as the basis

of this imperative. It would be a law by which I would necessarily will the other thing, but this law would again require an imperative to restrict this maxim.

In other words, Kant says if morality is derived from happiness there must already be a moral command that I desire happiness. A moral command, not a mere natural inclination. Morality cannot be derived, that's Kant's point, from the non-moral. And since the desire for happiness is here understood in itself as non-moral, I cannot have a moral obligation to be concerned with my happiness. Or else I assume a moral obligation to be concerned with my happiness, but then I have to find the ground of the moral obligation, as distinguished from the mere natural inclination.

Since the conception of an object commensurate to our own power incites in the will an impulse according to the natural characteristic of our person this impulse belongs to the nature of the subject, to the sensibility, that is, inclination and taste, or to understanding and reason, which faculties, according to the particular constitution of their nature, takes pleasure in exercising themselves on an object. It follows that it would be really nature that would give the law.

That is curical. In this case nature gives the law. That is clear. Therefore, the law is called, in the traditional meaning, the natural law. Nature gives the law. And why is this impossible?

As a law of nature, known and proved by experience, it would be contingent and therefore unfit to be an apodictical, practical rule, such as the moral rule must be. Such a law always represents heteronomy of the will

'heteronomy' means someone else gives the law.

The will does not give itself the law, but an external impulse gives it to the will according

An 'alien'. Alien or foreign. Freind. In other words, if I obey nature I do not obey myself. That's what Kant means. That's the point which he is making.

but an alien impulse gives to the will according to the nature of the subject which is adapted to receive it.

That is, I think, one of the most important statements on this subject, but there are two more which we have to consider, which show this crucial point, the absolute independence from nature. About the middle of this section. If you take this pagination at the top, 426. Page 84 in your edition, the paragraph beginning, 'here we see philosophy'.

But before we turn to that I remind you again of what we said in the preceding section. The moral principle cannot be derived from human nature. You remember that. That means it cannot be derived from anything. What follows? This paragraph.

Here we see philosophy brought to what it is, in fact a precarious position . . .

'To what it is' is not there. 'Here we see philosophy indeed put on a precarious standpoint'. Precarious is not quite it. Awkward would be better. Although it is not quite good enough, but better than precarious.

which should be made fast . . .

Not 'should be made fast', but 'should be fast', which is meant to be fast.

Which should be fast even though it is supported by nothing in either heaven or earth.

Mind you, Kant really knows what he is saying. It is an absolutely unsupported thing. Absolutely unsupported. And you see also a very interesting casual remark, He doesn't say man, or morality, he says philosophy. So inseparable is morality from philosophy that he can make this perhaps not quite conscious switch from man, or morality, to philosophy. Because what Kant says of philosophy is of course true of morality as well. Morality does not have any support in heaven or on earth, meaning neither God nor nature supports it.

Here philosophy must show its purity as the absolute sustainer of its laws.

These are the moral laws, and they are here of course the laws of philosophy. Isn't that interesting? So impossible is it to leave it at the common moral consciousness as the ground of the moral laws. You remember that, that Kant says the eight year old child - you remember? And then Kant says, unfortunately innocence can be so easily lost, and therefore we need philosophy as a helper to the eight year old child or maybe the fifty year old children. And now we see that philosophy itself is really the giver of the laws. Very strange.

And not as the herald of those which as a blunted sense or one who knows what tutelary nature whispers to it.

Yes, you see, that must be prevented. Man must not remain under any tutelage. Nature, natural law, that would mean that man remains under a tutelage. Man must be himself nature. In him, his nature, that's not him, it is an alien impulse. Remember that.

Those may be better than no laws at all but they can never attain fundamental principles, which reason alone dictates. These fundamental principles must originate entirely a priori and thereby obtain their commanding authority. They can expect nothing from the inclination of men but everything from the supremacy of the law and due respect for it. Otherwise, they condemn man to self-contempt and inner abhorrence.

These are the two most important passages in this book on the radical independence of the moral law. I repeat the thesis: genuine morality requires the emancipation of morality from God and/or from nature. In other words,

only if the law is self-given can the good will be the highest good, for if the good will is identical with mere subjection to the law, and this would correspond to the ordinary understanding of morality, the law, and not the good will, would be the highest good. I have developed this at great length in other meetings. A law preceding the will is accepted on the basis of the expectation of something else. On the crudest level, a law preceding the will is accepted on the basis of the expectation of punishment or reward. But that does not have to be literally true on the highest level. A law preceding the will is accepted on the basis of an expectation of the fulfillment of a need.

Now, this is crucial. There is a reference to that in this marginal enumeration which you have at the top of the page, on page 459, in the midst of a very long paragraph. On page 96, line 5.

There is a further paradox that the sublimity of the maxim of the worthiness of every rational subject to be a legislative member in the realm of ends consists precisely in independence of the maxims from all such incentives. Otherwise he would have to be viewed as subject only to the natural law of his needs.

Kant also calls this an interest in this connection. There must not be an interest involved in our acceptance of the moral law. We may take an interest in the moral law after it exists, but it must not be an interest or a need which drives us to it. That is crucial because what does need mean, a word which is not emphasized here by Kant but which must be emphasized by us? Man is a needy being. That means he lacks many things, he is incomplete. His neediness implies therefore the desire for completeness and the common term for that completeness is happiness. So, if the moral law is in any way rooted in man's needs it would necessarily have happiness as its basis. Another way in which Kant puts it, which sounds very strange if one does not consider in itself, is that happiness is necessarily private intention, as he puts it, which means egoism, or hedonism. These are all crude terms which are not quite up to what Kant means. The main point which he means is, stated very clearly, there cannot be a need as the basis of the moral law. Because need is relative to happiness and happiness is radically distinguished from duty. The law cannot originate, I repeat, in man's needs. In what, then, can it originate? Let us call the alternative to the need, for the time being, man's freedom, of course.

But we cannot help thinking, when we hear the term need, of the most painless presentation of this problem, and this is Plato's analysis in the Banquet. Do you remember this story? The Banquet deals with something which in Greek is called eros, and which we might translate by desire or by love. Now what is love, or desire, according to Plato? The progeny of two radically different parents, poverty and wealth. Poverty, otherwise there would be no desire. Desire means you lack something. But on the other hand if both parents had been poor the progeny wouldn't know anything of fullness, and could therefore not strive towards it. So, if we apply this Platonic analysis, the law cannot originate in man's poverty. It must originate in man's wealth, or fullness. That is crucial, because all notions of the sovereignty of man, or the human mind, or however you call it, are of course based on a tacit assumption of the fullness, and not indigence, or neediness, of the human mind. The sovereignty of the human mind presupposes the absence of poverty.

I mention one more point to show that this is of very great consequence. In everything I said was implied in what we read in Kant last time that there is no distinction between practical reason and the will. There is nothing good apprehended prior to willing it. Because if the good were apprehended prior to the will there would be a distinction between practical reason and will. Now, practical reason and will are the same, and practical reason has, according to Kant, primacy, we may say supremacy. But we see that we are equally entitled then to speak of the supremacy of will, because there is an identity of will and practical reason.

Quite a few changes had to be made but not one in the decisive respect when you come, two or three generations after Kant, to Nietzsche, where the key term is will to power, which is clearly the opposite to the Platonic desire, eros. Not a need for something lacking but an imposition of man's law out of his fullness and wealth. That is what Nietzsche means by the will to power. That is diametrically opposed to it. And, very strangely, Kant plays a great role in the pre-history of Nietzsche, a very great role.

Now, before we turn to a discussion of particular passages, and there are plenty of them, and we will by no means finish a discussion of this section, I would like to discuss briefly, what I did last time to some extent, the reasoning underlying Kant's moral philosophy. By the reasoning I mean this, not the historical basis for that although that is indispensable if one wants to understand fully what is going on, but if we are suddenly confronted as simple people, as we hope we still are somewhere, by Kant's proposal, how the argument would run. Now, I read to you the argument as I found it re-stated in a present day Kantian, Ettinghouse, but that is really based on Kant, substantively. The argument runs as follows: Either man is by nature directed towards the highest end in such a way that he cannot help choosing the highest end, then man of course could not be subject to any command in this respect. His will would be necessarily good. So, we must assume, and that agrees with experience, that man can choose an end different from the highest end and maybe even incompatible with the highest end. In this case, his choosing the highest end must be traced to a motive different from his being by nature ordered towards the highest end. For all men, good or bad, are by nature ordered towards the highest end. Therefore, the question arises, why does M. K., a good man, choose the highest end? That cannot be answered, to repeat, by the fact that he is by nature ordered towards it, because that applies to the bad man who is also ordered towards it and does not choose it. Hence, he must have a prior end which determines him to choose the highest end. A prior end which determines him to choose the highest end. But that would mean that he would choose the highest end for the sake of the lower end. What is primary is the lower end and he chooses for its sake the highest end. He would make the lower end the highest end and this is absurd. Therefore, no end of any kind, but only the categorical imperative, can be the ground of morality, the categorical imperative which tells us to act in a certain manner without any regard to the end. What do you say to this argument, which is extremely brief, and elliptical statement of Kant but fundamentally it amounts to that? This is the reasoning why no end can be presupposed, and the end, the true end, of man can only be derivative from the moral law. We have heard this last time. The moral law makes it certain that man is the end in himself, every man is an end in himself, and therefore the formula which the categorical imperative treats, no man must be treated merely as a means. To repeat: that man should be the end follows from the categorical imperative proper. There is no end prior, logically prior, to the categorical

imperative. There cannot be any end prior, logically prior, to the categorical imperative.

Father Buckley, what does your tradition say to that subject? That there is an end - we are speaking now only of the natural end - to which man is by nature ordered and not all men choose it. Undeniably. What then is that which induces a man, the good man, to choose the highest end, and the bad man to choose another end?

(Well, even a bad man is in a confused way choosing the final end, happiness.)

That's true.

(And psychologically he cannot not choose happiness.)

But, still, what he in fact chooses, what is actual as the end in his mind is something different, wealth, or something of this sort. I would state it as follows: man is by nature directed towards the highest end, but in such a way that his freely choosing the highest end is required for reaching it and even for progressing towards it. It is not an end in the way in which, for example, brutes have ends. That implies however that the highest end is in fact somewhat obscured. If it were perfectly lucid to every man in all situations one could not but choose it. An effort, therefore, is needed to grasp the highest end, and to keep it in mind. The immediate motive for seeking it as distinguished from the natural orderedness towards it could be said to be knowledge. Prior to man's possessing knowledge of that end he has other ends, lower ends, and the realization of the inadequacy of these lower ends leads him to understand the highest end. That would be one possibility to dispose of this particular argument. In other words, the fact that the highest end necessarily has a certain obscurity would explain this empirical fact to which this argument refers. It is not a complete solution to the problem because knowledge does not in itself necessarily kill the ignorance. If someone chooses a very low end while he should know better the mere ignorance cannot be the last word, at least not in all cases, and we have to consider therefore the question of the difference between ignorance and a bad will. But this is a question which we could perhaps with better right address to Kant himself, because, as we have already read on a former occasion, his will is necessarily a good will, and therefore Kant himself has the greatest difficulties of admitting a bad will proper. That I may take - time, I mention this only now.

Now let us turn to some discussion of the famous examples. You remember this great problem: granted that everything Kant said in favor of a necessarily formal moral law, without any matter - lest there by any misunderstanding regarding this point, if the moral law is not grounded on natural ends or on the nature of man then the moral law must be formal. No matter of any kind can enter. That is implied in the rejection of ends. The ethics must be formal. Two critical questions must therefore be addressed to Kant. First, is it really necessary to disregard the natural ends of man in the understanding of morality? Secondly, is it possible to disregard, i.e., will the formal ethics be in a legitimate way true moral rules on which we can act? That is to say, specific rules.

Now, let us turn to this section in this pagination, page 420.

(Page 80, top.)

If I think of a hypothetical imperative as such I do not know what it will contain until the condition is stated under which it is an imperative. But if I think of a categorical imperative I know immediately what it contains, for since the imperative contains, besides the law, only the necessity that the maxim should accord with this law, while the law contains no condition to which it is restricted, there is nothing remaining in it except the universality of the law as such to which the maxim of the action should conform. And in effect this conformity alone is represented as necessary by the imperative. There is therefore only one categorical imperative. It is: act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should be a universal law.

That is the formula. Note this, 'act according to that maxim through which'. Does he translate that literally? 'Through which thou canst will at the same time, simultaneously'. You must be able to will it through your maxim. In other words, your maxim must itself be moral. Take the maxim, to get rich by hook and by crook. Through this maxim you cannot will that it should become a universal law. But if you take the maxim, to help people who need help, through this maxim you can will that it should be a universal law.

Skip the next paragraph and then go on.

The universality of law, according to which effects are produced, constitutes what is properly called nature, in the most general sense, as to form, that is, the existence of things so far as it is determined by universal laws. By analogy, then the universal imperative of duty can be expressed as follows: act as though the maxim of your action were by your will to become a universal law of nature.

You see, that is not the strict formulation. That is only an analogous, or typical, formulation. That is very important. Kant makes it clear by his language. 'It could be called this way'. It is not the strict formulation. The difference is important because this most famous formulation regarding not treating any man as a mere means does not belong to the strict but to the analogous, or typical, formulation. It's a kind of sound illustration, but not the strict formulation. That is of some importance.

Now let us try first to understand that and to discuss a few examples. You find some discussion which is quite helpful in a book by Paton on the categorical imperative. I take some examples from him. Let us assume my maxim is to play games in my spare time, and I universalize the maxim, everyone ought to play games in their spare time. All right. But then we look at another man who acts on the maxim to read light literature in his spare time. He universalizes it, everyone ought to read light literature in his spare time. Neither maxim, universalized, contradicts itself. Both maxims, if universalized, contradict each other, because you cannot possibly, if you devote all your spare time to light literature, devote it to playing games. The conclusion is this: if different maxims regarding the same matter can equally well be universalized, the matter in question is morally irrelevant. Take as another maxim where you would see difficulties arise to take pot-shots at passers-by in your spare time. That cannot be universalized because you may be one of the passers-by in a given

situation and you wouldn't like that. Whether that is a good argument we shall consider later, but why should he not be willing to accept that you ask?

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

No, you would have to proceed this way: everyone ought to become a carpenter, and another man has the maxim, everyone ought to become a butcher, which can also be universalized without his contradicting himself, but since they predicate on the same matter, namely, profession, and contradict themselves regarding that, therefore the matter is morally indifferent.

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

But then you bring in material considerations. Do you see? I mean, that is exactly the point. I mean, we disregard the question where happiness comes in, whether happiness does not have to come in with every maxim. Take this: I know only one thing, I know nothing of good or bad, only the ability of universalizing the maxim guarantees the morality. That's the only thing I know. Then I say, everyone ought to become a carpenter. I don't contradict myself. If I want to become a carpenter there is no contradiction between my maxim and a universal law. But then I look at another fellow, who wants to become a butcher, and he universalizes this maxim, and he also does not contradict himself. That means simply that this matter is not one which offers itself to this kind of universalization. Therefore this matter is morally indifferent. I mean, you are not an immoral man if you choose carpentry in preference to butchery or an academic career in preference to carpentry, or vice-versa. That is morally indifferent. That is what he is driving at.

(It seems to me that in both these cases you would find internal contradictions because if everyone were a carpenter there would be no one to give you work as a carpenter.)

Then you bring in empirical considerations.

(No, it seems to me that the matters are directly contradictory . . .)

No, but in each case, you must admit that - the point is this, your maxim must be susceptible of universalization without contradicting yourself.

(I cannot be a carpenter if everyone else is a carpenter.)

I see, but I think you would know that on the basis of empirical knowledge. Let me see . . .

(Or nobody can be a carpenter if everyone is a carpenter.)

Yes, I really don't know whether this would be still called empirical knowledge. I believe Kant would have to say so. I suggest, however, that we proceed for the time being with these more formal considerations, because the other ones are bound to come in shortly.

Kant, we may say, thinks only of maxims where the universalization creates a problem. In our case, I like to do in my spare time what I enjoy. Let us

take this more general formula. I universalize that, everyone ought to do in his spare time what he enjoys. No problem for anyone. No tension between duty and inclination. And therefore no particular morality in that, in enjoying yourself, only if it is not immoral. But I like to play games in my spare time. Everyone ought to do what I like. But that is destructive of the freedom of everyone, which means that if I universalize that, I ought to do what any other man likes, which is manifestly impossible. Here I contradict myself and I learn something. The suppression of my inclination to dominate, everyone ought to like what I like, is my duty, because that cannot be universalized.

Now take another maxim, which is more interesting. My maxim is to worship only Zeus, and I say, everyone ought to worship only Zeus. You see, I take a fictitious example, because those who worship Zeus always worship other gods too. But now let us come to another maxim, to worship only the Biblical God. Everyone ought to worship only the Biblical God. Both maxims can be universalized equally well, and yet they contradict each other if both are universalized. What then is the root of the maxim in each case? Personal belief. Everyone ought to believe only in that god in whom I believe, that cannot be universalized. And therefore religion in this sense is morally neutral. Which is implied in Kant's categorical imperative. That is, only natural religion, not any positive religion, can be morally different, morally relevant. So, that is also implied in that.

Let us take now this first example. But read also the introductory note.

We shall now enumerate some duties, adopting the usual division of them into duties to ourselves and to others, and into perfect and imperfect duties.

And Kant proceeds as follows. First, perfect duty towards yourself. Then, perfect duty towards others. Imperfect duty towards oneself; and imperfect duty towards others. That is the arrangement. Kant has a note here in which he states that this distinction differs somewhat from the traditional distinction, traditional in his time. According to the then prevalent view to which he refers, there are only external perfect duties, which means enforceable duties are only duties towards others. That was the school doctrine in Germany at that time, but this is of minor interest to us now. Let us read the first example.

A man who is reduced to despair by a series of evils feels a weariness with life but is still in possession of his reason sufficiently to ask whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life. Now he asks whether the maxim of his action could become a universal law of nature. His maxim, however, is: for love of myself I make it my principle to shorten my life when a longer duration or it threatens more evil than satisfaction.

Annehmlichkeit. Almost pleasure. Satisfaction would be too strong. What is Annehmlichkeit? One could say pleasure. It would be better than satisfaction. Agreeableness. Pleasantness.

The only question which still arises, Kant says. In other words, it is all right to will what I want. The only question which arises is if it is moral.

But the only question which arises is whether this principle of self-love could become a universal law of nature.

This principle, namely, as qualified here.

One immediately sees a contradiction . . .

Kant says, 'one sees soon', which makes a slight difference.

One sees soon a contradiction in a system of nature whose law would be to destroy life by the feeling whose special office is to impel the improvement of life.

The feeling is self-love.

In this case, it would not exist as nature. Hence, that maxim cannot obtain as a law of nature and thus it wholly contradicts the supreme principle of all duty.

And since it contradicts it simply, it is a perfect duty not to commit suicide on this ground. I emphasize 'on this ground', namely, the ground of self-love, because Kant leaves it open in another work of his, Metaphysics of Morals, whether if someone chooses suicide out of duty this might not be legitimate. He gives the example of Frederick the Great of Prussia who carried poison with himself in case he would be made prisoner by his enemies in the Seven Years' War lest the government then would make peace in order to ransom him at a condition unfavorable to Prussia, and Frederick toyed with the thought that in this case he would take poison. Kant does not say it is immoral.

And he gives also some other examples. Let me see if I can quickly find them. Well, the action of Curtius, who jumped into the abyss to save Rome, which is in a way suicide of course. Kant leaves it open. So, the question is only suicide committed out of self-love in order to avoid the unpleasantness and inconvenience of life. This is, according to Kant, morally wrong.

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

Well, you must speak to Kant's principle. The only moral question discussed by Kant is suicide for reasons of self-love. Now that means you claim for yourself the right to destroy your life on the basis of that feeling, self-love, which was put into you in order to promote and preserve life. That's the decisive point.

(Must every maxim have strictly only one maxim in which it can be universalized? Can't there be some actions where there is a logical possibility of multiple universalization?)

I never considered that. I think Kant implies only one. But how would it affect the position?

(Well, I was wondering, with your previous example, I worship Zeus, couldn't you universalize that into everyone ought to worship the god of his choice?)

Sure.

(That would make a difference then between universalizing that way and universalizing it everyone should worship Zeus.)

That is not the same example. Everyone should enjoy himself as he sees fit in his spare time. Which means everyone may enjoy himself as he sees fit in his spare time in an innocent way. In other words - now I see. What are you driving at? Are you driving at this point that everyone ought to worship some god but which god is left to his choice. Is that it?

(Yes.)

I have never thought this through. Maybe. Maybe that would be tenable from Kant's point of view. But there would be theoretical objection on Kant's ground because the moral law demands the positing of one God, and therefore there would be some great difficulties.

(I was also wondering whether he ever discusses the actual logical procedure of the universalization.)

No. That is very simple. I don't want to pay taxes, No one ought to pay taxes. I simply replace I or myself by everybody or nobody, whatever the case may be, and I replace desire by ought. That's all he means. He means nothing else.

(I was wondering granting two maxims could logically be generalized of the same act whether that doesn't bring in a certain element of prudence.)

According to Kant, not. Because that merely shows that the matter is not subject to legislation. It is morally irrelevant.

(If it were possible to state as the general maxim of that, no one ought to pay taxes, or no one who doesn't want to ought to pay taxes, and if both of those were logically in the same relationship . . .)

Sure. That would also mean that this taxes is in itself morally irrelevant and becomes morally relevant only on the basis of the law insofar as the maxim, I do not wish to obey the positive law, is not universalizable. This way. That would simply mean that the matter of taxation in itself is morally neutral, just as driving left or right. The morally interesting maxim is obedience to the positive law or not and that cannot be universalized. Because if you universalize the maxim not to obey the positive law then you abolish the positive law as far as in you lies. The problem inherent in that, that was Hegel's problem, is why should there be any positive law. That must be settled in advance. We come to that later.

But let us now look more precisely at this precise statement which Kant makes here. I will try to interpret that. The would-be suicide thinks of happiness and misery but not of duty. But it is duty to think of his duty, to raise the question is it right to commit suicide. He is prompted by his self-love but the question of right and wrong cannot be decided by one's self-love. This perspective is too narrow. It is a perspective of passion as distinguished from reason. The question, is it right, gives me the proper perspective. The would-be suicide has to forget for a while about his situation, about his allegedly desperate situation, allegedly desperate because true

knowledge of what constitutes desparateness or not is not possible. A desperate situation would be one in which one could not possibly think of an alternative. But the mere reminder of the idea of duty shows him an alternative to despair, as well as, incidentally, an alternative to elatedness, in the opposite case. He sees his situation then not as the situation, completely wrapped up in it, but as one case, one example. He universalizes therefore his maxim. All men may commit suicide for the sake of self-love if their future looks desperate. He thinks of it in terms of a law of nature. The law of nature compels self-love to incite to self-destruction. Here there is a self-contradiction, that a law of nature compels self-love to incite to self-destruction. No being built on this principle could exist if that desire which makes it desire life makes it at the same time desire death and destruction. To commit suicide out of self-love is immoral. That is Kant's argument. What do you say to that?

(change of tape)

Yes?

(Couldn't you say that nature incites you to a love of a good life rather than mere life so that nature would be consistent if it impelled you to self-destruction when there was no possibility of a good life?)

Yes, but this of course you never know whether there is no more possibility. That you never know. You only assume that. No one can know that because no one can know the future. This simple desperate situation now, the greatest misery even, can change for all you know in half an hour. No one can know that. But I admit, according to the general prudential way of acting we are sure it will not change in a half an hour because we have tried all possible helps, but we cannot truly know that.

(From the way Kant argues though, I mean that isn't what he bases his suicide argument on, that things may change, that there's a great uncertainty about this, but what he argues on is that nature couldn't exist if self-love leads to self-destruction.)

Sure, ultimately. Ultimately.

(I don't see that that is necessary that such a nature couldn't exist.)

But how? Prove that.

(Because, for the most part it would not lead to such desperate straits as this man is in at the moment. Most men probably never seriously consider taking their own life because although things may be tough every once in a while they are not at the point where suicide is seriously considered, and if ever once in a while someone did take their own life there are still a lot of other people around, and nature goes on. It's just a question of whether you can conceive it or not. He says you can't even conceive of it because it involves a contradiction.)

Very good. What does he do then? You take the common-sensical Aristotelian view that nature is not simply uniform, but mostly. And therefore if a few members of the species do something outlandish the species itself can perfectly

survive. Kant tacitly makes nature subject only to uniformity, and therefore either/or. One could also say, with what right can I choose a teleological interpretation of nature? Self-love.

I would say there is another case in Kant himself, and it is always good if the same author contradicts himself, for then one is sure to be on his ground. Do you remember in the philosophy of history when Kant speaks of how nature brings about the just society? Do you remember the argument? By the antagonism among men. Nature uses the antagonism among men to bring about the just society. Part of this is war, and in war, as we all know, human life is destroyed. So, here we see that nature can very well exist although nature herself according to Kant uses this self-love of some men to destroy the life of other men. I mean we speak here of the universality and therefore it doesn't make this difference whether nature uses this self-love for the destruction of this same individual or for the destruction of another individual of the same species. This proves that nature can exist in spite of the considerable destruction of life both the self-love and the self-destruction based on the same principle of self-love.

(Well, in that case nature is not using self-love in order to destroy life but in order to advance and enhance life.)

You mean because she uses it bring about peace at the end?

(Yes.)

But the question arises - one would then have to consider this possibility in this argument, whether it is not an artifice of nature to bring about the suicide of men who are particularly unable to bear this kind of life. A kind of natural eugenics.

But I will state it somewhat differently to show you that it is really - that it really wouldn't work. If it is absolutely wrong to commit suicide to escape hopeless misery, or what you regard as hopeless misery, the moral law commands men in principle to live in misery, given that condition. Is this correct? All right, then let us read the next example.

Another man finds himself forced by need to borrow money. He knows well that he will not be able to repay it, but he also sees that nothing will be loaned him if he does not promise to repay at a certain time. He desires to make such a promise but he has enough conscience to ask himself whether it is not improper and opposed to duty to relieve his distress in such a way. Now, assuming he does not decide to do so, the maxim of his action would be as follows: when I believe myself to be in need of money . . .

You see, 'I believe', because there is never a certainty about that. There can be restrictions in your expenses below any restrictions conceivable. There are so many garbage cans in which you can find crumbs of bread. There are so many people from whom you can beg. And so on. You cannot know that. That's what Kant says. The economists know that, I believe, that there is no minimum.

when I believe myself in need of money I will borrow money and pro-

nise to repay it although I know I shall never do so. Now, this principle of self-love or his own benefit may very well be compatible with his whole future welfare, but the question is whether it is right. He changes the pretension of self-love into a universal law and then puts the question; how would it be if my maxim became a universal law? He immediately sees that it could never hold as a universal law of nature and be consistent with itself. Rather, it must necessarily contradict itself. For the universality of such a law which says that anyone who believes himself to be in need could promise what he pleased with the intention not of fulfilling it would make the promise itself and the end to be accomplished by it impossible. No one would believe what was promised to him but would only laugh at any assertion as a vain pretense.

Yes. We have discussed this before, haven't we? Do you remember what we made out on that occasion? It was a similar example. We discussed it rather from a different point of view I think. Most generally stated, I must never make a promise with the understanding that I will not keep it. Good. And my argument followed substantially Hegel's reasoning, because 'I have the will for all future time not to keep it'. What does this 'will' mean? Must the will not include what I know and I know that sometimes promises cannot be kept for moral reasons. There are unforeseeable situations in which it may even be my duty not to return it. I can't know that. I do not anticipate it in any particular way but I must be aware of this possibility. Therefore every promise made with full consciousness of the situation implied in any promise includes the possibility that I may morally not will to keep it in a certain situation. And therefore, because of its formality, it is too crude, too singly.

But the example I had chiefly in mind was the fourth one.

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

Because I am a crook. That's what he means. Because I am a crook and I know that I don't want to pay. There is some looseness of expression in Kant but these things he seems to have written with great care. Now let us turn to the fourth example which I think is crucial.

A fourth man, for whom things are going well sees that others whom he could help, have to struggle with great hardships and he asks, what concern of it is mine. Let each one be as happy as heaven wills or as he can make himself. I will not take anything from him or even envy him but to his welfare or to his assistance in times of need I have no desire to contribute. If such a way of thinking were a universal law of nature certainly the human race could exist and without doubt even better than in a state where everyone talks of sympathy and good will or even exerts himself occasionally to practice them while on the other hand he cheats when he can and betrays or otherwise violates the rights of man. Now, though it is possible that a universal law of nature according to that maxim could exist it is nevertheless impossible to will that such a principle should hold everywhere as a law of nature, for a will which resolved this would conflict with itself since instances can often arise in which

he would need the love and sympathy of others and in which he would have robbed himself by such a law of nature springing from his own will of all hope of the aid he desires.

Yes. We can call this the maxim of hard-heartedness. The maxim of hard-heartedness, I will never help anyone, cannot be universalized, because I cannot exclude the possibility of my needing help. Therefore my hard-hearted will now and my possible will to receive help contradict each other. I cannot consistently will that I shall not be helped by others under any circumstances. I cannot will a law which condemns me in principle to live in misery, given certain conditions. That's the nerve of the argument. Because in this situation of which Kant thinks here where I regretted, that is to say, because I have imposed on myself the law never to receive help, is of course a thing which happens only under certain conditions. I think that is a direct parallel to the case of suicide, where the moral law condemns me in principle to live in misery. Why should it not be the case here?

Yet, one can say that both the maxim of hard-heartedness and its opposite can be universalized, meaning, helping others and never helping others, and the issue would be morally neutral. To say nothing of the fact, which we must never forget, that according to Kant happiness is merely an ideal of the imagination, and here in this case it is of course used as something which can legitimately - that is to say, of every man, that every man may need help from others and that means of course that happiness has a certain definiteness. He needs help with a view to the indispensable conditions of happiness.

I'm again satisfied as far as I am concerned that somehow it doesn't work, to get specific moral laws, by the universalization of the maxims. But Kant means of course something very important, and I think we see this point most clearly, I saw it most clearly here, in the third example, to which we shall turn now.

A third man finds in himself a talent which could by means of some cultivation make him in many respects a useful man, but he finds himself in comfortable circumstances and prefers indulgence and pleasure to troubling himself with the broadening and improvement his fortunate natural gifts. Now, however, let him ask whether his maxim of neglecting his gifts, besides agreeing with his propensity to idle amusement, agrees also with what is called duty. He sees that a system of nature could indeed exist in accordance with such a law even though a man, like the inhabitants of the South Sea Islands, should let his talents rust and resolve to devote his life merely to idleness, indulgence, and propagation, in a word, to pleasure.

Did you ever read books by P. G. Wodehouse? There is a club The Drones. These are such people. They are in a way very nice people. They don't do any harm to anyone. But they are indeed drones.

But he cannot possibly will that this should become a universal law of nature, or that it should be implanted in us by natural instinct, for, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that all his faculties should be developed, inasmuch as they are given to him for all sorts of possible purposes.

Yes. Now, disregarding now again the implicit teleological understanding of nature, which is a difficult question how Kant can do that, since, according to him, there is no theoretical knowledge possible. First there must be the moral law, and on the basis of it a teleological interpretation can be postulated on practical grounds. But, apart from that, if you see what Kant is really doing, you recognize something which has a great pre-history, and which is this: what does he ask this drone to do? To step for one moment out of his dronish existence, and to take on what position? He just lives in the world, protected by laws and perhaps favored by wealth and other external goods and doesn't care, and what is he now supposed to do? To step out of that and to take on a responsibility. But what kind of responsibility? The responsibility of a founder of nature. You can see also say a creator. Then, he will see he could not possibly wish that. I refer to that because that is in a way the action of Plato's Republic. There you have two people who are by no means sure of morality. I mean, they are driven towards it but they are theoretically doubtful whether that is really sound drive, a sound impulse. And then Socrates makes an experiment with them. All right, he says, let us assume that injustice, or immorality, is good and then let us take the clearest and most perfect case of the immoral man, the tyrant. All right, let's try to be tyrants. But the tyrant is a poor fish, because he exploits a city already in existence. A much greater figure would be the founder of a city. The founder of a city does not exploit a city already in existence but he is responsible for the being of the city. He is much bigger from the point of view of mere prestige than a mere tyrant. So, let's found a city. They don't have people around so they found it only in speech but that doesn't affect the moral issue. In the moment they do that they see they must be concerned with making the city as safe and as powerful and as good as possible, because their prestige as founders depends entirely on that. In other words, they are made to think in this way of the common good, still taking, in a strictly selfish way, the attitude of the founder. I mean, the founder is concerned only with his prestige in this case and cannot help serving if he wants to rule. Of course Plato knows that this is not sufficient and therefore something else is needed. This fellow must undergo a conversion from any form of selfishness to philosophy. That comes later. But even on this first level something important is achieved by taking responsibility even on selfish grounds.

Kant's experiment here is in one way comparable. Make yourself responsible for nature; that means, consider your will as a law establishing a nature. If you do that then, and then alone, will you judge properly. So, as is shown by the Platonic example, this whole notion is not in its entirety dependent on Kant's specific premises. And the appeal which Kant had, and the evidence which his teaching had for many people, is some sign, it seems to me, that there is something to it. I tried to show that by my remarks about suicide, how Kant means this reflection of the will to suicide, to get out of the narrowness of passion, and by replacing yourself by everybody else, but this can only be done clearly by universalizing your situation. Think not only of what you are in now and passion consists in that that it narrows man's vision to his situation now. It must be counter-acted by the opposite movement, the broadest perspective: any human being, or nature as whole. That is surely the important and true point in Kant's thought, but whether - if we look only at Plato we see that this founder cannot begin to work if he does not constantly consider the nature of man. Otherwise how can he build up a city of men? That's a great difference. But the notion of universalization is an important part of

the moral will. That is so without any question. Well, that is of course also recognized on other doctrines which speak of the impartial spectator, we should look at ourselves as an impartial spectator would. That is in principle the same. Kant's formula has perhaps certain advantages.

Do you have some uneasiness?

(Yes.)

Why don't you communicate it to us?

(I'm not sure still why it should be a moral duty to live a sedentary life, to develop the faculties, if the only truly good thing is a good will. If the only truly good thing is a good will I don't see why it should have to enter into this will that it should develop the faculties.)

But what is the good will? The good will means to obey the law, and the law can only be known through the universalization of a maxim. So, the good will means to act according to universalizable maxims. Kant contends that the maxim of the hare at Rome, I forget his name, cannot be universalized. The maxim of Teddy Roosevelt, to speak softly and carry a big stick, cannot be universalized. You cannot will that it be a universal law that man ought not to cultivate his talents . . . several inaudible words . . . but we are not concerned with what he likes to do but with what he ought to do, and therefore we must see whether this maxim can be universalized. And Kant says, if he steps out of the charmed circle of his customary way of living and looks at it responsibly that from now on all men would be morally obliged not to cultivate their talents, he contradicts himself as a creator of nature. He couldn't wish to be a creator of a world in which there are human beings with all kinds of possibilities who should always crush them. He couldn't wish that, because he would contradict himself.

(It still seems to me that something else is being posited as unquestionably good, namely, the development of all sorts of faculties which may not necessarily contribute to the goodness of the will.)

That Kant denies. Kant says this: nature has in fact put in man . . . several inaudible words . . . what should our attitude be towards that fact? And Kant says, if we look at nature responsibly and not from the point of view of our life here and now, we see, as full founders, full creators, of nature, we couldn't not will to be responsible . . . several inaudible words . . . Now, I believe that it is fundamentally a teleological interpretation of nature. Is this not your difficulty? In other words, this particular form of the formula, according to the laws of nature, is, according to Kant himself, not the strict formula. And then the question would be this: with what right can we rephrase the strict formal principle, the universal applicability of maxims by the somewhat symbolic formulation where the laws of nature enter? That would be the difficulty. This is not discussed in this book but in the Critique of Practical Reason.

(I still have some logical difficulty. Suppose someone says: I don't want to develop my talents. Then he universalizes that: no one ought to develop his talents . . .)

That he really doesn't do . . . several inaudible words . . . no, his maxim would be: those who are not particularly inclined and in no way compelled by their situation to develop their talents should lead the life of a drone. That is practically universalizable.

(My trouble is that that is not a full universalization of the maxim, for if you substitute 'everyone' for 'I' then you would get no one should develop his talents. Suppose someone else said, I will not develop my talents, and my maxim is that no one should develop his talents. Now, that's wrong. That doesn't make it right that everyone should develop his talents.)

Let us take another example. I don't know whether I quite understand you. Let's take the example of marriage. Someone says, I don't want to marry. I universalize it, no one ought to marry. What follows from that? It follows from that that there must be a law that everyone ought to marry? What about Kant himself? So, that cannot be the case.

What I'm driving at is this. The universalization does not necessarily mean every human being. Or, we could - there must be some basis for duties for particular kinds of men. For example, let us take a maxim of a father qua father. This cannot by its very meaning be universalized. And similarly here the question how should one proceed? One can safely say that neither the maxim, no one ought to marry, or, everyone ought to marry, can be required. But the question is what is the principle which we follow here? What would that imply? It would imply that marriage while not necessarily morally irrelevant is necessarily involuntary, in the way in which membership in civil society is not morally voluntary. But the question is how can we arrive at that conclusion by the formula. That is what you mean. Now let me see how it works. We can universalize everyone ought to marry. We cannot universalize no one ought to marry.

(Why not? Dogs and horses don't marry.)

That is true. In other words, there would already be presupposed some substantive reflection why indiscriminate mating is not proper. That's true. Which Kant by the way does, on the basis of the duty of man, but that comes in in a very complicated way. I really don't know how to proceed in this case.

(. . . inaudible question . . .)

All right, but what would be the specification here? . . . several inaudible words . . . I really don't know how to proceed. Does anyone have some idea which would shed some light on the universalization in this case?

(. . . inaudible response . . .)

For Kant marriage is a moral institution based on the fact that the alternative, namely, indiscriminate mating outside of marriage, is incompatible with the decency of man. The construction is - some people said it proves that Kant was a bachelor. Kant was a bachelor - well, it is this: Kant conceives of mating as the use of another being as a mere means. So, in other words, two human beings use each other as mere means. This must not be encouraged, but remedied by marriage. So, in other words, by this they are no longer - it

is a very strange construction, which really serves only this purpose. Because if he had taken the traditional view, procreation and the bringing up of children, then there is a certain difficulty here, for a man like Kant, in childless marriage. Instead of saying that childless marriage in a certain respect is defective, because the relation between the two sexes is not absolutely limited by the presence of offspring although it has a natural correctness. Kant must take a position which fits equally well every marriage. Now, what belongs necessarily to every marriage is the right and duty of sexual intercourse. And therefore Kant makes a construction of marriage with a view to this fact alone. And in order to give it dignity he must bring in the dignity of man as threatened by sexual intercourse and therefore remedied by the institution of marriage. That is more or less it. That is a particularly thorny part of Kant's argument and I believe no Kantian ever accepted that. But, as I say, that is a very complicated thing. After he has established the dignity of man in the further argument that follows here then on this basis his construction of marriage develops. But there is no attempt to prove the moral necessity of marriage on grounds of the mere universalization of the maxim.

(Another thing which has been bothering me is that nature seems to keep coming back in here as the ground . . .)

Yes, in one way or another, though Kant would of course say he is not looking at natural ends of man but only at the formal character of nature as a self-subsistent system. By your maxim you as far as in you lies will a nature of a certain kind, a nature which is impossible to will. That is really true, without this scheme, as he calls it, of nature he cannot give this argument. He says later on that the same arguments can be made on the basis of the dignity of man. But here there is another point, which we will come to, that in the discussion of the dignity of man there is this very great ambiguity. On what is the dignity based? The fact that he is subject to the moral law, or the fact that he obeys the moral law? Kant switches from one to the other without notifying us. That makes an enormous difference.

(I thought it was the fact that he gives the moral law to himself.)

Yes, but that, at any rate, is very ambiguous. We can perhaps take a look at that passage. The last paragraph before the thick heading, the autonomy of will as the highest principle of morality.

(Bottom of page 96.)

From what has just been said it can easily be explained how it happens that, although in the concept of duty we think of subjection to the law, we do nevertheless ascribe a certain sublimity and dignity to the person who fulfills all his duties.

Listen to that, 'which fulfills all his duties'. Surely, we have respect for such a man.

Although there is no sublimity in him insofar as he is subject to the moral law. Yet he is sublime insofar as he is legislative with reference to the law and subject to it only for this reason.

Mind you, subject only to the moral law because he gives to himself the

moral law.

We have also shown above how neither fear nor inclination to the law is the incentive which can give a moral worth to action. Only respect for it can do so. Our own will insofar as it would act only under the condition of the universal legislation rendered possible by its maxim, this will, ideally possible for us, is the proper object of respect, although with the condition that it is itself subject to this same legislation.

You see, you have both statements. And while I think it will not be denied by anyone that a man who fulfills all his duties would be worthy of the highest respect it is a difficult thing to say that of every man because he might fulfill his duties. That's a difficulty. A certain gradation would at least be in order. One can also state it as follows; against those who say Kant has ascribed a much higher dignity to man than say Aristotle did, because of this remark. I'm not so sure this is really true. Well, what people say crudely is this: on this basis it is absolutely impossible to allow slavery, because a slave, according to Aristotle is a mere animate tool. And no man can be a tool and nothing else, according to Kant. He must also be an end in himself. But what does Aristotle really say about slavery. He says this about the animate tool but he also says that there is no gradation between human beings which is free from right, from moral responsibility, which means of course that he recognizes the other as a bearer of rights and duties. I would say that all men of some decency have always acted on this principle, although not always on the Kantian ground. I don't believe that this in itself in any way leads to a greater respect for man than you had on the basis of the earlier teaching. And it is only linked up with the great ambiguity, which you find here in one and the same short paragraph, the man who fulfills all his duties and the man who may fulfill all his duties, exactly the opposite. I think that that Kant makes this reference is no accident, because his respect for every human being, regardless of what he does, qua man, and this of course applies equally to all men, derives its evidence from the clear case of the man whom we respect because of his actual morality, who fulfills all his duties. And Kant says of the good will, the only unqualified good, the highest good, the jewel, and everything else is absolutely irrelevant. It is a good will, and not merely the will.

The difference comes out in the following way, the relevant way. If you think of Locke's remarks at the beginning of Civil Government, second part, when he speaks of men who harm others - do you remember that - and he says they must be killed like other noxious animals: tigers, wolves, or what not. Kant says no. Of course they must be killed, but we can never treat a human being, however perverse and beastly, like a lion or tiger; i.e., like a being which cannot possibly have any responsibility for his actions. We owe it to every man that we respect the responsibility, which he may not respect, and therefore human punishment must be something radically different from the shooting of a mad dog. Although such cases also do exist, where in fact - you know, take a homicidal maniac, and the man - you know, you read such descriptions in the papers, where someone is killed because he would kill more people. But that is a case of an extreme emergency. Human punishment is meant to be something different from hitting a bull over the head. That is indeed true. But I would say there is not a trace of evidence to assume that Aristotle or Plato thought of punishment in other terms, in terms, for example, with a

view to the possibility of improvement. That is the point which Plato makes, which shows at least that this thought crossed his mind, a thing which could not possibly occur in the case of a brute.

Well, we must leave it at this. Next time Mr. __ will read his paper.

(end of lecture)

. . . and I do not agree with everything you said, but you gave a very good analysis, a very profound analysis of the problem. Taking up what you said towards the end, I would suggest this point, that is quite truly observed, that modern natural science in its original form, the Newtonian form, wants to establish uniformity. Given teleology, we necessarily have such things as defects, not reaching the end, and all this kind of thing. That is true but Kant to me seems to solve the problem in this way: we have the uniformity of nature, in the Newtonian sense. But that is not sufficient because there is morality. And what does Kant do? He finds another realm, radically distinct from the realm of nature. But here, again, uniformity. Therefore, the problem of the bad will is really not solvable. In the realm of morality, there is always a good will. All rational beings as members of the realm of ends. As such they are all good wills. But, on the other hand, if we look at the empirical, sensible, world, we also find uniformity, namely, beings striving for happiness, and that is in principle the same in all men, and uniform. It is also uniform that they do not reach it, because happiness is an ideal of the imagination and not of reason. We have two spheres of laws, uniform laws, and the real difficulty is that man's being in-between - man having a bad will. He should act rightly, but he does not act rightly, that this becomes then an unsolvable problem for Kant. With this modification I would accept your analysis.

I thought you understood very well the peculiar difficulty of this last section of the Foundations by taking the question very seriously. The question is really not how is morality possible, or how is the good will possible. The question is how is the categorical imperative possible. And the difference is this: the good will, or morality, is not limited to man, or to finite beings, or to beings which are purely rational. The categorical imperative is that form of morality which applies to beings who cannot be good. Therefore it is an imperative, a command, which would not be possible and necessary in the case of a simply good being. And therefore analyzing the categorical imperative and trying to establish its conditions is identical with the question of the two worlds, because man belongs essentially to the two worlds. Therefore, that I found to be very good and very clear.

As for the beginning of your paper where you spoke of the circle of which Kant speaks I think you gave it a non-Kantian solution, because when Kant takes it up later on, you will remember, he denies that it is circular. He denies that it is circular. From Kant's point of view a circular reasoning is, as for Aristotle, a vicious reasoning, but you thought forward to Hegel, and you gave in a way an Hegelian interpretation of what Kant was doing, and that is defensible on this ground, but it is not the Kantian interpretation of that.

Now, let us then turn to a detailed discussion of this part. Now, at the end of the second section Kant raises the question how is the categorical imperative as a synthetic practical proposition a priori possible, and why is it necessary. That means in the context as could easily be shown by many quotations from earlier parts of the argument, and as you will remember, that Kant has argued this way: I take the common notions of morality, the common things I should say, and Kant tried to give the clearest and most precise formulation of what people mean when they speak of the good man, of duty, or of any other moral term. But this left still open the question, as Kant said: whether these ordinary notions are not fantastic, chimerical, in themselves. And that is the greatest difficulty of this third section. The third section is meant

to deduce morality from a higher principle, and that is a problem which really Kant cannot admit, and therefore in his somewhat later writing, the Critique of Practical Reason, he did not - that is not equivalent to this third section. But nevertheless that Kant at a certain stage of his thought felt it necessary to give a deduction of morality is very instructive as far as the problem is concerned. The alternative, to state this at once, would be to assert that the morality, or the categorical imperative, is irreducible, not deducible from any higher principle. It is the highest principle. He is tending towards that in this book as you see from the very beginning: the good will is the highest good. And that would mean it is not deducible from anything else. But here Kant is still worried by the necessity of a deduction and we must see how far we can understand better what Kant is driving at from that.

So, at the beginning of the third section Kant asserts that the concept of freedom is the key for the explanation of the autonomy of the will. We know by now that the autonomy of the will is the same as morality. And Kant speaks here first of a negative concept of freedom, where freedom is only understood as independence of alien causes. So a being is free if in a given action it is not determined to that action by an alien cause. For example, you are stung by a mosquito and you have the urge to hit, you are absolutely determined by the alien cause, the mosquito. That is at least possible, that there may be actions to which we are not determined by any alien causes. But that cannot be made clear if we do not turn from the negative concept of freedom to the positive concept. According to the positive concept freedom means in deed being dependant only on oneself and not on an alien cause, but this dependance must be understood as a dependance according to a law, a law of an entirely kind, the law of freedom. Freedom in the positive sense means to be a law to oneself, or to have a good will. Now, Kant argues as follows: if we presuppose freedom of the will morality follows analytically. But why must we presuppose freedom?

Why must we presuppose freedom? In the second heading here, Kant says freedom must be presupposed as a quality of the will of all rational beings. Why is that so? Why must freedom be presupposed? In other words, we do not now begin with morality, we begin now from freedom. Freedom must be presupposed as the quality of all rational beings. On page 105 in your edition.

It is not enough to ascribe freedom to our will on any grounds whatever if we do not also have sufficient grounds for attributing it to all rational beings. For since morality serves as a law for us only as rational beings, morality must call down all rational beings. And since it must be derived exclusively from the property of freedom, freedom as the property of the will of all rational beings must be demonstrated. And it does not suffice to prove it from certain alleged experiences of human nature which is indeed impossible as it can be proved only a priori. But we must prove it as belonging generally to the activity of rational being endowed with will.

Now will recall perhaps an earlier passage in the second section, on page 412 - we can't read that now - where Kant says morality must not be deduced from the essence or nature of man, but from the essence or nature of any rational being. And that seems to be what Kant will try to do. Because we have to understand the general character of the argument, if you take a little bit later

when this new section comes, 'of the interest which belongs to the ideas of morality'.

We have finally reduced the definite concept of morality to the idea of freedom. We could not prove freedom to be real in ourselves and in human nature. We only saw that we must presuppose it if you think of a being as rational and conscious of his causality with respect to actions, that is, as endowed with a will, and so we ascribe it on the very same grounds we must ascribe to each being endowed with reason and will the property of determining himself to actions with the idea of freedom.

Well, you see here that Kant indicates here that he has not really made a deduction, but he has only shown the necessity of presupposing freedom. And as he says in the immediate sequel, from this presupposition of those ideas, ie, the ideas of morality, there follows also the consciousness of a law regarding action. Can you read the immediate sequel.

That subjective principles of action, i.e., maxims, in every instance must be so chosen that they can hold also as objective, i.e., universal, principles and thus can serve as principles for the universal laws we give. Why should I subject myself as a rational being, and therewith all other beings endowed with reason, to this law?

Kant again repeats the question: why should I be moral? We are still, as far as the crucial question goes, where we were before. Skip the rest of it and read the next paragraph.

It therefore seems that the moral law, i.e., the principle of the autonomy of the will, is properly speaking only presupposed in the idea of freedom, as if we could not prove its reality and objective necessity by itself. Even if that were so we would have still gained something because we would have at least defined the genuine principle more accurately than had been done before. But with regard to its validity and the practical necessity means of course moral necessity. But with regard to its validity and the practical necessity we would not have advanced a single step, for we could give no satisfactory answer to anyone who asked us why the universal validity of our maxim, as of the law, had to be the restricting condition of our action. We could only tell on what it is based, the base with which we ascribe worth to actions of this kind, a worth so great that there can be no higher interest, nor could we tell how it happens that a man believes that it is only through this that he feels his own personal worth, in contrast to the . . .

Again, this shows the deduction, if a deduction is to be made, has not made any progress.

Now, let us skip the next paragraph and turn to where he speaks of the circle.

We must openly confess that there is a kind of circle here from which it seems there is no escape. We assume that we are . . . in-audible . . . so that we can conceive of ourselves as subject to

moral laws in the order of events and then we think of ourselves as subject to these laws because we have ascribed freedom of the will to ourselves. This is circular because freedom and self-legislation of the will are both autonomy and thus are reciprocal concepts. For that reason one of them cannot be used to explain the other and to furnish a ground for it. At most they can be used as logical principles bringing entirely different conceptions to the same object under a single concept, as we reduce different fractions of the same value to the lowest common terms.

Yes. And seven paragraphs later - we don't read that now - prior to this new heading: 'How is the Categorical Imperative Possible', Kant says, 'the suspicion that there was a secret circle in our conclusions from freedom to autonomy and from autonomy to the moral law has now been disposed of. There is in fact no circle'. Now, how then does Kant achieve this? Let us try to understand - Kant seems to have said here, and that is true in a way, a deduction of the moral law is not possible. We can only understand the implications of the moral law or the presuppositions of the moral law, and yet the concern with the deduction is here. How can such a deduction of the moral law be made? Now, in the intervening section Kant introduces the distinction between phenomena and things-in-themselves. This distinction is in a way the deduction of the categorical imperative. We must try to understand that.

What does this distinction mean? The phenomenal world is the sensible world, the world of experience, which is of course not merely the world of bodies but also the world of our mind to the extent to which our mind is an object of observation and experience. Not only the external world but the internal world of the consciousness is also phenomenal. But Kant says by realizing the phenomenal character of the everything we know we realize at the same time there must be things-in-themselves as the unknowable ground of the phenomenal. And the second point which he makes is that this world of the things-in-themselves must be purely intellectual, in no way sensible, and it must be a world of pure activity. Those of you who have any remembrance of Leibnitz would legitimately think of Leibnitz' notion that reality consists of monads, of active, perceptive beings, and whereas the spatial-temporal world of which we are aware is only a phenomenon based on these true things-in-themselves, the monads. But of course that is of some help to think of it but since Kant does not accept Leibnitz' doctrine we really cannot understand that.

We understand Kant's argument if we perhaps start - let me see. In this section, Of the Interest which belongs to the Ideas of Morality, from the beginning, the ninth paragraph, on page 452, the paragraph beginning, 'man finds in himself truly a faculty by which he distinguished himself from all other things even from himself'. But let us wait before we begin with it, in order that you understand the significance of this argument.

With what right does Kant make the distinction between the phenomenal world and the thing-in-itself? With what right does Kant ascribe to the things-in-themselves a pure activity which he denies to the phenomenal world? Now let us first try to understand what he means by denying to the phenomenal things, the things we observe, what he means by denying them activity. Are not all things we see active? What would Kant's objection be?

(They are rather passive.)

In other words, they are pushed. They are pushed. And every pushing thing is pushed by something else. There is no true activity. Good. Now, let us see how Kant discovers the necessity of assuming something fundamentally active. Let us read this paragraph.

(Page 106.)

Now, man really finds in himself the faculty by which he distinguishes himself from all other things even from himself insofar as he is affected by objects.)

Insofar as he is affected by objects he is no different from any other being. They impinge on us as they impinge on a stone and we react to them as a stone reacts. The stimulus-response psychology is the present day version of what Kant means. In other words, that human reactions as responses to stimuli are not fundamentally different from the reaction of a billiard ball to your touching on it. But, still, we find something in man which is not in its nature passive and that is reason.

This faculty is reason. As a pure, spontaneous activity it is even elevated above understanding, for, although the latter is also spontaneous understanding, it is, like sense, merely contains perceptions which arise only when one is affected by them, as being passive, nevertheless cannot produce by its activity any other concepts than those which serve to bring the sensuous conceptions under rules and thereby unite them into one concept. Without this use of sensibility it would not think at all, while on the other hand reason shows such a pure spontaneity in the case of ideas that it far transcends everything sensibility can give to consciousness and shows its chief occupation in distinguishing the world of sense from the world of understanding, thereby prescribing limits to the understanding itself.

In other words, the deduction of the categorical imperative, or morality, to the extent to which it is possible and necessary at all takes this form: we take our knowledge of the world, let me say, scientific or pre-scientific, and then we see that this knowledge presupposes a spontaneity of the understanding. That is again the matter of common knowledge in a somewhat different way today. Today they speak of logical constructs, what you have given as a passive thing, as a mere sense data. But when we speak of knowledge on any level we do not mean the mere sense data; that is not knowledge. We cannot communicate this to anyone. In order to have knowledge you need words but that means also something like constructs. Or let us use a term now so familiar, logical constructs. As the term construct indicates, that presupposes an activity of the mind, a spontaneity of the mind. The spontaneity is the condition of any possible knowledge, of any possible experience. For this reason it cannot be understood as derivative from experience. A psychological explanation of our making logical constructs is impossible because every psychological explanation presupposes already the construct. Every psychology of empirical knowledge makes use of those fundamental constructs which are underlying all human thought. For example, cause and effect, and all other concepts of this kind. Therefore the world of passivity, of stimuli and responses, because the stimuli themselves are, you can say, responses to some previous action on the stimulating thing - this whole world of passivity, of experience, of stimuli

and responses, is grounded on the spontaneity of the human understanding.

Now, this spontaneity of the human understanding is affected only in making possible experience. These logical constructs are completely empty if they are not filled with sensible content. That is what Kant means by the understanding. But Kant says that if we analyze the mind more radically we see that man possesses a faculty called reason, as distinguished from the understanding, which does not have this dependence on being filled with sense experience as the understanding does. The pure spontaneity we find in the reason rather than in the understanding.

Now, if someone says, where do we find that pure spontaneity of reason, Kant gives him an answer. If you read again this last sentence of this paragraph which we have read.

On the other hand, reason shows such a pure spontaneity in the case of ideas . . .

'under the name of ideas', Kant says.

. . . in the name of ideas that it far transcends everything sensibility can give to consciousness and shows its chief occupation in distinguishing the world of sense from the world of understanding, thereby prescribing limits to the understanding itself.

Now, what is the name for this chief business of pure reason in which it distinguishes between the phenomenal and the non-phenomenal? Where do we find that? I mean, what is the name of that business, of that activity, or work?

(. . . inaudible response . . .)

No, no. We are not yet so far. Critique of pure reason. Well, again let us take an example from our present day experience. Let us take logical positivism. We have knowledge. That everyone admits, at least in science, perhaps not otherwise. All right. This is what we'll call first-order knowledge. But then it is necessary to reflect on science and to understand, for example, that atoms or some such thing of this kind, are logical constructs. Or a time-space continuum. It does not mean something like table. That is a fundamental concept which is necessary to organize sense data. Now this is what the positivists call second-order knowledge. I mean, that must be knowledge. It must have an object. And it is nevertheless fundamentally distinguished from first-order knowledge. It deals with the mind as understanding mind.

Let us now turn to Kant. The understanding of the understanding is not dependant as such on sense-perception. This understanding of the understanding is strictly speaking beyond the understanding proper, the work of pure reason. What Kant contends then is that an analysis of ordinary knowledge, scientific or pre-scientific, leads us to realize the essential character of knowledge, therewith also the limitations of such knowledge, and makes us see first of all the spontaneity of the understanding with its constructs in its prescribing nature its laws, and secondly that there is something which is higher than that understanding which alone can be active by applying itself to the organization of sense-data. That's pure reason.

So, theoretical knowledge, what Kant has been doing in the Critique of Pure Reason, establishes the fact of pure reason. And this is the basis for a possible deduction of the categorical imperative. Starting from the ordinary understanding of morality we have reached the conclusion, according to Kant, that morality means pure reason giving itself a law, pure reason in man giving itself a law to man. But how do we know that there is pure reason? That is established, according to Kant, by his strictly theoretical thinking in the Critique of Pure Reason. The critique of pure reason as a pre-moral theoretical activity shows that man is not merely a member of the world of sensible experience, because this reason is in man.

Now, let us turn to two passages of the Critique of Pure Reason. In the Transcendental Dialectic, the section on the cosmological ideas, third section of the Interest of Reason. Of the Interest of Reason in this Antinomy of Pure Reason. Now, towards the second-third of this section there is a short paragraph in which Kant says, 'this is the opposition of Epicureanism against Platonism', and there is a note there. I think it is really the first note in this paragraph. Will you read that note.

It is, however, a question open to whether Epicurus ever propounded these principles as objective assertions. If perhaps they were for him nothing more than maxims for the speculative employment of reason then he showed in this regard a more genuine philosophical spirit than any other of the philosophers of antiquity.

I must mention what this is about. Epicureanism means here the position or the attitude of the modern scientist, a strictly deterministic, atheistic, analysis of phenomena. Platonism means speculative metaphysics. That's the point. And Kant tries to solve this secular conflict, and in this connection writes this note.

That in explaining the appearances we must proceed as if the field of our enquiry were not circumscribed by any . . . several inaudible words . . . that we must assume the material that occurs in the world to be such as it must be if we are to learn about it from experience, that we must postulate . . . several inaudible words . . . deduction from events and one that will enable them to be regarded as determined . . . several inaudible words . . . and finally that no use must be made of any cause except in the world. All these principles still retain their value.

That means of course that no cause distinct from the world must be adduced, that no reference to God is possible. What does Kant say?

They are very sound principles, though seldom observed, for extending the scope of speculative philosophy . . .

Speculative however means here just science.

. . . while at the same time enabling us to discover the principles of morality without depending for this discovery on alien, i.e., non-moral theoretical sources.

Yes. Now, you see what Kant says here, that the proper understanding of

knowledge or science is the indispensable condition in order to discover the principles of morality. Well, Kant does not deny that man has an awareness of these principles of morality; he speaks of that all the time, but we are now concerned not with ordinary moral understanding but we are concerned with the philosophic understanding of moral understanding. Kant contends that this is not the - the beginning must be from an analysis of our theoretical knowledge, of our scientific knowledge. If we do not do this properly, in the way in which Kant claims to have done in the Critique of Pure Reason, we shall not be able to discover the principles of morality in a rational manner.

Now the other passage to which I want to refer is earlier, in the section on the paralogisms of pure reason, at the end of the first book of Transcendental Dialectic. There is a section called General Remark concerning the transition from rational psychology to cosmology. At the end of the section, the Paralogisms of Pure Reason.

Before we read a few passages from here I must make a remark about what Kant is speaking. Kant is discussing here rational psychology. That meant at that time the purely rational knowledge of the soul which was meant to establish the immortality of the soul. And Kant thinks here chiefly of Descartes. Descartes had claimed that he had discovered the first principle of all knowledge in the fact that I exist as a thinking being. Descartes had claimed that from this it follows that there is a thinking substance distinct from the corporeal or extended substance and that this knowledge of the thinking substance as a substance is the condition for proving the immortality of the soul. Kant rejects this argument. Kant says it is indeed so that any analysis of knowledge leads us to the 'I think' as the highest principle. There is a sentence somewhere in the Critique of Pure Reason, the 'I think' must be able to accompany all my thoughts. For example, if I surrender completely to a sense impression--that's green--a moment's reflection shows me that this implies that I see it. I think it. So, this 'I think' is accompanying - that is in a way the meaning of understanding. This makes possible the possible unification of impressions that it is the same thinking Ego which has a variety of impressions. And the Critique of Pure Reason tries to develop this in all details. Kant contends that this fact, that the 'I think' is implied in every perception means no more than what we call a logical function. No conclusion can be drawn from that as to the soul being a substance. What we know of the soul, or of the consciousness is as phenomenal in its character as what we know of bodies. This is the context in which Kant makes this remark.

In other words, our knowledge of the ego cogito, of the 'I think', does not give us any substantive knowledge beyond the world of experience. It has no other purpose, and that is in itself an important purpose, except to make us understand better what empirical understanding means. It does not lead us into a transcendent world.

Now, let us read the fourth paragraph.

Should it be granted that it remains for us to discover not in experience but in certain laws of the pure employment of reason the laws which are not merely logical rules but which wholly a priori concern our existence, the ground for regarding ourselves as legislating completely a priori in regard to our own existence, and as

determining this existence. There would thereby be revealed a spontaneity through which our reality could be determinable, independently of the conditions of empirical intuition.

What Kant means is that the moral law dictates to you in such and such a manner without any reference to conditions of empirical intuition.

And we should also become aware that in the consciousness of our existence there is contained a something a priori which can serve to determine our existence, the complete determination of which is possible only in sensible terms as being related yet . . . insensible word . . . certain inner faculty to a non-sensible, intelligible world. But this would not be of real service in furthering the attempts of rational psychology . . .

Meaning of a speculative metaphysics of the immortal soul.

In this marvelous faculty, which consciousness of the moral law first reveals to me, I should indeed have for the determination of my existence a principle which is purely intellectual . . .

And so on. But nothing would follow for speculative metaphysics. What I'm driving at is only this, and that is the reason why I referred to these two passages of the Critique of Pure Reason: that in an important sense the purely theoretical, purely amoral, analysis of the human understanding given in the Critique of Pure Reason supplies us with the only possible deduction of the moral law. It is not sufficient, but that we will see later, but it is nevertheless of the greatest importance. If Kant proves, as it were, or claims to have proven, that any empirical morality, any morality based on the principle of happiness, however understood, cannot be valid because of the fundamentally phenomenal character of all empirical knowledge. This is of course today admitted, the so-called value-free social science is in this respect building on the Kantian foundation. For example, if these people are not utilitarians, or modified utilitarians, which they otherwise would surely be, they owe this to the fact that they have learned something from Kant.

Now, how could we restate Kant's argument to make it intelligible on the basis of the present day discussion, which is not necessarily a higher level but is more easily intelligible to us? Well, I have referred to this more than once, perhaps not in this course. Now if you take the present day view, the positivistic view, the only worthwhile knowledge is scientific knowledge, and values of course can be described, they are simply expressions of our emotions, but they have no truth character, they cannot have any truth character. You know this position by now, if not from other sources at least from what I say. How would the argument of Kant or of someone who would remember Kant today run? There arise certain questions regarding science, and crucial questions, which science is completely unable to answer, and not only science, but the so-called scientific philosophy of positivism going with it also cannot answer, and that is the question of the goodness of science. If all value-judgments are merely expressions of emotions, have no truth character whatever, the question of the goodness of science cannot be rationally answered. To mention only one very crude but characteristic formula, science, a predictive science, is necessary for man for the sake of survival. That's one. It is

follows: if I disregard the moral law, if I take the work of experience as we live well, we pursue happiness. That means for Kant that we follow pleasure of pain and their modifications. Sure, that is clear. But then what can theoretical reason tell us? How can theoretical reason make us realize that there is something fundamentally wrong with the mere pursuit of happiness? Kant argues as follows: the purely theoretical reason of our ordinary and scientific understanding makes us realize that there is such a thing in man called reason, pure reason, which as such being the ground of any meaning is beyond the world or experience. Therefore, by disregarding this pure reason and abandoning himself to the pursuit of happiness man forgets himself, his true self. This thesis could be said to follow from the Critique of Pure Reason, as, to repeat: as a purely amoral theoretical reason. That I think is the utmost one can say in order to understand what Kant could have meant by a deduction of morality from something else. Something else cannot be morality as morality. And that also fits with the remark we read earlier, that we must deduce morality not from the essence of man but from the essence of a rational being as a rational being. To repeat: to understand reason in its foundational character means to be at least on one's way towards overcoming the dimension in which happiness is the sole consideration. Happiness manifestly belonging, in the Kantian understanding, to the phenomenal world.

But these things would need a much more detailed and sustained discussion than we are capable of here. I only repeat this main point which we must keep in mind. What Kant is groping with in this last section of the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, as well as in some other passages, is this problem. Kant is really trying, at some part of his argument, to deduce morality, to deduce morality, and the only form in which this can be done from Kant's point of view is the critique of pure reason which makes us discover pure reason and therewith pure reason as the fundamental phenomenon and therefore the character which human actions as human actions ought to have. A man must not forget himself, his true self, which he would if he is not guided by pure reason.

Now, let us first read the last paragraph. There may be some more points. On page 454, where Kant refers to an empirical example. Mr. ___ (student who read paper earlier) made some good observations on this point.

(Page 109.)

The practical use of common sense confirms the correctness of this deduction. When we present examples of honesty, courage, and steadfastness in the following good maxims, and a sympathy and general benevolence, even at the great sacrifice of advantage and comfort, there is no man, not even the most malicious villain, provided he is otherwise accustomed to using his reason, who does not wish that he also might have those qualities, but because of his inclinations and impulses he cannot bring this about. Yet at the same time he wishes to be free from such inclinations. . . . several inaudible words . . . with the will free from all impulses of sensibility. He in thought transfers himself into an order of things altogether different from that of his desires in the field of sensibility. Do not expect to obtain by that wish any gratification of desires, nor any conditions which satisfy his real or even imagined inclinations, for the idea itself which elicits this wish from him could lose its pre-eminence if he has any such expectations.

Now, what do you say to this proposition? This is a proposition which is in a way an empirical illustration of the reality of morality in man as man. Mr. ___ (student who read paper earlier) regarded it as possible that there may be villains so malicious as not to have that desire at all. But Kant makes here a qualification, provided only he is otherwise accustomed to use reason. Say, a homicidal maniac is obviously not meant here. I mean, he doesn't use reason at all. What about Cesare Borgia? He used his reason. I mean, he was a very shrewd planner - I take Machiavelli's Cesare Borgia. I don't know the difference between him and the historical Cesare Borgia - he was certainly a very nasty customer. Could one make an assumption that Borgia from his misdeeds, that he had murdered his brother-in-law, his brother, and quite a few other people of course, and committed all kinds of - can one safely assume that? I think that is a great difficulty.

Well, I read to you a passage from another writing of Kant's about six or seven years later, where he speaks of the proposition that the pangs of conscience bother the vicious man more than any furies already in this life. Kant says, in this judgment there is obviously an error for the virtuous man loans to the vicious man his character, namely, conscientiousness in all its strength. Of course it was wrong to presuppose in the case of the vicious man. Where this moral way of thinking and the conscientiousness doesn't exist, there also the conscience as punishing and laughs about the timidity of the square who worries himself with self-reproval, but if he reproaches himself from time to time they are of no great importance and can easily be overcome by pleasures of the senses in which alone he finds reality. . . .

(change of tape)

That I thought I should mention lest Kant be regarded as more naive than he was. Now, the conclusion of this section, towards the end of this section, Kant states clearly that there is no possibility of deducing from morality from the intellectual or noumenal world of the things-in-themselves. Now, that is clear. Why? What Kant had said before in this long discussion, which we cannot read here, - well, that complicates the book very much and I must see. There is this complication which I have not yet discussed and which I can barely more than mention. We have the world of experience, which of course should not be presented in this way, because it has its own . . . inaudible word . . . , but it is limited, it has its limits, the world as it appears. Now, this world creates another great difficulty for morality, a decisive difficulty, because in the world of experience there is nothing but strict determination. Freedom is impossible. Freedom is impossible here, and the only way of proving that freedom is possible is to show that this whole phenomenal world is only phenomenal and that there is a world radically different from the phenomenal world. However, we must think of ourselves as members of the noumenal world in order to understand ourselves as moral beings. But we do not know, we must assume, we must presuppose, this noumenal world. We do not know it. Therefore a deduction of the categorical imperative is impossible.

Differently stated, and correcting a statement which I made earlier: it is indeed true to begin with that the moral law must not be deduced from the essence of man, but from the essence of a rational being. Kant says towards the end, in different words, we have no knowledge of ourselves as rational beings except to the extent to which this rationality shows itself in the act of reason, like founding science and supplying us with a moral law. Therefore, the moral law cannot be deduced from anything.

The great ambiguity which goes through this section can perhaps be stated as follows: one can easily present it in the form of a simple contradiction, but one must then try to understand how a man like Kant can make such a contradiction. It is necessary to deduce morality. That is said very clearly throughout the book. But Kant also says, it is impossible to deduce morality. What is behind this difficulty? It is impossible to deduce the moral law fundamentally because the moral law is the only unconditioned, the only absolute, of which we know. In all other cases, for example, in all other principles of reason, we do not have this unconditioned character. The moral law is the principle, the principle, of all understanding you can say. Although that goes much beyond Kant. The principle. But obviously that cannot be maintained. The moral law is conditioned. It cannot be the principle. The first ground of any human orientation, the moral law, cannot be the first cause. Therefore, the difficulty. I think this difficulty is not limited to Kant. You can find similar things in other modern philosophers.

I will illustrate this a bit by the following remark: morality, Kant says, presupposes freedom. But how is freedom possible, in a world which is ruled by the iron law of cause and effect? It is not possible in that world. So we must make a distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds. But what do we imply in making that distinction? We try to answer the question, how must we behave so that there can be morality. What are the conditions, the cosmic conditions, of self-legislation. These cosmic conditions may not be fulfilled in the phenomenal world, but still they are conditions. The un-

conditioned categorical imperative does have conditions. Morality cannot be simply the principle. Or, to introduce a term used by Kant, we cannot escape some form of tutelage. In Suarez' books on the laws - Suarez was the codifier, you can say, of Thomistic philosophy in the early seventeenth century - in Suarez' book on the laws, Book I, Chapter 3, at the beginning, he says, 'Absolute necessity, according to which something is said to be by itself and because of itself necessary, cannot belong to law as law, because such a necessity is proper only to God. But the law is either something created or else it presupposes some creature for the sake of which it is given. Since rational creatures, men, are not absolutely necessary, there could not be men, the law cannot be absolutely necessary. The law is necessary if we suppose the creation of the rational creature, and then it is necessary so that such a being can live in accordance with its nature.' What Kant is trying to do is to assert the necessity of the moral law as an absolute necessity, so that the moral law is in fact taking the place of God in traditional theology.

There are many other difficulties coming up here in connection with this principle in this last section. I have to mention only two great problems. The one was already mentioned on an earlier occasion: how is a bad will, an immoral will, possible from Kant's point of view, if the will is identical with practical reason? If the will is identical with practical reason, it follows that there cannot be a bad will. The bad will can be understood simply if one assumes that there is a libertas indifferentiae, as it was called, a freedom of indifference, that man is free to choose the good and the evil. And if this is the essence of the will, to be free in this way. But this is rejected by Kant. Freedom means for Kant, in the positive sense of the word, autonomy, self-legislation, subjecting oneself by deed to that law.

(I really wonder if that is necessarily a problem for Kant. When you don't act in accordance with practical reason then you simply fall under the sway of the passions, so that evil is not a bad will at all.)

Yes, but the question is that from any moral point of view it is necessary to admit in one way or another a bad will, that a choice of a life of desire, in this narrow sense, as distinguished from a life of the will, is the bad will. But Kant has no clear possibility of giving an account of that. That is a very complicated thing in Kant. The only thematic discussion of the bad will you find in his book on religion, Religion Within the Limits of Pure Reason, where he makes considerable use of traditional Christian notions, but which do not quite however with his other philosophy. That is one of the points.

The other point, the other difficulty, is also rather obvious. Assuming this dualism of the noumenal and sensible worlds, our actions take place in the sensible world. Obviously. As far as our life is concerned there is only this world. You must therefore, if you are confronted with any human action, you can and must understand it in two contradictory ways, as a free responsible action of the man who does it, good or bad, and as a perfectly determined action. A terrible difficulty.

(With regard to the necessity of the will being good, it seems to me that Kant implies that the will is always good in a sense, it is always giving universal law but that it is weak or fragile. He seems to imply the fragility of the will.)

Yes.

(The fragility of the will comes into operation where the will comes into collision with the sensual phenomena, and this is where the choice takes place. It would then be necessary for there to be a possibility of a good will shifting itself, for it would continue to give the law because that is its nature, but yet would fall down somehow in bringing this will into effect in connection with the phenomena.)

Yes, but the question is simply whether from such a strict moral point of view as Kant is anxious to assert you can reduce the badness of the will to mere fragility. That is a great difficulty. It is true that Kant denies in one sense the bad will proper. He denies that it is possible for a man to rebel against the moral law as moral law. That is true. That he calls a diabolical will and thinks it is impossible in man. But the question is whether the bad will is not more than a merely fragile will. Take someone who is forbidden to drink alcohol. I know this from a German presentation which some of you will know, Eush von Helena(?). A woman who is forbidden to drink and she prays to God to give her strength. While she is on her knees she moves towards the bottle. That is a simple example of a merely fragile will. But whether you can understand the actions of really evil people, for example, Hitler, in terms of a merely fragile will can be doubted.

(Wouldn't it be possible to say from Kant's point of view that the surrender of the will to the phenomenal world is a truly horrible thing?)

Yes, that is the evil will, but that would presuppose a liberty of indifference, that man is free to turn to the world of morality or to be and remain submerged in the world of desire and mere concern with happiness without any moral regard. But Kant denies that. And that is a very difficult question. It must have something to do with what we discussed at the beginning of this course, the uniformity. You know, there is a uniformity in the world of morality, the moral uniformity of the good will. There is a uniformity of passion, let me say, or desire, in the phenomenal world. But if there is a liberty of indifference that means of course essentially non-uniformity, because no one's choice can be predicted in any way. That is really in a way essentially a sphere of chaos. You know. And I think the mere usage of Kant, the identification of will and practical reason, which is so necessary for him to make, shows that there cannot be a bad will proper. And there is sufficient evidence in his writings, especially in this late writing about religion, that this is so.

(Couldn't we say that what is not free is in some sense that he must continue to will the universal law but he is free to reject what he wills?)

Yes. That's the bad will. Sure. But how do you account for this leeway, for the fact that man has this latitude?

(This is the realm of freedom . . .)

Yes, but which would mean I think a liberty of indifference, that the will as such is neither good or bad but becomes good or bad by his choice. That is traditionally called the liberty of indifference. And Kant rejects that.

(Well, Kant says that the realm of freedom must be bound by law, but he says we can't penetrate into the nature of those laws. We must simply leave it at saying that they are laws of freedom. So, perhaps within the laws of freedom into which we cannot penetrate . . .)

The laws of freedom are for Kant simply the moral laws. There are no other laws of freedom. But that there is a mystery of freedom Kant admits. The laws of freedom are the moral laws. Only your expression is not quite correct. I can only say this difficulty is really not - while it is obviously present in Kant it is never solved by him. That would need a much broader analysis than we can give now.

(I do not quite understand why Kant says practical reason is identical with the good will.)

Because there cannot be any objects of the moral will. Well, that is very easy to understand. I will try to explain that.

(It confuses me because practical has this sensual . . .)

No, no. Practical reason means, as used here, the same as the moral reason. It comes from the meaning of the Greek word, praxis, where praxis is distinct action as distinguished from poesis, from any production of anything. For example, if you open a tin box or drive a car that is not an action proper. An action proper is morally either good or bad. If you do anything which is meant to have an effect and does not possess its value in itself that is not an action strictly speaking.

In the traditional teaching, a moral action means to choose the right thing in the right spirit. That you choose it in the right spirit that is the proper quality of your will, good will. But it must also be the right thing. For example, if you do the wrong thing in the right spirit, for example, if you steal in order to help the poor, you still act immorally. The goodness of the will in this sense is not sufficient to make the action good. You must also have the right object. Then that would be the function of practical reason, to establish the right thing, and of the will to choose it for its own sake. Kant says it is impossible to determine the right thing by practical reason, in the old sense of the term, because this would mean that there are certain presupposed ends which are intrinsically good. We have to discuss quite a bit. I do not know any examples right now. Kant's point is this: any end, even the end of helping other people, for example, what we all ordinarily regard as a good end, cannot be in itself good. What Kant means by the formal character of the moral law means that no end can be known to be good prior to the moral law itself. The formalism means that only the how of the will and not the what is morally important. And Kant contends that this mere how of the will is sufficient for establishing all possible legitimate whats. We have discussed this last time. You know, the examples where Kant tried to show, for example, that human society is not possible if promises are not, as it were, an institution of society. That would be a consideration of ends. Here you would have a reasoning, practical reasoning, looking at society as an end and you see promises are indispensable if people are to live together, and if that is so then promises must not fraudulently be made, because that would be destructive of the very institution of promises. But Kant deduces, you remember,

by the mere fact that you cannot successfully universalize the maxim, I want to make fraudulent promises - this mere fact, that maxims of this kind cannot be successfully universalized, is sufficient, is necessary and sufficient, for determining the moral or immoral character of the maxim. And therefore Kant does not need and cannot use a practical reason different from the good will. No apprehension of goods proceeds and can precede the good will, according to Kant. And therefore the impeccability, as it were, of practical reason as practical reason migrates into the will and makes it into a good will.

But we must now come to a conclusion. The conclusion must certainly be that we have not exhausted in any way the text of Kant, but we have become perhaps aware of certain important considerations which one must keep in mind if one wants to understand Kant. And I believe that the beginning of the analysis which I suggested, namely, to start from the modern natural right, especially in its Rousseauian version, as the starting point of Kant's whole understanding of morality, is the most helpful I know. Is there any point which you would like to bring up, which is so burning it cannot be postponed? We have ended this quarter.

(end of lecture)